Competence creep via the duty of loyalty? : article 4 (3) TEU and its changing role in EU external relations by REUTER, Kristin
  
Competence Creep via the Duty of Loyalty? 
Article 4 (3) TEU and its Changing Role in EU 
External Relations 
Kristin Reuter 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining 
the degree of Doctor of Laws of the European University Institute 
Florence, May 2013  

 
European University Institute 
Department of Law 
Competence Creep via the Duty of Loyalty? 
Article 4 (3) TEU and its Changing Role in EU 
External Relations 
 
Kristin Reuter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining 
the degree of Doctor of Laws of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Professor Marise Cremona, European University Institute (Supervisor) 
Professor Bruno De Witte, European University Institute 
Professor Sara Poli, Università di Pisa 
Dr Anne Thies, University of Reading 
© Kristin Reuter, 2013 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
 
 
Abstract 
With  the  growing  awareness  in  EU  external  relations  that  the  existence of  Member  States' 
competence does not necessarily allow them to freely exercise such competence, the duty of sincere 
cooperation laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU is increasingly becoming the focus of academic attention. 
In light of the vast potential of the duty to encroach on Member State prerogatives, in combination 
with a number of striking developments in the Court's case law in the field of external relations,  
particularly in recent years, the question arises whether Article 4 (3) TEU is slowly turning into an 
instrument  for  the  Union  institutions  to  achieve  a  loss  of  national  competence,  disguised  as 
restrictions on the Member States' freedom to exercise their powers. This thesis investigates which 
role  Article  4 (3) TEU has  really played in  governing the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States in external relations. It sets out to answer the positive question of which concept of 
federalism  dominates  the  exercise  of  external  powers.  Building  on  this  foundation,  the  thesis 
ultimately  endeavours  to  provide  an  answer  to  the  normative  question  regarding  the  vision  of 
federalism best suited to the needs  of  both the Member States  and the EU when acting on the 
international scene. In order to answer these questions, the thesis seeks to transpose Halberstam's 
theory of the political morality in federal systems to the field of EU external relations. Looking at the 
interpretation given to Article 4 (3) TEU, both in its detailed reasoning and as part of a broader picture, 
may then allow us to appreciate the construction of the loyalty obligation as the reasoned outcome of a 
constitutional  process  involving  the  EU institutions,  the  Court  of  Justice  and the  Member  States 
themselves.  It will be argued that instead of pursuing political harmony between the Member States 
and the Union by way of creeping competence, Article 4 (3) TEU emphasises cooperation, compliance 
and complementarity in areas where the rigid division of competence would otherwise render the 
system of external relations ineffective. 
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Introductory Chapter
The Duty of Loyalty – Competence Creep or a Liberal Vision of Federalism? 
I. Introduction: Emphasising the limits to EU powers 
Contemporary constitutionalism in Europe reflects a political desire to emphasise more strongly the 
boundaries  to  EU  powers  and  to  demarcate  Union  from  national  activity.  With  a  view  to 
“develop[ing] the Union into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world”1, a key 
issue identified in constitutional discourse has been how to ensure a “better division and definition of 
competence” in the EU2. Starting with the 2001 Laeken Declaration3, increasing emphasis has been 
placed  on  confining  the  Union  to  an  agenda  which  can  be  reliably  identified  in  advance, 
characterised by a clarification of the delimitation of competences between the EU and the Member 
States,  a  focus  on the retention  of  Member State  powers,  and the strengthening of  mechanisms 
designed to ensure a controlled exercise of competence. 
In order to dispel national fears of a “European superstate or European institutions inveigling their 
way into every nook and cranny of life”4, the Laeken Declaration set out to simplify the division of 
competences between the Union and the Member States and to make it more transparent. To that 
end, it not only identified the need for a clearer distinction between the different types of competence 
as well as an efficient exercise of competence, but it also raised the question of how to ensure that a 
redefined division of competence did not lead to a “creeping expansion of the competence of the 
Union”5. 
The Treaty of Lisbon took up these impulses by stressing more clearly that the Member States are 
the source of the powers conferred on the Union6. It emphasises the principle of conferral, according 
to which the Union may act only within the limits of the powers expressly transferred on it by the 
1 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, European Council, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, 
14 and 15 December 2001, para II.
2 Ibid.
3 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, European Council, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, 
14 and 15 December 2001.
4 Ibid., para I. 
5 Ibid., para II.
6 Article 1 (1) TEU reads: “By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union 
[…] on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common”.
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Member States7. In addition to being mentioned in several Treaty articles8, the principle of conferral 
is highlighted in Declaration 24 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty,  which states that the EU's newly 
acquired legal personality “will not in any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the 
competences conferred upon it”. 
Alongside the exclusive effect of the principle of conferral, the Lisbon Treaty underlines the positive 
aspect of conferred powers manifested in the retention of Member State powers, which is especially 
evident  in  the  field of  external  relations9.  The Treaty expressly confirms that  “competences  not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”10. With regard to external 
competences, in particular, several Declarations ensure the Member States' continuing right to act in 
the fields of CFSP and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and police cooperation11. 
The  increased  emphasis  on  conferred  competences  has  been  accompanied  by  a  procedural 
reinforcement of the principle of subsidiarity laid down in Article 5 (3) TEU, which provides that the 
EU may take action only where an objective can be better achieved at Union than at Member State  
level.  Indeed,  the  Lisbon  Treaty12 aimed  to  strengthen  the  principle  by  empowering  national 
parliaments to scrutinise legislative proposals and act as “watchdogs of subsidiarity”13. 
II. Framework for Analysis: The scope of EU competence vs. the scope of EU law
These initiatives aimed at strengthening the position of the Member States towards the EU reflect a 
long-standing national sensitivity to the implications of ever-expanding Union powers. To take a 
prominent  and  relatively  recent  example,  the  German  Federal  Constitutional  Court  (BVerfG) 
famously emphasised the limits to European integration in its 2009 judgment on the compatibility of 
7 According to Article 5 (2) TEU, “[u]nder the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the  
competences  conferred  upon  it  by  the  Member  States  in  the  Treaties  to  attain  the  objectives  set  out  therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.”
8 Articles 1, 4 (1) and 5 TEU, Article 7 TFEU, see further M. Cremona, “Coherence through Law: What Difference 
Will the Treaty of Lisbon Make?” (2008) 3 Hamburg Review of Social Sciences 11 at 28.
9 See M. Cremona, “Coherence through Law: What Difference Will the Treaty of Lisbon Make?”, 29.
10 Declaration 18 in relation to the delimitation of competences. 
11 Declarations 13 and 14 regarding CFSP and Declaration 36; see further, M. Cremona, “Coherence through Law: 
What Difference Will the Treaty of Lisbon Make?”, 29.
12 See the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, OJ C 306/150 (17 Dec. 2007). 
13 I.  Cooper, “The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU” (2006) 44 
Journal of Common Market Studies 281 at 288. For a critical assessment of the new role of the national parliaments, 
see e.g.  J.-V. Louis, “The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish ‘No’.  National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity – 
Legal Options and Practical Limits” (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 429, R. Schütze, “Subsidiarity 
After Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?” (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 525.
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the Treaty of Lisbon with the German Basic Law14. The BVerfG had already in the past earned a 
“reputation  as  a  concerned observer  of  the tendency of  the EU to play fast  and loose with the 
constitutionally  fundamental  principle  of  conferral”15.  Unsurprisingly  then,  a  central  part  of  the 
Lisbon judgment  was  devoted  to  the  importance  of  the  principal  of  conferral  and  the  Union's 
obligation to respect the constitutional and political identity of the Member States. The BVerfG even 
linked  the  principle  of  conferral  with  the  protection  of  national  sovereignty16.  Due  to  their 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it held, the Member States remained in a position to decide which powers to 
transfer to the Union, instead of the Union deciding which powers to take away from the Member 
States. From this position of “Masters of the Treaties”17, it followed not only that conferred powers 
must be exercised within the framework of the Treaties, but also that the position of the Member  
States may not be eroded through the interpretation of primary law18. 
This kind of liberal interpretation of the legal basis provisions by the EU institutions criticised by the 
BVerfG has long been recognised to lead to a creeping expansion of Union competences19.  The 
phenomenon  known  as  “competence  creep”  generally  refers  to  the  scope  of  legislative  powers 
transferred  to  the  EU by the  Member  States20.  However,  other  restraints,  which  go beyond  the 
existence of  powers and impact on the Member States'  freedom to  exercise existing powers, are 
increasingly perceived as competence creep as well21. This type of creeping competence “occurs as 
soon as the […] Member State action can be situated within the scope of the Treaty or EU law”22. In 
these cases, “various limits imposed by EU law have to be observed, even if the subject matter at 
issue falls outside the scope of EU competence to act and the Member States are in principle free to 
regulate on the matter”23.
In EU external relations, in particular, the noticeable divergence between the existence of Member 
14 German Federal Constitutional Court,  Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al.  An English  version has been 
published by the Court.
15 S. Weatherill, “The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Case 
Law has become a “Drafting Guide” (2001) 12 German Law Journal 827 at 856.
16 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 233.
17 Ibid., para 235.
18 Ibid., para 238. 
19 See e.g.  S.  Weatherill,  “Competence and Legitimacy”,  in C. Barnard and O.  Odudu (eds.),  The Outer Limits of  
European Union Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 17, with further references. 
20 See M. Pollack, “Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community” (1994) 14 Journal of 
Public Policy 95.
21 See S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law” (2010) 3 Review of European Administrative 
Law 5, see also S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU 
Law'”, in L. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. Prechal (eds.),  The Eclipse of Legality (Kluwer Law International 2011) 
213.
22 S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU Law'”, 215.
23 Ibid.
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State  competence  and  their  freedom  to  exercise  such  competence  has  been  receiving  growing 
attention in the legal literature in recent years24. In this respect, the duty of sincere cooperation laid 
down in Article 4 (3) TEU plays a central role, giving rise to a number of different obligations that  
operate to restrain the Member States' freedom to act on the international scene. 
A. Member State sovereignty and the principle of conferred powers 
The relationship between the EU and its Member States has always been considered “a complex 
one”25. The Court of Justice attempted to shed some light on the issue by declaring that the Treaties  
“established a new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, 
in ever wider fields”26. But although the constitutional order of the Union has significantly modified 
the Member States' national systems of checks and balances, it “still preserves the unique character 
of the Union as a polity having sovereign States as its component political entities”27. It is hence 
“obvious that the Union cannot be seen as a (federal) state and that its member states have not given 
up their treaty-making competence”28.    
Statehood and treaty-making competence are, in fact, the defining factors of national sovereignty in 
the view of the Member States, at least if we take the German Constitutional Court to represent the 
common position  of  all  Member  States29.  In  its  above-mentioned  Lisbon  judgment,  the  BVerfG 
24 See e.g. J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law: Towards a 
Framework for Analysis”, in E. Cannizaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer 
2002)  151  at  151,  S.  Weatherill,  “Beyond  Pre-emption?  Shared  Competence  and  Constitutional  Change  in  the 
European Community”, in D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey, Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty  (Chancery Law 1994) 
13 at 13; A. Dashwood, “The Limits of European Community Powers” (1996) 21 ELRev. 113 at 114; M. Cremona, 
“Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance”, in M. Cremona and B. de Witte 
(eds.),  EU Foreign Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2008) 125; J. Heliskoski,  Mixed agreements as a technique for  
organizing the international relations of the European Community and its member states  (Kluwer 2001) at  61; J. 
Heliskoski, “The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of 
Mixed Agreements” (2000) 69 NJIL 395 at 411; R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community:  
Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses (Kluwer 2008), Chapter 7; B. De Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the 
Nature of the Legal Order”, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999) 178 at 191, E. 
Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations” 
(2010) 47 CMLRev. 323, C. Hillion, “Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of the 'Duty of 
Cooperation'”,  in  C. Hillion and P.  Koutrakos (eds.),  Mixed Agreements Revisited – The European Union and its  
Member States in the World (Hart Publishing 2010) 87 at 87.
25 A. Dashwood, “The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/European Community” (2004) 
41 CMLRev. 355 at 356.
26 Opinion 1/91 re: Draft EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6079, para 21.
27 A. Dashwood, “The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/European Community”, 355.
28 R. Wessel,  “The Multilevel  Constitution of  European  Foreign  Relations”,  in  N.  Tsagourias  (ed.),  Transnational  
Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2007) 160 at 179.
29 For a critical assessment of the Constitutional Court's conception of sovereignty, see T. Lock, “Why the European 
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started  from the  premise  that  the  European  Union  was  designed  as  a  long-term association  of 
sovereign states to which a number of sovereign powers were transferred30. The authority to exercise 
these powers, however, came from the Member States, in their function as permanent “Masters of the 
Treaties”31.  A transfer of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz  to the Union, i.e.  the competence for the EU to 
decide on its own competence, was therefore prohibited by the Federal Constitution32. 
The protection of national sovereignty, in the form of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, is closely connected to 
the principle of conferral. Safeguarding the Member States' position as Masters of the Treaties, the 
principle  of  conferral  is  not  only a  principle  of  European  law,  but  also  “the  expression  of  the 
foundation  of  Union  authority  in  the  constitutional  law of  the  Member  States”33.  As  such,  the 
principle is “pivotal to the relationship between the Union and the Member States”34. One of the 
cornerstones  of the EU legal  order,  the principle  enshrined in  Article  5  TEU (ex Article  5  EC) 
foresees that “the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the 
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein”. This means that in order to be 
able to act, the EU institutions need a legal basis in the Treaty which sets forth both the vertical and 
horizontal division of competences.  The choice of such a legal basis is not at the discretion of the 
institutions themselves, but must be based on objective factors amenable to judicial review35. 
B. The division of competence as a safeguard of national sovereignty 
In theory, the principle of conferred powers should therefore represent a reliable safeguard against 
unwelcome inroads into Member State sovereignty. In practice, however, the notion of limited and 
attributed  powers  in  itself  reveals  nothing  about  the  legal  nature  of  these  powers  and  the 
consequences which they may have for the exercise of Member State competence. 
In addition to the principle of conferral,  a second safeguard against inroads into sovereign state 
Union is Not a  State – Some Critical  Remarks” (2009) 5 European Constitutional  Law Review 407 at  408; D.  
Doukas, “The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty: Not Guilty, but Don't Do it  
Again!”  (2009)  34  E.L.  Rev.  866  at  886;  R.  Bieber,  “An  Association  of  Sovereign  States”  (2009)  5  European 
Constitutional Law Review 391 at 399. 
30 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 229.
31 Ibid., para 231.
32 Ibid., para 233.
33 Ibid., para 234.
34 A. Dashwood, “The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/European Community”, 357.
35 See e.g. Case 45/86 Commission v. Council [1987] ECR 1493, para 11; Case C-440/05 Commission v. Council [1991] 
ECR I-2867, para 10. 
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authority consists in the rules on the distribution and delimitation of competences. In particular, the 
newly created catalogue of powers introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon plays a valuable role in this 
respect: 
“A protection  mechanism  with  a  formal  approach  is  the  categorisation  and  classification  of  the 
European Union’s  competences  according  to  exclusive  competences,  competences  shared  with  the 
Member States, and competences to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions 
of the Member States, carried out for the first time”36.
The codification of different categories of competences serves to provide transparency regarding the 
scope and the nature of the powers that have been transferred from the Member States to the Union37.
C. The division of competences in external relations 
In line with the Laeken mandate, the Lisbon Treaty sets out in Article 4 (1) TEU that “competences 
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”.  Conversely,  this 
means that if the EU wants to act externally, it needs to be determined whether a competence has 
been  conferred  on  it.  The  Lisbon Treaty  recognises  two ways  in  which  the  Union may obtain 
international  treaty-making  power.  In  addition  to  express competences  to  act  in  a  certain  field 
contained in  Treaty provisions,  Article  216 TFEU explicitly acknowledges  for the first  time the 
existence of implied powers for EU external action38. The provision thus codifies some of the Court's 
long-standing case law39 on the conditions under which a Union competence may arise in areas 
where no express power has been conferred. 
According to the first of the three bases for implied powers listed in Article 216 TFEU, an external  
EU competence exists  “where the conclusion of an agreement  is  necessary in order  to  achieve, 
within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties”. This 
condition, based on the  effet utile of EU law, codifies40 the Court's approach in Opinion 1/76 by 
36 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 302.
37 Ibid., para 303.
38 Article  216  (1)  TFEU  reads:  “The  Union  may  conclude  an  agreement  with  one  or  more  third  countries  or  
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in 
order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is 
provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope”.
39 See Chapter One for a discussion of this case law. 
40 It  has been argued that the Treaty of Lisbon actually goes further than the Court of Justice, in that it  appears to 
establish a wider basis for implied powers by loosening the link between internal objectives and external action. See 
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which the Union is authorised to act internationally where this is necessary to achieve a specific 
objective41.  The  second  condition  mentioned  in  Article  216  TFEU,  recognising  implied  Union 
powers where the conclusion of an agreement “is provided for in a legally binding Union act”, is 
derived from Opinion 1/94, in which the Court found that the adoption of an internal act based on an 
internal competence may give rise to a corresponding external EU competence42. The third condition 
provides for implied powers where the conclusion of an agreement “is likely to affect common rules 
or alter their scope”. The wording of this basis for implied powers reflects the AETR43 line of cases, 
in which the Court has developed the doctrine that the existence of a body of Union legislation in a  
given field gives rise to external Union powers in that field. 
Following the mandate of the Laeken Declaration to “make a clearer distinction between three types 
of competence: the exclusive competence of the Union, the competence of the Member States and 
the  shared  competence  of  the  Union  and  the  Member  States”44,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  recognises 
different  categories  of  competence  –  exclusive,  shared,  complementary  or  supporting,  and  a 
separately listed competence for CFSP. 
Where the Union enjoys exclusive powers, it alone is allowed to legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts, “the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empowered” 45. Aside from the 
express competences mentioned in Article 3 (1) TFEU, the Union is granted in Article 3 (2) TFEU an 
exclusive treaty-making power where the conclusion of an international agreement “is provided for 
in  a  legislative  act  of  the  Union  or  is  necessary  to  enable  the  Union  to  exercise  its  internal 
competence, or in so far as is conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope”. Although the 
provision  does  not  expressly refer  to  Article  216 TFEU,  its  wording  is  nearly  identical,  which 
suggests that Article 3 (2) TFEU is intended to codify the same case law as the former provision  
forming the basis of the existence of implied powers46.
J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty”, in  S. 
Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008) 
148  at  178; M.  Cremona,  “Defining  Competence  in  EU  External  Relations:  Lessons  from  the  Treaty  Reform 
Process”, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of  
a Changing Landscape (Cambridge University Press 2009) 34 at 56-57.
41 Opinion 1/76 (re: Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels) [1977] ECR 
741, para 3.
42 Opinion 1/94 Competence of  the Community  to  conclude international  agreements  concerning services  and the  
protection of intellectual property - Article 228 (6) of the EC Treaty [1994] ECR I-5267, para 95.
43 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (re: European Road Transport Agreement) [1971] ECR 263, para 16.
44 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, European Council, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, 
14 and 15 December 2001, para II.
45 Article 2 (1) TFEU. 
46 The phrasing of Article 3 (2) TFEU has been criticised for conflating the separate questions of the  existence of 
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Exclusive external competence for the Union, however, 
“is  the  exception and, as a rule, the [Union] shares its areas of competence with the Member States  
because only in that way is it possible to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity [...] has appropriate 
scope for application”47.
The Lisbon Treaty affirms this principle in Article 4 (1) TFEU by declaring that the Union shares  
competence  with  the  Member  States,  unless  the  Treaties  expressly  provide  otherwise48.  Where 
competence is shared in a specific area, both “the Union and the Member States may legislate and 
adopt legally binding acts in that area”49. 
Article 2 (2) TFEU puts an end to the “enormous terminological confusion as to what are 'shared 
powers'  in  the  external  relations  of  the  European Union”50.  According to  this  provision,  shared 
powers means that “[t]he Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union 
has  not  exercised  its  competence”.  This  type  of  competence  is  also  known  as  “concurrent 
competence”51. The Court of Justice already made clear in the past that the Union's external powers 
do not automatically flow from its internal competence. In the AETR judgment, the Court declared 
that the Member States only lose their right to enter into obligations with non-member countries as 
and when common rules which could be affected by those obligations come into being52.
This  type  of  exclusive  competence,  known as  pre-emption53,  differs  significantly from  a priori  
exclusivity. Pre-emption does not as such preclude the Member States from acting, but is based on 
implied  external  competence  and  the  nature thereof,  see  M.  Cremona,  “Defining  Competence  in  EU  External 
Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process”,  62; see also R. Schütze, “Lisbon and the Federal  order of 
Competences: A Prospective Analysis” (2008) 33 E.L. Rev. 709 at 713-714. In that respect, Article 3 (2) TFEU does 
not adequately reflect the Court's most recent case law on the nature of implied powers, which expressly affirms that 
implied EU competence may be both exclusive or shared with the Member States (Opinion 1/03 on the competence 
of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-1145, para 115). See further the discussion in Chapter One. 
47 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council (Vietnam WTO Accession), Opinion of Advocate General Kokott [2009], case 
withdrawn, para 55, emphasis added.
48 Article 4 (1) TFEU reads: “The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it 
a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6”.
49 Article 2 (2) TFEU.
50 R.  Schütze,  “Federalism  and  Foreign  Affairs:  Mixity  as  an  (Inter)national  Phenomenon”,  in  C.  Hillion  and  P. 
Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart Publishing 2010) 57 at 81, footnote 132.
51 See e.g. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-13/07  Commission v. Council (Vietnam WTO Accession), 
case withdrawn, para 76: “A characteristic of concurrent competence (also referred to as shared competence) is that 
the Member States exercise their competence in so far as the [Union] has not exercised its competence”, emphasis in 
the original.
52 Case 22/70  Commission v. Council (AETR), paras 17 and 18, see further D. O'Keeffe “Exclusive, Concurrent and 
Shared Competence” in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (Eds.),  The General Law of EC External Relations (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2000) 179 at 193.
53 See further Chapter One. 
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the occupation of the field by existing Union law. Unlike constitutional exclusivity, the exclusive 
effect of pre-emption therefore depends on Union action. And although such action on the part of the 
Union may have the effect of pre-empting Member States from exercising their own competence, 
their  right  to  act  may,  in  theory,  also  be returned to  them54.  The  distinction  between these  two 
different types of exclusivity is important, because they represent different conceptions of
federalism55. However, this distinction has at times been muddied both by the Court of Justice56 and 
the Treaty itself57, which may explain why in the legal literature, pre-emption has in the past often 
been referred to as a form of exclusive external Union competence58. 
In addition to concurrent competences, a second type of shared powers is mentioned in the Treaties 
which does not have the effect of precluding Member State action. In the areas listed in Article 4 
paragraphs 3 and 4 TFEU, the exercise of EU competence “shall not result in Member States being 
prevented from exercising theirs”59. Although not expressly acknowledged in the Lisbon Treaty, this 
category of shared competence guaranteeing the continued involvement alongside the Union in areas 
in which the Union has already exercised a competence is known as “parallel competence”60. In areas 
of parallel competence, independent Member State action is welcomed, for this type of competence 
is based on the rationale that the involvement of the Member States may result in a more intensive 
development of a given policy area by sharing out e.g. financial or technical burdens, as in the field 
of development cooperation61. In external relations, in particular, case law has construed this type of 
competence  as  meaning  that  the  Member  States  remain  “entitled  to  enter  into  commitments 
themselves vis-à-vis non-member countries […], either collectively or individually, or even jointly 
54 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 61.
55 R. Schütze  “Dual Federalism Constitutionalised”, 4: “[A priori] [e]xclusive competences are the hallmark of dual 
federalism:  within  their  scope,  only  one  authority  exists.  Exclusive  powers  are  constitutionally  guaranteed 
monopolies, for only one governmental level is entitled to act autonomously. Actions of other public authorities are  
prohibited unless authorised – a constitutional logic that inverts that of shared powers”.
56 See R. Schütze “Dual Federalism Constitutionalised”, 6-15. 
57 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 61, see also R.  Schütze, “Lisbon and the Federal 
Order of Competences”, 714.
58 See e.g. R. Holdgaard,  External Relations Law of the European Community, 92: “There are two principal types of 
exclusive external [Union] competence. 1. Exclusivity based directly on an interpretation of the provisions in the 
[EU] Treaty (a priori exclusivity), 2. Exclusivity that follows from the adoption of internal [Union] measures (pre-
emption)”. 
59 Article 4 TFEU reads: “(3)  In the areas of research, technological  development and space, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that  
competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs. (4) In the areas of development  
cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common 
policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising 
theirs”.
60 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, paras 67 and 68. 
61 See ibid, para 70. 
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with the [Union]”62. 
Such joint exercise of powers is not only possible, but even necessary, where the Member States and 
the  Union  enjoy  joint  competence  over  a  given  subject-matter.  Although  the  Treaties  do  not 
expressly mention this category of competence, they nevertheless refer to joint action in a number of  
provisions63.  Joint  competences  tie  the  exercise of  Union powers  to  that  of  the Member States, 
preventing the independent development of a given policy area by either one. In contrast with other 
categories of non-exclusive competence, which allow both the EU and the Member States to act 
autonomously within the same area and at the same time, joint competences require the Union and 
the Member States to act together64.  
Article 2 (5) TFEU codifies another type of non-exclusive Union powers generally subsumed under 
the category of “complementary competence”. Specifically, it affirms the Union's power to “support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States” in the areas listed in Article 6 TFEU 65. 
In  the  same  way  that  parallel  powers  do  not  preclude  Member  State  action  in  a  given  area, 
complementary Union competence cannot have the effect of superseding Member State competence 
in these areas66. Consequently, complementary competences allow Member States to “act next to and 
in addition to the EU”67. 
Not included in the different categories of exclusive, shared and complementary competences listed 
in Article 2 TFEU is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Since it is instead listed 
separately in  paragraph 4 of  the provision68,  it  remains  “far  from clear  what  competence CFSP 
constitutes under the Lisbon Treaty”69. Although CFSP competence does share certain characteristics 
of both shared and complementary competences70, it has nevertheless been described as “a type of 
sui generis competence”71. 
62 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, para 68, with further references. 
63 See R. Schütze, “The European Community's Federal Order of Competences”, 85-87. 
64 R. Schütze, “The European Community's Federal Order of Competences”, 71 and 85. 
65 Article  6  TFEU lists  seven  areas:  the  protection  and  improvement  of  human  health,  industry,  culture,  tourism,  
education, vocational training, youth and sport, civil protection and administrative co-operation.
66 Article 5 (2) TFEU states: “In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States, without 
thereby superseding their competence in these areas”.
67 J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty”, 168.
68 Article 2 (4) TFEU reads: “The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing 
of a common defence policy”.
69 J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty”, 161.
70 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 65. 
71 Ibid. Similarly, J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon  
Treaty”, 169.
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D. Conferral, competences and other limits to integration 
The principle of conferred powers and the objective of a clear delimitation of competences cannot 
determine the boundaries to the scope of EU powers in every respect. The Member States' quest for 
integration,  it  was  recognised by the  BVerfG,  must  accept  a  certain “tendency of  political  self-
enhancement”  of  the  Union institutions72.  Integration  reaches  its  limits,  however,  where  the  EU 
claims a power that has not been transferred on it by the Member States, or where the application of 
existing powers leads to de facto amendments to the Treaty73. In particular, such amendments occur 
where the institutions “re-define expansively, fill lacunae or factually extend competences”74. 
This kind of “liberal interpretation of the legal basis provisions by both the EU institutions and, in 
particular, the ECJ” is what is traditionally considered a “competence creep”75. Competence creep is 
constitutionally  objectionable  from  the  Member  State  point  of  view,  not  only  because  it  risks 
transgressing the principle of conferred powers, but also because it ultimately leaves it up to the  
Union to decide on its own legal foundations76. Competence creep, in other words, leads to a loss of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz,  which is  the essence of national  sovereignty in the understanding of the 
BVerfG. 
These  concerns  over  the  boundaries  of  EU  law  have  long  led  to  national  fears  of  “creeping 
federalism”, which assume that “[t]he powers have all been going towards Brussels and away from 
nation states”77. Such anxieties stem from a “deficit in confidence about the Union's readiness to 
operate  within  its  constitutional  limits”78.  The  general  perception  is  “that  competence  has  crept 
outwards, both in identification of its existence and readiness to exercise it”79. And far from offering 
a mechanism of control against constitutional expansionism, the Court of Justice is considered “part 
of the problem not the solution”80.
The risk of  de facto extensions of EU competence can be, according to the BVerfG, considered 
particularly high  in  the  case  of  a  number  of  Treaty provisions  which  allow for  an  autonomous 
amendment  of  the  scope  of  primary  Union  law  without  the  formal  requirement  of  statutory 
72 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 237.
73 Ibid., para 238. 
74 Ibid., para 238. 
75 S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU Law'”, 214. 
76 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 238. 
77 See, for example, A. Grice, “Hain warns of 'creeping federalism' in EU”, The Independent, 22 July 2002, citing Peter 
Hain, the British minister for Europe at the time. 
78 S. Weatherill, “Competence creep and competence control” (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1 at 17.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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ratification by the Member States. Thus, the division of competences may not be modified through 
Treaty revision procedures81, nor via special bridging clauses that may change the voting conditions 
in the Council82 or the flexibility clause contained in Article 352 TFEU which allows for EU action 
without a specific legal basis83. 
E. New forms of competence creep 
As the principle of conferral and the delimitation of competences only govern the scope and nature 
of the powers divided between the EU and the Member States, but not the extent to which they may 
be  exercised,  the  Member  States  rely  heavily  on  “protection  mechanisms  […]  concerning  the 
exercise of competences” which are “intended to ensure that the powers conferred at European level 
are exercised in such a way that the competences of the Member States are not affected” 84. These 
mechanisms include the duty to respect the Member States' national identities stated in Article 4 (2) 
TEU and more specific obligations of the EU institutions, such as the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality laid down in Article 5 TEU and the principle of sincere cooperation incorporated in 
Article 4 (3) TEU85.
However,  it  is  increasingly  recognised  that  general  principles  of  law,  such  as  precisely  these 
principles aimed at safeguarding Member State powers, may lead to creeping competence86. As we 
saw above, the notion of competence creep is traditionally associated with a generous application by 
the Court of Justice of legal basis provisions. According to a broader understanding of competence 
creep87,  however,  also  the  limits  imposed  on the  Member  States'  freedom to  act can  constitute 
significant inroads into national sovereignty. 
This more comprehensive conception of creeping competence is based on the observation that the 
technique of bringing a matter within the scope of EU law, which is increasingly used by the Court 
of Justice, may trigger the use of certain EU competences or create new positive obligations for the 
Member States88. Although matters within the scope of Union law are not per se matters on which 
81 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., paras 307-314. 
82 Ibid., paras 313-321.
83 Ibid., paras 325-328.
84 Ibid., para 304, emphasis added.
85 Ibid.
86 S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”.
87 See S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU Law'”; see  
also S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”.
88 S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU Law'”, 246. 
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the EU is competent to act, the “distinction between the 'scope of the Treaty' and 'competence of the 
EU institutions' is often blurred, or both notions are – erroneously – conflated”89.
Where Member State action can be situated within the scope of EU law, the Member States may be 
limited in their freedom to act, even in areas outside the scope of Union competence. The Court of 
Justice employs different techniques in order to assess whether a given act is within the scope of 
Union law, which all have in common that “Member State action is more often 'inside' than 'outside' 
the scope of EU law”90. Particularly contentious are those situations in which limits of EU law lead 
to the creation of new, positive obligations for the Member States to act. After all, for the Member 
States “it  may make quite some difference whether they have to observe limits  or actively take 
measures”91.  As  such  obligations  may,  furthermore,  lead  to  harmonization  without  the  required 
approval of the EU legislature, the shift from negative to positive obligations raises questions about 
their compatibility with the principle of conferred powers: 
“The problem with the principle of attributed powers here is twofold: The Member States are obliged to 
act without EU legislative measures to that effect having been adopted first; this implies that similar  
obligations are imposed on the Member States as in the case of such measures, however without the  
(procedural) guarantees that are inherent to a legal basis”92. 
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that restraints on Member States' competence based 
on the scope of EU law are “often perceived as a loss of sovereign powers and for that matter 
creeping competences”93, even if they do not concern the scope of competences in a strict sense. The 
Member  States  and the  various  actors  on  the  national  scene  often  do  not  make any distinction 
between the separate questions of scope of EU law and competence to act94. 
F. Existence vs. exercise of competence in external relations 
In the field of EU external relations, the realisation that a competence retained by the Member States 
does not necessarily mean that this competence may be freely exercised is not new. Within the last 
decade or so, the legal literature has increasingly accepted that the relationship between the treaty-
89 Ibid. at 214. 
90 Ibid. at 245.
91 S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”, 14.
92 S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU Law'”, 241.
93 S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”, 19. 
94 S. Prechal, S. De Vries and H. Van Eijken, “The Principle of Attributed Powers and the 'Scope of EU Law'”, 214.
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making powers of the Union and those of the Member States cannot be conceived of solely in terms 
of competence95. Although it was “[i]ntuitively […] already accepted for quite a while” that a simple 
power perspective did not  consider  the extent  to  which a competence could be exercised96,  and 
tentative observations to that effect were submitted in the literature early on97, recent years have seen 
increased academic attention being paid to the fact that Member States may  be restrained in the 
exercise of their powers due to the potential effect of such exercise on the EU legal order. According 
to the traditional conception, the relationship between the Union and its Member States constituted a 
“zero-sum game” by which an X-amount of powers was distributed between the EU and the Member 
States: while the particular distribution of competences could be subject to change, the amount of 
powers belonging to the Union, the Member States, or both at the  same time, would remain the 
same98.  Particularly  in  the  field  of  EU  external  relations,  however,  this  competence-focused 
perspective is insufficient at addressing the legal reality of action involving non-EU actors, in which 
“the edifice of [Union] law is not only vulnerable to distortions or potential distortions from within,  
but also from without”99. 
In  light  of  the  inadequacy  of  a  simple  power  perspective,  a  number  of  recent  academic 
contributions100 have adopted Dashwood's distinction between the scope of EU competences and the 
scope of application of EU law, according to which “[d]iscovering the limits of [the authorisations 
the Treaty has given the institutions] is not the same as discovering the limits of the Treaty's scope of 
application”101. The Member States' obligations under EU law may therefore restrict the exercise of 
national powers “beyond the scope  ratione materiae of the doctrines of exclusivity”102, including 
pre-emption, even in areas outside of EU competence103. 
95 See e.g. J. Klabbers, "Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 151, S. 
Weatherill,  “Beyond Pre-emption?”,  13;  A.  Dashwood,  “The Limits  of  European Community Powers”,  114;  M. 
Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”; J. Heliskoski, Mixed agreements as a technique for organizing the  
international relations of the European Community and its member states, 61; J. Heliskoski, “The Jurisdiction of the 
European  Court  of  Justice  to  Give  Preliminary  Rulings  on  the  Interpretation  of  Mixed  Agreements”,  411;  R. 
Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, Chapter 7; B. De Witte, “Direct Effect, Supremacy, 
and the Nature of the Legal Order”, 191, E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, C. Hillion, “Mixity and Coherence in EU 
External Relations”, 87.
96 J. Klabbers, "Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 152.
97 See  U.  Everling,  “Sind  die  Mitgliedstaaten  der  Europäischen  Gemeinschaft  noch  Herren  der  Verträge?”,  in 
Festschrift für Mosler (Springer 1983) 173 at 186.
98 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 125, and J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-
Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 153-156.
99 J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 153.
100 See M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”; E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”; R. Holdgaard, External 
Relations Law of the European Community, 126.
101 A. Dashwood, “The Limits of European Community Powers”, 114.
102 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 126. 
103 Contrast, however, G. Gaja, “Restraints imposed by European Community Law in the Treaty-making Power of the 
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G. Restraints based on the scope of EU law – The impact of Article 4 (3) TEU
It is not a coincidence that the growing awareness of the discrepancy between the scope of Union 
competence  and the  scope  of  Union  law has  been most  prominent  in  the  field  of  EU external  
relations. In this area, international EU and Member State action creates rights for third states, which 
are  obviously  not  bound  by  EU  law.  Where  incompatibilities  arise  between  Member  States' 
international obligations and their obligations towards the Union, it is “difficult, time-consuming and 
perhaps  embarrassing”104,  if  possible  at  all,  to  revise  or  terminate  inconsistent  international 
obligations owed to third countries. In external relations, more than in any other area of EU law, it is 
therefore fundamental to avoid incompatibilities between Member States' international activity and 
their obligations under Union law from the outset. 
As Treaty objectives cannot exclusively be pursued through actions of the Union institutions, 
“the  Member  States,  too,  have  a  part  to  play  through  the  observance  of  rules  that  require  them 
sometimes to take action, but more often to refrain from exercising, or from exercising fully, powers 
that would normally be available to them as incidents of sovereignty.”105
This logic is reflected in the principle of sincere cooperation106 incorporated in Article 4 (3) TEU (ex 
Article 10 EC, previously Article 5 EC). The provision lays down that 
“The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The  
Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives”.
After leading an initially “dormant existence”107 in which it was considered incapable of limiting 
national rights108, the principle of sincere cooperation became “very important for the development 
of the [Union]” in the 1980s109. Notwithstanding its growing significance as a constitutional principle 
Member States”,  in I.  Cameron and A. Simoni (eds.),  Dealing with Integration: Perspectives  from Seminars on  
European Law (Iustus 1998) at 112: “Over matters for which the [Union] lacks treaty-making power, Member States 
are to be considered as exclusively competent. They are not only generally free to conclude agreements or not; they 
also generally do not have to comply with any obligation under [Union] law when concluding an agreement. While  
the [Union] may acquire in the future competence over some of these matters, there would be little justification for 
suggesting a system for monitoring Member States' agreements in these areas”. 
104 J. T. Lang, “Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty” (1990) 27 C.M.L. Rev. 645 at 669. 
105 A. Dashwood, “The Limits of European Community Powers”, 114.
106 The terms “principle of sincere cooperation” and “duty of loyalty” will be used interchangeably hereinafter, with both 
denoting the concept of loyal cooperation expressed in Article 4 (3) TEU.
107 K. Mortelmans, “The Principle of Loyalty to the Community (Article 5 EC) and the Obligations of the Community 
Institutions” (1998) 8 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 67 at 69. 
108 See Opinion of AG Mayras in Case 192/73 Van Zuylen, [1974] ECR 731.
109 K. Mortelmans, “The Principle of Loyalty to the Community”, 69. 
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underpinning the entire EU legal order, it had still at the end of the 1990s “received only limited 
attention from commentators”110.  However,  in the same way that the insufficiency of the simple 
power perspective has started to attract attention from legal commentators, the potential of the duty 
of loyalty to impact on the Member States' freedom to act has increasingly been acknowledged in 
recent years. Particularly in the field of external relations, the development of Article 4 (3) TEU by 
the Court has led to a growing awareness of the restraints imposed on the Member States' powers. 
Article 4 (3) TEU has been recognised to be “the most important and the most dynamic single Article 
in the [EU] Treaty”111. It owes its significance to the fact that Union loyalty is a highly flexible legal 
concept, capable of operating in different ways in various situations in order to meet the needs and 
objectives of the Union and the Member States112. Depending on the nature of the Member State 
action at issue, the duty of loyalty can give rise both to a substantive obligation to give primacy to 
EU law and to procedural obligations which manifest themselves in a duty to cooperate with EU 
institutions113.  According  to  the  principle  of  primacy,  the  Member  States  are  obliged  to  give 
precedence to EU law where EU rules conflict with national rules or obligations. Article 4 (3) TEU, 
however, goes beyond primacy114, by imposing a duty on the Member States not to interfere with the 
working of Union law even when the national measure in question is not directly contrary to EU 
rules115. 
Once it had been accepted that Article 4 (3) TEU was capable of making a “difference to the legal 
situation which would result anyway from other Articles of the Treaty”116, the salient questions that 
arose concerned the scope of the provision: “how far does it go, and what are the limits on the duty 
to cooperate?”117. 
As the common feature of all loyalty restraints imposed by the Court of Justice, it emerged that  
Article  4  (3)  TEU was  “always  used  in  combination  with  some other  rule  of  [EU]  law which  
provides specific content to the general duty of cooperation”118. It was therefore considered necessary 
to identify another rule of Union law with which a Member State was required to cooperate, with the 
110 Ibid.
111 J.  T.  Lang,  “The  Duties  of  Cooperation  of  National  Authorities  and  Courts  under  Article  10  EC:  Two  More 
Reflections” (2001) 26 E.L. Rev. 84. 
112 See S. Hyett, “The Duty of Cooperation: a Flexible Concept”, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.),  The General  
Law of E.C. External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell 2000). 
113 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 126.
114 See further E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 325.
115 J. T. Lang, “The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 EC”, 85.
116 Ibid. at 84. 
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid. at 87.
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result  that the duty of loyalty was incapable of being invoked separately119.  Furthermore,  it  was 
assumed that  the principle  entailed only obligations of best  efforts,  and not a duty to achieve a 
specific  result.  In  the  field  of  external  relations,  specifically,  it  was  deduced  from the  Court's  
jurisprudence that in international negotiations, Article 4 (3) TEU “may impose no more than a duty 
to negotiate” on the Member States in order to try to achieve a particular outcome for the Union, but 
it “cannot impose a duty to achieve the desired result”120. 
In the last  decade,  however,  these boundaries  of  the principle  of  sincere cooperation have been 
progressively expanded by the Court of Justice. Recent case law121 suggests that Article 4 (3) TEU 
may also apply as an autonomous obligation, the infringement of which is penalised by the Court122. 
As far as the scope of obligations imposed by Article 4 (3) TEU is concerned, recent cases have 
shown a transformation of the procedural duty of cooperation into an obligation of result123. 
H. Article 4 (3) TEU – A vehicle for competence creep in external relations? 
These recent developments in the interpretation of Article 4 (3) TEU have attracted criticism of the 
Court going so far as to describe the principle of sincere cooperation as “first and foremost a 'duty to  
remain silent'”, tempting the rhetorical question “[h]ow active can you be, if you cannot speak up, or  
can just act as backing vocals of the European Commission's solo performance?”124. The imagery 
invoked was suddenly no longer one of Member States cooperating with the EU institutions out of a  
sincerely  felt  spirit  of  fidelité  fédérale and  solidarity  towards  the  Union125,  but  rather  one  of 
“frustration”, inflicted upon the Member States by the strict compliance obligations based on the 
duty of cooperation126. Where these compliance obligations are construed in such a strict manner that 
the Member  States'  freedom to act  is  as  limited  as  it  is  in  those areas  in  which they enjoy no 
119 See P. J.  Kuijper,  “Re-reading External  Relations Cases  in the Field of  Transport:  The Function of  Community 
Loyalty”, in M. Bulterman, L. Hancher, A. McDonnell & H.G. Sevenster (eds.),  Views of European Law from the  
Mountain, Liber Amicorum for Piet-Jan Slot (Kluwer 2009) 291 at 293; J. T. Lang, “The Duties of Cooperation of 
National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 EC”, 87; see also the Opinion of AG Slynn in Case 308/86 Lambert  
[1988] ECR 4369.
120 J. T. Lang, “The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 EC”, 92, emphasis added.
121 Cases C-433/03 Commission v. Germany [2005] ECR I-6985 and C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg [2005] ECR 
I-4805, Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden [2010] ECR I-3317. 
122 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 324.
123 See Chapters Two and Five.
124 A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik,  “The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External  Relations?”  
(2011) 36 E.L. Rev. 524 at 525.
125 The literature often cites these principles, together with the German equivalent of “Gemeinschaftstreue”, as the basis  
for loyalty obligations imposed by the Court of Justice, see also E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 324.
126 A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, “The Duty to Remain Silent”, 526.
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competence whatsoever, the question inevitably arises whether the duty of cooperation is turning 
into a competence provision, rather than a provision regulating the exercise of competences:
“Can it  be said that,  by preventing the Member States from acting in a field which belongs to the  
category of shared competences, the Court has broken down this distinction and moved loyalty into the  
area of division of competences?”127 
Such criticism alleging that the Court encroaches on national prerogatives is, in fact, not new. The 
introduction and subsequent expansion of the concepts of implied powers and pre-emption in the 
1970s128, both based on the duty of loyalty laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU, has still recently been 
held responsible for a  “progressive erosion,  or rather a weakening of the principle  of conferred 
powers as the guiding notion of the question of division of powers in the [Union] legal system”129. 
In the light of such developments, the Court of Justice has been ascribed a tendency to adopt an 
“expansive approach” to the scope of Union powers in external relations, which manifests itself in a 
teleological interpretation of the power-conferring provisions of the Treaty, on the one hand, and by 
a restricted understanding of Member State powers, on the other130. 
Notions of judicial expansionism raise the more general question of the limits of the EU's legislative 
reach into the domain of the Member States. The potential of this reach has been characterised as 
“not only dynamic but […] perhaps […] limitless”131. Along the same lines, it has been remarked 
that “there simply is no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against 
the [Union]”132. 
According to  the BVerfG,  the real  risk for inroads  into national  sovereignty was epitomised by 
Article  352 TFEU (ex  Article  308 EC)133.  The  provision provides  a  basis  for  action  where  the 
Treaties do not grant the necessary specific competence, but EU action is required in order to attain 
the objectives set out therein134. As such, Article 352 TFEU pursues the same goal as Article 4 (3) 
127 G. De Baere, “'O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty?' Some Thoughts on the Duty of Loyal Co-operation and the 
Union's External  Environmental  Competences in the Light of the PFOS Case” (2011) 36 E.L. Rev. 405 at  417, 
emphasis added. 
128 See further Chapter One.
129 A.  Goucha  Soares,  “The  Principle  of  Conferred  Powers  and  the  Division  of  Powers  between  the  European  
Community and the Member States” (2001) 23 Liverpool Law Review 57 at 64. 
130 Ibid. 
131 J.  Weiler  and  N.  J.  S. Lockhart, “'Taking  Rights  Seriously':  the  European  Court  and  its  Fundamental  Rights 
Jurisprudence” (1995) 32 C.M.L. Rev 51 at 64.
132 K. Lenaerts, “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism” (1990) 38 AJCL 205.
133 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 328.
134 Article 352 para. 1 TFEU reads: “If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the  
necessary powers,  the Council,  acting unanimously on a proposal  from the Commission and after  obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.” 
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TEU. Both provisions ensure that all “appropriate measures” be taken for the “attainment of the 
Union's objectives”.  In the light of this  “functionally  broad” nature, Article 352 TFEU has been 
labelled “perilous to confidence in the vitality of the principle of attributed competence”135. Already 
the Laeken Declaration, in its quest for a “better division and definition of competence” that would 
ensure  that  a  redefined  allocation  of  powers  did  not  lead  to  a  creeping  expansion  of  EU 
competence136, had identified Article 352 TFEU as “generating special sensitivity”137. The provision, 
in fact, raises constitutional objections because it allows for an autonomous amendment of the scope 
of primary Union law without the requirement of statutory ratification by the Member States138. As 
the “indefinite nature of future application” of Article 352 TFEU was found capable of transferring 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz to  the  Union,  the  BVerfG  declared  that  its  application  presupposed  the 
ratification  by  both  national  chambers139 with  the  same  threshold  that  applies  to  constitutional 
amendments140. 
The objections of the BVerfG to a vaguely defined power-conferring provision such as Article 352 
TFEU not only gives an insight into national scepticism towards the provision itself,  but it also 
highlights  the  potential  for  competence  creep  inherent  in  broadly  framed  provisions  aimed  at 
achieving Treaty objectives more generally. In this respect, the duty of cooperation laid down in 
Article 4 (3) TEU is no different from Article 352 TFEU. If applied in such a way as to deprive 
Member  States  of  their  retained  treaty-making  powers,  the  duty  of  cooperation  is  capable  of 
weakening the principle of conferral and providing the Union with the power to decide on its own 
competence to an extent which rivals that of Article 352 TFEU. Indeed, the principle of sincere 
cooperation takes this potential for encroachments on national sovereignty even one step further, not 
least because it has been shaped by the Court of Justice into a “general constitutional principle, far 
beyond  its  explicit  wording”141.  The  use  of  the  flexibility  clause  under  Article  352  TFEU, 
furthermore, requires a unanimous decision by the Council with the consent of the Parliament142 and 
imposes an obligation on the Commission to inform national  parliaments of corresponding law-
making proposals143, whereas Article 4 (3) TEU foresees no procedural safeguards to avoid that its 
135 S. Weatherill, “Competence creep and competence control”, 42.
136 See section II of the Laeken Declaration. 
137 S. Weatherill, “Competence creep and competence control”, 41. 
138 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 328.
139 Ibid.
140 P. Kiiver, “The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: A Court-Ordered Strengthening of the National  
Legislature in the EU” (2010) 16 European Law Journal 578 at 579.
141 S. Weatherill, “Beyond Pre-emption?”, 31.
142 Article 352 para. 1 first sentence TFEU.
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application unduly restrains the exercise of Member State competence. 
III. Research Question: The role of Article 4 (3) TEU in governing the relationship between the 
Union and its Member States in external relations – which type of federalism?
The question of whether the use of Article 4 (3) TEU causes a creep of competence away from the 
Member States towards the Union leads to a more general, fundamental discussion about the right 
balance between the preservation of Member States' freedom to act as subjects of international law, 
on the one hand, and dynamism in European integration, on the other. The tension between these two 
competing interests represents the “basic problem of federalism”144. Federalism145 describes the way 
in which political power has been divided vertically – as opposed to a horizontal division between 
legislative, executive and judicial arms of government – between the constituent parts of a given 
system146. In assessing the question of “how to create a set of central institutions strong enough to 
pursue  common  ends  effectively  at  home  and  exert  influence  abroad,  while  at  the  same  time 
preserving the autonomy of the Member States”147,  different  conceptions  of  federalism accord a 
different  weight  to  the  competing  interests  at  stake,  in  accordance with the  respective  ideology 
underlying each conception.
A. Halberstam's theory of political morality in federal systems
Where federalism refers to the exercise of powers within a system of multilevel governance instead 
of focussing on the catalogue of  powers divided between the actors, the ideology which underlies 
federalism has  been termed “political  morality”148.  The  present  thesis  will  take  inspiration  from 
144 E. A. Young, “Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American  
Federalism” (2002) 77 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1612 at 1614.
145 This definition of federalism will be adopted for the remainder of the study, even if there is no general consensus on  
the exact definition of the term “federalism”, for further references regarding the debate over the uncertainty of the  
concept see e.g. E. T. Swaine, “Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice” (2000) 41 
Harv. Int'l. L. J. 1 at 1. 
146 N. Emiliou, “Subsidiarity:  Panacea or  Fig Leaf”,  in  D. O'Keeffe and P. M. Twomey (eds.),  Legal Issues of  the 
Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing 1994) 65.
147 E. A. Young, “Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union”, 1614. 
148 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems” (2004) 90 Virginia L. 
Rev. 731, see also D. Halberstam,  “Beyond Competences: Comparative Federalism and the Duty of Cooperation”, 
Towards a European Constitution: from the Convention the IGC and Beyond, The Federal Trust for Education and 
Research,  Goodenough  College,  London,  July  1-2,  2004,  available  at 
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Halberstam's theory of the political morality in federal systems, which asks whether an actor in a 
divided power system “may act solely on the basis of political self-interest or whether the actor must 
take into account the needs of the system as a whole”149. 
In order to provide answers to this question, the theory distinguishes three approaches. At one end of 
the  spectrum,  there  is  the  so-called  “entitlements  approach”,  focussed  entirely on  political  self-
interest.  According to this approach, allocated powers may be used without regard to whether the 
exercise  of  these  powers  serves  the  system  as  a  whole150.  Both  regulatory  competition  and 
cooperation between the institutional actors is supported by the  entitlements view, as long as the 
choice between competition and cooperation serves the actors' own political interests. Each actor 
may employ the regulatory tools at its disposal according to self-interested political calculus151: 
“Under  the  entitlements view, this is  as it  should be:  Federalism is all  about  arms'  length relations 
among competing political institutions.”152
At the other end of the spectrum of political morality, the “conservative fidelity” approach seeks to 
counteract  the diversity of policies  and interests  inherent  in  a divided power system. Instead of 
focussing  on  the  political  self-interest  of  each  institutional  actor,  conservative  fidelity aims  to 
harmonise the interests of the various actors throughout the system153. It does so by imposing a duty 
on the actors involved to consider the substantive policy interests of all other actors throughout the 
system at all times. Ultimately, this approach results in a “unitary alignment of interests that mimics  
the existence of a unitary system”154. 
In  between  these  two  opposed  conceptions,  Halberstam  locates  the  so-called  “liberal  fidelity” 
approach. This type of political morality “celebrates the multiple persistent disequilibria of power to 
which federalism gives rise”155. Unlike  conservative fidelity, which considers conflict between the 
various actors “an embarrassment to the proper functioning of the system”156, its liberal counterpart 
actually promotes productive engagement throughout the system. In fact, liberal fidelity is based on 
the idea that “one of the prime virtues of federalism lies in generating vibrant […] interaction by a 
greater number of constituencies […] regarding the needs of the political system as a whole”157.  In 
149 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 3; see further D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”.
150 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 3.
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contrast with the focus on self-interest predominant under the  entitlements approach, however, the 
liberal vision of fidelity recognises that “no institution enjoys powers for its own sake, but only as 
part of a division of powers justified with reference to the system as a whole”158. 
Unlike the entitlements approach, the two latter approaches based on fidelity always entail the claim 
that  “an  institution  must  temper  its  political  self-interest  with  a  general  concern  for  the  federal  
enterprise as a whole”159. The two fidelity approaches, in turn, differ in the fact that the liberal vision 
of fidelity focuses on “what the federal enterprise as a whole demands in any given case”, while the 
conservative approach indiscriminately encourages political harmony between the actors160. 
B. Different visions of federalism for Article 4 (3) TEU
If we accept that the principle of sincere cooperation in external relations is applied in such a way as 
to lead to a creeping expansion of Union competence in areas in which no correlative powers exist  
for the EU, then it must be assumed that the EU institutions are pursuing an entitlements approach 
towards European integration. The Member States are not only no longer free to exercise their own 
competence as they wish, but they also lose the power to decide on the scope of future transfers of 
powers  to  the  EU.  Depriving  the  Member  States  of  their  Kompetenz-Kompetenz,  the  Union 
empowers itself to act or prevents the Member States from acting where this is necessary for the 
fulfilment of its own political self-interest. In deciding which restraints to impose on the exercise of 
Member State competence, the Union does not take account of the needs of the system as a whole, 
nor of the national interests of the Member States. 
Where the entitlements approach prevails, federalism is viewed as no more than “the product of an 
arm's length bargain among otherwise hostile adversaries to overcome historically situated political 
obstacles”161. This vision of federalism is certainly what appears to be dominating the reasoning of 
the German Federal  Constitutional  Court in its  Lisbon Judgment.  In the opinion of the BVerfG, 
European  integration  is  “a  voluntary,  mutual  pari  passu commitment  which  secures  peace  and 
strengthens  the  possibilities  of  shaping  policy  by  joint  coordinated  action”162.  Far  from  being 
“tantamount to submission to alien powers”163, integration is aimed at creating a close association of 
158 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 737.
159 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 1-2.
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sovereign states which exercises public authority,  but whose fundamental order is subject to the 
decision-making power of the Member States as permanent masters of the Treaties164. The Court's 
understanding  of  the  EU  as  an  association  of  states  reduces  the  European  Union  to  a  purely 
“functional” community of sovereign states165. Thus, the Union is “presented as a foreign entity” and 
not as part of the national identity166.  
However, if federalism in EU external relations is understood as more than a constant bargaining 
between opponents, then the fidelity approach is more appropriate to describe the dominant political 
morality. The fidelity approach, in fact, aims to “creat[e] something more”, such as “a polity, the 
political integration of previously separate polities, or the joining of institutional actors in a common 
enterprise of governance”167. This common enterprise or polity may be based either on a static or on 
a dynamic model. A static model is pursued by the conservative fidelity approach. The objective of 
this type of political morality is to achieve an optimal allocation of powers between the institutional 
actors and to maintain this hierarchy of the system permanently168. The liberal fidelity approach, by 
contrast, rejects the static notion of hierarchy. Here, coexistence and mutual obedience are based on a 
more  dynamic  concept.  Instead  of  hierarchical  subjugation,  interaction  among  the  actors  is  the 
“result  of  repeated,  voluntary acceptance  of  the  necessary discipline  that  holds  the  […]  system 
together”169. Unlike the entitlements approach, the two fidelity visions of federalism do not approve 
of the creation of new powers by way of creeping competence. However, a strengthening of already 
existent EU powers which amounts to restrictions of Member State competence is acceptable where 
this is in the interest of the system as a whole. 
The question of which of these three types of political morality is most evident in the exercise of 
powers in EU external relations law, however, has not received any in-depth attention in the legal 
literature to date. Some tentative assessments of a more general role of Article 4 (3) TEU, which go 
beyond the impact of the provision in a specific case, have been formulated. Against the background 
of recent case law involving the principle of sincere cooperation, the duty of loyalty is increasingly 
being presented as pursuing an entitlements approach. According to this understanding of Article 4 
(3) TEU, the provision may impose potentially “limitless loyalty”170 on the Member States in order 
164 Ibid., paras 229 and 231.
165 D. Doukas, “The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty”, 871.
166 R. Bieber, “An Association of Sovereign States”, 397. 
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to further the needs of the Union in any given case. The duty of loyalty is, furthermore, directly 
associated with the loss of national sovereignty.  Under this  view, the loyalty obligation contains 
principles  “which  transform  the  status  of  sovereign  States  into  that  of  Member  States  of  the 
European Union”171. 
C. Which kind of political morality for EU external relations? 
These assessments of the way in which Article  4 (3) TEU has been developed by the Court of 
Justice, however, are mostly based on the perspective of the Member States and do not evaluate the 
needs  of  the  Union  system as  a  whole.  Concerns  over  sovereignty  and  Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
notwithstanding,  can  we  readily  assume  that  an  entitlements view  is  not the  right  approach  to 
safeguarding the interests of the Union  and the Member States on the international scene? In the 
daily reality of external relations, characterised by interactions with third countries which are not 
bound to respect either EU law or EU interests, would it not make sense to empower the Union to 
speak with a single voice on behalf of the Member States in all negotiations? The Court of Justice, in 
fact, found early on that if Member States were to adopt positions in international negotiations which 
differed from those which the Union intended to adopt, they “would thereby distort the institutional 
framework,  call  into  question  the  mutual  trust  within  the  [Union]  and  prevent  the  latter  from 
fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest”172. The Court's call for “strict uniformity”173, 
made in the context of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), was subsequently echoed in the legal 
literature also with regard to policy areas not comprised by the CCP at the time. Thus, the Court's 
findings  in  Opinion  1/94174 that  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  were  jointly  competent  to 
conclude the WTO Agreements were received as “fatal for the coherence of the Union”175 and “a 
programmed disaster”176. 
And all other areas of EU notwithstanding, should not at least the exercise of CFSP competence be 
based on an entitlements approach, in the sense that it is the Member States which act according to 
171 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 323.
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political self-interest? As the BVerfG held in its  Lisbon judgment, a decision adopted under CFSP 
did not fall under supranational law, but “would only exist in the context of international law”177. If it 
is true that the “European Union does not yet take the step towards a  system of mutual collective 
security”178, then surely the Member States cannot be obliged to take any interests into account other 
than their very own.  
As an alternative approach to Article 4 (3) TEU, it could be argued that the  conservative fidelity 
vision of Union loyalty is most appropriate in the field of external relations. This type of political 
morality  endeavours  to  achieve  a  state  of  governance  in  which  tasks  are  divided  between  the 
constituent entities in such a way that each unit has some areas on which it makes the final decisions. 
Once the optimal division of powers has been established, the objective is to protect the powers of 
each level of governance from intrusions by other levels179. In the legal literature, we may find such a 
conservative fidelity vision of Article 4 (3) TEU which has been expressed with specific regard to 
EU external relations.  According to  this  evaluation of the loyalty obligation,  the significance of 
Article 4 (3) TEU is slowly fading. While it originally seemed to play a “central and indispensable 
role”, the argument goes, the increasing rule-intensiveness of the domain of external relations has led 
to a decreasing need for the loyalty obligation180. In this view, Article 4 (3) TEU is of an entirely 
complementary, secondary nature, while the prime objective is the allocation of  powers within the 
Union framework. The loyalty obligation merely serves “to force the Member State […] 'to behave'” 
with the rules that are already in place181. This “help” becomes less and less necessary, however, 
once the rules adopted by the Union become stronger or more complete182. To put it in Halberstam's 
terms,  once the optimal  allocation of  competence has been achieved,  the  system has  found  its 
permanent equilibrium and the duty of loyalty has no further relevance183. 
If,  however,  neither  the  entitlements approach  nor  the  conservative  fidelity view  prove  to  be 
sufficient to fulfil the interests of both the Union and the Member States in external relations, is the 
liberal vision of fidelity perhaps better suited to the needs of all actors throughout the system? A 
177 German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et al., para 390.
178 Ibid., emphasis added.
179 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 821, with further references.
180 P. J. Kuijper, “Re-reading External Relations Cases in the Field of Transport”, 293: “To the extent that the rules, and 
especially the procedural rules in the field of the [EU]'s foreign relations powers, become more numerous and 
more precise, there will be less scope to invoke a breach of [Union] loyalty and more scope to accuse Member States  
of simply having infringed the procedural rules directly. The notion of [Union] loyalty cannot stand on its own; it is  
invoked as a complement to a [Union] rule that in a particular situation lacks sufficient effect to compel a Member  
State […] to act in conformity with it.”
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 821.
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liberal fidelity reading of Article 4 (3) TEU has been advocated with respect to governing the EU-
Member State relationship on the internal level. This view emphasises the provision's character as a 
pragmatic solution for the management of diversity which accommodates both the interests of the 
Member  States  and  those  of  the  Union  itself:  in  a  legal  order  which  “ultimately  rests  on  the 
voluntary  obedience  of  its  Member  States”,  the  duty  of  loyalty  “has  a  key  role  in  generating 
solutions to open questions and thus containing conflicts that may arise in a polycentric and diverse 
polity”184.
In his  theory on political  morality,  Halberstam himself  promotes the  liberal  fidelity view as the 
approach which “best exploits the productive democratic potential of a mature system of divided 
powers”185. Having identified all three conceptions of political morality as present in the EU system, 
he  concludes  that  only  the  liberal  vision  of  fidelity  is  a  “promising  approach  to  deciding 
intergovernmental power disputes in federal systems”186. This approach is preferable because of its 
“symmetrical potential” to protect both the central government and the constituent states187. 
More generally, the liberal fidelity view of federalism is an expression of the pluralist approach to 
constitutionalism advocated by Halberstam188. Like the  liberal fidelity view, the idea of pluralism 
considers the plurality of actors as a “source of strength, not weakness”189. Pluralism offers a “middle 
course” between local and global constitutionalism190. In terms of political morality, local and global 
constitutionalism may be viewed as an expression of the  entitlements view, in the sense that the 
former subjects the global realm to national interests, while the latter incorporates the national and 
the global into a single unity of interest191. On the pluralist view, by contrast, neither the global nor 
the local level is necessarily privileged over the other. In addition to a lack of hierarchy, the idea of 
pluralism is based on mutual autonomy and mutually embedded openness to the authority of the 
other level of governance. Like the liberal fidelity view, pluralism promotes “conversation, contest, 
184 A.  Von  Bogdandy,  “Founding  Principles”,  in  A.  Von  Bogdandy  and  J.  Bast  (eds.),  Principles  of  European  
Constitutional Law, Second Edition (Hart Publishing 2010) 42. 
185 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 2.
186 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 737.
187 Ibid. at 765.
188 See D. Halberstam, “Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational, 
and Global Governance”, in M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and  
Beyond (Hart Publishing 2012) 85; D. Halberstam, “Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the  
World”, in G. de Búrca and J. Weiler (eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 150; see also D. Halberstam, “Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend”, in M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.),  
The Past and the Future of EU Law: Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty  (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 26. 
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and conflict” among the different actors192.
Applied to the field of EU external relations, liberal fidelity would require common external action 
of both the Union and the Member States and a strict limitation of “speaking with one voice” to 
those areas in which common or unilateral  Member State action would seriously undermine the 
fulfilment of all interests involved. Exclusive Union action is thus not necessarily considered the 
best  option  to  achieve the  most  favourable outcome of  external  action,  neither  for  the  Member 
States, nor for the Union itself193. Instead of encouraging exclusivity, liberal fidelity seeks to unfold 
the full potential of the divided power system by fostering constructive engagement between the 
units of governance throughout the system194.
D. The Research Question 
Against this background, the thesis sets out to provide an answer to the positive question of which 
concept of federalism dominates the exercise of powers in EU external relations. Looking at the vast 
potential  of  the  principle  of  sincere  cooperation  to  encroach  on  Member  State  prerogatives  in 
combination with the striking developments in the Court's case law in the field of external relations,  
particularly in recent years, the question arises whether Article 4 (3) TEU is slowly turning into an 
instrument for the Union institutions to promote a loss of competence at national level, disguised as  
restrictions on the Member States' freedom to exercise their powers. Or can the limitations imposed 
on the exercise of Member State competence, instead, be deemed to form part of a broader strategy, 
aimed  at  furthering  both  Union  and  Member  State  interests?  In  assessing  these  questions, 
Halberstam's  distinction  between  the  three  different  visions  of  political  morality  becomes 
fundamental. If Article 4 (3) TEU is applied in such a way as to ensure exclusive Union action in as  
many instances as possible, the underlying rationale of federalism differs significantly from a simple 
increase in restrictions on the exercise of Member State powers where the strengthening of existing 
EU powers vis-à-vis parallel powers of the Member States is required to ensure unified action for the 
common interest. Has the loyalty obligation been employed mostly,  as intended by the Masters 
of  the  Treaties,  as  a  “general obligation to help and not hinder”195 the achievement of common 
192 Ibid. at 171.
193 See also M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 125-126.
194 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 825.
195 J. T. Lang, “The Duties of Co-operation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10 EC”, 86: “The original 
[Union] treaties were not intended to be exhaustive or to be sufficient for ever. The authors knew that the [Union]  
would develop, and that they had not written everything that would be needed to govern the relations between the 
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objectives  for  their  own  benefit?  Or  has  its  application  gone  further  than  that,  reducing 
simultaneous involvement of both the Member States and the Union and furthering uniformity 
for the sole purpose of furthering the Union's political self-interest?  In order to assess the role 
which Article 4 (3) TEU has really played in governing the relationship between the EU and the 
Member States in external relations, the present study sets itself the goal to obtain a holistic view of  
the development of the principle of sincere cooperation. To that end, it will seek both to examine the  
application of Article 4 (3) TEU in specific cases and to shed light on its changing role in external 
relations more generally. This approach of looking at the interpretation given to Article 4 (3) TEU 
both in its detailed reasoning and as part of a broader picture will then, it  is hoped, allow us to  
appreciate  the  construction  of  the  loyalty  obligation  as  a  reasoned  outcome  of  a  constitutional 
process involving the EU institutions, the Court of Justice and the Member States themselves. 
Building on this foundation, the thesis ultimately endeavours to provide an answer to the normative 
question regarding the vision of political morality best suited to fulfilling the needs of the Member 
States  and the  EU  when  acting  on  the  international  scene.  To  that  end,  it  seeks  to  transpose 
Halberstam's theory of political morality to EU external relations and test whether his argument in 
favour of a liberal fidelity approach is equally workable in this field as it is on the internal level. Are 
Member States interests really safeguarded best if the scope for unilateral action is limited for the 
sake of complementarity? Or does it make more sense to reduce simultaneous involvement of both 
the Member States and the Union with a view to achieving uniformity? Alternatively, can the  
interests of both the Union and the Member States be furthered most if each actor is assigned  
strictly divided areas of competence in which it is free to act without any kind of interaction  
between the two? And to what extent do these findings differ with regard to the CFSP? 
IV. Research Methodology
In his assessment of which vision of political morality can best describe a given situation under EU 
law, Halberstam relies on two different indicators. Firstly, he looks at the type of restraints imposed 
on the Member States and, secondly, he examines the rationale underlying the specific restraint. The 
type of obligation which limits the exercise of Member State competence is, therefore, not  per se 
[Union]  and  its  Member  States.  […]  But  they did  need  to  say something,  and  what  they wrote  was  a  general  
obligation to help and not hinder. Article [4 (3) TEU] is where it is found.”
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sufficient to determine which approach to federalism is being pursued in the specific case. 
A. A typology of restraints 
Article 4 (3) TEU has given rise to a variety of compliance obligations of both a substantive and a 
procedural nature. The provision has been used extensively by the Court of Justice in its justification 
for the core constitutional principles in EU external relations law, including primacy of Union law, 
the doctrine of pre-emption, and the duty of cooperation. 
Within the context of legal restraints on the Member States in external relations, the principle of  
primacy  may  be  considered  to  be  the  “heart  of  the  legal  matter”196,  for  it  ensures  substantive 
compatibility  between  Member  State  agreements  and  rules  of  EU  law.  Primacy  is  the  leading 
conflict  rule  developed in the case law of the Court  of  Justice,  providing that  Union law takes 
precedence over Member State law in case of conflict, and only to the extent of that conflict. What is 
less straightforward, however, is whether Member States “must simply accept this supremacy and 
give way to [Union] law, or whether they must do more”197. The Court of Justice may require that 
Member  States  affirmatively  repeal  national  rules  which  conflict  with  Union  law,  even  if  the 
Member State concerned interprets national law in such a way as to eliminate a positive conflict with 
the Treaties198. 
In  contrast  with  primacy,  the  doctrine  of  pre-emption  discussed  above  is  concerned  with 
impediments to EU law rather than actual conflicts. It is aimed at  avoiding normative conflicts by 
means of preventing the Member States from entering into certain international obligations deemed 
damaging to the Union's interests. Pre-emption of a given field means that the Member States lose 
their competence to conclude international agreements that could potentially affect present or future 
Union legislation199. Limiting the possibility for law-making by the Member States, the doctrine of 
pre-emption thus goes further than primacy. 
In  addition  to  primacy  and  pre-emption,  Member  States  are  under  an  obligation  of  effective 
implementation  of  Union  law.  According  to  Article  216  (2)  TFEU,  international  agreements 
concluded by the Union are binding on the Member States, which means that the Member States 
196 B. De Witte, “Old-fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements between Member States of the European Union”, 
in  G.  de  Burca  and  J.  Scott  (eds.),  Constitutional  Change  in  the  EU  -  From  Uniformity  to  Flexibility? (Hart 
Publishing 2000) 31 at 45.
197 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 771-772.
198 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 7.
199 See Chapter One.
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fulfil an obligation towards the Union by implementing them. Article 216 (2) TFEU can, therefore, 
be considered an expression of the principle of primacy200. 
Another  obligation  stemming  from the  duty of  loyalty  under  Article  4  (3)  TEU is  the  duty of  
cooperation.  Unlike  the  doctrines  of  primacy,  pre-emption  and  implementation,  the  duty  of 
cooperation is not intended to achieve substantive compliance with EU law, imposing procedural 
restraints only201. These procedural duties include the obligation to inform and consult the relevant 
Union institutions before taking unilateral action on the international scene. 
B. Restraints and their rationales  
These different obligations flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU of course vary in the intensity with 
which they interfere with the Member States' freedom to act. Procedural obligations, for one, do not 
seek  to  achieve  substantive  policy  agreement.  Instead,  they  are  primarily  intended  to  “address 
structural  power  gaps  in  the  implementation  of  [Union]  law”202.  Duties  of  this  kind  may  be 
reconciled with a liberal understanding of fidelity, as they “require cooperation only in situations in 
which a primary duty already commits the member state to the accomplishment of the substantive 
goal specified in the [EU] Treaty”203. In other words, procedural obligations are  not free-standing, 
generalised duties for the harmonisation of interests throughout the Union, but apply only when a 
specific legal relationship exists between the Member State and the Union204. 
Procedural obligations may turn into substantive ones, however, where the Member States are not 
only required to use best efforts to fulfil the procedural duty, but are actually under an obligation of 
result. The result may also consist in a negative obligation not to act. 
Compared with their procedural counterpart, substantive compliance obligations are decidedly more 
intrusive  than  obligations  of  a  procedural  nature,  in  that  they significantly narrow the  scope of 
permissible Member State action. Nevertheless, obligations of a substantive kind generally do “not 
seek to suppress political dissent”, but instead attempt to “ensure the effectiveness of the federal 
legal system by demanding clear legal rules throughout the system”205. 
200 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 331.
201 This  distinction  between  substantive  and  procedural  compliance  obligations  is  adopted  from  M.  Cremona, 
“Defending the Community Interest”.
202 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 6.
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Thus,  both  procedural  and  substantive  compliance  obligations  may  be  read  in  a  way which  is 
consistent with a liberal fidelity approach. Both types of duties implicitly distinguish “between the 
substantive policy choice and the effectiveness of decisionmaking or implementation”. Instead of 
seeking to harmonise interests at the policy-making stage, their goal is to “help the European Union 
overcome debilitating obstructionism both at  the  input level,  for example in gathering necessary 
information, and at the output level, such as in the enforcement of E.U. Policies”206. In the absence of 
such obligations, “the European Union’s vertical division of powers would have rendered the central 
government largely ineffective and the project of European integration hopeless”207. 
Neither  if  seen  from the  perspective  of  national  sovereignty  can  such  obligations  be  considered 
objectionable. The  liberal fidelity approach seeks to maximise the potential for success of all actors 
involved in a given system of multilevel governance. In the case of the EU, which was after all created 
by Member States for the attainment of their own objectives, the fulfilment of both Member State  and 
Union interests should generally go hand in hand. As long as substantive restraints, even if they include 
a prohibition to act altogether, are imposed with a view to achieving a more effective functioning of the 
system of EU law, they should therefore be considered compatible with the principle of conferred 
powers.  It  does  not  jeopardise  the  Member  States'  Kompetenz-Kompetenz and  can,  therefore,  be 
reconciled with the understanding of national sovereignty underlying the reasoning of the  BVerfG, 
according to which Member States remain sovereign as long as they retain their position as Masters of 
the Treaties.  Where,  however,  these restraints  are  imposed with the sole  intent  of  furthering the 
unitary alignment of interests, this constitutes a significant inroad into Member State competence 
and sovereignty. In that case, restrictions on the Member States' powers serve only the interests of 
the Union, detached entirely from the will of the Member States as Masters of the Treaties. 
However, aside from fostering the effective functioning of the legal order, substantive compliance 
obligations can also be indicative of an entirely different rationale. In these cases, the intent is to 
“impose harmonious political relations among the various actors” throughout the system and “try to 
create  political  unity  where  the  institutional  architecture  calls  for  pluralism”208.  Instead  of 
encouraging engagement between the different actors like a liberal fidelity approach would, such a 
conservative approach  “insists  on  harmony  even  where  there  is  none”209.  This  rationale 
fundamentally takes issue with federalism itself  and with the existing state  of integration in  the 
206 Ibid. at 9.
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particular area210. 
C. The Union interest 
In  EU  external  relations,  the  observation  that  there  are  different  rationales  underlying  loyalty 
obligations imposed on the Member States is not new. These rationales are reflected in the concept of 
“Union interest” which was first expressed in the Court's case law in the 1970s211. Over the years, the 
Court has oscillated between different rationales for the imposition of obligations based on Article 4 
(3) TEU212. The Union interest has thus been linked to a variety of rationales, including the “effective 
implementation  of  common  rules”,  the  “preservation  of  their  effet  utile”,  the  “facilitation  of  the 
exercise of Union competence” and “the requirement of unity”213. 
Despite its long-standing application by the Court of Justice, the concept of Union interest has only in 
recent years started to receive academic attention as a principle useful for defining the scope of the EU 
loyalty  obligation214.  Academic  opinion,  however,  is  divided  on  the  more  general  Union  interest 
underlying the strategy of the Court of Justice in its construction of the duty of loyalty. According to 
one understanding, the Union interest in external relations lies in the unity of representation of the EU 
and its Member States215. This unity rationale has been making a recurring appearance in the Court's 
reasoning, featuring in early case law all the way until recent Opinions216. As this unity is challenged 
by the autonomy of the Member States, the underlying concept of the principle of unity is “to merge all 
voices  into  one,  and  thus  to  obliterate  plurality  on  the  ground  that  it  undermines  the  [Union's] 
international posture”217. As the requirement of unity is often linked to uniformity and exclusivity218, 
adopting this type of Union interest would mean “somehow regard[ing] shared competence as second-
210 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778.
211 See Opinion 1/75 Understanding on a Local Cost Standard; see further See M. Cremona, “Defending the Community 
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best”219. With its nature of fostering an “instinctive territoriality reflex in the EU-MS interactions”220, 
the requirement of unity can be considered a perfect example of the  conservative fidelity approach 
which seeks to obtain a unitary alignment of interests between the Union and the Member States.  
Under a different view of the Union interest, the loyalty obligation is “being reorientated to pursue 
consistency  and coherence in the intrinsically multifarious action and international representation of 
the Union”221. In contrast with the requirement of unity, a Union interest based on consistency and 
coherence  does  not  seek  to  obliterate  plurality  through  the  means  of  exclusivity,  but  instead  it 
embraces  and  exploits  “the  fortune  of  diversity”222 by  ensuring  that  “all  voices  speak  the  same 
language” as opposed to insisting on the same voice223. 
Another conception of the Union interest in external relations advocates a definition of the loyalty 
obligation in terms of effet utile224. Aimed at the completion of Union objectives, the principle of effet  
utile focusses  on  achieving  both  substantive  and  procedural  compliance  with  Union  law.  The 
application of the dynamic notion of effet utile, however, is limited in that it must “be linked to the 
demands of the [Union] legal order”225. Furthermore, compliance aimed at achieving the effet utile of 
EU rules “requires an identifiable Union law norm with which the Member States should comply, and 
not merely a not-yet-exercised capacity to act”226. 
These latter two conceptions of the Union's interest in loyal cooperation are consistent with a liberal 
vision of fidelity. They both focus on what the legal order as a whole demands in a given case, with 
both accepting diversity over unity and neither one seeking to achieve substantive harmonisation at the 
policy-making stage. The objective is to maximise the potential of Union action, either by way of 
common action or, if necessary, by excluding Member State participation. As long as the Union can 
develop its full potential in external relations, the imposition of any loyalty obligation to that end must 
be deemed to be in the interest of the Member States as well. The Union interest understood in a 
liberal fidelity sense is, therefore, neither an expression of the political self-interest of the EU, “no[r] 
simply an expression of the collective interest of the Member States”227. Instead, it  “represents an 
219 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 125.
220 C. Hillion, “Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations”, 114.
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aspect of the autonomy of the Union system228.  
IV. Structure of the thesis 
In  order  to  assess  which  vision  of  political  morality  dominates  the  construction  of  the  loyalty 
obligation in external relations, and in order to be able to then test the argument that liberal fidelity 
approach is best suited to the needs of the Union and the Member States in this area, the thesis will 
follow Halberstam's two-step approach of examining first the  nature of the restraint imposed and 
then  analysing  the  rationale –  or  Union  interest  –  guiding  the  decision  to  impose  the  specific 
restraint. A thorough appreciation of how the Union interest has evolved from case to case is only 
possible if the relevant cases are grouped according to the type of restraint they impose. Thus, the 
thesis will cover all substantive and procedural obligations mentioned above: the substantive duties 
of primacy, pre-emption,  implementation,  as well  as the procedural obligation to cooperate.  The 
order in which these different obligations are dealt with, however, will be a different one. The thesis, 
in fact, is structured in the order of the extent to which a given obligation reduces the Member States' 
freedom to act, starting with the most intrusive obligations and ending with those obligations which 
allow the Member States a broad scope for participation. 
Thus, Chapter One examines how Article 4 (3) TEU operates to pre-empt Member State action in 
external relations. It addresses questions relating to who should act in a given case,  exploring how 
the doctrine of implied powers governs the preclusion of Member State powers. To that end, the 
chapter will trace the development of the different types of implied powers, with the main focus 
being on the doctrine of pre-emption established in the classic AETR judgment and developed further 
in subsequent case law. The aim of the chapter is to investigate the relationship between the exercise 
of EU powers and the nature of the implied powers such an exercise gives rise to. 
In contrast with Chapter One, which deals with the question of how the duty of loyalty restrains 
Member  State  competence in  order  to  prevent  the  assumption  of  conflicting  legal  obligations, 
Chapter Two focuses on questions pertaining to how the duty of loyalty restrains Member State 
action in order to prevent incompatibilities with EU law. It picks up where Chapter One leaves off 
by looking first at the effect on the Member States' freedoms to act in areas in which pre-emption has 
already taken place, before addressing the same questions with regard to areas where powers remain 
228 Ibid.
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shared. To that end, the chapter explores the question of what impact the exercise of EU powers has 
on the  Member  States'  freedom to  exercise their  own powers,  examining the  role  of  the  AETR 
doctrine in situations in which the Member States have already exercised their powers by entering 
into an international agreement and the Union subsequently obtains an AETR-type competence in the 
field. By contrast, where no AETR type pre-emption has taken place, the Member States remain, in 
theory, free to exercise their powers as they wish. However, the start of concerted Union action may 
also in these cases restrain the Member States' freedom of action. 
Chapters Three and Four shift the focus away from questions relating to the modalities of  action 
towards questions of substantive compliance. Primacy is the key obligation in this respect. The two 
chapters deal with the problem of resolving normative conflicts between Member State rules and 
Union law.  Chapter  Three examines  the restraints  imposed on the Member States  in  relation to 
international  agreements  concluded  by the  Member  States  before  joining  the  EU.  This  type  of 
situation differs from those discussed in the previous chapter by virtue of the fact that pre-accession 
agreements enjoy a particular kind of protection afforded by Article 351 TFEU. However, as we will 
see, Member States are required to bring prior agreements into conformity with EU law. 
Chapter Four raises the same questions discussed in Chapter Three in a different context. Unlike the 
previous chapter, however, Chapter Four does not concern areas of EU competence, focusing instead 
on international Member State agreements concluded with third countries in fields where there is no 
EU legislation in place, either because the area falls outside Union competence or EU competence is  
parallel in nature. Even in such areas, the fundamental economic freedoms and the general principle 
of non-discrimination apply, with the result that the powers retained by the Member States must be 
exercised in a manner consistent with EU law. 
Chapter  Five  turns  to  those  situations  in  which  both  the  Member  States  and  the  Union  jointly 
exercise  their  powers.  This  occurs  where  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  enter  into  a  mixed 
agreement. The chapter examines when and how the duty of loyalty crystallises into concrete legal 
obligations  where  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  have  concluded  international  agreements 
together.  In  this  context,  Article  4  (3)  TEU entails  both  substantive  and procedural  compliance 
obligations.  Chapter  Five  first  looks  at  the  obligations  that  concern  the  interpretation  and 
implementation of those parts of a mixed agreement which falls within national competence, before 
turning to the procedural restraints imposed by the duty of sincere cooperation. 
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Chapter One
Implied Powers – From Pre-emption to Complementarity
I. Introduction 
Foreign affairs  powers  of  the  Union can flow from Treaty provisions  expressly providing for  a 
corresponding external competence, but they can also be found to exist by way of implication from 
legislative  powers.  Despite  its  sceptical  stance  on  European  integration,  the  German  Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG) accepted in its Lisbon judgment229 that 
“[a]ny integration into peacekeeping systems, in international or supranational organisations opens up 
the possibility for the institutions thus created to develop independently, and in doing so, to show a 
tendency of  political self-enhancement,  even,  and particularly if,  their bodies act  according to their 
mandate.”230
A tendency on the part of the Union towards interpreting powers along the lines of US doctrine of 
implied powers  was,  according to  the  BVerfG,  generally in  line with  the principle  of  conferred 
powers and, therefore, had to be “tolerated”231. 
Until the Court of Justice recognised the existence of implied Union competence in the 1970s, these 
powers were widely considered, if ever found to exist,  to be of a shared nature232.  In fact,  even 
express competence to act in any given field was initially shared between the Union and the Member 
States,  both  on  the  internal  level  as  well  as  far  as  international  relations  were  concerned.  The 
principle  of  exclusivity was  “well  known to  federal  constitutions  but  alien  to  the  original  EEC 
Treaty”233 and did not appear on the “canvas of shared competence”234 until it was introduced into the 
Union legal order by the Court of Justice in the 1970s235. 
However, the assumption that implied powers were shared did not prevent the Court from adopting a 
different approach. When it laid the foundation for the implied powers doctrine in the AETR case, the 
229 German Federal  Constitutional  Court,  Decision of 30 June 2009, 2BvE 2/08 et  al.,  see further  the Introductory 
Chapter. 
230 Ibid., para 237, emphasis added.
231 Ibid.
232 H. Krück, Völkerrechtliche Verträge im Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Springer 1977) at 107.
233 T. Schilling, “A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule and a Principle” (1994) 14 YEL 203 at 221.
234 R. Schütze, “Dual Federalism Constitutionalised”, 6.
235 See Opinion 1/75 Understanding on a Local Cost Standard.
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Court found this type of competence to be of an exclusive nature, with the result that the principle of 
implied  competence  became  equivalent  with  the  principle  of  pre-emption.  Unlike  a  priori 
exclusivity, which deprives the Member States immediately and irreversibly of all external powers, 
regardless  of  whether  the  Union  has  exercised  its  exclusive  competence  or  not236,  pre-emption 
follows from the interpretation of the Treaty on a case-by-case basis. 
The finding that the existence of implied powers was equivalent to pre-emption of Member State 
competence constituted a significant inroad into Member State sovereignty. Whenever the Union 
acquires an exclusive competence in a given area, the Member States are deprived not only of their 
regulatory powers in the field, but also of the “most widely-accepted characteristic of the sovereign 
state”237, that is, the possibility to enter into agreements with third countries outside the framework of 
Union law. In the case of pre-emption, this effect is further exacerbated by the fact that entire policy 
areas may automatically be removed from Member State competence once it has been regulated by 
the Union, even if only in part. Such an “aggressive policy of automatic field preemption” would 
then be incompatible with a liberal fidelity view of federalism238. Liberal fidelity, in fact,
“generally counsels against automatic exclusivity of central government powers as well as inviolability 
of  specific  substantive  areas  of  constituent  state  authority,  in  favor  of  preserving  constructive 
democratic policy engagement between the different levels of government.”239
The aim of the present chapter is to examine which view of political morality has governed the 
Court's approach to implied powers and how it has developed over time. As a theoretical basis for the 
subsequent discussion, Section II will first outline the different types of pre-emption that operate to 
restrain  Member  States'  external  competence,  assigning  each  to  its  corresponding  model  of 
federalism.  Section III will then turn to the Court's case law, tracing the evolution of the implied 
powers doctrine from an instrument of pre-emption to a mechanism favouring the complementarity 
of Member State and Union action governed by the duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU. The 
process culminating in the recognition by the Court of Justice that implied powers may be shared, 
however,  is  contrasted  with  the  Court's  incremental  broadening  of  the  conditions  under  which 
implied  Union  powers  become  exclusive,  as  will  become  apparent  in  Section  IV.  Against  this 
background, Section V will seek to shed light on the way in which these two separate strands of the  
236 K. Lenaerts, “Les répercussions des compétences de la Communauté européenne sur les compétences externes des 
Etats  membres et  la  question de la  'preemption'”,  in  P.  Demaret  (ed.),  Relations extérieures  de la Communauté  
européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et fonctionnels (Story 1988) 39 at 41.
237 M. Cremona, “The Doctrine of Exclusivity and the Position of Mixed Agreements in the External Relations of the  
European Community” (1982) 3 OJLS 393 at 393.
238 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 27.
239 Ibid. at 26, emphasis added.
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Court's  case  law  on  implied  powers  relate  to  each  other,  before  the  final  section  attempts  an  
assessment of the findings of this chapter in relation to the area of the CFSP. 
II. Implied powers and the principle of conferral – Three visions of federalism
The first time that the Court of Justice dealt with the question of whether Union powers were capable 
of arising by way of implication was in the 1971  AETR case240,  the “arguably […]  single  most  
important judgment the Court has handed down in the field of [EU] external relations law”241. 
The case concerned the European Transport Road Agreement (AETR) regulating the work of crews 
engaged in international transport, which had been signed under the auspices of the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe. The EU Commission was of the view that the Union alone was competent  
to conclude the AETR and brought an action against the Council. 
However, the Treaty provision governing the conclusion of international EU agreements at the time 
(Article 228 EEC, now Article 218 TFEU) expressly laid down that Union competence in external 
matters could only be exercised “where [the] Treaty [so] provides”242, which suggested that “there 
was external competence only where the Treaty expressly provided for it”243. The Treaty did not, 
however, establish a competence for the Union in the field of road transport. Indeed, only very few 
Treaty  articles  concerning  commercial  policy  and  association  referred  to  the  conclusion  of 
international agreements by the EU. Neither did the Treaty contain a principle of parallelism, unlike 
the ECSC Treaty. While the latter Treaty provided for a Union competence to “perform its functions 
and attain its objectives” in international relations244,  the EEC Treaty merely established that the 
Community had legal personality245.
The absence of express treaty-making power notwithstanding, the Commission opposed the Member 
States' plan to conclude the AETR, arguing that competence to conclude the agreement had passed 
on to the Union when it had adopted Regulation 543/69 in the field of road transport246.
240 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR).
241 P. Eeckhout, “Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond”, in M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and the Future  
of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 
218 at 218, emphasis added.
242 See further Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 22/70 AETR [1971] ECR 284 at 293.
243 P. Eeckhout, “Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond”, 218
244 Article 6 ECSC provided:  “In international relations, the Community shall enjoy the legal capacity it  requires to  
perform its functions and attain its objectives.”
245 Article 210 EEC.
246 Regulation 543/69 [1969] OJ L 77/49.
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Advocate  General  Dutheillet  de  Lamothe  considered  that  the  recognition  of  such  a  Union 
competence would be tantamount to those “implied powers” granted by the US Supreme Court in 
order to supplement the powers of the federal institutions. In EU law, however, such a transfer of 
competence was subject to the principle of conferral. Although conferred powers could be construed 
widely in matters relating to  intra-EU questions, their application to the conclusion of agreements 
with third countries was more limited: 
“It appears clear from the general scheme of the Treaty of Rome that its authors intended strictly to limit  
the [Union's] authority in external matters to the cases which they expressly laid down.”247
Therefore, the recognition of implied powers for negotiations with third countries “would far exceed 
the intentions of the authors of the Treaty”248.  Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter,  if  the 
attribution  of  implied  competence  to  the  Union  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  Member  States' 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz as Masters of the Treaty, then a competence creep must be deemed to have 
taken place at EU level, jeopardising the protection of national sovereignty249. 
As is  well  known,  the Court  of  Justice did not  share the Advocate General's  concerns over  the 
compatibility of implied external powers with the principle of conferral. Instead, as further discussed 
below, it not only ruled that EU powers to conclude an international agreements could arise by way 
of implication, but at the same time, it also found this type of competence to be exclusive. And thus,  
the doctrine of “pre-emption” in EU external relations law was born. 
The doctrine of pre-emption has its origins in the constitutional law of the United States250, but it 
“very slowly” became a constitutional principle in the EU of its own right251. Indeed, together with 
the  principles  of  direct  effect  and  primacy  of  Union  law,  it  may  be  considered  “one  of  the  
foundations of the European [Union's] normative supranationality”252. Like the notions of exclusivity 
and  implied  powers,  pre-emption  in  Union  law  is  a  creation  of  the  judiciary.  It  refers  to  “the 
preclusion of national regulatory powers that results from a decision by the judicial branch”253. More 
generally, pre-emption is a means for the Court of Justice to balance and allocate decision-making 
power among the Union institutions and the legislative and administrative bodies of the Member 
247 Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 22/70 AETR, 293.
248 Ibid.
249 For the relationship between the notions of conferred powers, Kompetenz-Kompetenz and competence creep, see the 
Introductory Chapter, Section II. 
250 K. Lenaerts, “Les répercussions des compétences de la Communauté européenne sur les compétences externes des 
Etats membres et la question de la 'preemption'”, 42.
251 R. Schütze, “Supremacy without Pre-Emption? The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-Emption” 
(2006) 43 CMLRev. 1023.
252 A. G. Soares, “Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity” (1998) 23 ELRev. 132 at 133. 
253 Ibid. 
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States254.
Broadly  speaking,  pre-emption  can  be  understood  as  “a  formal  doctrine  that  defines  the 
circumstances in which Member State law will be invalidated on the basis of its conflict with the  
legislation of the [Union] institutions”255. However, the pre-emptive exclusivity established in AETR 
is by no means the only technique available to the Court for invalidating conflicting Member State 
rules. Indeed, in the  AETR judgment, the Court of Justice “could easily have adopted a different 
approach”256. What, then, are the different methods available to the Court for resolving a conflict 
between Member States' international obligations and their obligations towards the Union (A.)? And 
what vision of political morality do the different approaches reflect (B.)?
A. A typology of pre-emption
In order to find a solution to the problem that the AETR concerned a subject covered by EU rules,  
the Court of Justice could have relied on an approach “outside the sphere of exclusive treaty-making 
competence”  by  applying  a  rule  of  primacy257.  Primacy  of  EU  law is  one  of  the  fundamental 
principles of Union law and serves to resolve conflicts  between the EU and the Member States 
concerning the ranking of Union law above national law. According to the principle of primacy, the 
Member States are obliged to give precedence to EU law where Union rules conflict with national 
rules. Primacy always requires a material conflict between Union law and national law, applying 
where  Member State  legislation “literally contradicts  a  specific  [Union]  rule”258.  Where  a  direct 
conflict is found to exist, Member State legislation will always be invalidated. Therefore, in keeping 
with the terminology of pre-emption, the principle is sometimes termed “direct conflict pre-emption” 
or “rule pre-emption”259, even if, strictly speaking, its effect on Member State provisions is not pre-
emptive in nature.
Like rule pre-emption, a second modality of pre-emption applies in situations of a material conflict 
254 E. D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis”  
(1992) 29 CMLRev. 447 at 447.
255 Ibid.
256 P. Eeckhout, “Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond”, 219.
257 Ibid.
258 R. Schütze, “Supremacy without Pre-Emption?”, 1042.
259 See e.g. R. Schütze, “Supremacy without Pre-Emption?”; E. D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the 
European Economic Community”; A. G. Soares, “Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity”; similarly M. 
Waelbroek, “The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – Consent and Re-delegation”, in T. Sandalow and 
E. Stein (eds.), Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, Vol. II (OUP 1982) 548. 
Note,  however,  that  in  general  EU external  relations literature,  the term “pre-emption” is  generally used  in  the 
narrower sense, referring to occupation of the field. 
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between Union and national law. However, the exclusionary effect of Union legislation in this case 
does not presuppose a conflict between Member State rules and a specific provision of EU law. The 
pre-emptive effect is solely based on a finding that the national measure interferes with the proper 
functioning of the common market or impedes the  objectives of the Union legislation260. For this 
reason, the third modality has been termed “obstacle pre-emption”261. 
By contrast,  a third category of  pre-emption,  known as “occupation of  the field” or “field pre-
emption”, precludes Member State action from the outset. This is the case if the Union legislator has 
regulated a field “so exhaustively that the [Union] has allowed no room for additional Member State 
law”262.  If the Member States were to take action in fields in which Union rules have been adopted, 
the effective functioning of EU law would be jeopardised, preventing the Union from carrying out 
the tasks  which  have  been conferred  upon it263.  The mere  occupation  of  a  field is  sufficient  to 
exclude  Member State  involvement,  irrespective  of  whether  a  material normative  tension exists 
between Union legislation and Member State rules264. This type of preclusion of Member State law 
operates even in the absence of EU rules: 
“We are concerned here with a situation where there may not exist a specific [Union] measure, but  
where the entire policy area – the legal space – has become occupied, or even potentially occupied, by  
the [Union] in the sense that it is the duty of the [Union] to fill and regulate that area. When pre-
emption  operates,  Member  States  will  be  prevented  from introducing  measures  –  and  hence  the 
temporal dimension – even in the absence of, or before the adoption of, a specific [Union] rule.”265 
The  principles  of  primacy  and  field  pre-emption  are  closely  related  and  share  many  practical 
consequences. Being both “designed to ensure the primacy of the [Union] over the Member States”,  
the two concepts represent “two sides of the same coin”266. However, they should not be equated, for 
they  operate  in  substantially  different  ways.  Field  pre-emption  logically  precedes  primacy:  it 
precludes  Member State  action not because rules of Union law apply which prevail  in cases of 
conflict, but simply because national action in a given area is not permitted, even if no EU norm 
260 E.  D.  Cross,  “Pre-emption  of  Member  State  Law  in  the  European  Economic  Community”,  463,  R.  Schütze,  
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263 L. and R. Holdgaard, “The External Powers of the European Community” (2001) 1 RETTID 108 at 166.
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exists with which national rules can come into conflict267. 
B. The different types of pre-emption and their impact on Member States' treaty-making powers 
Their close relationship notwithstanding, the differences between the two concepts are of paramount 
significance for the Member States in determining the scope for national law-making powers in a 
given area. When the Court of Justice applies the doctrine of primacy, the Member States are only 
precluded from taking those measures which are in direct conflict with a given Union rule. Indeed, 
both obstacle pre-emption and rule pre-emption affect only the specific national provision at issue 
and not every national measure in the field. Therefore, these two modalities have  a less restrictive 
effect on the Member States' powers than occupation of the field. Moreover, they allow the national 
authorities to redraft their measures in a way that will avoid the obstruction of Union objectives268.
The mere fact that obstacle and rule pre-emption have a similarly limited scope for restraint does not, 
however, mean that their application reflects the same approach to federalism. On the contrary, the 
visions of political morality which they represent could not be more different. An approach based on 
the  primacy  of  Union  rules  promotes  productive  engagement  throughout  the  system,  imposing 
restraint only in case of actual conflict of rules and resolving such a conflict with a view to furthering 
the needs of the system as a whole. By encouraging interaction among the Member States and the 
Union until a normative conflict arises, the liberal vision of fidelity focuses on what the system “as a 
whole demands in  any given case”269.  As such, primacy can be reconciled with a  liberal fidelity 
approach  to  federalism270.  In  the  context  of  implied  external  competence,  an  example  of  this 
approach would be the recognition of implied Union powers which are non-exclusive in nature271. 
By contrast,  the  pre-emptive effect of obstacle pre-emption is solely based on a finding that the 
national measure impedes the objectives of the Union legislation272. Where powers are created which 
have previously not been recognised, it must be assumed that this occurs with a view to furthering 
the political self-interest of one of the actors. Such an approach then indicates an entitlements view 
267 S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (OUP 1995) at 137.
268 E. D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community”, 467.
269 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 736, emphasis added.
270 See D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 4.
271 On the nature of non-exclusive implied competence, see M. Klamert and N. Maydell, “Lost in Exclusivity: Implied 
Non-exclusive External Competences in Community Law” (2008) 13 E.F.A. Rev. 493.
272 E.  D.  Cross,  “Pre-emption  of  Member  State  Law  in  the  European  Economic  Community”,  463,  R.  Schütze,  
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of  federalism273.  The  “necessity”-test  developed in  Opinion  1/76,  as  we will  see  below,  can  be 
considered an example of this type of federalism.
Compared  with  primacy,  field  pre-emption  is  “more  clean-cut  and  it  is  more  dramatic  in  its 
exclusionary effect on national powers”274. When the Court applies the field pre-emption principle, 
Member State rules are precluded in relation to the entire  area  in question275. Field occupation is, 
therefore,  the  “most  comprehensive”276 and  “most  powerful”277 type  of  pre-emption.  It  operates 
irrespective of whether  the national  measures actually conflict  with or impede the objectives  of 
Union legislation, of whether they are existing or subsequently adopted, and of whether they were 
subjected to a specific pre-emption analysis or not278. 
The creation of implied powers, as will be further discussed below, may generally be considered in 
line with a conservative fidelity approach, which seeks to create political unity where the institutional 
architecture calls for pluralism279. Conservative fidelity does not advocate the creation of new powers 
by  way  of  creeping  competence.  However,  a  strengthening  of  already  existent  EU  powers  is 
acceptable where this is in the interest  of the system as a whole.  The creation of corresponding 
external powers in areas which have been sufficiently regulated by the Union is, therefore, not an 
expression of the entitlements view of federalism. Once the occupation of a given field automatically 
equips the Union with an exclusive competence in the area, this goes beyond a mere enhancement of 
already  existing  powers.  By  precluding  an  entire  legislative  area  from  the  reach  of  national 
competence, field pre-emption has the effect of overcoming the regulatory competitiveness between 
the EU and its Member States280. The absolute exclusion of Member State powers within an occupied 
field, in fact, “reproduces the effects of a 'real' exclusive competence” for the whole policy area281. 
Like in the case of obstacle pre-emption, there is an “evident antagonism” between the notion of 
field occupation and the doctrine of subsidiarity282. Designed as a legal instrument to oppose “certain 
centripetal tendencies caused by application of the material content of determined technical features 
273 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences: Comparative Federalism and the Duty of Cooperation”, 3.
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278 E. D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community”, 467.
279 Ibid. at 778.
280 S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, 137.                             
281 R. Schütze, “Supremacy without Pre-Emption?”,1040.
282 A. G. Soares,  “Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers  and Subsidiarity”,  139.  The doctrine of  subsidiarity essentially 
incorporates the principle of attributed Union competence and the notion that Union action should not go beyond 
what  is  necessary  to  achieve  its  objectives.  For  a  detailed  analysis  see  e.g.  G.  De  Búrca,  “The  Principle  of  
Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor” (1998) 36 JCMS 217.
60
such as pre-emption”, subsidiarity is not compatible with a method for the adjudication of conflicts 
of competences which “favours a centralising perspective of the division of powers”283. An example 
of field pre-emption can be found in Opinion 2/91, as we will see in Section III284. The following 
section, however, will first look at how the Court of Justice has construed the principle of field pre-
emption and what view of political morality underlies the Court's approach to  AETR competence, 
outlining how this approach has evolved in subsequent case law. 
III. Implied powers and their relationship with exclusivity – The scope of implied competence
When the Court of Justice recognised the existence of implied powers in the 1970s, it considered 
them to be synonymous with the exclusivity of Union competence. By ruling that the exercise of the 
EU's regulatory powers internally gave rise to exclusive powers externally for the entire policy area 
concerned, the Court introduced two new and distinct concepts in a single case, namely the principle 
of implied powers and the principle of field pre-emption in EU external relations law. The present 
section seeks to disentangle the two concepts interwoven in the Court's approach to implied powers, 
asking how the  changing scope of  implied  competence  can  be  reconciled  with  the  principle  of 
conferred powers. To that end, this section will trace the evolution of the Court's approach to implied 
powers  from the bold  assertion of  Union powers  in  the  early cases  (A.),  through the period  of 
clarification in the 1990s (B.), to the Court's declaration in Opinion 1/03 that implied powers may be 
shared (C.). 
A. The early case law – An incremental broadening of the scope of implied competence
i. AETR
When the Court of Justice was first faced with the question of implied external competence in AETR, 
Advocate  General  Dutheillet  de Lamothe  urged the  Court  to  reject  the  Commission's  view that 
authority in external matters could be transferred to the Union by way of the adoption of a EU 
Regulation, as that would make it very difficult “to establish a criterion which avoids ambiguity or 
283 Ibid., at 140.
284 Opinion 2/91 Convention No. 170 on safety in the use of chemicals at work [1993] ECR I-1061.
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legal uncertainty”285. Therefore, he proposed “a relatively strict interpretation of the Treaty” in this 
case286. 
Not only did the Court choose not to follow the Advocate General by establishing the principle that  
Union powers could arise by implication from secondary legislation, but it also provided for such 
competence  to  be  exclusive  in  nature.  In  a  first  step,  the  Court  of  Justice  acknowledged  that 
competences to act externally may derive not only from an express conferral by the Treaty but, in 
addition, “may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within 
the framework of those provisions, by the [Union] institutions”287.  The Court thus agreed with the 
Commission's argument that the Union's external competence could flow from primary or secondary 
Union law, and went on to specify the circumstances under which external powers may be conferred 
upon the EU. According to the Court, such competence arose 
“each time the [Union], with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts 
provisions laying down common rules [...]”288. 
The Court thus laid the basis for the principle of parallelism, also known as in foro interno in foro  
externo, according to which Union competence to conclude international agreements runs in parallel 
with the development of its internal competence289. 
In a next step, the Court provided the legal implications of the conferral of competence based on 
secondary law adopted internally: 
“[...] the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake  
obligations with third countries which affect those rules”290. 
The retained powers of the Member States were, therefore, pre-empted, with the result that the Union 
was exclusively competent to conclude the agreement in question291. It is important, here, to recall 
the distinction between the existence and the nature of implied competence and its application by the 
285 Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 22/70 AETR at 291.
286 Ibid. at 294.
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Court of Justice. The Court appeared to infer from the mere existence of Union competence that it 
was of an exclusive nature. The Union's powers to negotiate and conclude the agreement in question 
“exclude the possibility of concurrent  powers on the part of  Member States,  since any steps taken 
outside the framework of the [Union] institutions would be incompatible with the unity of the Common 
Market and the uniform application of [Union] law”292. 
The  AETR judgment thus  had two dramatic  consequences.  First,  it  expanded the Union's  power 
potential.  Ruling that the existence of internal Union rules gave rise to a corresponding external  
competence, the Court confirmed that the EU could be competent even in the absence of an express 
provision in the Treaties. Second, it introduced a significant  prohibitory potential for Union rules: 
holding  that  Member  State  action  was  excluded  in  a  given  area  once  the  Union  legislator  had 
occupied that legal space,  the Court linked the existence of implied competence to its exclusive 
nature. 
Against this background, can the AETR judgment be deemed to represent an entitlements approach to 
federalism? Both the Council and the Advocate General had argued that the mere granting of powers 
to the Union by way of implication would contravene the principle of conferral293. This view was 
also supported by the prevailing opinion in the legal literature at the time294. 
Under international law, however, it is generally assumed that the principle of conferred powers “is 
flexible enough to accommodate the existence of powers in international organisations which were 
not expressly attributed in their constituent instruments”295. In the AETR case more specifically, the 
Court's creation of implied powers may be reconciled with the principle of conferral: 
“The [Union] only has those competences that have been conferred on it, but […] that does not mean  
that the [Union] can only act on the external front when it has explicitly been granted the competence 
to do so […].”296 
While the  existence of implied competence may,  therefore,  be deemed to be in accordance with 
conferred  powers,  the  same  does  not  necessarily  hold  true  for  the  exclusive  nature of  such 
competence. By ruling that to  the extent to which the Union had adopted legislation, the Member 
States were not able to undertake obligations in a given field, irrespective of any normative tension 
292 Ibid., paras 30-31.
293 Case 22/70 AETR, para 9; Opinion of AG Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 22/70 AETR at 293.
294 See E. Stein and L. Henkin, “Part I: the International Dimension”, in M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J. Weiler 
(eds.), Integration through Law – Europe and the American Federal Experience (Gruyter 1986) 43.
295 See A. Antoniadis, “The EU's Implied Competence to Conclude International Agreements after the Reform Treaty –  
Reformed Enough?”, in F. Laursen (ed.), The EU in the Global Political Economy (PIE Peter Lang 2009) 67 at 69, 
emphasis added. 
296 G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 20. 
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between Union law and Member State rules, the Court established the presumption that all Member 
State commitments in matters regulated internally by the Union were capable of affecting EU rules 
or altering their scope. As such, the Court's reasoning is a perfect example of field pre-emption. The 
combination  of  the  broad  power  potential  and  the  prohibitory  nature  of  the  AETR judgment 
effectively created an “absolute entitlement” for the Union to regulate the external aspect of transport 
policy297.  In fact, the  AETR doctrine “created conditions which could lead to the usurping of the 
competences of the Member States externally as well as internally through the back door”298.
ii. Kramer 
The question of the nature of implied powers arose again a few years later in  Kramer299.  In this 
preliminary  reference  concerning  the  application  of  the  1959  North  East  Atlantic  Fisheries 
Convention,  the  Court  had  to  decide  whether  the  Union  alone  had  the  authority  to  enter  into 
commitments in the field of fisheries conservation despite the fact that the majority of the Member 
States at the time were parties to the Convention. 
The Court recalled that the Union enjoyed internal powers to take measures for the conservation of  
biological resources of the sea, but contrary to the situation in  AETR, internal rules had not been 
adopted and the field had consequently not been occupied by the Union yet. Having already hinted in 
its  AETR judgment at the existence of different ways in which implied external competence could 
arise300,  the Court acknowledged explicitly that external competences could be found to exist  by 
implication301. After reiterating the principle established in AETR, the Court went on to specify that 
Union competence to enter into international agreements could be drawn from “the whole scheme of 
the Treaty”302. The Court of Justice thus not only confirmed the existence of complied competence, 
but it also interpreted it “more broadly” than the initial AETR case303. 
With  regard  to  the  specific  case,  the  Court  argued  that  fisheries  conservation  could  only  be 
effectively ensured through a system of rules binding on all members of the convention. It followed 
297 This reasoning is adopted by analogy from Halberstam's assessment of the Court's approach to the internal market in 
Dassonville, see D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 12.
298 A. Antoniadis, “The EU's Implied Competence to Conclude International Agreements after the Reform Treaty”, 69.
299 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others [1976] ECR 1279. 
300 In para 17 of the AETR Case the Court introduced the principle of implied powers by pointing out one circumstance 
in which it can arise “in particular”, that of internal legislation having been promulgated prior to the conclusion of an  
international agreement. 
301 A. Dashwood and J. Heliskoski, “The Classic Authorities Revisited”, 10.
302 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others, paras 19/20. 
303 A. Antoniadis, “The EU's Implied Competence to Conclude International Agreements after the Reform Treaty”, 70.
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“from the very nature of the activity in question” that the Union, by virtue of its internal powers, was 
competent  to  enter  into  commitments  concerning  such  a  system304.  Relying  on  “the  aim  of 
'encouraging rational use of the biological resources of the sea'”305, the Court effectively extended the 
substantive  scope  of  Union  competence  to  fishing  on  the  high  seas306.  This  emphasis  on  the 
teleological interpretation of internal EU powers had the effect of creating an equally teleological 
interpretation  of  external  Union  competence,  leading  to  a  “wide  construction”  of  the  scope  of 
implied powers307. 
The broad scope of implied external competence did not, however, mean, that Member State action 
was excluded in the specific case. Having established a Union competence over the matter, the Court 
went on to consider whether the obligations arising from the convention had been assumed by the 
EU. It declared that the mere existence of a legislative power did not suffice to deprive the Member  
States of their concurrent powers, but only an actual exercise of its powers could lead to exclusive 
competence308. Given that the Union had not yet made use of its powers, the Court held that the 
Member States retained their competence to act. Nevertheless, once the transitional period  of the 
Member States' authority to enter into international commitments regarding conservation measures 
had expired309, the EU would be solely competent to become active in the field310. 
iii. Opinion 1/76
From  AETR and  Kramer, it  appeared that the existence of implied powers was dependent on the 
existence of internal rules. Shortly after  Kramer, the Court of Justice rebutted this presumption in 
Opinion 1/76311. In the absence of any internal Union legislation on the matter, the Court was asked 
to rule on the compatibility with the EEC Treaty of an agreement aimed at regulating certain aspects 
of navigation in the Rhine and Moselle basins. After confirming the doctrine of implied powers as 
developed in AETR, the Court clarified that such Union powers were not limited to cases in which an 
internal  power had already been exercised,  but  could  equally be based  on the necessity for  the 
304 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer, paras 30-33.
305 Ibid., para 27.
306 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2006) 91.
307 Ibid.
308 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer, para 39.
309 Article 102 of the Act of Accession obligated the Council to adopt measures for the conservation of the resources of  
the sea no later than five years after accession.
310 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer, para 41; see also Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, 
discussed in Chapter Two.
311 Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels [1977] ECR 741.
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attainment of one of the objectives of the Union, in this  case the implementation of a common 
transport policy312. In the specific case, only a Union agreement was capable of organising navigation 
on  the  Rhine  in  such a  way as  to  include  also  the  third  country involved,  which  made  Union 
competence in the field indispensable313. 
The  Court  of  Justice  thus  created  a  second basis  for  implied  powers,  different  from the  AETR 
principle founded on pre-emption. According to this second basis, implied powers arise where this is 
“necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives of the [Union]”314. While the AETR doctrine 
links  the  exclusion  of  Member  State  competence  to  the  existence  of  EU rules,  the  doctrine  of 
necessity established in Opinion 1/76 pursues an approach based on “effet utile, the implication of 
powers necessary to achieve an expressly defined objective”315. As such, it represents an example of 
obstacle pre-emption, creating powers which have previously not been recognised. 
However,  while  obstacle  pre-emption  generally  operates  on  the  basis  of  primacy  in  cases  of 
incompatibilities with Union law, the Court's ruling in Opinion 1/76 raised the question of whether 
its  approach went  beyond  primacy,  pre-empting  Member  State  action  in  an  entire  field  of  law. 
Notwithstanding  its  finding  of  implied  Union  powers  to  conclude  the  agreement,  the  Court 
sanctioned the participation of the Member States. Even if  the Court did not  expressly mention 
“exclusivity”, it has been widely accepted that the Court did accord exclusive external competence to 
the Union in Opinion 1/76316. The theory of exclusivity seems to rest on the assumption that, had the 
Member States not been bound by pre-existing obligations, their participation in the conclusion of 
the agreement  would not  have  been considered necessary and the EU would have  had the  sole 
authority to undertake commitments in the field. Some commentators, however, find that assumption 
“puzzling”317,  not  least  because  it  would  have  implied  a  significant  expansion  of  the  scope  of 
exclusive competence318. In Opinion 1/2003, the Court finally laid all doubts regarding the nature of 
implied competence based on the “necessity”-criterion to rest by expressly stating that the Opinion 
312 Opinion 1/76, para 4.
313 The fact that some of the concerned Member States were nevertheless able to participate in the conclusion of the 
agreement was solely due to their obligations already assumed prior to the establishment of the Union.  
314 Opinion 1/76, para 4.
315 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 51.
316 In its submissions to Opinion 1/94, the Commission referred to “exclusive external competence” in the context of 
Opinion 1/76; as far as the legal  literature is concerned, see e.g. M. Cremona, “External Relations and External  
Competence: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy”, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law 
(OUP 1999) 137 at 153; P. Pescatore, “External Relations in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European  
Communities”, (1979) 16 CMLRev. 615 at 623.
317 See  A.  Dashwood  and  J.  Heliskoski,  “The  Classic  Authorities  Revisited”,  13;  similarly,  P.  Koutrakos,  EU 
International Relations Law, 95.
318 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 95.
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1/76-type competence did indeed give rise to exclusivity319.
iv. The early cases – A bold assertion of Union competence 
The picture which emerged from the early case law on implied competence was rather fragmented. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Court  approached  the  subject  of  implied  external  competence  with  “an 
inexorable  dynamism  of  enhanced  supranationalism”320.  Instead  of  relying  on  the  principle  of 
primacy of European law in cases of conflict with Member State rules, the Court opted for a different 
approach based on the avoidance of conflicts by means of pre-emption. It not only empowered the 
Union to enter into international agreements on the basis of the existence of internal rules, but it also 
precluded the Member States from further action in areas in which the Union had legislated. Such a 
“bold” claim of external powers had a significant impact on both the political and the constitutional 
level: 
“Exclusive competence is exceptional in the [Union's] constitutional order, and where it affects the 
external sovereignty of the Member States, it is even more delicate.”321
The  introduction  of  the  AETR doctrine  meant  that  the  scope  of  Member  State  powers  would 
increasingly  diminish  over  time,  as  the  number  of  fields  in  which  the  EU  enjoyed  exclusive 
competence was bound to increase in parallel with its growing legislative activity. The boundaries of 
this  doctrine  were,  furthermore,  expanded incrementally.  Thus,  in  Kramer,  the  Court  adopted  a 
teleological approach, relaxing the requirement of promulgated internal legislation to give rise to 
exclusive implied powers upon the expiry of a certain period of time set for the exercise of Union 
competence. In Opinion 1/76, finally, it granted the Union an implied competence in the absence of 
any internal Union rules in the field whatsoever.
On the other hand, the period between the AETR case and the adoption of the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1986 saw a significant broadening of the scope of the Treaties aimed at the centralisation of 
powers  away from the  Member  States322.  This  increase in  the  substantive  scope of  the  Union's 
regulatory activity provided legal bases which expressly attributed external relations competences to 
the Union. It thus appears that the Member States “did not hesitate in equipping the [Union] with the 
319 Opinion 1/2003 Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano  Convention on jurisdiction and the  
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-1145, para 115.
320 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1990-1991) 100 Yale L. J. 2403 at 2410.
321 P. Eeckhout, “Bold Constitutionalism and Beyond”, 219.
322 See A. Goucha Soares,  “The Principle of  Conferred Powers  and the Division of  Powers  between the European 
Community and the Member States”, 67-68. 
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necessary tools to act on the global plane”323. 
The creation of implied powers by the Court of Justice, accordingly, did not appear to go against the 
interests of the Member States. What was of “greater concern”, instead, was the exclusive nature of 
the newly created type of competence324. The Court left no doubt that the competence granted to the 
Union in AETR, Kramer and Opinion 1/76 belonged either to the Union or to the Member States, but 
could not be shared. Member State action in the field was precluded, unless concurrent competence 
was considered necessary “in order to avoid a legislative vacuum”325 created by the pre-emption of 
Member  State  competence.  Complementary  action  of  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  was, 
however, not foreseen. Once Member State involvement  ceased to be necessary, all Member State 
power was excluded by the mere fact that the Union had obtained an external competence or had 
acted in a particular field. The principle of implied Union competence therefore “remained very 
'exclusive' indeed”326. 
Whether  intended or not,  by equating the existence of implied competence with exclusivity,  the 
Court  established  the  presumption  that  all  Member  State  commitments  in  matters  regulated 
internally by the Union were capable of affecting those rules or altering their scope. In the legal 
literature, the Court's apparent “confusion”327 between the existence and the nature of a competence 
led,  at  the  time,  some commentators  to  deduce  from this  ruling  a  general  principle  of  implied 
exclusive competence, arguing that there was no place for concurrent or parallel powers whenever a 
matter belonged to the Union's sphere328.
Leaving many questions unanswered, the AETR case essentially allowed for two interpretations. 
Before the AETR doctrine was brought before the Court again, the question arose whether it implied
“that  the  [Union]  has  exclusive  competence  over  the  subject-matter  on  which  the  [Union]  has  
legislated, and that Member States have no longer any competence to adopt international agreements in  
that subject matter329”. 
Alternatively, the other interpretation of the AETR doctrine was 
“that the [Union] has exclusive competence to enter into international agreements which would 'affect'  
the [Union] measures or 'alter their scope', but Member States would remain competent to enter into 
323 A. Antoniadis, “The EU's Implied Competence to Conclude International Agreements after the Reform Treaty”, 74.
324 Ibid.
325 M. Cremona, “External Relations and External Competence”, 153.
326 R. Schütze, “Dual Federalism Constitutionalised”, 15.
327 See, for example, P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 85. 
328 See P. Pescatore, “External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities” (1975) 
12 CMLRev. 615 at 624.
329 J. Temple Lang, “The ERTA Judgment and the Court's Case-Law on Competence and Conflict” (1986) 6 YEL 183 at 
197. 
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agreements in the same area provided that they did not have this result”330. 
While  the  first  interpretation  “suggests  that  a  whole  subject  [...]  is  transferred  from  national 
competence to [Union] competence as a result of the adoption of [Union] measures”, the second one 
“merely says that in cases of conflict, [Union] law prevails, and that national measures and treaties  
which may not conflict with [Union] law must not interfere in practice with its operation either”331. 
B. The period of clarification – Taking account of the Member States' role as Masters of the Treaty
In the light of the uncertainty surrounding the conditions under which common rules were affected 
within the meaning of the AETR doctrine and the criteria for necessity to conclude an agreement in 
order to attain one of the Treaty objectives as laid down in Opinion 1/76, the Member States reacted 
by introducing a non-exclusive power in the field of environmental cooperation in the SEA and by 
expressly providing for further non-exclusive powers in the Maastricht Treaty332.  In addition, the 
Treaty  set  out  fundamental  principles  governing  the  vertical  division  of  powers,  including  the 
principles of conferred powers, subsidiarity and proportionality333. The Member States, 
“qua  pouvoir  constituant,  […] thus  sought  to  regain  control  and  limit  the  competence  creep 
phenomenon, catalysed notably by the Court's competence jurisprudence.”334
The Court of Justice did not have the opportunity to elaborate further on implied powers and their 
legal nature until the 1990s. When it finally did, however, it opted for a more nuanced and more  
restrictive approach to  the exclusivity of implied powers,  reflecting the dynamic and interactive 
nature of the Union's order of competences.
i. Opinion 2/91 
Opinion 2/91335 concerning ILO Convention No. 170 on the use of chemicals at work built on the 
foundations laid by the Court's early case law. The Court was called upon to decide whether the 
conclusion  of  the  convention  fell  within  the  competence  of  the  Union  and,  if  so,  whether  that 
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid. at 202.
332 See J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 154.
333 See further A. Goucha Soares, “The Principle of Conferred Powers”, 70-74.
334 C. Hillion, “A Look Back at  the  Open Skies Judgments”,  in M. Bulterman, L.  Hancher,  A.  McDonnell  & H.G. 
Sevenster (eds.), Views of European Law from the Mountain, Liber Amicorum for Piet-Jan Slot  (Kluwer 2009) 257 at 
258. 
335 Opinion 2/91 Convention No. 170 on safety in the use of chemicals at work.
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competence was exclusive. 
For the first time, the Court made an express distinction between the existence of implied powers 
and their exclusive nature. Referring to its AETR judgment, it stated that 
“the exclusive or non-exclusive nature of the [Union's] competence [...]  may also depend on the scope  
of  the  measures  which  have  been  adopted  by the [Union]  institutions  for  the  application  of  those 
provisions and which are of such a kind as to deprive the Member States of an area of competence  
which they were able to exercise previously on a transitional basis”336. 
Applying this  rule  to  the  specific  case,  the  Court  had  no difficulty finding an  external  implied 
competence resulting from internal EU legislation, but it stopped short of accepting its exclusive 
nature. As the internal Union measures laid down minimum standards only, the conclusion by the 
Member States of an agreement providing for more stringent rules could not affect the content of the 
Union legislation337. 
Compared with its case law on implied competence from the 1970s, the Court introduced a stricter 
definition of the conditions under which implied Union powers became exclusive. Exclusivity no 
longer  arose automatically from the adoption of  internal  rules,  but  was linked to  the scope and 
content of these rules. In contrast with its strict stance on the nature of implied powers, however, the 
Court adopted a broad approach to the  scope of implied powers. Germany, Spain and Ireland had 
submitted that the wording of the original AETR case only referred to Union rules adopted within the 
framework of a common policy. With regard to the specific rules at issue, this was not the case338. In 
the view of the Court, however, it was “of little significance whether those measures do or do not 
come under a common policy”339. Instead, it followed from (current) Article 4 (3) TEU that Member 
States were to facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks in all areas corresponding to the Treaty 
objectives340. 
The broadening of the scope of implied powers notwithstanding, Opinion 2/91 is noteworthy for 
opening the door for the discussion of concurrent implied competences and the circumstances under 
which  these  could  be  based  on internal  legislative  powers341.  The  Court  thus  introduced  a  new 
perspective on implied powers, one that recognised the possibility that Member State commitments 
336 Ibid., para 9.
337 Ibid., para 18.
338 Opinion 2/91, para 10. 
339 Ibid., para 3.
340 Ibid.
341 S. Griller and K. Gamharter, “External Trade: Is There a Path Through the Maze of Competences?”, in Griller and 
Weidel (eds.),  External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union (Springer 2002) 66 at 79; 
similarly A. Dashwood and J. Heliskoski, “The Classic Authorities Revisited”, 17.
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may “happily co-exist”342 with  Union rules.  Concurrent  competence  was  no  longer  seen as  two 
separate sets of power, but could rather be understood as describing overlapping competences. In 
contrast with the Court's early case law on implied powers – where Member State participation was 
sanctioned in order to remedy the lack of substantive powers or practical problems on the part of the 
Union – the new approach accepted shared powers flowing not from a lack of authority, but from the 
“retention of competence by the Member States”343. 
ii. Opinion 1/94
The Court's  willingness to react to the political  developments at  the time was put to the test  in 
Opinion 1/94344. The request for an Opinion was made in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations which established the World Trade Organisation (WTO), when the 
question arose whether the Union enjoyed exclusive competence to conclude all of the envisaged 
WTO Agreements. The controversy centred in particular around the EU's competence over the TRIPs 
and the GATS Agreements. The Commission argued that the agreements fell within the scope of the 
CCP in their entirety and that, alternatively, the areas covered by the GATS and the TRIPs gave rise 
to  implied  exclusive  powers.  With  particular  regard  to  the  GATS,  the  Commission  argued  that 
exclusive implied competence arose from the fact there was no area or specific provision contained 
in the agreement in respect of which the Union did not enjoy the corresponding powers to adopt 
measures at the internal level345. 
The Court of Justice, however, rejected this argument. Reiterating the AETR principle, the Court first 
recalled that the external competence of the Union could only become exclusive once common rules 
had been established internally. However, common rules had to exist on all matters falling under the 
policy,  which was not  the case for  the field of transport346.  As far  as  the fields  of  services  and 
intellectual property rights were concerned, the Court reached the same conclusion that “complete 
harmonisation” was essential for the granting of implied exclusive powers347. The AETR requirement 
based on the existence of “common rules”348 was thus modified to mean that common rules could 
342 A. Dashwood and J. Heliskoski, “The Classic Authorities Revisited”, 17.
343 M. Cremona, “External Relations and External Competence”, 158.
344 Opinion 1/94 Competence of  the Community  to  conclude international  agreements  concerning services  and the  
protection of intellectual property - Article 228 (6) of the EC Treaty [1994] ECR I-5267.
345 Ibid., para 74.
346 Ibid., para 77.
347 Ibid., paras 96 and 103.
348 Case 22/70 AETR, para 17.
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only be found to exist where a given field had been completely harmonised. As far as the nature of 
such a competence was concerned, common rules were found to give rise to exclusivity only if they 
specifically provided for the negotiation and conclusion of an international agreement falling within 
their scope or if they laid down rules relating to third-country nationals349. 
Neither did the Court accept practical reasons relating to potential distortions within the internal  
market arising from the conclusion of bilateral agreements as a valid argument for exclusivity in the 
absence of internal legislation350. The Commission's alternative contention based on the necessity 
argument was swiftly rejected for not reflecting the circumstances of Opinion 1/76. According to the 
Court, Opinion 1/76 had to be distinguished from the situation at issue in Opinion 1/94 in that the 
attainment of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services at internal Union 
level was not “inextricably linked” to the treatment afforded to third-country nationals351. Only where 
internal powers were capable of being “effectively exercised” at the same time as external powers 
could exclusive Union competence arise352. The necessity test established in Opinion 1/76 was thus 
modified in such a way as to become an “ineffectual concept without any realistic prospect for future 
application”353.
In addition to limiting the applicability of the necessity test of Opinion 1/76, the Court of Justice  
reinstated the distinction between the existence and the nature of implied competence354. The Court 
tightened the criteria for exclusivity it had laid down in AETR by requiring that the Union needed to 
have achieved complete harmonisation in a given field355. It thus displayed a “conservative reading, 
if not overturning of  AETR”356. In terms of political morality, this ruling was, therefore, far from 
“conservative”, indicating a liberal fidelity approach instead. Indeed, the Court sent out a clear signal 
that “mixity of competences [was] there to stay”357.  As a result,  Opinion 1/94 was considered  a 
“watershed”358 ushering in a new phase in the articulation of the principle of implied powers359.
349 Opinion 1/94, para 95. 
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C. The consolidation of the doctrine – Towards a balanced approach
Opinions 2/91 and 1/94 not only led to the consolidation of the principle of implied powers, but they  
also contributed to its acceptance by the Union institutions when the Council expressly referred to it  
in  its  Decision  concluding  the  WTO  Agreements360.  Nevertheless,  they  left  open  a  number  of 
questions relating to the scope of the doctrine of implied powers and the conditions under which this 
type of competence became exclusive.
i. The Open Skies cases
In the Open Skies cases, a series of parallel enforcement proceedings challenging bilateral aviation 
agreements  concluded  by  eight  Member  States  with  the  United  States361,  the  Court  had  the 
opportunity to  address  the  issue of  shared  implied competence again.  Having enacted  extensive 
secondary legislation on air transport, the Commission had been seeking since the early 1990s to 
obtain  a  comprehensive  mandate  for  the  negotiation  of  a  Union  agreement  in  the  field362.  The 
Commission, in essence, argued that the Member States had disregarded the EU's exclusive external 
competence to conclude air transport agreements, which flowed from Opinion 1/76-type necessity or, 
alternatively, from the AETR doctrine. 
According to the Commission, the Union had obtained exclusive competence, since the conclusion 
of an Open Skies agreement was necessary in order to attain the objectives of the Treaty. Given the  
international  nature  of  air  transport,  purely internal  measures  were  not  effective  to  regulate  the 
activities covered by the agreements. Bilateral Member State agreements in the area would lead to 
“discrimination, […] distortions of competition and the destabilisation of the [Union] market”363. The 
Member States, on the other hand, argued that a Union agreement in the field was not necessary 
360 Council Dec. 98/800 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its 
competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) [1994] OJ L 
336/1.
361 Case C-466/98 Commission v. UK [2002] ECR I-9427, Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519, 
Case C-468/98  Commission v. Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575, Case C-469-98 Commission v. Finland [2002] ECR I-
9627, Case C-471/98 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681, Case C-472/98 Commission v. Luxembourg [2002] 
ECR I-9741, Case C-475/98  Commission v. Austria [2002] ECR I-9797, Case C-476/98  Commission v. Germany 
[2002] ECR I-9855.
362 See e.g. Case C-467/98  Commission v. Denmark, op. cit., para 16. For a detailed description of the Commission's 
activities in the field of air transport before the conclusion of the Open Skies agreements, see e.g. R. Greaves “The  
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within the meaning of Opinion 1/76 and that, in any event, this type of implied competence did not 
create exclusive powers for the EU364.
The Court rejected the Commission's claim based on necessity on the grounds that the aims of the 
Treaty regarding air  transport  could be achieved through the adoption of autonomous rules.  The 
institutions were free to arrange concerted action in relation to the US or prescribe the external 
approach to be taken by the Member States in the field. In the specific case, therefore, the exercise of 
internal competence was not dependent on a simultaneous exercise of external competence365.
Applying the AETR test next, the Court examined whether the Union had obtained exclusive external 
competence by way of exercising its internal competence. After summarising its previous case law 
concerning  the  conditions  under  which  the  Union  acquired  an  implied  competence,  the  Court 
examined the EU Regulations relied upon by the Commission. These did not, however, govern the 
situation at issue and the Open Skies agreements could, therefore, not be deemed to fall within an 
area largely covered by Union legislation366. 
Nevertheless, the Court found exclusive Union competence to exist for a small number of individual 
subject  matters.  By  exercising  its  internal  competence,  the  Union  had  acquired  an  exclusive 
competence to enter into international agreements concerning the freedom of non-EU carriers to set 
fares and rates and obligations relating to computerised reservation systems (CRS) offered for use or 
used in its territory367. The Court made clear that this competence was indeed exclusive in nature. It 
was  not  sufficient  that  the  Member  States  had,  by  virtue  of  treaty  amendments,  provided  for 
compliance with the EU rules concerned. The Member States had failed to fulfil their obligations 
towards the Union by entering into such commitments on their own, even if, as the Court conceded, 
the substance of those commitments did not conflict with Union law368. In this context, the Court 
recalled the rationale of the original AETR judgment based on the principle of sincere cooperation369. 
By concluding international agreements over matters covered by exclusive Union competence, the 
Member States had consequently failed to fulfil their obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU370. 
The  Open  Skies judgments  were  met  with  criticism  regarding  the  Court's  shortcomings  in 
distinguishing the concept of implied powers from its legal effects. Several authors expressed their 
364 Ibid., para 51.
365 See e.g. Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, paras 59-62.
366 Ibid., paras 92-93.
367 Ibid., paras 97-103.
368 Ibid., para 101.
369 Ibid., para 110.
370 Ibid., para 112.
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perplexity in view of the “confusion” and “muddling” of the separate issues of existence and nature 
of  a  competence  which  the  Court  of  Justice  still  displayed  more  than  thirty  years  after  the 
introduction of the principle of implied powers371. Discussing a possible exclusive competence, it 
seemed to rule out the possibility of shared implied competence by stating that 
“[i]t must next be determined under what circumstances the scope of the common rules may be affected 
or distorted by the international commitments at issue and, therefore, under what circumstances the 
[Union] acquires an external competence by reason of the exercise of its internal competence.”372
In the view of the Court, either the common rules were affected, giving rise to exclusive Union  
powers, or the Member States continued to be competent. Complementary action by the EU and the 
Member States did not appear to be an option for the Court. The Court could have easily avoided any 
mention of the matter, as the Open Skies cases did not require any distinction between the existence 
and  the  nature  of  the  Union's  competence,  but  instead,  it  “deliberately  chose  to  obscure”  this 
distinction373.
The Court's muddling of the two aspects of the implied powers doctrine notwithstanding, the Open 
Skies cases  cannot  be taken to  represent  a  return to  an  entitlements view of  federalism.  On the 
contrary,  the  Court's  approach  has  been  applauded  for  its  matter-of-fact  approach  to  Union 
competence. Unlike the early case law, the  Open Skies judgments display no attempt at furthering 
European integration or strengthening the Court's position as promoter of the European polity374. 
Instead of showing a subtle awareness of the internal politics of commercial air traffic, the Court  
“treats [Union] legislation as a  purely formal trigger for the transfer of exclusive competence”375. 
Similarly, the Court's approach to the Commission's necessity-based argument is “seemingly strict”, 
where it holds that distortions in the flow of services in the internal market do not in themselves 
affect common rules and are therefore not capable of establishing an external Union competence376. 
The Court's assessment in Open Skies thus reflects its respect for the principles of conferred powers 
371 See  e.g.  G.  De  Baere,  Constitutional  Principles  of  EU  External  Relations,  20;  Holdgaard,  “The  European 
Community's Implied External Competence after the Open Skies”, 389; P. Koutrakos,  EU International Relations 
Law, 123.
372 See e.g. Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, para 81.
373 R. Holdgaard, “The European Community's Implied External Competence after the Open Skies”, 389.
374 R. Post, “Constructing the European Polity: ERTA and the Open Skies Judgments”, in in M. P. Maduro and L. Azoulai 
(eds.), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome  
Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 234 at 246.
375 R. Post, “Constructing the European Polity: ERTA and the Open Skies Judgments”, 246, emphasis added.
376 C. Hillion, “ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the Grounds of the EU System of External Relations”, in  M. P.  
Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th  
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 224 at 228. 
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and subsidiarity377. 
What emerges from the Open Skies judgments then is a balancing by the Court of the two different 
strands of its case law on implied competence378. On the one hand, the Court continued the trend 
established in its 1990s jurisprudence of circumscribing the limits to exclusive implied competence, 
while, on the other hand, it emphasised the Member States' obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU. 
Where common rules are affected,  the Member States remain precluded from acting and cannot 
rectify a failure to fulfil their obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU by achieving compliance with EU 
rules. Thus, the Court 
“not only acts as the garant of the [Union] interest against individual Member States' encroachment, it 
also preserves, at another (meta) level, the Member States' powers as primary law makers of the EU”379.
ii. Opinion 1/2003
In Opinion 1/2003380,  the  Court  of  Justice took the opportunity to  clarify the nature  of  implied 
powers.  The  request  for  an  opinion  concerned  the  conclusion  of  the  new  Lugano  Convention 
replacing  a  1988  convention  on  jurisdiction  and  the  enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and 
commercial matters, which had been concluded between the EU Member States and the majority of 
EFTA countries. Against the background of a Union Regulation adopted in the area, the Court had to 
decide  whether  conclusion  of  the  new  convention  fell  entirely  within  the  Union's  exclusive 
competence or whether it was shared with the Member States. 
It first summarised its previous case law on the existence of implied powers, confirming that implied  
powers could arise in a two-fold manner – it could either flow from measures adopted by the EU 
institutions within the meaning of  AETR or from the necessity to attain a specific Treaty objective 
within the meaning of Opinion 1/76381. 
Remarkably, then, for the first time since the creation of implied powers in its AETR judgment some 
35  years  earlier,  the  Court  of  Justice  explicitly  stated  that  implied  Union  competence  may  be 
377 C. Hillion, “ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the Grounds of the EU System of External Relations”, in  M. P.  
Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds.), The Past and the Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th  
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 224 at 228. 
378 See C. Hillion, “ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the Grounds of the EU System of External Relations”, 228-
229.
379 Ibid. at 226.
380 Opinion 1/2003 Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano  Convention on jurisdiction and the  
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-1145. 
381 Ibid., para 114.
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exclusive or shared with the Member States382. This did not mean, however, that the competence to 
conclude the agreement at issue in the specific case was shared too. In its assessment, the Court 
appeared to exclude the applicability of the necessity principle from the outset without providing any 
further explanation, basing its analysis on the  AETR doctrine instead383. With regard to the  AETR 
principle,  however,  the  Court  made clear  that  where  the  basis  for  implied  competence  was  the 
existence of internal rules, any considerations concerning the  effet utile of EU rules were out of 
place.  When  addressing  the  argument  that  the  envisaged  convention  had  to  be  analysed  taking 
account of the legal basis of the internal measures in the field, i.e. Article 81 TFEU (ex Article 65 
EC), which provided for the adoption of measures “in so far as necessary for the proper functioning 
of  the  internal  market”,  the  Court  considered  the  legal  basis  to  be  “irrelevant”  in  determining 
whether an agreement affected Union rules384. 
The Court then dedicated itself to an analysis of the specific rules at issue. To that end, it examined 
the Union legislation relating to jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters385. It is noteworthy that the Court went on to examine the scope, nature 
and content of the relevant EU legislation, but this served the purpose of determining the nature of 
the Union competence and not its existence386. The Court seemed to have little doubt that within the 
field covered by the Lugano Convention, the Union had acquired an implied competence within the 
meaning  of  the  AETR  principle.  After  a  separate  examination  of  the  provisions  of  the  new 
convention, on the one hand, and the Union rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments, on 
the other, the Court reached the conclusion that the uniform and consistent application of the existing 
Union  rules  could  only  be  safeguarded  through  exclusive  Union  competence  to  conclude  the 
convention387. In that respect, Opinion 1/2003 also made it clear that the determination whether the 
sphere  of  a  specific  agreement  fell  within  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Union  required  a 
“comprehensive and detailed” analysis of the relationship between the agreement envisaged and the 
area in which the Union has regulated388. The need for such a “specific analysis of the relationship 
between the agreement envisaged and the [Union] law in force”, the Court pointed out, derived from 
382 Opinion 1/2003, op. cit., para 115.
383 Opinion 1/2003, op. cit., para 117.
384 Ibid., para 131.
385 Opinion 1/2003, op. cit., para 134.
386 Opinion 1/2003, op. cit., para 134: “The request for an opinion does not concern the actual existence of competence 
of the [Union] to conclude the agreement envisaged, but whether that competence is exclusive or shared.”
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the fact that the Union enjoyed conferred powers only389. 
Here again, we see a balancing by the Court of the two strands of its case law on implied powers390. 
On the one hand, it emphasises the principle of conferred powers and the separation of the existence 
of implied competence from its exclusive nature, thus highlighting the role of the Member States as  
Masters of the Treaty. On the other hand, it “reinvigorates” the AETR doctrine by acknowledging that 
the Union had indeed acquired exclusive powers to enter into the new Lugano Convention391. 
iii. Towards complementarity of action
Opinion 1/2003 concluded the period of clarification of the 1990s as far as the nature of implied 
powers was concerned. In the aftermath of the original  AETR judgment, it had remained unclear 
whether implied competence meant that the Member States no longer had any authority to adopt 
international agreements in all areas in which the Union had legislated, or whether this effect applied 
only to  those  international  agreements  which  would  actually  affect EU rules392.  Opinion 1/2003 
finally confirmed that the adoption of Union measures did not mean that entire areas of law were 
automatically transferred from national to Union competence.
Together with the Open Skies cases, Opinion 1/2003 reflects awareness on the part of the Court of 
Justice of the political developments on the internal EU level at the time. Not only does it take 
account  of  the  Member  States'  wish  to  limit  the  scope  of  Union  exclusivity  expressed  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty, but it also takes inspiration from the mandate of the Laeken Declaration aimed at 
a simplified and more transparent division of competence between the Union and the Member States. 
This awareness is characterised by an emphasis on the complementarity of action by the Union and 
the Member States. Implied powers, the Court confirms, no longer mean that Member State action is  
precluded. 
Furthermore,  the reach of the  AETR principle is circumscribed: the existence of internal rules is 
considered  a  purely  formal  trigger  for  external  competence,  in  the  context  of  which  any 
considerations relating to effet utile are misplaced. As a result of the Court's post-Opinion 1/94 case 
law,  the scope of  implied  external  competence  is  “inherently (and properly)  limited and cannot 
389 Opinion 1/03, op. cit., para 124.
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provide the basis for developing an external policy independent of the needs and functioning of the 
internal regime”393. 
Instead of fostering European integration by way of an effet utile approach as it did in its early case 
law on implied competence, the Court emphasises the rationale of implied powers based on the duty 
of sincere cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU. Encouraging complementary action based on mutual 
loyalty, the Court “may have found it more apposite to send signals to the 'Masters of the Treaties' 
than to pre-empt the outcome of their discussions”394. 
Thus, it appears that the Court is increasingly striving for a balance between the two strands of its 
case law on implied powers, i.e. preserving the Member States' integrity as Masters of the Treaty, 
while safeguarding the Union interest against encroachments by the Member States: 
“This  is  coherent  in  terms  of  the  balance  between the  necessary flexibility of  an  implied  powers 
doctrine and the need to ensure compliance with the principle of conferred powers.”395 
The Court thus “safeguards the overall balance of powers envisaged by the [Treaties], in due respect 
of the perceived original intent of the primary law makers”396. 
IV. The nature of implied competence – Towards a broadening of the conditions for exclusivity 
In Opinion 1/2003, the Court of Justice treated all questions relating to the scope, nature and content 
of Union rules as relevant solely to the issue of  exclusivity,  and not to the  existence of implied 
powers. Indeed, a finding of exclusivity requires a thorough examination of the rules at issue, as its 
effect on the Member States' freedom to act could not be any more restrictive. Despite the Court's 
acceptance of shared implied powers, the principle of AETR pre-emption is “more relevant than ever 
before”397. After all, 
“[a]s  the  [EU's]  legislative  activity  grows,  so  does  the  [EU's]  exclusive  external  competence  to 
conclude any international agreement which contains provisions 'affecting' an instrument of [Union] 
law.”398 
The question under which conditions an implied competence becomes exclusive is central to the 
Member States' freedom to act as sovereign states on the international scene. Nevertheless, when it 
393 See M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 53.
394 C. Hillion, “ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the Grounds of the EU System of External Relations”, 226.
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created the AETR principle, the Court offered little guidance as to the precise scope of the notion of 
exclusivity  and  the  conditions  under  which  internal  Union  rules  were  affected  by  international 
agreements.  It  broadly stated that  Member States were precluded from undertaking international 
commitments once “the [Union] with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged in the 
Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever form these may take”399. Concurrent 
powers were excluded so as to prevent any Member State action taken outside the framework of the 
Union institutions400. To the extent to which the Union had adopted legislation, the Member States 
were not able to undertake any obligations in the field. The Court thus created the presumption that 
all  Member  State  commitments  in  matters  regulated  internally  by  the  Union  were  capable  of 
affecting those rules or altering their scope401. As a result, “the [Union] alone [was] in a position to 
assume and carry out contractual obligations towards third countries affecting the whole sphere of 
application of the [Union] legal system”402. As the Court had stated in the context of express external 
competence,  Member  State  activities  such  as  entering  into  relations  with  third  countries  would 
“distort  the  institutional  framework,  call  into  question  the  mutual  trust  within  the  [Union]  and 
prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest”403.
This generous interpretation of exclusivity left open the question to what extent national action had 
to affect common rules in order to preclude the Member States from taking any action in the field.  
The term 'affect', in fact, “implies a high degree of flexibility and dynamism because it is usually 
debatable  whether  or  not  a  certain  action  of  a  Member  State  already affects  [Union]  rules  and 
therefore is prohibited”404. 
Against this background, the definition of the circumstances under which Union rules are affected 
becomes crucial for the Member States. However, the Court left unanswered the question of whether 
Member State action in areas occupied by EU rules continued to be allowed or whether all Member 
State engagement was automatically ruled out. The issue saw some significant clarification in the 
more recent cases, particularly in Opinion 1/2003. The Court introduced a new test for determining 
the nature of implied Union competence. In order for exclusive EU competence to arise, it was no 
longer sufficient that the area in question was covered by internal legislation. Starting with Opinion 
2/91, the Court had made clear that the Member States lost their authority to take external action 
399 Case 22/70 (AETR), para 17.
400 Ibid., para 31.
401 Ibid., para 22.
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only  if  national  measures  were  liable  to  affect  or  alter  the  scope  of  Union  rules.  The  Union's  
exclusive external competence no longer flowed automatically from its power to lay down rules at 
internal level.  
A. When are Union rules “affected”? The two different tests
In the Open Skies cases, the Court summarised the conditions under which Member States were pre-
empted from acting. It held that EU rules could be affected 
“where the international commitments fall within the scope of the common rules […], or in any event 
within an area which is already largely covered by such rules […]”405.  
The first condition derives from the AETR judgment. The Court in this case undertook a comparison 
of the provisions of the envisaged agreement and the provisions of EU law adopted in the field:
“Since the subject-matter of the AETR falls within the scope of Regulation No 543/69, the [Union] has 
been empowered to negotiate and conclude the agreement in question since the entry into force of the  
said regulation.”406
The second condition, by which an exclusive implied competence arises when the Union exercises 
an internal competence, follows from Opinion 2/91. Here, the Court held that in situations in which 
both  the  envisaged  international  commitment  and  EU law set  out  minimum requirements  only, 
Member State  involvement  could  not  affect  the latter407.  Other  parts  of  the convention  at  issue, 
however, concerned areas in which the Union had adopted directives containing more than minimum 
requirements.  Even in the absence of any direct  conflict  between the relevant  provisions  of the 
convention and the existing EU directives, the Member States were precluded from assuming such 
obligations. The Court stressed that the relevant part of the convention dealt with matters that were 
already covered to a “large extent” by Union legislation adopted with a view to achieving an even 
greater degree of harmonisation408. 
By contrast,  the Court's finding regarding implied exclusive competence in Opinion 1/94 did not 
constitute an alternative basis for exclusivity, but merely an example of a situation in which there 
was  a  presumption  that  the  common rules  were  affected  by the  conclusion  of  an  international 
Member State agreement409: 
405 Case C-476/98 (Commission v. Germany), para 108, emphasis added. 
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408 Ibid., para 25.
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“Thus it is that, whenever the [Union] has included in its internal legislative acts provisions relating to 
the treatment of nationals of non-member countries or expressly conferred on its institutions powers to 
negotiate  with non-member  countries,  it  acquires  an exclusive external  competence  in  the  spheres 
covered by those acts […].”410
The Open Skies judgments thus clarify that exclusive competence may arise in two different ways. 
The original AETR principle focuses on the specific provisions of the Union rules at issue, while the 
“largely  covered”  principle  applies  where  the  policy  area  of  which  the  Union  rules  form part 
overlaps largely with the international commitment.
It has been argued that these two circumstances in which exclusivity on the basis of internal EU rules 
is found to exist entail two different tests411. The first test is specific, while the second test is general 
in nature412. The comparison of the specific provisions falling within the scope of the common rules 
within the meaning of AETR operates like a “surgical knife with which Member State competence 
over a particular issue is cut out only to the extent that [Union] legislation deals with the very same 
issue”413. Focussing on the conflict between the specific content of the Union rules in the field and 
the specific content of the envisaged international agreement, this first test can be understood as an 
example of rule pre-emption. As we saw earlier, the restrictive effect of rule pre-emption is limited, 
affecting only the conflicting national provisions at issue and not every national measure in the field. 
The second test, by contrast, undertakes a comparison of the general areas of law involved. In doing 
so, it “wipes out Member State competence in whole areas where the [Union] has legislated (almost) 
exhaustively”414.  As  Member  State  rules  are  precluded for  the  whole  area  in  question,  this  test 
operates irrespective of whether the national measures actually conflict with Union legislation. As 
such,  it  represents  an  example  of  field pre-emption,  the  “most  comprehensive”415 and  “most 
powerful”416 type of pre-emption.  Where the Union has occupied an entire policy area,  Member 
States  are  precluded from introducing national  measures  “even in  the absence  of,  or  before the 
79: “Previously, [paragraph 95 of Opinion 1/94] seemed to hang in a vacuum and appeared difficult to justify with 
regard to the AETR […]. Following the Open Skies formulation, it can be interpreted together with paragraph 96 of 
Opinion 1/94 as providing examples in which there is a presumption that the common rules would be affected were 
the Member States entitled to conclude an international agreement falling within the scope of those rules.”
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adoption of, a specific [Union] rule”417. In fact, the Court of Justice expressly stated in Opinion 2/91 
and in the  Open Skies cases that Member States were pre-empted from entering into international 
commitments  “even  if  there  is  no  contradiction  between  those  commitments  and  the  common 
rule”418.  An  example  of  the  general  test  can  be  found  in  Opinion  2/91,  where  the  Court,  after 
comparing the scope of application of the two sets of rules at issue, came to the conclusion that the 
envisaged  convention  laid  down minimum requirements  only and was  therefore  not  capable  of 
affecting Union law. Similarly, after a lengthy analysis, the Court found in Opinion 1/2003 that the 
Lugano Convention provided for a “unified system of rules” which would conflict with the “unified 
and coherent system of rules” established by the EU Regulation in the field 419. The specific test, on 
the other hand, can be found for example in the  Open Skies cases, where the Court carried out a 
comparison of different specific provisions in the Open Skies agreements with the relevant articles of 
Regulation No. 2409/92420. 
B. A “comprehensive and detailed” analysis 
Depending on the international agreement or provision of the agreement at issue, the Court decides 
which of the two tests to apply in the specific case. Both tests can be applied together, but a finding 
of exclusivity does not require that both tests are carried out successively. The distinction between 
the two tests is not always clear cut421, but what is undisputed since the Court's 1990s case law is that 
a detailed comparison of the international rules with the Union provisions has to take place before 
exclusive competence can be found to exist. When an international commitment touches upon areas 
covered by Union legislation, there is no presumption that it automatically falls within the scope of 
the common rules. 
Although implicit already in its previous case law, it was only in Opinion 1/2003 that the Court of 
Justice explicitly recognised the need for a detailed scrutiny of the scope of the internal measures 
before an exclusive implied competence could be found to exist. A detailed test, analysing both the 
relevant international and the EU rules, had to establish that the common rules were likely to be 
affected by an international Member State obligation in the area:
417 S. Krislov, C. D. Ehlermann and J. Weiler, “Political Organs and the Decision-Making Process in the United States  
and the European Community”, 90.
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419 Opinion 1/2003, para 151.
420 See e.g. Case C-467/98, paras 97-100.
421 See R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law, 115.
83
“[A] comprehensive and detailed analysis must be carried out to determine whether the [Union] has the 
competence to conclude an international agreement and whether that competence is exclusive. In doing 
so, account must be taken not only of the area covered by the [Union] rules and by the provisions of the 
agreement envisaged, insofar as the latter are known, but also of the nature and content of those rules 
and those provisions […].”422
The Court placed great emphasis on the context in which the Union rules at issue were developed 
and their evolution over a period of several decades and particularly the aims they were meant to  
achieve423. This passage should not be understood as potentially extending the scope of the Union's 
external powers, as it has been argued424, but rather as “a signal that the approach to be adopted 
should focus on the overall nature and effect of an agreement on the [Union] legal order”425. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court only stressed the need for a comprehensive comparison of 
the relevant rules in Opinion 1/2003, the Court has carried out either a general or a specific test or 
both in all cases involving an application of the AETR test to an envisaged agreement since Opinion 
2/91426. 
C.  The “largely covered” criterion – A controversial test 
While  the  Court's  finding  that  Union  legislation  is  capable  of  being  affected  whenever  an 
international commitment  falls  within the scope of the common rules is  widely accepted by the 
Member States and in the legal literature, the possibility for exclusivity to arise also in situations in 
which  the  area  in  question  is  only  covered  by  common  rules  to  a  large  extent has  sparked 
considerably more controversy. 
In the course of the procedure leading up to Opinion 1/2003, the UK, supported by a number of other 
Member States, invited the Court to reconsider its reasoning in Open Skies concerning the extent to 
which an area had to be covered by Union rules, arguing that the “largely covered”-test gave rise to  
uncertainty and that in the light of the principle of conferred powers, it was “unacceptable when it  
came to limiting the competences of the Member States”427. The UK argued that the criterion should 
422 Opinion 1/2003, para 133, emphasis added.
423 Opinion 1/2003, para 120.
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427 Opinion 1/2003, para 47. 
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be abandoned, as that “would give greater precision in defining an ERTA effect whilst ensuring that 
the Member States fulfil their duty of loyal cooperation when acting in the international sphere”428.
Despite the Member State's protests, the Court of Justice upheld its  previous findings that areas 
largely covered by Union rules were capable of being affected by Member State involvement. It  
confirmed that  the  AETR principle  “also applies where rules  have been adopted in  areas falling 
outside common policies and, in particular, in areas where there are harmonising measures”429. This 
followed from the Member States' duty to facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and to 
abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties laid 
down in (current) Article 4 (3) TEU430. Yet, it appears that the Court felt compelled to explain its 
reasoning which provided the basis for the “largely covered” test in Opinion 2/91. It pointed out that 
in establishing exclusive powers over Part III of the ILO Convention, 
“the Court took account of the fact that those rules had been progressively adopted for more than 25 
years with a view to achieving an ever greater degree of harmonisation designed, on the one hand, to  
remove barriers to trade resulting from differences in legislation from one Member State to another  
and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  provide,  at  the  same  time,  protection  for  human  health  and  the 
environment.”431
This did not, however, stop the Court from declaring the “largely covered” criterion to be of general 
applicability.  Although the UK government had asked the Court to abandon the general test in the 
interest  of  legal  certainty and the principle  of  conferred  powers,  the Court  not  only upheld  the 
“largely covered” test, but also introduced a number of modifications which can be said to achieve 
the opposite aim of that pursued by the UK, significantly broadening the scope of the AETR test432. 
Firstly,  the specific situations which the Court previously found to give rise to exclusivity were 
characterised  as  “only  examples”  of  a  more  general  rule  of  exclusive  implied  competence433. 
Secondly, the Court stressed that “in general terms”, exclusive Union competence may arise “where 
the conclusion of an agreement by the Member States is incompatible with the unity of the common 
market  and  the  uniform  application of  [Union]  law”434.  By  recalling  this  basis  for  exclusivity 
mentioned in paragraph 31 of the original AETR judgment, the Court “resurrected” a rationale which 
428 Ibid., para 48.
429 Opinion 1/2003, para 118.
430 Ibid. at para 119.
431 Ibid. at para 120. 
432 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 111.
433 Opinion 1/2003, para 121, emphasis added.
434 Ibid. at para 122, emphasis added.
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had never been mentioned in any post-AETR case435. The doctrine developed in Opinion 1/2003 is 
“much more general in scope” than its previous formulation of the AETR doctrine: 
“[I]f  the  unity  of  the  Common  Market  and  the  uniform application  of  [Union]  law  as  such  are  
recognised as grounds for  the [Union]  to develop exclusive external  competence,  the  reach of the 
reformulated implied powers doctrine is potentially unlimited.”436 
Thirdly, the broadening of the scope of the  AETR principle is completed by an expansion of the 
temporal dimension of exclusivity. It is no longer sufficient to examine only the scope of the “current 
state of [Union] law in the area in question”, but also its “future development, insofar as that is 
foreseeable at the time of that analysis” have to be taken into account437. 
V.  Assessment – Reconciling the two strands of the Court's case law
Against the background of the three-fold expansion in Opinion 1/2003 of the conditions under which 
internal EU rules give rise to an exclusive implied competence, it has been argued that 
“the  Court  re-invents  itself  and  offers  a  formulation  which  is  potentially  even  more  broad and 
sovereignty-encroaching than the original implied powers doctrine as established in the 1970s.”438
The Court, so the argument goes, is deliberately using the “guise of unity of the Common Market  
and uniform application of [Union] law” in order to broaden the possibilities for the establishment of 
exclusive  EU powers439.  If,  as  this  assessment  suggests,  the  Court  of  Justice  is  returning to  an 
entitlements approach to the scope of implied exclusive powers, then how can we reconcile this 
development with the other strand of its case law on implied competence? 
As we saw in Section II, the Court has been moving away from the notion that Member States are 
precluded from acting once the Union has adopted measures in a given field towards accepting the 
complementarity of Member State and Union action, which is governed by the duty of loyalty under 
Article 4 (3) TEU. This strand of the Court's case law emphasises the importance of the principle of 
conferred  powers  within  the  context  of  exclusive  implied  competence  and  points  out  that  the 
granting  of  any external  power  presupposes  a  specific  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the 
435 A. Antoniadis, “The EU's Implied Competence to Conclude International Agreements after the Reform Treaty”, 84. 
436 Ibid. at 84, emphasis added.
437 Opinion 1/2003, para 126, emphasis added.
438 A. Antoniadis, “The EU's Implied Competence to Conclude International Agreements after the Reform Treaty”,  85, 
emphasis added.
439 Ibid.
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agreement  envisaged  and  the  relevant  Union law so  as  to  determine  whether  the  agreement  is 
capable of affecting the Union rules or not440. 
After its  bold assertion of implied exclusive powers in  the 1970s aimed at  furthering European 
integration, the Court of Justice began taking account of the will of the Member States as Masters of  
the Treaty in the 1990s. This change of perspective is not only reflected in the Court's incremental  
circumscription of the nature of implied powers, which culminates in Opinion 1/2003 in the express 
confirmation  that  implied  competence  may  be  shared,  but  also  in  its  rejection  of  a  broad 
interpretation of the “necessity” test established in Opinion 1/76. In Opinions 1/94 and 2/92 and the 
Open Skies cases, the Court made clear that the conclusion of the international agreement by the 
Union  had to  be  “inextricably linked” to  the  attainment  of  a  Union  objective.  Thus,  the  Court 
reduced the applicability of the test to situations which closely resemble that of the original context 
in  which  it  was  developed.  Indeed,  the  necessity  test  has  not  been  successfully  applied  in  any 
subsequent cases. While the Court did confirm the necessity principle as being one of two bases for  
exclusive  implied  competence,  it  is  of  little  practical  relevance  and  leads  a  mere  “theoretical 
existence”441. 
Instead,  the AETR doctrine  has  become the  main  basis  for  implied  powers.  As  a  basis  for  the 
existence of implied powers, the AETR principle has always enjoyed a considerably broad scope. The 
Court declared in Opinion 2/91 that the test was not confined to instances in which the Union had 
adopted rules within the framework of a common policy, but applied to all areas corresponding to the 
objectives  of  the  Treaty  and  tasks  of  the  Union.  The  broad  scope  of  the  AETR principle 
notwithstanding, its  legal effects have been increasingly limited since the Court, in Opinion 2/91, 
began to shift its focus away from determining the existence of implied powers to an analysis of the 
conditions under which such became exclusive. The original AETR judgment left open the question 
of whether the doctrine implied that the Member States no longer had any competence to adopt  
international agreements over a subject-matter on which the EU had legislated, or whether exclusive 
Union competence would arise only in case an envisaged Member State agreement “affected” the 
EU measures or “altered their scope”442. Three and a half decades later, Opinion 1/2003 confirms that 
the Court of Justice has adopted the second, more nuanced interpretation. In order for exclusive 
Union competence to arise, it is now no longer sufficient that the area in question is covered by 
internal  legislation.  The  Court  stresses  in  Opinion  1/2003  that  the  Member  States  lose  their 
440 Opinion 1/2003, para 124.
441 M. Cremona, “External Relations of the EU and the Member States”, 3.
442 See J. Temple Lang, “The ERTA Judgment and the Court's Case-Law on Competence and Conflict”, 197. 
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competence for the conclusion of agreements with third countries only when such measures are 
liable to affect or alter the scope of Union law.
However, adopting the second interpretation then makes it important to define precisely when Union 
rules are “affected”443.  The Court's re-examination in Opinion 1/2003 of the test  for determining 
when common rules are affected and its emphasis on the “uniform and consistent application of the 
[Union] rules and the proper functioning of the system they establish”444 constitutes a significant 
refinement  of  the AETR  principle  as  it  was  previously applied.  However,  it  is  important  not  to 
understand the broadening of the conditions under which AETR competence becomes exclusive as an 
attempt to enlarge EU powers under the guise of the unity and uniformity of EU law. Opinion 1/2003 
marks a shift from the “static and restrictive” test focussing on whether a given area is “largely 
covered” towards a “more flexible, dynamic” test445. The emphasis is not on expanding the scope of 
exclusive Union competence, but on preserving the “full effectiveness of [Union] law”446. Even if the 
'effect on EU' test is not new, the “innovative aspect” is that it is “placed at the centre of the analysis 
[...] instead of being almost forgotten”447. A detailed test has to be carried out in order to assess 
whether the envisaged agreement is likely to affect the scope of the Union provisions in areas in 
which the EU has  regulated.  While  the 'largely covered'  test  remains relevant,  the new “central 
element” of the Court's assessment of whether an implied competence is exclusive focuses on policy 
considerations, such as the nature and content of the rules at issue and the future development of  
Union law in the field448. 
Like the Court's adoption of a distinction between the existence of implied powers and their legal 
nature, the introduction of a detailed “affect”-test can, therefore, be seen as a manifestation of the 
change in the Court's approach from pre-emption towards a more nuanced assessment. The newly 
elaborated conditions for exclusive implied powers in Opinion 1/2003 do not seek to counteract the 
increasing complementarity of Member State and Union action. Taken together, the two strands of 
the Court's case law simply signal that implied competence may be exclusive or shared, but where 
exclusivity is required “to preserve the full effectiveness of [Union] law”449, the Court is inclined to 
conclude that the Union has acquired an exclusive competence over the subject-matter.
443 Ibid.
444 Opinion 1/2003, para 128.
445 N. Lavranos, “Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention”, 1095.
446 Opinion 1/2003, para 128, emphasis added. 
447 N. Lavranos, “Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention”, 1096. 
448 See ibid. 
449 Opinion 1/2003, para 128.
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Seen from the perspective of the Member States, the case law on the  AETR doctrine has thus not 
proven to be the powerful and comprehensive instrument that initial case law suggested. The remaining 
point of contention among the Member States appears to be the “largely covered” criterion which 
raises questions relating to legal certainty and the principle of conferral.  Nevertheless, in Opinion 
1/2003 the Court showed awareness of the Member States' concerns by incorporating respect for the 
attribution of powers into the  AETR doctrine and balancing the principle with the effectiveness of 
Union law. The alleviated impact of the AETR case law is illustrated by the outcome of the specific 
cases. Although the doctrine has been relied on in a number of cases over the years, it  led to the 
exclusion of Member State action in two cases only, viz. Opinion 1/2003 and the original AETR case450. 
Rather than a forceful articulation of a theory of pre-emption in EU external relations law, the Court's 
case law on the whole suggests a return to the “canvas of shared competence”451.
VI. Implied powers within the CFSP
Within the CFSP normative order, the doctrine of implied powers does not apply in the same way as 
it does in relation to other EU policy areas. It is questionable whether CFSP rules are capable of 
giving rise to implied competence to begin with,  irrespective of whether such powers would be 
exclusive or non-exclusive in nature.
Article  216 TFEU provides  the legal  base for  the Union's  competence to  conclude international 
agreements. Codifying some of the Court's long-standing case law on the conditions under which a 
Union competence may arise in areas in which no express power has been conferred, Article 216 
TFEU explicitly acknowledges the existence of implied Union powers452.  As far as international 
agreements  under  the  CFSP  are  concerned,  the  Union's  treaty-making  competence  is  further 
specified in Article 37 TEU, according to which “[t]he Union may conclude agreements with one or 
more  States  or  international  organisations”  in  areas  covered  by  Chapter  2,  which  contains  the 
specific provisions on the CFSP. Unlike the general legal base of Article 216 TFEU, however, the lex 
specialis rule laid down in Article 37 TEU does not provide for any treaty-making competence by 
implication.
The  special  status  of  the  CFSP within  the  Union  legal  order  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the 
450 As far as case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece (Greek IMO Case) is concerned, see below.
451 R. Schütze “Dual Federalism Constitutionalised”, 6.
452 See further the Introductory Chapter. 
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possibility  of  implied  powers  from  the  outset.  Even  general  international  law  recognises  the 
existence  of  such  powers.  According  to  the  principle  of  effectiveness  in  international  law,  an 
international organisation possesses not only the powers expressly conferred on it, but also those 
implied  powers  necessary  for  achieving  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  set  up453.  Nevertheless, 
implied powers must  remain within the boundaries  of  the principle  of  conferral  and respect  the 
internal distribution of powers within the international organisation454. 
Notwithstanding  the  possibility  for  implied  powers  to  arise,  the  nature  of  CFSP norms  leaves 
virtually  no  scope  for  this  type  of  competence455.  Under  Article  24  (1)  TEU,  the  adoption  of 
legislative acts is excluded. In addition, the rules contained in Chapter 2 are mostly of a procedural 
nature. The objectives Chapter 2 refers to are 
“so broad that an unselfconscious application of the principle of implied competences implying all the 
competences needed to achieve the CFSP objectives would lead to an extensive grant of foreign policy 
competences going far beyond what the Treaty intends.”456
As discussed above, such a creation of powers with the sole purpose of furthering EU  objectives 
would be indicative of an entitlements view of federalism457. If implied Union powers are to remain 
within the bounds of a liberal fidelity approach, they must be predicated on the scope of Union law. 
The  AETR principle was established in order to ensure that the Union's competence to  conclude 
international agreements corresponded with the development of its internal competence. Within the 
CFSP, however, such a parallelism is inconceivable, not only because its provisions are procedural 
and broadly framed in nature, but also because they inherently relate to external action, making any 
parallelism unnecessary. As a result, it should be assumed that the codification of the Court's case 
law on implied powers in Article 216 (1) TFEU does not apply to the CFSP. 
Another argument in favour of this interpretation of Article 216 (1) TFEU concerns the history of the 
provision. The present chapter sought to demonstrate how the acceptance of implied powers by the 
Member States was the outcome of a constitutional dialogue between the Court and the Member 
States  over  the course of  decades.  Once the Member States  were satisfied that  the  principle  of 
implied competence had been shaped according to their preferences, they accepted its incorporation 
in the Treaties. In the CFSP, by contrast,  such a dialogue has been absent, due to the continued  
453 Reparation  for  Injuries  Case, 1949  I.C.J.  Rep.  174  at  180-182.  See  also  P.  Malanczuk, Akehurst's  Modern 
Introduction to International Law, 7th Edition (Routledge 1997) at 367.
454 P. Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 368.
455 G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 106.
456 Ibid.
457 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 3.
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exclusion  of  the  Court's  jurisdiction  in  the  field458.  It  can,  therefore,  not  be  assumed  that  the 
recognition of implied Union powers in CFSP matters would be compatible with the will of the 
Member States as Masters of the Treaties. In fact, we may find a confirmation of this assumption in  
Article 352 (4) TFEU. The flexibility clause, which grants the Union institutions the authority to 
adopt the appropriate measures “if action by the Union should prove necessary […] to attain one of  
the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers”,  
expressly excludes its application to the CFSP. 
Should implied powers nevertheless be found to exist in relation to the CFSP, it appears unlikely that 
these would give rise to Union exclusivity.  Although it  has been argued that “it seems too early 
completely to rule out exclusivity in the field of CFSP”, since EU agreements in the field could be deprived 
of any effect if Member States were allowed to conclude agreements which departed from established EU 
law459, it is not evident that CFSP competences are capable of pre-empting Member State action. 
The CFSP is  not,  as we saw in the Introductory Chapter,  included in the different categories of 
exclusive, shared and complementary competences listed in Article 2 TFEU. Since it is instead listed 
separately in paragraph 4 of the provision460,  it  remains “far from clear  what  competence CFSP 
constitutes  under  the  Lisbon  Treaty”461.  Although  CFSP  competence  does  share  certain 
characteristics of both shared and complementary competences462, it has nevertheless been described 
as “a type of sui generis competence”463. Indeed, the fact that CFSP is listed separately from the 
shared competences described in Article 2 (2) TFEU indicates that the Treaty drafters intended this 
policy  to  be  treated  differently. While  there  has  been  “much  confusion”  among  commentators 
regarding  the  precise  nature  of  CFSP competence464,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  this  type  of 
competence  is  not  capable  of  pre-empting  Member  States'  powers465.  In  fact,  two  declarations 
458 Article 24 (1) TEU provides: “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to 
[the provisions on the CFSP], with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this 
Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the  
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
459 R. A. Wessel, “The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities”, in A.  
Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing  
Landscape (Cambridge University Press 2009) 152 at 184.
460 Article 2 (4) TFEU reads: “The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on 
European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing 
of a common defence policy”.
461 J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty”, 161.
462 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 65. 
463 Ibid at 65. Similarly, J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the 
Lisbon Treaty”, 169.
464 For an overview of the different views, see M. Brkan, “Exploring EU Competence in CFSP: Logic or Contradiction?” 
(2006) 2 CYELP 173 at 186-89.
465 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance between 
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annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon suggest that the Member States intended to exclude pre-emption in 
the area of the CFSP466. Declarations 13 and 14 emphasise that the CFSP is not to affect the Member 
States' responsibilities and powers in relation to the formulation and the conduct of their foreign 
policy.  The lack of  jurisdiction in  CFSP matters,  furthermore,  makes pre-emption impracticable, 
since the Court of Justice would not be competent to determine the precise extent of pre-emption in a 
specific case467. 
Delimitation and  Consistency” (2010) 47 C.M.L.  Rev.  987 at  991;  M. Cremona,  “Defining Competence  in  EU 
External Relations”, 65; M. Brkan, “Exploring EU Competence in CFSP: Logic or Contradiction?”,186; G. De Baere, 
Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 111.
466 G. De Baere,  Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 111;  M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU 
External Relations”, 65. 
467 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 65. 
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Chapter Two
The Impact of an Exercise of Union Competence on the Member States' Freedom to Act 
I. Introduction 
An exercise of Union competence, as we saw in the foregoing, may have an effect on the existence 
of Member State powers. The adoption of Union legislation will pre-empt the Member States' powers 
to the extent that the EU has regulated. In addition to affecting Member State powers, however, the 
duty of loyalty laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU may also have an effect on their freedom to act. 
Questions as to the scope of such an effect arise in different circumstances. Firstly, if the Union is 
prevented from exercising its competence, do the Member States remain free to act as sovereign 
states on the international scene, or are they required to act on behalf of the Union? Secondly, where 
the  Union  has  opted  not  to  exercise  its  powers  and  the  Member  States  consequently  remain 
competent to act, may Member State action be restrained even before an exercise of EU competence 
has taken place? Thirdly, where the exercise of Union competence leads to incompatibilities with 
international agreements concluded by the Member States prior to the adoption of EU rules, are the 
Member States required to adjust all inconsistent commitments?
This chapter examines these different ways in which an exercise of Union competence may affect the 
Member States' freedom to act. To that end, it will first look at the restraints which apply when the 
Union is barred from acting (Section II.). What obligations does Article 4 (3) TEU entail in a field 
which  has  been  reserved  to  the  exclusive  powers  of  the  EU,  but  in  which  no  exercise  of  EU 
competence has taken place yet? And how do these obligations change in case the Union fails to 
exercise its powers within a stipulated period? Once an exercise of Union competence has taken 
place, can the AETR doctrine preclude Member State action even in situations of a non-contractual 
kind? 
In areas in which the Union has decided not to regulate (yet), its competence remains shared with the  
Member States. Although, by definition, the Member States remain free to act in these areas, the duty 
of loyalty may impose certain restraints (Section III.). The central question is to what extent the 
loyalty  obligations  differ  in  areas  of  shared  powers  from those  in  which  the  Union  enjoys  an 
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exclusive competence. At what point does the duty of cooperation become operative? And does it 
impose procedural restraints only, or can it also entail a substantive obligation of result?
Finally, the chapter looks at the effect which an exercise of Union powers may have on bilateral  
Member State agreements concluded before the EU decided to exercise its competence (Section IV.). 
If  the  supervening  exercise  of  Union  powers  leads  to  incompatibilities  with  international 
commitments assumed by the Member States before Union action in the field was foreseeable, the 
Member States can obviously not be blamed for an ensuing conflict of rules. In these situations, does 
the Court of Justice strive for a solution which respects the Member States' commitments towards 
third countries involved, or are the Member States under a strict substantive obligation to achieve the 
primacy of EU law?
In the light of the broad potential of Article 4 (3) TEU to restrain Member State powers in this 
context, the question arises of the relationship between the duty of cooperation and the principle of 
pre-emption discussed in  the previous  chapter  (Section V.).  In  CFSP matters,  any potential  pre-
emptive effect based on the duty to cooperate must be excluded from the outset. This does not mean, 
however, that the Member States are not subject to concrete procedural restraints also in this area 
(Section VI.). 
II. Loyalty restraints in areas in which Union action is impossible  
A finding of exclusive Union competence in a given field does not always correlate with exclusive 
Union action in that area. In some cases, it may be either desirable or legally necessary that the EU 
acts through the medium of its Member States. Such a situation may occur where the exercise of 
Union powers cannot be completed due to factors outside the control of the EU institutions. Until the 
exercise  of  EU  powers  has  taken  place,  the  Member  States  are  subject  to  certain  procedural 
obligations (A.), which may transform into substantive restraints once a predetermined period for the 
exercise  of  EU competence  has  expired  unsuccessfully  (B.).  Once  an  exercise  has  taken  place, 
Member  States  are  required  to  defend  the  Union's  interests  where  the  Union  is  incapable  of 
negotiating an agreement (C.) or where the Union's participation in an international organisation is 
impossible (D.). 
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A. Loyalty obligations in transitional periods 
The first time that the Court of Justice was faced with the question of what effect the exercise of an 
external Union competence would have on the Member States' freedom to act was in Kramer468. In 
this  judgment,  the Court laid down the guidelines for dealing with restrictions of Member State 
competence in an area which had been “reserved”469 to the Union, but in which the latter had not yet 
fully exercised its powers. The Court declared that  the Member States were free to exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union had not exercised its powers. However, once the Union had 
exercised its competence, it was to act alone.
The  preliminary  reference  from a  Dutch  court  concerned  criminal  proceedings  initiated  against 
Dutch fishermen on grounds of a violation of Dutch rules implementing a recommendation under the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention. The Netherlands had signed the Convention two years 
after the founding of the Union, but prior to the adoption of a number of Union measures which 
conferred on the EU the responsibility for recommendations concerning the regulation of catch and 
fishing  quotas.  The Court  of  Justice acknowledged that  in  adopting the  contested  measures,  the 
Netherlands had not exercised a right under international law, but fulfilled an obligation “arising 
from a binding recommendation of […] an international body”470. 
When  addressing  the  question  of  whether  the  EU  was  exclusively  competent  to  enter  into 
commitments  such as  those  undertaken by some of  the  Member  States,  the  Court  found Union 
competence  to  exist  by  implication  on  the  basis  of  primary  and  secondary  EU  rules.  When 
determining  whether  that  competence  had  become  exclusive,  the  Court  pointed  out  that  the 
Convention was concluded at  a time when the EU had not yet made any regulations relating to 
fisheries, and in the meantime, the Union had still not fully exercised its functions in the matter. As a 
result,  the  Member  States  were  free  to  exercise  their  competence  and  assume  international 
commitments until the Union had made use of its own powers471. 
However, the residual Member State competence was subject to two limitations. According to Article 
102 of the Act of Accession, the Council was given a six-year period in which it was required to 
complete the adoption of the necessary measures for the conservation of the resources of the sea 
foreseen in Regulation no. 2141/70. In the meantime, the Member States' power to act in the field 
468 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1305.
469 See Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, para 30.
470 Ibid., para 13, emphasis added.
471 Ibid., paras 35/38 and 39.
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was  of  a  transitional  nature  and  would  expire  automatically  once  the  Union  had  exercised  its 
authority in the field472. 
Moreover, the Member States were subsequently bound in their negotiations with third countries by 
their obligations towards the Union under Article 4 (3) TEU473. These obligations included a “duty 
not to enter into any commitment within the framework of those Conventions which could hinder the 
[Union] in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it” and a “duty to proceed by common action within the 
Fisheries Commission”474. Once the Union had initiated the procedure for the exercise of its powers 
or, at the latest, upon the expiry of the interim period, the Member States would be under a “duty to  
use all  the political  and legal means at  their  disposal in order to ensure the participation of the 
[Union] in the Convention and in other similar agreements”475. 
B. The start of concerted Union action
When the transitional period for implementation laid down in Article 102 of the Act of Accession 
expired on 1st January 1979,  the Union had still  not  been able to  adopt  legislation in  the field. 
Although the Commission had submitted the required legislative proposals to the Council and the 
latter had laid down guidelines concerning the rules on fisheries conservation, the UK government 
had hindered the adoption of new measures by blocking the decision-making process in the Council. 
Instead, the UK had taken steps to bring into force a series of measures of its own, prompting the 
Commission to bring an action against the Member State. 
Thus, in Commission v. United Kingdom476, the Court of Justice had to assess the implications of the 
lapse of the transitional period for the competence of the Member States. While the UK argued that  
the Member States retained residual power until the EU had exercised its competence to the full 
extent477, the Court held that the Union had acquired exclusive powers in the area upon the expiry of 
the transitional period, emphasising that the Council's failure to adopt the appropriate conservation 
measures in time “could not in any case restore to the Member States the power and freedom to act  
unilaterally in this field”478. 
472 Ibid., para 40.
473 Ibid.
474 Ibid., paras 44/45.
475 Ibid.
476 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045.
477 Ibid., para 14.
478 Ibid., paras 27 and 20.
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The Court pointed out that the area of fisheries conservation had been “reserved to the powers of the 
Union”, and as a consequence, the Member States were henceforth allowed to “act only as trustees 
of the common interest”479. The Court went on to specify what obligations this finding entailed for the 
Member States. The adoption of legislative measures in the matter of fisheries conservation measures 
was from now on “a matter (...) of [Union] law”, with the result that the Member States were “no 
longer entitled to exercise any power of their own in the matter of conservation measures in the 
waters under their jurisdiction”480. Instead, they were, by virtue of (current) Article 4 (3) TEU  under 
“special duties of action and abstention” aimed at meeting urgent needs of conservation481.
Two points are noteworthy in this context. The first concerns the extension of the temporal scope of 
implied exclusive competence in this case. For the first time, the Court recognised that the Union 
was capable of “reserving” a field to its powers even before it had fully exercised its competence in 
the areas. It was argued that the Court's approach 
“went far beyond what  had been held to be the legal consequences of  failure to introduce a common 
organization  by  the  due  date  in  other  agricultural  sectors,  where  the  absence  of  the  common 
organization had been held to lead to the application of the basic Treaty rules rather than the exclusion 
of national competence”482.
However, while the Court left no doubt that the Union's power in the field automatically became 
exclusive upon the expiry of the transitional period483, it must nevertheless be recalled that the failure 
on the part of the Union to exercise its competence was not the result of inaction, but followed from 
the UK's interference in the adoption of the necessary measures in the Council. What appeared to be 
decisive in the Court's reasoning, therefore, was not the mere lapse of a predetermined period of 
time, but the fact that the Commission had submitted to the Council proposals for the adoption of  
conservation measures. Irrespective of the Council's failure to adopt them, the submission of the 
proposal represented “the point of departure for concerted [Union] action”484. 
And thus, the Court had coined a new formula which, as we will see in the following, plays an 
important role in the temporal dimension of the duty of loyalty485. Where “concerted action” has been 
479 Ibid., para 30, emphasis added.
480 Ibid., para 18.
481 Ibid., para 28.
482 J.  A.  Usher,  “The Scope of  Community Competence – Its  Recognition and Enforcement” (1985) 23 Journal  of  
Common Market Studies 121 at 125.
483 See  Case  804/79  Commission  v.  United  Kingdom,  para  17:  “[S]ince  the  expiration  on  1  January  1979  of  the 
transitional period laid down by Article 102 of the Act of Accession, power to adopt, as part of the Common Fisheries  
Policy, measures relating to the conservation of the resources of the sea has belonged fully and definitely to the 
[Union]”. 
484 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 28, emphasis added.
485 See also Cases C-433/03  Commission v. Germany [2005] ECR I-6985 and C-266/03  Commission v. Luxembourg 
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initiated at Union level, the Member States are subject to “special duties”. These go beyond a mere 
procedural obligation to cooperate (in this case, “an obligation to undertake detailed consultations 
with the Commission”486), but also include obligations of a substantive nature (“an obligation […] to 
seek [the Commission's] approval in good faith” and “a duty not to lay down national conservation 
measures in spite of objections”487). Against this background, it is noteworthy that the “concerted 
action” referred to by the Court in the present case was not concerted at all. Having been rejected in 
the Council, the Commission proposal in question was bound to remain very much unilateral. 
Such a generous interpretation of the notion of “concerted” action may be explained by the special 
circumstances of the case. The Member State which then proceeded to adopt the contested national 
measures was the same that had blocked the adoption of the Commission proposal in the Council, 
while no other Council members had objected to the adoption. 
The second point concerns the scope of the “special duties” imposed on the Member States. The 
Court made clear that upon the expiry of the transitional period, the adoption of national measures 
had become “a  matter […] of [Union] law”488. Member State action in the field was subsequently 
limited  to  “amend[ments]  of  the  existing  conservation  measures  in  case  of  need  owing  to  the 
development of the relevant biological and technological facts in this sphere” until the EU's own 
conservation measures entered into force489. However, the development of a new conservation policy 
on the part of a Member State was excluded490. It is interesting to note that the Court nevertheless 
adopted a rather lenient approach to circumscribing the limits of national action. Far from requiring 
an express authorisation from the Commission to act, national measures were in conformity with the 
duty of loyalty as long as the Commission gave its “retroactive approval […], where necessary after 
acceptance by the state  concerned of the conditions laid down by the Commission”491.  The UK, 
however,  had  proceeded  to  adopt  the  contested  national  measures  without  regard  to  the 
“reservations”  submitted  to  it  by  the  Commission492.  It  has  thus  failed  “to  undertake  detailed 
consultations with the Commission and to seek its  approval in good faith” and “to abstain from 
laying down national conservation measures” which had not been approved by the Commission493. 
[2005] ECR I-4805 discussed in the present chapter and Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS) [2010] ECR 
I-3317 discussed in Chapter Five.
486 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 31. 
487 Ibid.
488 Ibid., para 18, emphasis added. 
489 Ibid., para 22.
490 Ibid., para 22. 
491 Ibid., para 37.
492 See ibid., para 37.
493 Ibid., para 31.
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The Court of Justice clarified that the UK's failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU did 
not result from the adoption of national measures. Indeed, other cases in which Member States had 
proceeded to adopt national measures were held to be “not comparable with the disputed measures of 
the  United  Kingdom”,  as  the  UK had  opted  to  bring  incompatible  rules  into  force  despite  the 
objections expressed by the Commission494. 
C. Negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on behalf of the Union 
In  the  foregoing  case,  the  Member  States  remained  authorised  to  act  in  an  area  of  reserved 
exclusivity,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  EU  had  been  hindered  from  fully  exercising  its  powers. 
Nevertheless, any national measure was subsequently “a matter of Union law”. Once the exercise of 
a Union competence has been completed,  however,  Member States are only allowed – or rather 
required – to act if the Union is not in a position to defend its interests on its own. This may be the 
case where the Union is incapable of negotiating an agreement or, as we will see in the following 
section, participating in an international organisation. 
Where the Union is barred from participating in the negotiation of an international agreement, the 
Commission  may  choose  to  obtain  a  negotiating  mandate  from the  Council  and  carry  out  the 
negotiations  itself.  Thus,  for  negotiations  leading  to  conventions  concluded  by the  International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), of which the Union is not a member but only enjoys observer status, a 
working agreement contained in a Council decision of 22 December 1986 provides that in matters of 
exclusive Union competence, the Council will authorise the Commission to negotiate and to speak 
on behalf of the Union in the Conference495. Prior to the adoption of the Council decision, a number 
of Member States had disputed the Union's right to take part in the Conference, leading the Council 
to agree that the Union and its Member States together would put forward the Union's position. The 
Council  decision  of  22  December  1986,  however,  imposed  full  compliance  with  the  tripartite 
procedure for consultation, stipulating that the Council was required to adopt the proposals submitted 
to it by the Commission and grant the Commission a negotiating mandate if requested to do so. 
In Opinion 2/91, the Court of Justice had to assess the refusal by several Member States to comply 
with this consultation procedure on the ground that the Union lacked exclusive competence to act. 
The  Court  established  that  parts  of  the  Convention  did  indeed  cover  an  area  of  exclusive  EU 
494 Ibid.
495 See Opinion 2/91 Convention No. 170 on safety in the use of chemicals at work, part IV.
99
competence  and  that,  therefore,  the  Member  States  were  pre-empted  from  undertaking  any 
commitments in the field outside the framework of the Union institutions496. The Court went on to 
emphasise the role of the duty of sincere cooperation in this context. Comparing its application to 
situations of shared competence, the Court stressed that in the present case, 
“cooperation between the [Union] and the Member States is all the more necessary in view of the fact 
that the former cannot, as international law stands at present, itself conclude an ILO convention and 
must do so through the medium of the Member States.”497
Instead of  assuming the role  of  negotiator,  the  Union may,  in  certain cases,  prefer  to  leave the 
Member States in charge of negotiating an agreement, notwithstanding its exclusive EU competence 
in the field. In the  AETR case498, the Commission complained that the Council's  decision that the 
negotiations of the European Agreement on Road Transport (AETR) should be carried out by the six 
contracting Member States deprived it of its role as negotiator under (current) Article 218 TFEU. 
However,  the Court of Justice accepted the Council's  approach as valid.  Although a shift  in the 
allocation  of  powers  over  parts  of  the  agreement  had  taken  place  during  the  course  of  the 
negotiations,  it  was  more  favourable  for  the  Union's  position  to  maintain  in  force  the  original 
negotiation arrangement. As the Court put it,
“to have suggested to the third countries concerned that there was now a new distribution of powers  
within the [Union] might well have jeopardised the successful outcome of the negotiations […]”.499 
Nevertheless,  the  Court  emphasised  that  by  assuming  the  position  of  negotiator  in  an  area  of 
exclusive Union competence, the Member States did not act by way of “voluntary coordination”, 
but instead laid down “a course of action binding on both the institutions and the Member States” 500. 
Therefore,  the Member States  were under  an obligation to  “act  in  common” and to “constantly 
coordinate their positions […] in close association with the [Union] institutions”501. Under (current) 
Article 4 (3) TEU, the Member States were, in sum, required to act “in the interest and on behalf of 
[Union]” by establishing a joint negotiating position within the framework of the institutions with 
binding effect on all participating Member States502. 
496 Opinion 2/91, paras. 22-26.
497 Ibid., para 37, emphasis added. 
498 Case 22/70 AETR [1971] ECR 263.
499 Case 22/70, para 86. 
500 Ibid., para 53.
501 Ibid., para 49, emphasis added.
502 See ibid., para 90.
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In both cases, it emerges that where the Member States act “on behalf of” the Union, they are under 
more than an obligation to use their best efforts. Where this is in the interest of the Union, it may be 
preferable that the Member States negotiate through a common position. In other cases, the Council  
may be required to grant a negotiation mandate to the Commission. Either way, the Member States 
are under an obligation of result: “[T]he obligation is to negotiate through a common position or not 
to conclude the agreement at all”503. 
D. Participation in international organisations 
The  obligations  flowing  from Article  4  (3)  TEU  are  not  only  relevant  for  the  negotiation  and 
conclusion of international agreements, but also apply to the participation within the framework of 
those agreements. If Member States exercise their treaty-making powers by joining an international 
organisation,  the  question  arises  to  what  extent  supervening  exclusive  Union  competence  may 
restrain them in their freedom to exercise the rights under international law. Can the AETR doctrine – 
established with a view to pre-empting the Member States of their power to conclude international 
agreements that had the potential for affecting Union law – develop the same exclusionary effect in 
the ambit of action within an international organisation (i.)? And if so, what implications does this 
have for the Member States' participation in that organisation (ii.)? 
The Court of Justice dealt  with these two questions in the  Greek IMO case504.  The Commission 
brought an infringement action against Greece aimed at establishing that Greece had infringed Union 
law when submitting to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) a proposal for monitoring the 
compliance of ships and port facilities with Chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code. While Greece had become a member of the IMO in 1958, the EU was barred from 
joining the organisation. 
i. The extension of the AETR doctrine 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Union was not a member of the IMO, it had adopted Regulation 
No. 725/2004 with a view to implementing both the ISPS Code and the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 
503 M. Cremona, “Member States as Trustees of the Community Interest: Participating in International Agreements on 
Behalf of the European Community”, EUI Working Paper LAW 2009/17 at 4.
504 Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECR I-701.
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Convention into EU law. The Commission argued that the Union had acquired exclusive competence 
by virtue of the AETR principle. By acting unilaterally in an area of exclusive Union competence, the 
Commission continued, Greece had breached the principle of united external representation flowing 
from (current) Article 4 (3) TEU. 
While Greece did not dispute the exclusive competence of the Union in the field covered by the 
Regulation, it questioned whether the effects of AETR exclusivity extended beyond the conclusion of 
an international agreement. The Member State brought forward a number of arguments in defence of 
its actions within the framework of the IMO. It argued, inter alia, that the submission of its proposal 
was part of its active participation in the organisation. Active participation was not tantamount to 
entering into international commitments and, therefore, not covered by the  AETR doctrine. On the 
contrary, active participation of the Member States was necessary in cases where the Union was not a 
member of the international organisation, and the restriction of such participation would only lead to 
the devaluation and, ultimately, the loss of the status of member of the IMO. 
In assessing whether the Union had acquired exclusive competence in the area covered by the two 
international conventions at issue, the Court largely followed the Advocate General. AG Bot had 
concluded:
“By virtue of the fact that the [Union] exercises its internal competence in the area of sea transport and,  
more especially, on account of the fact that common rules were adopted for enhancing ship and port  
facility security, exclusive external competence was conferred to that extent upon it.”505 
It  appears  that  to  the  Court,  the  case  for  exclusivity  was  rather  clear,  as  it  swiftly reached the 
conclusion that the provisions of the EU Regulation at issue were “[Union] rules promulgated for the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty”506.
The assertion of exclusive competence to conclude an international agreement,  however,  did not 
reveal  anything  about  its  implications  for  the  Member  States'  freedom to  participate  within  an 
international organisation. Thus, the Court went to on to examine whether the submission of the 
Greek proposal constituted an obligation capable of affecting the EU Regulation, finding that the 
national action had initiated a procedure capable of leading to the adoption by the IMO of new rules 
within the area covered by the Regulation. As such a procedure was likely to affect the provisions of 
the  Regulation,  the  Court  concluded that  Greece  had breached (current)  Article  4  (3)  TEU and 
Articles  91  and  100  (2)  TFEU,  which  served  as  the  legal  base  for  the  adoption  of  the  EU 
505 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-45/07, para 34 (emphasis added). 
506 Case C-45/07, para 18.
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Regulation507.  The  Court  emphasised  that  the  fact  that  the  Union  was  not  a  member  of  the 
international organisation did not prevent its external competence from being exercised and “in no 
way authorises a Member State (...) to assume obligations likely to affect [Union] rules”508. 
The Court stressed that  Article 4 (3) TEU prohibited “any measure” capable of jeopardising the 
attainment of Treaty objectives509. Should this be taken to mean that  any national non-contractual 
action may be deemed to have the potential of “affecting” Union rules or are there limits to the 
extension of the AETR principle to this type of situation? 
Since Opinion 2/91, the Court had consistently held that any finding of implied exclusive powers in a 
given area presupposed a detailed analysis in order to determine whether and to what extent internal 
legislation was affected by international commitments, and only when the specific rules were found 
capable of being affected could this give rise to exclusive Union powers510. The conclusion that EU 
rules in a given area were affected or that their scope was altered by an international agreement 
entered into by a Member State was thus dependent on the regulatory intensity and the content of 
those Union measures. As the Court made clear in Opinion 1/03, by virtue of the fact that the Union 
enjoyed conferred powers only, any implied competence 
“must have its basis in conclusions drawn from a specific analysis of the  relationship between the 
agreement envisaged and the [Union] law in force and from which it is clear that the conclusion of such 
an agreement is capable of affecting the [Union] rules”511.
Such an analysis “must be based not only on the scope of the rules in question but also on their  
nature and  content”512. In other words, the pre-emptive effect of the  AETR principle could not be 
assumed solely on the basis of the existence of Union rules in a given field, but depended on the  
nature of the rules in question. In the  Greek IMO case, however, the national measure was not an 
obligation  directly  capable  of  affecting  the  EU  Regulation,  as  Greece  had  merely  initiated a 
procedure which could have led to the adoption of new rules by the IMO. 
The Court of Justice had already declared in Opinion 1/2003 that the AETR principle may also apply 
to situations in which Union rules which could be affected have yet to come into existence: 
“It is also necessary to take into account not only the current state of [Union] law in the area in question 
but also its future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis.”513 
507 Ibid., para 19 and paras 21-23.
508 Ibid., paras 30-31.
509 Ibid., para 16, emphasis added.
510 See Chapter One.
511 Opinion 1/03 [2006] ECR I-1145 at para 124, emphasis added.
512 Ibid., para 126, emphasis added.
513 Opinion 1/03, para 126.
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The same reasoning appears to underlie the Court's construction of AETR pre-emption in the present 
case,  which  has  led  to  criticism  alleging  a  significant  extension  of  the  scope  of  exclusive 
competence. It was argued that the “totally hypothetical, possible, future effect” of Member State 
action  on  Union  law  was  sufficient  to  impose  an  obligation  on  Greece  to  abstain  from acting 
altogether514.  As  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  Court  “has  modified  the  'effect-based'  test  into  a 
'hypothetical incompatibility' test”, it is now possible 
“to determine at  a much lower threshold than before that  an international  treaty potentially affects  
[Union] law and therefore must fall within the exclusive competence of the [EU]”515. 
Such a reading of the Court's approach in the Greek IMO would indicate a conservative fidelity view 
of federalism. While a liberal fidelity approach in these cases would have called for the preservation 
of engagement between the Union and the Member States until EU rules that could be affected by 
Member State action had actually come into being, the conservative vision seeks to prevent conflict 
between pre-existing international obligations and EU law from the outset by achieving an optimal 
position for the Union to freely exercise its powers516. 
The extension of the AETR principle in this case, however, does not seek to calm policy disputes by 
suppressing political dissent as the  conservative fidelity approach would517. There is nothing in the 
Greek  IMO case  which  suggests  that  non-contractual  Member  State  action  of  any  kind  may 
automatically trigger AETR pre-emption, regardless of whether common rules are directly affected or 
not. The Court of Justice pointed out that Greece had initiated a procedure which could lead to the 
adoption by the IMO of new rules in respect of Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS code.  Since it  was 
apparent from the Regulation that the EU legislature had “decided to incorporate in substance both of 
those  international  instruments  into  [Union]  law”,  the  adoption  of  new IMO rules  would  “as  a 
consequence have an effect on the Regulation”518. The Court was thus
“careful to link the scope of the exclusivity principle to the scope of the Regulation […] and to match  
the national  action in  question to  the  purposes  and structure  of  the  Regulation when assessing its 
effects”519.
Against this background, it may be argued that it 
“would be wrong […] to read into this judgment an extensive reinterpretation of  AETR to cover all 
514 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 277.
515 Ibid.
516 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778, see further the Introductory Chapter. 
517 Ibid at 773.
518 Case C-45/07, para 22.
519 M. Cremona, “Extending the Reach of the AETR Principle: Comment on Commission v Greece (C-45/07)” (2009) 34 
E.L. Rev. 754 at 763.
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kinds of unilateral (non-contractual) action in a vaguely identified field such as “maritime security”520. 
ii. The duty to act on behalf of the Union – An obligation of result
In practice, the Court's finding that the  AETR formula also applied to the participation within an 
international organisation entailed an obligation on the Member States to either act on behalf of the 
Union, or to refrain from acting whatsoever. Greece had submitted the contested proposal to the 
Maritime Safety Committee  for  discussion  with  a  view to  formulating  a  Union position  on the 
subject-matter. The Commission, acting through its representative chairing the Committee, however, 
refused to include that proposal on the agenda for that meeting. Having used its best efforts to obtain 
a common position, Greece considered that it did comply with its obligation of sincere cooperation 
under  Article  4  (3)  TEU. It  submitted that,  instead,  it  was the Commission which had failed to 
comply with this obligation by rejecting the national proposal521. 
The  Court  of  Justice  did  not  accept  the  Member  State's  defence.  Acknowledging  that  the 
Commission might  indeed have,  as  argued by Greece,  failed  to  fulfil  its  own obligations  under 
Article 4 (3) TEU by rejecting the national proposal for inclusion on the agenda522, the Court stressed 
that 
“[n]one the less, any breach by the Commission of Article [4 (3) TEU] cannot entitle a Member State to 
take initiatives likely to affect [Union] rules promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of the 
Treaty, in breach of that State’s obligations […].”523
The  case  illustrates  that  in  situations  in  which  the  Member  States  have  unsuccessfully  tried  to 
achieve the adoption of a common position at Union level, they nevertheless remain precluded from 
taking further unilateral action, even if the failure to reach a common position can be ascribed to the 
Commission alone. In the specific case, informing and consulting the Commission was not sufficient 
for a Member State to fulfil its duty of cooperation. Instead, Article 4 (3) TEU called for abstention 
from action, thus imposing more than a mere “best efforts” obligation. 
As  a  second  defence,  Greece  invoked  a  gentleman’s  agreement  adopted  by the  Council,  which 
permitted Member States to submit proposals to the IMO in the absence of a common position on a 
given  subject-matter.  The  Court,  however,  was  quick  to  reject  this  argument.  A  gentleman’s 
520 Ibid.
521 See Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-45/07, para 16.
522 See Case C-45/07, para 25.
523 Case C-45/07, para 26, emphasis added.
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agreement was not capable of affecting the division of powers between the Union and its Member 
States524. 
In  sum,  the  Court  of  Justice  left  no doubt  that  the  duty of  loyalty  was absolute:  it  entailed  an 
obligation of result – Member States were precluded from acting, unless they had been authorised by 
the  Union  to  do  so.  This  general  rule  applied  regardless  of  any  internal  shortcomings  or 
arrangements. Whether the Commission had failed to fulfil the duty of sincere cooperation on its 
part,  or whether the Council  had adopted different  procedural rules was irrelevant.  Nothing was 
allowed to affect the division of powers between the Member States and the Union, and the task of 
the Member States under Article 4 (3) TEU was to ensure that this division is preserved. Therefore, it 
may be  argued that  “the Court  focuses  on  exclusivity rather  than on the  special  position  of  the 
Member  States  and  [Union]  vis-à-vis the  IMO,  on  pre-emption rather  than  the  duty  of  co-
operation”525. 
Thus, although AG Bot emphasised in the Greek IMO case that the “duty of genuine cooperation is 
of general application and does not depend either on whether the [Union] competence concerned is 
exclusive”526, it nevertheless becomes apparent that in areas of exclusive competence, the Member 
States' obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU are particularly stringent. However, it also emerges that 
even within areas of exclusivity, there may be different degrees of the Member States' duty to abstain 
from  acting.  As  we  saw  in  Commission  v.  United  Kingdom527,  Member  States  may  in  certain 
circumstances be granted the right to continue adopting national measures, provided that they obtain 
the Commission's retroactive approval, or, where necessary, adjust the planned measures according 
to the Commission's reservations528. In the Greek IMO case, by contrast, no such right of initiative 
was accepted. In the absence of an  express authorisation by the Commission, the Member States 
were bound to remain inactive. In both cases, the Member States had assumed the role of “trustees of 
the Union interest”, but in one case, the loyalty obligation was more relaxed than in the other. The 
slight difference in approach may be explained by the fact that the duty on the Member States to act 
on behalf of the Union was all the stronger in the Greek IMO case due to the fact that the case did not 
concern the development of a given Union policy, but the adoption of  regulatory standards at an 
international level and their enforcement529. 
524 Case C-45/07, para 29.
525 M. Cremona, “Extending the Reach of the AETR Principle”, 768, emphasis added.
526 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-45/07, para 38.
527 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, see above. 
528 See ibid. at para 37.
529 See M. Cremona, “Extending the Reach of the AETR Principle”, 768.
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III. The start of concerted Union action in areas in which competence remains shared 
What emerges from the foregoing is that Member States are only allowed to act until the Union 
exercises a competence or, where it is impeded from doing so, “reserves” a field. Once an exercise of 
competence has taken place, Member States may only act as “trustees of the Union interest”. In areas 
of shared competence, by contrast, Member States generally remain free to enter into international 
commitments, provided that no Union rules or agreements exist with which the envisaged agreement 
could conflict.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  that even in these areas,  the Member States'  freedom of 
action may be circumscribed by a prospect of the exercise of Union competence. Here, too, the start 
of “concerted action” at Union level can have a significant impact on the Member States' freedom to 
act, both as far as the conclusion of international agreements (A.), as well as national participation in 
international organisations (B.) is concerned. 
A. The duty to cooperate – An obligation of abstention? 
Two cases brought by the Commission against Germany and Luxembourg demonstrate how Article 4 
(3)  TEU may impose  significant  procedural  restraints  on the  Member  States  in  areas  of  shared 
competence.  In  Commission  v.  Germany530 and  Commission  v.  Luxembourg531,  the  Commission 
sought a declaration from the Court of Justice that, by unilaterally negotiating, concluding, ratifying 
and bringing into force a number of bilateral agreements on inland waterway transport, Germany and 
Luxembourg  had  breached  their  obligations  under  (current)  Article  4  (3)  TEU  and  Council 
Regulation No. 3921/91532.
Prior to the conclusion of the agreements, the Council had granted the Commission a negotiating 
mandate for the conclusion of a multilateral agreement between the Union and third countries in the 
field of transport by inland waterway533. Following the Council's authorisation, the Commission had 
called  on the  Member  States  to  abstain  from any conduct  that  could  jeopardise  the  multilateral 
negotiations and to abandon the ratification of any agreements which had already been signed534.
530 Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany.
531 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg.
532 The case is frequently cited in combination with Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, delivered shortly before 
Commission v. Germany. The former case is similar on the merits and in its outcome, but the timing of the conclusion  
of the agreements at issue excludes issues of supervening competence from the outset, since all contested agreements 
were concluded after the entry into force of the EU Regulation and before the adoption of the Council Decision.
533 Case C-433/03, paras 16-17.
534 Ibid., para 18. 
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By its  first  submission,  the  Commission  alleged  that  the  two  Member  States  had  infringed  the 
Union's exclusive competence to conclude international agreements on transport by inland waterway 
which it enjoyed by implication in accordance with the AETR doctrine535. It argued that the three 
bilateral  agreements  affected the common rules  laid down in Regulation No. 3921/91 in  a  field 
harmonised completely by Union rules536.  The Court, however, refused to accept the Commission's 
argument  that  Union  competence  in  the  field  was  exclusive,  on  the  ground  that  existing  EU 
legislation  was concerned only with market access for EU carriers and would,  therefore,  not be 
“affected” by the bilateral agreements in question537.
Secondly,  the Commission submitted that by ratifying and implementing the bilateral agreements 
subsequently to the Council decision, Germany had jeopardised the Commission's negotiations of the 
envisaged multilateral  agreement  and thus  infringed Article  4  (3)  TEU538.  In  its  reply,  Germany 
argued that the principle of loyal cooperation neither obliged the Member States to denounce existing 
agreements by the mere fact that the Commission had initiated negotiations in the same area539, nor 
could it impose a standstill obligation to refrain from action540. In any event, the Member State had 
offered the Commission “every possible form of cooperation”, including consultations and timely 
denunciation as soon as a Union agreement would be signed541. 
The Court of Justice rejected all of the Member States' submissions. Citing AG Tizzano, it declared 
that the adoption of the Council decision had caused a “substantial change in the legal framework” in 
which  the  three  agreements  were  concluded,  requiring  closer  cooperation542.  Indeed,  the 
Commission's authorisation by the Council to negotiate a multilateral agreement marked the “start of 
a concerted [Union] action at international level”543. In the interest of coherence and consistency of 
Union action and international representation, the Member States were, therefore, 
“if  not  a  duty  of  abstention on  the  part  of  the  Member  States,  at  the  very  least a  duty of  close 
cooperation between the latter and the [Union] institutions”544. 
This statement is ambiguous, leaving open the question of whether Member States may or may not 
be required to abstain from acting by virtue of the start of concerted action in an area of shared 
535 See Chapter One. 
536 Case C-433/03, para 36. 
537 Ibid., paras 48-51.
538 Ibid., para 55.
539 Ibid., para 57. 
540 Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 64.
541 Ibid.
542 See Case C-433/03, op. cit., para 67.
543 Ibid., para 66.
544 Ibid., emphasis added.
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competence. Germany had, in fact, argued that the Commission's demands amounted to a “standstill 
obligation to refrain from action”545. Such an obligation would be “tantamount to conferring on the 
[Union] exclusive external competence”, without the conditions for exclusivity being satisfied546. 
This reading of the loyalty obligations in the present case would then indicate a conservative fidelity 
approach, enforcing “harmony even where there is none”547. In fact, 
“[w]ere Article [4 (3)] to require a  complete halt to negotiations that would be tantamount to finding 
that the Member States were no longer competent to conclude the agreements, and inconsistent with the 
explicit ruling that there was no exclusive competence”548.
In order to assess Germany's argument alleging a hidden expansion of exclusive Union competence, 
it is important to examine to what extent the Member State would have been able to remedy its  
failure  to  fulfil  obligations  and  under  what  conditions  it  would  have  remained  entitled  to  act.  
Germany took the view that it “offered the Commission  every possible form of cooperation”, by 
consulting the Commission during the negotiations of the bilateral agreements and undertaking to 
denounce them as soon as a Union agreement was signed, and it had reduced the period within which 
they were to be denounced to six months549. 
If Germany was right in claiming that it  had used its best  efforts to ensure the fulfilment of its 
obligations towards the Union,  then imposing any further  restraints  would have amounted to an 
obligation of result, in this case to abstain from acting. Advocate General Tizzano argued that the 
Member  State  should  have  given  the  Commission  the  opportunity  to  ensure  that  the  national 
initiative would proceed in accordance with EU law, by allowing it to seek amendments or request 
changes to the agreements at issue550. However, he concluded, the Member State “did none of that”, 
opting instead to proceed to ratification of the agreements551. 
In the legal  literature,  the restraints  imposed on Germany and Luxembourg in  these cases  were 
mostly  regarded  “purely  as  procedural obligations  without  a  requirement  of  substantive 
compliance”552. The breach of Article 4 (3) TEU “lay not so much in continuing bilateral negotiations 
545 Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 64.
546 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 64, emphasis added.
547 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778.
548 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 164, emphasis added.
549 Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 67.
550 See Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 95.
551 Ibid., para 96.
552 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements,  Eventual  Future  Measures  of  the  European  Union”,  in  A.  Arnull,  C.  Barnard,  M.  Dougan and  E. 
Spaventa (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood  (Hart Publishing 
2011) 545 at 558 (emphasis added); see also C. Hillion, “Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External 
Relaions of the Union”, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP 2008) 10 at 28; M. 
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as in the absence of consultation and coordination with the [Union] institutions”553. 
Nevertheless,  doubts  remain  as  to  the  precise  scope  of  the  duty  of  loyalty  in  these  cases.  For 
example, the Advocate General's suggestion that Germany should have “deferr[ed]  ratification in 
order to be able to coordinate with the Commission and await its instructions”554 implies that the 
Member State was under an obligation to refrain from acting until the Commission had expressly 
authorised it to do so. Furthermore, his argument that the ratification of a bilateral agreement in a 
field covered by a negotiating mandate “constitutes  per se a measure ‘which could jeopardise the 
attainment  of  the  objectives  of  [the]  Treaty’”555 is  noteworthy.  If  the  ratification  of  a  bilateral 
agreement in such a situation is “per se” deemed incompatible with Article 4 (3) TEU, it is difficult  
to  see  how  consultation  and  cooperation  prior  to  ratification  should  be  able  to  remedy  this 
shortcoming. 
Ambiguities of this kind have led two authors to raise the question
“would having informed and consulted with the Commission once again after the start of  concerted 
[Union] action really have salvaged Germany’s behaviour of continuing down the road with its bilateral  
agreements?  What  constituted  the  real  handicap  to  the  Commission’s  work,  Germany’s  lacking 
communication, or indeed the fact that Germany acted […] “without being requested to do so by the 
Commission”?”556
Answering their own question, they conclude that “what the Court still presents here as potentially a 
duty to inform and consult in reality leads to an  obligation to refrain  from acting”557. The Court's 
equivocal language does not help in this respect either. Although it has been argued that “the Court 
does not  link the infringement to one of the provisions on the basis  of [Union]  competence,  but 
establishes the obligation entirely on the basis of Article [4 (3) TEU]”558, its repeated reference to 
exclusivity in  the context  of  the duty of  cooperation further  adds  to  doubts about  the procedural 
character of the Member States' obligations in these cases. 
Firstly, the Court emphasised that the duty was “of general application and does not depend either on 
whether the [Union] competence concerned is exclusive”559. Secondly, it recalled that Member States 
may be subject to “special duties of action and abstention” after a Commission proposal has been 
Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 164; E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 350.
553 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 164.
554 See Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, paras 94-96.
555 Ibid. at para 84, emphasis added.
556 A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, “The Duty to Remain Silent”, 533.
557 Ibid., emphasis added.
558 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 350.
559 See Case C-433/03, para 64.
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submitted to the Council, citing expressly Case 804/79 Commission v. UK, which concerned an area of 
exclusive EU competence560. Finally, the Court declared that 
“the fact that the German Government has undertaken to denounce the bilateral agreements as soon as a 
multilateral agreement has been concluded on behalf of the [Union] does not establish that the obligation 
of loyal cooperation laid down in Article [4 (3) TEU] has been complied with.”561
If, however, the “extreme remedy”562 of denunciation was not sufficient for the Member States to fulfil 
their obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU, it is questionable whether a higher degree of consultation 
with the Commission would have been enough for Germany and Luxembourg to comply with their 
duty of cooperation. 
B. The start of concerted action as the end of concurrent competence 
From the Commission v. Germany and Commission v. Luxembourg cases, it emerges that even before 
the Union has exercised a competence by entering into an international agreement in an area of 
shared  powers,  the  Member  States  may  be  subject  to  strict  restraints  on  the  exercise  of  their 
competence. This is the case where “concerted action” has been initiated at Union level. If these 
cases are understood as imposing an obligation to abstain from acting, the application of Article 4 (3) 
TEU effectively amounts to exclusive EU competence in an area of shared powers. In her Opinion in 
the  Vietnam WTO Accession case563, Advocate General Kokott actually confirmed that the start of 
concerted action may entail an obligation of abstention. 
In the Vietnam WTO Accession case, which was rendered obsolete in the wake of the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty and was consequently withdrawn, it was not the maintenance in force of an 
agreement  which  was  challenged  but  the  exercising  of  voting  rights  within  an  international 
organisation  of  which  both  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  were  active  members.  The  WTO 
Agreements  had  been  concluded  as  mixed  agreements  after  the  Court  of  Justice  found  shared 
competence to exist for parts of the subject matters covered564.  However, the Treaty of Nice had 
subsequently added two paragraphs to the legal basis for Union action in the field, Article 133 (5) 
and (6) EC, which became redundant after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty565. 
560 Ibid. at para 65.
561 Ibid. at para 72.
562 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies Cases, para 115, emphasis added.
563 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council (Vietnam WTO Accession), Opinion of Advocate General Kokott [2009], case 
withdrawn.
564 See Chapter 1, Opinion 1/94.
565 The Lisbon Treaty explicitly identifies the CCP as an exclusive EU competence which, according to Article 207 (1)  
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Article  133 (5)  EC established an  express  competence for  the  Union to  negotiate  and conclude 
international  agreements in the fields  of trade in  services and commercial  aspects of intellectual 
property, providing that where an international agreement included provisions for which unanimity 
was required for the adoption of internal rules or where it related to a field in which the Union had 
not yet exercised its powers, the Council had to act unanimously when negotiating and concluding 
such an agreement. 
The Commission and the Council were in dispute as to whether approval for Vietnam's accession in 
the appropriate WTO body fell within Union competence under Article 133 (5) EC or whether the 
involvement of the Member States was required in accordance with Article 133 (6) EC. The latter 
provision was aimed at circumscribing the Union's powers to conclude trade agreements with regard 
to certain service sectors. An agreement containing “provisions which would go beyond the Union's 
internal powers” required, according to paragraph 6, the “common accord of the Member States”.
In line with the wording of this provision, the representatives of the Member States meeting within 
the Council adopted a common position of the Member States which included paragraph 6 as a legal 
basis. The Commission, however, brought proceedings against the Council, claiming that the subject-
matter fell within the sole competence of the Union. 
The question of what type of competence Article 133 (5) and (6) created for the EU had not yet been  
addressed by the Court when the Commission brought the action. Thus, Advocate General Kokott 
first  considered the Council's claim that it  was possible for the Member States to voluntarily be 
involved alongside the Council within the framework of Article 133 (5) EC, even if paragraph 6 was 
not applicable.  Assessing whether the competence under paragraph 5 could be classified as non-
exclusive, the AG came to the conclusion that the powers conferred by Article 133 (5) EC in respect 
of  trade  in  services  and  the  commercial  aspects  of  intellectual  property  were  not  parallel,  but 
concurrent. As the Court had stated in Kramer, the Member States could in such a situation exercise 
their competence only to the extent that the Union had not exercised its own powers566. 
It  was,  however,  (current)  Article  4  (3)  TEU  which  determined  the  point  in  time  from which 
concurrent competence under Article 133 (5) EC came to an end and the Member States were no 
longer  capable  of  exercising  their  powers567.  Relying  on  the  Court's  findings  in  Commission  v.  
Luxembourg  and Commission v. Germany, AG Kokott specified that the start of concerted Union 
TFEU, now covers all trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual property. The reservation of Member 
State competence in the field of trade in services has, therefore, disappeared. 
566 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council (Vietnam WTO Accession), para 75-76.
567 Ibid., para 79.
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action consisted in the adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to act externally568. From 
the moment in which the Council had established a Union position on Vietnam's accession to the 
WTO,  the  Member  States  were  bound by their  duty not  to  jeopardise  the  EU's  actions  on  the 
international level, even if those actions “'only' involved acting in parallel alongside the [Union]”569. 
It was consequently the Union alone which was entitled to take measures under Article 133 (5) EC, 
unless  paragraph  6  made  additional  Member  State  action  “absolutely  necessary”570.  A lengthy 
analysis of that paragraph revealed that the Union was indeed not entitled on its own to approve 
Vietnam's accession to the WTO, but required involvement of the Member States in the form of 
concerted voting conduct571. 
Although, as we saw earlier, there had been doubts in the legal literature whether Article 4 (3) TEU 
was capable of imposing more than a procedural obligation in an area of shared competence, AG 
Kokott confirmed in the Vietnam WTO Accession case that the start of concerted Union action was 
indeed sufficient to impose a duty of abstention: 
“The adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to act externally on behalf of the [Union]  
marks the start of concerted [Union] action. Such a decision may thus already give rise to a duty on the 
Member States to refrain from acting […]”572. 
Article 2 (2) TFEU provides that the Member States remain entitled to act until the Union exercises 
its competence. Therefore, if the procedural duty of cooperation 
“is to be kept conceptually separate from pre-emption, as a restraint on but not a denial of Member 
State  competence,  this  obligation is  best  seen as  a  ‘best  efforts’ obligation rather than requiring 
Member States to refrain from acting until agreement is reached.”573
Conversely, this means that where the Member States are required to refrain from acting, the duty of 
cooperation operates in a way tantamount to exclusive Union competence. Such an application of 
Article 4 (3) TEU in an area of shared competence would then be in line with a conservative fidelity 
view of federalism. The conservative approach, in fact, seeks to achieve an optimal position for the 
Union  to  freely  exercise  its  powers  by  preventing conflict  between  pre-existing  international 
obligations and EU law from the outset574. 
568 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 80.
569 Ibid., para 82. 
570 Ibid.
571 Ibid., para 169.
572 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 80, emphasis added.
573 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 168.
574 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778, see further the Introductory Chapter.
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In Commission v. Germany and Commission v. Luxembourg575, it remained debatable whether Article 
4 (3) TEU was applied in order to prevent such a conflict, by way of a duty of abstention, or whether 
the aim was merely to minimise the potential for conflict by way of coordinated action. However, 
even if we assume that the Member States concerned were indeed under an obligation to refrain from 
acting,  it  is  not  apparent  that  the intention was to  calm policy disputes  by suppressing political 
dissent as the  conservative fidelity approach would576. Indeed, the duty of cooperation was applied 
with a view to avoiding that Member State action jeopardised the conclusion of an envisaged Union 
agreement. To that end, the two Member States were required to “proceed in accordance with, or at 
least without prejudice to, [Union] requirements” by following the guidelines of the Council and the 
Commission577. 
By contrast, AG Kokott's reasoning in the Vietnam WTO Accession case reflects a desire to enforce 
“harmony even where there is none”578. Although, as the AG established, the situation concerned an 
area of shared competence, independent Member State action was only permissible if there was a 
“compelling  need”  for  it579.  The  coherence  and  consistency  of  the  Union's  representation  at 
international level was “endangered particularly in the field of external trade”, as the Member States' 
involvement would “weaken the [Union's] negotiating position vis-à-vis its trading partners”580. In 
the  absence  of  any concrete  risk for  the  consistency and coherence  of  the  Union's  international 
representation,  AG Kokott  reasoned on the  general assumption  that  any form of  Member  State 
involvement would be likely to jeopardise the effectiveness of EU action. Her approach, therefore, 
expresses the desire to achieve an optimal allocation of powers between the institutional actors and to 
maintain this hierarchy of  the  system permanently581.  In  the  case  of  external  trade,  this  optimal 
allocation  excluded  Member  State  participation  from the  outset.  In  the  words  of  the  Advocate 
General, 
“[t]he more players there are on the European side at international level, the more difficult it will be to  
represent effectively the interests of the [Union] and its Member States outwardly, in particular vis-à-
vis significant trading partners.”582
Like the  conservative fidelity view, this reasoning seeks to counteract the diversity of policies and 
575 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg and Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany. 
576 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 773.
577 See Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, paras 94 and 95.
578 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778.
579 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 81.
580 Ibid.
581 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 821.
582 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 72.
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interests inherent in a divided power system583.
IV. The supervening exercise of Union competence and bilateral Member State agreements
An exercise of Union competence not only triggers the duty of cooperation, but also leads to the 
applicability of the obligation to ensure the primacy of Union rules. If Member States conclude an 
international agreement, they are subject to a duty of compliance, which may be enforceable before 
the Court of Justice. As the Court of Justice established early on,  in situations of conflict between 
national  and EU law,  “a  subsequent unilateral  act  incompatible  with the concept  of  the [Union] 
cannot prevail”584.  How, then,  does this  compliance obligation change in case an incompatibility 
arises not as a result of a subsequent  national act, but because of a supervening exercise of Union 
powers?
In this regard, it has been argued that 
“[o]ften the Member States concerned will not really be to blame for such a conflict arising. Because of 
the evolutionary of the [Union], the state of [Union] law in the future is not easy to predict. A Member 
State may conclude a treaty relating to a particular subject matter years before the [Union] develops a  
comprehensive policy in the same subject area and before the development of such a policy could have 
been foreseen.”585
In order to take due account of the inconvenient situation caused by a supervening exercise of Union 
powers, it has sometimes been suggested in the legal literature that the Treaties ought to include a 
provision,  similar  to  Article  351  TFEU586,  which  respects  the  rights  of  third  countries  having 
concluded agreements with Member States on a subject-matter not yet covered by Union rules587. 
However, the Court of Justice does not accept such a limitation of the primacy of EU law. An entire 
583 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 736.
584 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
585 R. R. Churchill and N. G. Foster, “European Community Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States: The 
Spanish Fishermen's Cases” (1987) 36 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 504 at 519.
586 Article 351 (1) TFEU provides: “The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 
1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand,  
and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties.”; see further  
Chapter Three. 
587 See  e.g.  P.  Daillier,  “Le  Régime  de  la  Pêche Maritime des  Ressortissants  Espagnols  sous  Juridiction  des  États 
Membres  de  la  CEE  (1977-80)”  (1982)  256  R.M.C.  187,  190-191;  E.  U.  Petersmann  and  C.  Spennemann, 
“Kommentar zu Artikel 307”, in H. Von der Groeben and J. Schwarze (eds.), Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag,  Vol. 
4, 6th Ed. (Nomos 2004) at Rn 6;  H. Krück, Völkerrechtliche Verträge im Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
(Springer Verlag 1977) at 136.
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regime of Union law may be superimposed on prior national commitments, affecting Member States'  
contractual relations with third countries (A.). Where superimposition is excluded, Member States 
are  nevertheless  required  to  ensure  the  primacy  of  Union  rules,  even  if  this  necessitates  the 
denunciation of an international agreement (B.).
A. The “superimposition” of EU law on prior Member State obligations  
The  problem  of  the  relationship  between  Union  law  and  agreements  concluded  by  individual 
Member  States  before  the  Union  develops  a  comprehensive  policy  in  a  given  field  was  first 
addressed Arbelaiz-Emazabel588. The case, which formed part of a series of judgments which came to 
be known as the “Spanish Fishermen cases”589, concerned a preliminary ruling from the French Cour 
de  Cassation,  brought  before  a  lower  court  against  the  master  of  a  Spanish  fishing  vessel.  In 
November  1977,  he  was  caught  fishing  in  French  waters  without  the  licence  required  by  EU 
Regulation  No.  2160/77.  The  Regulation  laid  down  interim  measures  for  the  conservation  and 
management  of  fishery  resources  in  relation  to  vessels  of  non-member  countries  pending  the 
conclusion of an international agreement on the matter with Spain. The regional court found that 
Arbelaiz-Emazabel was authorised to fish in French territorial waters by the General Agreement on 
Fishing concluded between France and Spain in 1967, which had been signed within the framework 
of the 1964 London Fisheries Convention. 
As Spain had not yet acceded to the Union at the time, the situation concerned a bilateral agreement 
between an EU Member State and a non-member country. The question arose whether Union law 
would prevail over agreements of one of its Member States or whether it would yield to the rights of 
the third state under international law. The referring Court asked the Court of Justice whether the 
relevant  EU Regulations  were valid  and,  if  so,  whether  they could  be enforced against  Spanish 
588 Case 181/80 Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel [1981] ECR 2961.
589 See Case 812/79 Attorney General v.  Juan C. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787; Joined Cases 180 and 266/80  Tomé v.  
Procureur de la République  and  Procureur de la République v. Yurrita [1981] ECR 2997; Joined Cases 138 and 
139/81  Directeur des Affaires Maritimes du Littoral du Sud-Ouest v. Marticorena-Ortazo and Parada [1982] ECR 
3819; Case 181/80 Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel [1981] ECR 2961. The Spanish Fishermen cases centred 
around the prosecution in national courts of the Member States of Spanish fishermen found fishing in Union waters  
without the appropriate licenses. In each case, the national court submitted questions to the Court of Justice under 
(current) Article 267 TFEU. What sets  Arbelaiz-Emazabel apart from the foregoing cases,  however, is where the 
Spanish fishermen involved were found fishing. In Burgoa, Tomé and Yurrita and Arantzamendi-Osa, the fishermen 
were fishing beyond the 12-mile limit covered by the 1964 Convention and the 1967 Franco-Spanish agreement.  
Only Arbelaiz-Emazabel was fishing within the 12-mile zone before the signature of the EU-Spain agreement. Thus, 
in the latter case, the 1964 Convention and the 1967 bilateral agreement were relevant and posed a potential problem  
about their compatibility with the relevant EU regulations. See further, R. R. Churchill and N. G. Foster, “European 
Community Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States”, 518-519.
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nationals. 
The Court of Justice first acknowledged that the situation involved a Member State commitment 
undertaken before the Union had adopted any measures in the field of sea fishing. Therefore, France 
was able to validly conclude both the London Convention and the subsequent bilateral agreement 
with Spain. However, the parties to the Convention had foreseen the possibility of supervening EU 
legislation in the area, as they had explicitly regulated that no provision of the Convention was to  
prevent  the  establishment  of  a  special  regime  in  matters  of  fisheries  as  between  EU  Member 
States590.  In  addition,  Spain  had  accepted  that  its  rights  under  the  London  Convention  and  the 
bilateral agreement would be substituted by a new agreement with the Union591. 
Against this background, the Court had no difficulty in finding that the bilateral exchange of notes 
between France and Spain was valid  during the interim period in  which the Union had not yet 
legislated,  but  was  subordinate  to  EU  law  once  such  rules  entered  into  force.  It  came  to  the 
conclusion that the contested Regulation fell within the framework of the relations between Spain 
and  EU  concerning  conservation  measures,  adding  that  those  relations  “replaced”  the  prior 
international  obligations  existing  between  Member  States  in  the  field592.  It  seemed  to  base  its 
reasoning on the “progressive development” of the relations from the adoption of Union measures in 
1976  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Spanish  authorities  until  the  conclusion  of  the  EU-Spain 
agreement593. Therefore, Spanish fishermen were not able to rely on the French-Spanish agreement in 
order to prevent the application of the interim regulations adopted by the Union594.
This doctrine of “superimposition”, as it was termed by the Court of Justice in Burgoa595, has been 
described as “very significant”596. In Kramer, the Court had confirmed that the Member States' power 
to  act  unilaterally  in  the  field  of  fisheries  came  to  an  end  once  the  Union  had  exercised  its 
competence in the field. In Arbelaiz-Emazabel, the Court went one step further: 
“It now becomes clear that the development of such a policy entails not only the loss on the part of the 
Member States of the power to act unilaterally vis-à-vis third states, but also the superimposition of the  
[Union] regime on pre-existing international commitments. [Union] law may, as it develops, have an 
590 Case 181/80 Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel, paras 12-13.
591 Ibid., para 18. 
592 Ibid., paras 29 and 30.
593 See Ibid., para 30; for an assessment of the compatibility of this reasoning with international law, see R. R. Churchill 
and N. G. Foster, “European Community Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States”, 514-518.
594 Case 181/80 Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel, para 31.
595 Case 812/79 Attorney General v. Juan C. Burgoa, para 24.
596 M. Cremona, “The Effect in Community Law of Treaty Obligations between Member and Non-Member States of the 
European Community” (1983) City of London Law Review 65 at 70.
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effect on the treaty-relationships between the Member States and third States.”597
Moreover,  Arbelaiz-Emazabel confirmed  that  the  protection  of  prior  Member  State  agreements 
foreseen in  Article 351 (1) TFEU could not be applied by analogy to post-accession agreements, 
contrary to what is sometimes argued598. Advocate General Capotorti considered the argument that 
“in the case of conventions on matters over which the [Union] did not start to exercise its powers for  
some time after the entry into force of the Treaty, the institutions' obligation not to obstruct observance  
of the commitments entered into by one or more Member States towards one or more non-member 
States should extend also to the commitments entered into before such powers were exercised.”599
However,  he  rejected  such  a  suggestion,  on  the  ground  that  the  wording  of  Article  351  TFEU 
conflicted with such an interpretation and the provision was “of an exceptional nature”, in that it 
ensured  on  a  temporary basis  the  observance  of  incompatible  obligations  towards  non-member 
States600.  It  could,  therefore,  not  serve  as  a  basis  for  permanently  maintaining  in  force  any 
incompatible post-accession agreements. In any event, it is doubtful that the analogous application of 
Article 351 (1) TFEU to the facts of this case would have led to a different outcome. Indeed, the 
doctrine of superimposition was developed in Burgoa601, a case in which Article 351 (1) TFEU was 
found to  apply.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  doctrine  “does  not  make  any distinction  between 
agreements  concluded  prior  to  the  entry  into  force  of  the  [EU  Treaties]  and  those  concluded 
subsequently”602.  As a  general  rule,  Union legislation may be superimposed on a  Member State 
regime and take precedence over national rules once the Union has developed its own policy in a 
particular field, regardless of when the Member State regime came into being. 
B. The duty to denounce incompatible agreements 
It follows that bilateral relations between Member States may be replaced by the exercise of Union 
competence, irrespective of the fact that the Member States concerned “will not really be to blame 
for  such  a  conflict  arising”603.  In  fact,  it  may  be  argued  that  in  these  situations,  a  conflict  of 
597 Ibid.
598 See e.g. E. U. Petersmann and C. Spennemann,  “Kommentar zu Artikel 307”, Rn 6;  P. Daillier, “Le Régime de la 
Pêche  Maritime”,  190-191;  R.  R.  Churchill  and  N.  G.  Foster,  “European  Community  Law  and  Prior  Treaty 
Obligations of Member States”, 523.
599 Opinion of AG Capotorti in Case 181/80 Procureur Général v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel [1981] ECR 2961 at 2988.
600 Ibid.
601 Case 812/79 Attorney General v. Juan C. Burgoa, para 24.
602 M. Cremona, “The Effect in Community Law of Treaty Obligations between Member and Non-Member States of the 
European Community”, 70.
603 R. R. Churchill and N. G. Foster, “European Community Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States”, 523.
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obligations does not even arise in the first place:
“[I]n  terms  of  competence,  […] the  issue  of  compatibility with  [Union]  law cannot  arise,  for  the 
obvious reason that supervening external competence of the [Union] in matters previously regulated by 
agreements of the Member States does not suffice in itself to render those agreements incompatible  
with the rules and principles governing the division of powers.”604
Instead,  supervening exclusive competence  operates  irrespective of  a  conflict  of  obligations  and 
“irrespective of any positive or negative action on the part of the Member States”605. It is noteworthy 
in this regard that  Arbelaiz-Emazabel  concerned a special situation, in which Spain was already in 
negotiations over accession to the Union and a process of approximation to EU law standards had 
already been initiated. In fact, the superimposition of EU legislation on the pre-existing Member 
State regime in this case must be deemed to conform to the wishes of both the Union and the third 
state involved, since under Article 58 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, two or 
more  parties  to  an  agreement  may conclude  a  new agreement  with  the  effect  of  suspending its 
operation inter se606. 
However, it appears that even where the superimposition of EU rules does not conform to the wishes 
of third states, Union law leaves the parties to the agreement no choice. As AG Tizzano argued in the 
Open Skies cases607,  in such a case, the “only possible remedy would be for the Member States' 
agreements to be replaced with an agreement concluded by the [Union] itself”608. If the replacement 
of pre-existing obligations is not possible, “there is nothing the Member States [can] do, short of 
resorting […] to the extreme remedy of denouncing the earlier agreements”609. 
The  Court  of  Justice confirmed the  existence  of  such a  duty of  denunciation in  Commission v.  
Belgium610.  When  EU Regulation  No.  4055/86  on  the  principle  of  freedom to  provide  services 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries came into force in 1987, a 
604 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies  Cases [2002] ECR I-09427, para 113, emphasis 
added.
605 C. N. K. Franklin,  “Flexibility vs. Legal Certainty: Article 307 EC and Other Issues in the Aftermath of the Open 
Skies Cases”, 96.
606 See M. Cremona, “The Effect in Community Law of Treaty Obligations between Member and Non-Member States of 
the European Community”, 71.
607 Case C-466/98 Commission v. UK [2002] ECR I-9427, Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519, 
Case C-468/98  Commission v. Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575, Case C-469-98 Commission v. Finland [2002] ECR I-
9627, Case C-471/98 Commission v. Belgium [2002] ECR I-9681, Case C-472/98 Commission v. Luxembourg [2002] 
ECR I-9741, Case C-475/98  Commission v. Austria [2002] ECR I-9797, Case C-476/98  Commission v. Germany 
[2002] ECR I-9855. 
608 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies  Cases [2002] ECR I-09427, para 115, emphasis 
added.
609 Ibid., emphasis added.
610 Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium [1999] ECR I-5493.
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number of cases concerning cargo-sharing arrangements in liner shipping in bilateral  agreements 
concluded by Member States with third countries were brought before of the Court of Justice against 
Belgium and Luxembourg611. The cases related both to the delays in the Member States' adjustment 
of the contested agreements and to the introduction of new agreements which were incompatible 
with Union law. Thus, some of the agreements concerned had been concluded before the EU had 
exercised its competence in the field612. 
According to Articles 3 and 4 (1) of Regulation No. 4055/86, existing cargo-sharing agreements were 
to be phased out or adjusted in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation. The Commission 
contended that if the adjustment or phasing out was not accepted by the other contracting party, “the 
only available means of terminating the infringement would be to denounce the Agreement”613. 
In its defence, Belgium sought to rely on two arguments. The first one related to the existence of  
such a duty to denounce. In its view, denunciation of an entire agreement was “disproportionate, 
given that it contains a series of provisions which are not contrary to [Union] law”614. By its second 
argument, Belgium sought to demonstrate that it had used its best efforts to achieve the elimination 
of all incompatibilities. Political developments in the other contracting state made it impossible to 
arrange re-negotiations of the contested clause, which led Belgium to postpone the finalisation of the 
adjustments until the political situation allowed for further negotiations. Therefore, the Member State 
felt that “it always showed that it was willing to amend the provisions at issue”615. 
In the past, the prevailing opinion in the legal literature had merely recognised “an obligation on the 
part  of  the  Member  States  to  attempt in  good  faith  to  release  themselves  from  incompatible 
obligations”616. Thus, in cases of conflict between supervening Union legislation and Member State 
agreements, “there would seem to be an obligation on individual Member States, arising from Article 
[4 (3) TEU], to seek to eliminate such conflicts”617.
The Court of Justice, however, left no doubt that being “willing” to eliminate incompatibilities was 
not sufficient to justify a failure to fulfil obligations, but that EU law imposed an obligation of result. 
611 Joined Cases C-176/97 and C-177/97 Commission v. Belgium & Luxembourg [1998] ECR I-03557, Case C-170/98 
Commission v. Belgium [1999] ECR I-5493, Joined Cases C-171/98, C-201/98 and C-202/98 Commission v. Belgium 
and Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-5517. 
612 Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium; C-201/98 and C-202/98 Commission v. Belgium and Luxembourg. 
613 Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium, para 34, emphasis added.
614 Ibid., para 36.
615 Ibid., para 37, emphasis added.
616 See J. Klabbers, “Moribund on the Fourth of July? The Court of Justice on Prior Agreements of the Member States” 
(2001) 26 EL Rev 187 at 195, emphasis added.
617 R.R. Churchill and N.G. Foster, “European Community Law and Prior Treaty Obligations of Member States”, 519,  
emphasis added.
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In that respect, a difficult political situation in a third state was no valid excuse, as a Member State 
was ultimately under a duty to denounce the agreement if it encountered difficulties which made 
adjustment of an agreement impossible618. The Court, therefore, found that by failing to denounce or 
adjust its cargo-sharing agreements so as to provide for fair, free and non-discriminatory access by 
all Union nationals to the cargo operations between a third country and a Member State, Belgium had 
failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation.
V. Assessment – The duty of cooperation vs. the AETR principle 
Although,  as  mentioned earlier,  it  has  sometimes  been suggested  in  the  legal  literature  that  the 
Treaties  ought  to  include  a  provision  which  protects  international  Member  State  commitments 
entered into prior to an exercise of Union competence, the Court of Justice does not in any of the 
cases discussed in this chapter acknowledge that the Member States may not always be to blame for 
incompatibilities with EU law which arise only after the Union has exercised its powers. The Court 
does not appear to assume that prior obligations entered into by the Member States could be entitled 
to any kind of protection, for example safeguards comparable to those offered by Article 351 (1) 
TFEU. 
On the contrary, the Court displays a broad understanding of the applicability of Article 4 (3) TEU to  
this type of situation, both as far as the scope of the loyalty obligations and the actual restraints 
imposed are concerned. In comparison with the AETR principle discussed in the previous chapter, the 
scope of the loyalty obligations flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU is expanded in a temporal sense (A.), 
while the restraints imposed are expanded to include a pre-emptive effect even in areas of shared 
competence (B.). Against this background, the question arises of the relationship between the duty of 
cooperation and AETR exclusivity in this context (C.). 
A. The scope of EU law  – The temporal dimension of Article 4 (3) TEU
In Chapter One, we saw how the exercise of Union competence may have the effect of precluding 
further Member State action in a given area. In the present chapter, however, it became apparent that 
Article  4  (3)  TEU  can  give  rise  to  loyalty  restraints  even  before the  Union  has  exercised  its 
618 Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium, para 42.
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competence. This is the case where concerted action has been initiated at EU level. 
Although  Kramer concerned an area of law in which Union exclusivity had been envisaged, the 
Member States remained allowed to act – albeit subject to the duty of cooperation – until the EU had 
actually  occupied  the  field  by  exercising  its  competence.  In  Commission  v.  United  Kingdom, 
however, the Court made clear that once the transitional period for the exercise of Union competence 
had expired,  EU competence automatically became exclusive,  even in the absence of any actual 
exercise of powers. In this  context,  it  is  noteworthy that the failure on the part  of the Union to 
exercise its competence was not due to inaction, but resulted from the fact that the UK had impeded 
the adoption of the necessary measures in the Council. Irrespective of the Council's failure to adopt 
the Commission's proposal, the submission of the proposal represented “the point of departure for 
concerted [Union] action”619. The start of concerted action was, under the circumstances, sufficient 
to impose an obligation on the Member States to refrain from acting. The Court of Justice refused to 
reward the UK's strategy of blocking the exercise of Union competence so it would continue to be 
allowed to adopt national measures, and linking exclusive EU powers to the start of concerted action 
was the only way not to yield to the Member State's pressure. The notion of “start of concerted  
action” was, therefore, born out of  necessity in order to overcome the deadlock caused by the UK 
itself. 
However, restraints based on the start of concerted Union action were not to remain confined to 
exceptional situations of necessity. Subsequent case law has shown not only that the concept can 
apply in areas of shared competence, but also that its applicability is not dependent on a finding that 
the  exercise  of  Union  competence  is  impeded.  In  Commission  v.  Germany and  Commission  v.  
Luxembourg, the start of concerted action entailed (at least) a strict procedural obligation for the 
Member  States  involved.  Here,  the  conclusion  of  the  envisaged EU agreement  was not  at  risk. 
Instead, the rationale behind the application of the “start of concerted action” doctrine was to avoid 
future incompatibilities with bilateral Member State agreements once the Union decided to actually 
exercise  its  competence.  Similarly,  the  Member  State  action  contested  in  the  Vietnam  WTO 
Accession case would not have jeopardised the exercise of Union powers in the field, as the EU 
remained free to vote on the subject-matter as it wished. In both the  Commission v. Germany and 
Commission  v.  Luxembourg  cases  and the  Vietnam WTO Accession case,  the  “start  of  concerted 
action” doctrine was applied merely “in order to facilitate the [Union's] performance of its task”620, 
619 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 28, emphasis added.
620 See Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council (Vietnam WTO Accession), Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 80; 
Case  C-433/03  Commission  v.  Germany,  paras  65-66;  Case  C-266/03  Commission v.  Luxembourg,  paras  59-60. 
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and not with a view to remedying the fact that an exercise of EU competence was impossible. 
In addition to finding that the Member States may be subject to loyalty restraints before the Union 
has exercised its competence, the Court further expanded the temporal scope of Article 4 (3) TEU so 
as to provide for  AETR pre-emption also in situations which did not concern the conclusion of an 
agreement,  but  which related to  action within the framework of  an agreement after it  had been 
concluded. In its submissions to the Court of Justice in the Greek IMO case, Greece had claimed that 
the  AETR doctrine  was  intended  to  regulate  competence  issues  concerning  the  conclusion  of 
international agreements instead of being aimed at governing the exercise of rights and obligations 
arising from those commitments621. The Court, however, disagreed, finding that the Member State 
had violated its Union law obligations by initiating a procedure which could lead to the adoption of 
international rules with the potential of affecting EU law. 
We thus see that the scope of EU law restraints in this context is determined by the  risk of future 
legislative developments and their impact on the Union legal order. Where there is the prospect of the 
Union exercising its competence – either by negotiating an EU agreement or by adopting Union 
measures in a given area – the Member States' freedom of action is circumscribed by Article 4 (3) 
TEU622. To that end, it is not necessary that the prospect of an exercise of Union competence consists  
in an emerging exclusive EU power, as was the case in Commission v. United Kingdom. Indeed, the 
exercise of Member State competence “may also be circumscribed by a prospect of the exercise of 
the Union competence that is less specific, should the action to be taken by the Union be sufficiently 
foreseeable”623, as evidenced by the Commission v. Germany and Commission v. Luxembourg cases, 
the Vietnam WTO Accession case and the Greek IMO case. 
B.  The  obligations  flowing  from  Article  4  (3)  TEU  –  What difference does  the  nature  of  EU 
competence make?
The Court of Justice has not only adopted a generous approach to the circumstances under which 
loyalty restraints may arise, but also to the scope of the obligations themselves. As we saw, the 
exercise of a Union competence may entail  a number of different restraints on existing Member 
commitments and on the Member States' freedom to exercise their international powers.  
Emphasis added.
621 See Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, para 17.
622 See also J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their  
International Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 545.
623 Ibid. at 558.
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Where  the  exercise  of  EU powers  leads  to  incompatibilities  between an  existing  Member  State 
agreement and Union rules, the Member States are required to eliminate such incompatibilities and 
ensure the primacy of EU law.  The Court of  Justice leaves  no doubt that  the obligation on the 
Member States is of a substantive nature, requiring more than a Member State's best efforts to bring 
national commitments into line with Union rules.  Where necessary,  Article 4 (3) TEU may then 
entail an obligation to denounce an entire agreement. 
In those cases in which the Union interest requires the imposition of loyalty restraints even before an 
EU competence has been exercised, the Member States are subject to the duty of cooperation. In a 
field which has been “reserved” to the powers of the Union, but no exercise of Union competence 
has taken place yet,  the  Kramer and  Commission v.  United Kingdom cases have shown that the 
Member States are under particular procedural obligations to act as “trustees” of the Union interest. 
This  includes  using  “all  the  political  and  legal  means  at  their  disposal”  in  order  to  ensure  the 
participation of the Union in international agreements in which EU action is impossible624.
Once a Union policy has been developed in a given field, such an exercise of EU competence not 
only entails the loss of Member State power to act internationally,  as confirmed by  Kramer and 
Commission v. United Kingdom. In addition,  Arbelaiz-Emazabel showed that it may under certain 
conditions lead to the superimposition of the Union regime on existing commitments of the Member 
States entered into with third states. 
The most striking expansion of the scope of loyalty restraints, however, is noticeable in areas of 
shared  competence.  The  Commission  v.  Germany and  Commission  v.  Luxembourg  cases  were 
ambiguous as far as the precise scope of Article 4 (3) TEU was concerned, laying down that the 
loyalty obligation entailed “at least” a duty of coordination,  if not of abstention625. By contrast, the 
Vietnam WTO Accession  case  was  straightforward  in  this  respect.  AG Kokott  had  no difficulty 
finding that the start of concerted action at EU level necessarily led to a duty on the Member States 
to  abstain  from any  action  whatsoever.  Although  Article  133  (5)  EC  did  not  confer  exclusive 
competence upon the Union but provided for concurrent powers, the Member States were no longer 
capable of exercising their remaining powers once the Council had adopted a position in the area. 
The duty imposed by the Council  decision entailed complete abstention from action,  even if  the 
action was coordinated with the Commission. For the Member States, this effectively means that the 
adoption of a Council position is equivalent to a finding of AETR exclusivity. 
624 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1305, paras 44/45. 
625 See above.
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In that respect, the case does not differ from the Greek IMO case. Here, the Member States were also 
restrained in the exercise of their rights of participation in an international organisation to the point 
of not being allowed to act without the express authorisation of the Union. The important difference 
between the two cases, however, concerns the nature of EU competence at issue. While the Vietnam 
WTO Accession case involved an area of  shared competence, it was undisputed in the  Greek IMO 
case that Greece had acted in a field in which Union competence had become exclusive by virtue of 
the AETR principle. However, in the latter case, the existence of exclusive EU competence did not 
automatically imply that the disputed unilateral measure could be considered to affect Union rules. In 
fact, as we saw earlier, the finding that the AETR principle extended also to the active participation of 
a  Member State  in  an international organisation required a direct  link between the scope of the 
exclusivity principle and the scope of the EU Regulation at issue. Far from suggesting that any non-
contractual Member State action was capable of triggering AETR pre-emption, the Court emphasised 
that the national measure had set in motion a procedure which could lead to the adoption of new 
regulatory standards binding on the Union. 
The Vietnam WTO Accession case, by contrast, did not concern the adoption of new rules, but merely 
the exercise of voting rights within an international organisation. As no AETR competence was found 
to  exist,  an  assessment  whether  common  rules  could  be  affected  by  national  action  was  not 
necessary. However, this did not stop AG Kokott from establishing that the Member States were 
equally precluded from acting as they would have been had the AETR principle been found to apply. 
In the Vietnam WTO Accession case, and perhaps also in Commission v. Germany and Commission v.  
Luxembourg, the Member States were thus no less restrained in their freedom to act than Greece was 
in the Greek IMO case. 
It emerges that where there is the prospect of an exercise of Union competence, the Member States 
may be subject to a duty to refrain from acting, regardless of whether the area in question is covered 
by shared or by exclusive competence. Against this background, we can assume that the contested 
national measure at issue in the  Greek IMO case would have constituted a breach of Article 4 (3) 
TEU even if Union competence had not been exclusive626. 
C. The relationship between AETR exclusivity and the duty of cooperation 
If, as it appears, the duty of cooperation in this context operates in a way identical to that of AETR 
626 See also Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden [2010] ECR I-3317, discussed in Chapter Five.
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pre-emption, the question arises of the relationship between  the two legal instruments. On the one 
hand, we saw that both obligations flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU may preclude Member State 
action once the Union has exercised its powers or an exercise thereof is imminent. Furthermore, the 
Court of Justice has emphasised that the duty of cooperation is “of general application” and may 
consequently be invoked regardless of the nature of Union competence627. 
On the other hand, this does not mean that there may not be additional reasons to invoke the  AETR 
principle over the duty of cooperation. As AG Tizzano pointed out in Commission v. Germany, where a 
competence  is  exclusive,  it  is  clear  that  “it  is  above  all  and  directly  the  infringement  of  that 
competence that can be challenged”628. Consequently, “any reference to Article [4 (3) TEU] is merely 
a corollary”629. The Commission's motivation for alleging an infringement of AETR exclusivity as the 
first head of claim when bringing an action against a Member State can be explained by the fact that 
the duty of cooperation does not  hinder the Member States in the exercise of their treaty-making 
powers, provided that national action “is in accordance with the common interest and follows the line 
desired and decided by the [Union] bodies”630, whereas pre-emption applies also in absence of any 
contradictions  between  the  envisaged  agreement  and  the  affected  EU  rules631.  Indeed,  where  a 
competence is deemed exclusive, it is “easier” to challenge the legality of the Member State conduct, 
regardless of “whether or not any adverse effect in relation to the exercise of that competence was 
actually established”632. 
In areas of exclusive Union competence, in fact, the Member States' freedom to act is confined to 
those situations in which the EU expressly authorises them to act on its behalf. As the Court of 
Justice made clear in the  Greek IMO case and  Commission v. United Kingdom, where the Union 
enjoys exclusive powers, Member States may act through the Union or not act all. This applies even 
in case the Union institutions themselves fail to fulfil their duty of cooperation to reach a common 
position, as we saw in the Greek IMO case. Indeed, it is in this respect that AETR exclusivity differs 
substantially from the duty of cooperation. In a field covered by exclusive EU powers, the absence of 
a Union position does not legitimise national action. By contrast, in areas of shared competence, the 
Member States remain entitled to exercise their competence freely until the Union decides to act. It 
should  be  assumed  that  once  the  Union  has  acted,  the  Member  States  are  under  a  best  efforts 
627 Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany, para 64.
628 Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 79. 
629 Ibid.
630 See Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 83. 
631 See e.g. Opinion 2/91, part IV, para 25; see also Chapter One.
632 Case C-433/03, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, para 71.
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obligation to reach a common position633. However, the Commission v. Germany and Commission v.  
Luxembourg cases and the Vietnam WTO Accession case, as we saw, cast doubt on the validity of this 
assumption. If the start of concerted action at Union level has the effect of precluding any kind of 
Member State action in the field, the duty of cooperation can no longer be distinguished from the 
AETR principle.  On  the  contrary,  it  even  takes  pre-emption  one  step  further,  since  the  duty of 
cooperation is broader both in terms of substantive and in terms of temporal scope. While the AETR 
principle becomes operative once the Union has actually exercised a competence, we saw that the 
duty of cooperation may circumscribe the Member States' freedom of action even where there is only 
a prospect of legislative developments. At the same time, an exclusion of Member State action does 
not require a detailed test assessing the extent to which common rules would be affected by a given 
national  measure.  In  such  cases,  a conservative approach  to  fidelity  is,  as  discussed  earlier, 
undeniable. 
VI. The Member States' freedom to act under the CFSP
The AETR principle, as we saw in Chapter One, does not apply to the CFSP. For the same reason, 
neither Article 4 (3) TEU nor the CFSP-specific loyalty obligation under Article 24 (3) TEU can 
have the effect of precluding any further national action once a Union initiative has been started. 
Substantive  obligations  of  result  are,  therefore,  excluded  in  this  context.  This  does  not  mean, 
however, that the Member States cannot be subject to specific restraints of a procedural nature. 
The key provision concerning procedural restraints in the CFSP is found in Article 32 TEU, which 
lays down that 
“Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter  
of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach”634. 
This obligation forms part of the concept of systematic cooperation referred to in Article 25 TEU. In 
the CFSP area, it still serves as the key concept, in the absence of which it would be impossible for 
633 See M. Cremona, “Extending the Reach of the AETR Principle”, 766: “If the duty of co-operation in cases of shared 
competence is ultimately a best efforts obligation, then a point may come where a Member State, having tried without  
success to establish a [Union] common position, is entitled to act as long as the [Union] has not yet acted.
634 Further,  paragraph 1 lays  down: “Before undertaking any action on the international  scene or  entering into any 
commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European 
Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able 
to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.”
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the Union to  define and implement  a  foreign and security policy635.  The systematic  cooperation 
referred to in Article 25 TEU is to be established in accordance with Article 32 TEU, which contains 
the actual procedural obligations. 
Article 32 TEU thus represents “a necessary pre-legislative procedure”636. In the same way that the 
duty of cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU may restrain Member State action in other policy areas 
even before an exercise of  Union competence has  taken place,  Article  32 TEU imposes  certain 
procedural obligations prior to the adoption of a common strategy in CFSP matters.  In fact,  the 
wording of Article 32 TEU suggests that the CFSP-specific duty is even wider in its temporal scope 
than  its  counterpart  discussed  above.  While  Article  4  (3)  TEU  becomes  operative  only  once 
concerted action has been initiated at Union level, the CFSP obligation applies independently of any 
expression of interest to act on the part of the Union. It is sufficient that a given matter relates to 
foreign and security policy and is of general interest. The obligation encapsulated in Article 32 TEU 
is, therefore, “not subject to any limitation regarding time or space”637. 
However,  the content of the obligation under Article 32 TEU appears to differ from the duty of 
cooperation. While Article 4 (3) TEU entails an obligation to coordinate national action with the 
Union institutions, which may require the Member States to act only when authorised to do so or to 
refrain  from acting  whatsoever,  in  the  CFSP context,  the  Member  States  are  merely obliged to 
“consult”  one  another  within  the  European  Council  and  the  Council  and  to  “show  mutual 
solidarity”638. It is only once a “common approach” has been defined at Union level that, according 
to the wording of Article 32 (2) TEU, an obligation to “coordinate” Member State activities arises639. 
Nevertheless,  it  must  be  assumed  that  the  consultation  obligation  laid  down  in  paragraph  one 
establishes more than a mere duty to acknowledge other Member States' positions. Article 32 (1) 
TEU  speaks  of  consultation  with  a  view  to  “determin[ing]  a  common  approach”  and  of 
“convergence” of Member States' actions. This more material obligation is in line with the scope of 
the consultation obligation under general international law. It is assumed that this obligation imposes 
at least a duty to deliberate on a given subject-matter with the aim of reaching a common stance640. It 
635 R. Wessel, “The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations”, 179.
636 Ibid., emphasis added. 
637 Ibid.
638 See Article 32 TEU, paragraph 1. 
639 Article 32 TEU para 2 reads:  “When the European Council or the Council has defined a common approach of the 
Union within the meaning of  the first  paragraph, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States shall coordinate their activities within the  
Council”.
640 W. Möstl, Die Konsultationsverpflichtung im Völkerrecht (Schmitt & Meyer 1967) at 68.
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may, however, also be understood to go a step further, prohibiting states from taking a position until 
this position has been discussed with the other partners641.
Once  a  common EU position  has  been adopted,  the  Member  States  are  under  an  obligation  to  
coordinate  their  activities  within  the  Council642.  This  obligation  applies  also  in  international 
organisations and at international conferences, particularly where the Union is not in the position to 
represent itself. In those circumstances, the Member States “shall uphold the Union's positions in 
such forums”643.  Thus, the Member States may,  similarly to their  obligations under Article 4 (3) 
TEU, be required to act as “trustees of the Union interest” also in the context of the CFSP, even if  
such an obligation cannot entail a duty to act solely through a common Union position or not to act  
all. Compliance with the obligation to uphold a Union position in international fora is not left to the 
discretion of the Member States themselves. Instead, it is the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
who organises this coordination644. 
The scope of the issues to which the systematic cooperation applies is not subject to any limitations, 
but Article 32 TEU immediately qualifies the obligation by adding the words “of general interest”. 
The  European  Council  has  not,  however,  provided  any  further  specification  of  what  is  to  be 
understood by “general interest”. This seriously limits the information and consultation obligation in 
the first part of the article. On the one hand, the Member States are required to consult one another, 
while on the other hand they are given the individual discretion to decide whether or not a matter is 
of general interest. Indeed, although there is an obligation to try and reach a Union position, in case 
of failure, the Member States remain free to pursue their own national policies645.
Nevertheless,  it must be assumed that the Member States are indeed under a general obligation to 
inform and consult one another. Through the information and consultation obligation in Article 32 
TEU,  the  Member  States  ordered  themselves  to  use  it  as  one  of  the  means  to  attain  the  CFSP 
objectives in Article 24 TEU. This assumption is supported by Article 24 (3) TEU which lays down a 
more general loyalty obligation. The CFSP-specific loyalty obligation is furthermore reinforced by 
the duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU. Like Article 4 (3) TEU, the CFSP provision 
contains a positive obligation for the Member States to actively develop the Union's policy, including 
the obligation to “work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity”. Moreover, 
641 T. Jürgens, Die gemeinsame Europäische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Carl Heymanns Verlag 1994) at 210. 
642 Article 32 (2) TEU.
643 Article 34 (1) TEU.
644 Article 34 (1) TEU.
645 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, in M. Cremona 
and B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law - Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart Publishing, 2008) 79 at 102. 
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the negative obligation not to undertake “any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or 
likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” is also comparable to 
Article 4 (3) TEU. 
The  absence  of  any  legal  enforcement  mechanisms  notwithstanding,  the  Court  of  Justice  has 
repeatedly  made  it  clear  that  the  duty  of  loyalty  is  of  general  application  and  reaches  beyond 
limitations imposed by Treaty provisions and questions of competence. Thus, Member States are 
bound by a duty of loyalty even when operating in spheres of national competence646. As the Court 
held in Commission v. Luxembourg, the “duty of genuine cooperation is of general application and 
does not depend either on whether the [Union] competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of 
the Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member countries”647.  
The broad construction of the duty of loyalty by the Court does not, however, automatically imply 
the extension of the Court's findings concerning Article 4 (3) TEU to the CFSP. Yet, it has become 
apparent  that  the Court  relies  on its  interpretation of  provisions  from the first  pillar  in  order  to 
interpret corresponding provisions from other areas of EU law. Thus, the Court suggested in the 
Pupino648 judgment that the duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU was not limited to the first pillar: 
“It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the principle of loyal cooperation,  
requiring in particular that Member States take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,  
to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not also binding in the area of  
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which is moreover entirely based on cooperation 
between the Member States and the institutions [...]”649. 
In the view of the Court, recourse to legal instruments with effects similar to those provided for by 
the former EC Treaty was necessary in order to “contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s  
objectives”650. The Court thus suggested that the principle of sincere cooperation had a binding effect 
on the Member States in relation to the Union as a whole. This broadly-framed reasoning has led 
commentators to deduce that the principle of sincere cooperation should also, a fortiori, apply in the 
context of the CFSP651. 
646 See e.g. case C-124/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v. HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-81 
at paras 24-25; case C-235/87 Annunziata Matteucci v. Communauté Française de Belgique [1988] ECR 5589 at para 
19. 
647 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, at para 58.
648 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285. 
649 Ibid., para 42.
650 Ibid., para 36.
651 See A. Dashwood, “The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions”,  in M. Cremona and B. De Witte (eds.),  EU 
Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals  (Hart Publishing 2008) 53 at 56; C. Hillion and R. Wessel, 
“External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 93.
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Another argument brought forward in support of the applicability of the Court's interpretation of 
Article 4 (3) TEU across all areas of EU law relates to the principle of consistency and coherence of 
the Union's external action laid down in Article 13 TEU. The duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU, 
in fact, plays a key role in ensuring such coherence652. A failure to comply with the requirement of 
consistency and coherence could thus be considered a breach of the duty of sincere cooperation. 
In sum, the obligation of systematic consultation under Article 32 TEU operates as a procedural 
restraint on the exercise of the Member States' foreign policy powers. Its binding effect is reinforced 
by the CFSP loyalty obligation under Article 24 (3) TEU and the general duty under Article 4 (3) 
TEU. It imposes an obligation to consult with the other Member States before a national position can 
be adopted in a given matter. While Article 32 TEU does not entail a substantive obligation for the 
Member States to refrain from acting,  it  may nevertheless preclude them from taking a national 
position until this position has been discussed with the other Member States.
652 See also C. W. Hermann, “Much Ado about Pluto? The 'Unity of the Legal Order of the European Union' revisited, 
EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2007/05; C. Hillion, “Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations 
of the European Union”, 10.
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Chapter Three
Incompatibilities with Pre-Existing Obligations – What Role for Article 351 TFEU?
I. Introduction
Chapter Two showed all three different obligations flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU – pre-emption, 
the  duty  of  cooperation  and  the  principle  of  primacy –  at  work  when  the  Union  exercises  its 
competence. The Court's approach to primacy was particularly straightforward, leaving no doubt that 
Article  4  (3)  TEU required  more  than  a  procedural  obligation  of  best  efforts  to  bring  national 
commitments into line with Union rules. Where the exercise of EU powers led to incompatibilities 
between an existing Member State agreement and Union rules, the Member States were under a 
substantive obligation to eliminate all incompatibilities. 
In contrast with the general obligation laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU, Article 351 (1) TFEU (ex  
Article 307 (1) EC) recognises the special nature of conflicts between the Member States' obligations 
towards  the  Union  and  their  obligations  towards  third  countries  stemming  from  agreements 
concluded  prior to joining the EU. Article 351 (1) TFEU provides that the rights and obligations 
arising from pre-accession agreements “shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties”. 
In spite of the sweeping wording of paragraph 1, the Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed that 
Article 351 TFEU cannot be considered an exception to the principle of primacy of Union law. 
Instead,  Member  States  are  required  to  take  all  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate  incompatibilities 
between pre-existing international commitments and EU rules. The present chapter examines the 
Court's approach in its interpretation of Article 351 TFEU towards balancing the interests of the 
Union, the third countries and the Member States in these situations. How does the Court define the 
notion of “incompatibilities”? The more broadly this notion is interpreted, the more easily the duty to 
take the appropriate steps will be triggered. Has the Court mostly followed a liberal fidelity approach 
to pre-existing agreements by recognising incompatibilities to exist only where prior international 
obligations are in actual conflict  with specific obligations under EU law? Or does the Court go 
further than that, aiming at the  avoidance of conflicts, irrespective of whether Union powers have 
actually  been  exercised  or  not?  A finding  that  a  conflict  between  prior  obligations  and  power-
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conferring  Treaty  norms  is  enough  to  impose  a  duty  to  eliminate  incompatibilities  would  then 
indicate a conservative view of fidelity. Once an incompatibility has been established, the question 
arises what obligations this entails. Does Article 351 TFEU merely impose an obligation of best 
efforts to take all appropriate steps, or does it require a specific result after all appropriate steps have 
been taken? Are Member States obliged to denounce entire agreements which are not incompatible 
with EU law merely because they contain a single inconsistent clause, or is it sufficient if Member 
States exhaust all other, less intrusive means at their disposal?
In order to shed some light on these questions, the following section will provide a brief introduction 
to Article 351 TFEU and the rights and obligations it seeks to protect. The remainder of the chapter 
then focuses on paragraph 2 of Article 351 TFEU. It first examines the Court's approach towards the 
scope of incompatibilities (Section III.), before looking at the appropriate steps to eliminate such 
incompatibilities (Section IV.). The Chapter then attempts to assess whether the Court has settled on 
a balanced approach between the establishment of an incompatibility and the obligations that such a 
finding entails (Section V.). The Chapter proceeds to transpose the findings of the present chapter to 
the broader context of Article 4 (3) TEU, addressing the question of whether Article 351 TFEU 
serves an additional purpose which could not be achieved by relying on the general duty of loyalty 
(Section VI.). Finally, the Chapter examines to what extent the duty to eliminate incompatibilities 
with pre-existing obligations may apply in the area of the CFSP (Section VII.). 
II. The scope of Article 351 TFEU
A.  Article  351  (1)  TFEU – An  expression  of  the  respect  for  Member  States'  obligations  under  
international law
When the founding Member States established the EU, they would have been, as Advocate General 
Mischo pointed out in  Commission v. Portugal653, in a position to “releas[e] themselves from the 
obligation to fulfil earlier commitments to non-member countries” without the need to resort to any 
other procedure by the mere act of “creating a regional international organisation – and that is what 
the European Union certainly is under international law [...]”654. Nevertheless, they chose to honour 
653 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal (merchant shipping agreement with Angola) [2000] ECR I-5171 and Case C-
84/98 Commission v. Portugal (merchant shipping agreement with the FRY) [2000] ECR I-5215.
654 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Cases C-62/98 and C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR I-
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their prior international obligations by incorporating the international law principle of  pacta sunt 
servanda655 into the Treaties. 
This principle is reflected in Article 351 (1) TFEU. The provision lays down that the rights and 
obligations arising from agreements concluded by Member States prior to their membership of or 
accession to the Union “shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties”656. Article 351 (1) 
TFEU thus “acknowledges that the establishment of the [Union] cannot possibly run counter to one 
of the foundations of public international law”657. Therefore, it can be considered an expression of 
the principle of conformity of the European integration process with public international law658. 
The respect for prior Member State commitments under international law, however, is limited to the 
interests of third countries. As the Court of Justice has made clear from the outset, Member States 
automatically waive all rights granted by pre-existing international agreements once they become 
members of the EU so as not to affect compliance with their obligations towards the Union: 
“[B]y virtue of the principles of international law, by assuming a new obligation which is incompatible  
with rights held under a prior treaty a state ipso facto gives up the exercise of these rights to the extent  
necessary for the performance of its new obligations”659. 
The Court furthermore made clear that “rights” within the meaning of paragraph one referred to the 
rights which non-member countries derived from prior agreements and that the provision was by no 
means intended to protect the interests of the Member States under those agreements660. Indeed, the 
purpose of Article 351 (1) TFEU was exclusively to ensure that Union law did not have any adverse 
effects on the “duty of the Member State concerned to respect the rights of non-member countries 
under  a  prior  agreement  and  to  perform  its  obligations  thereunder”661.  This  interpretation  was 
consolidated in  Evans and Macfarlan Smith662,  where the Court held that “when an international 
agreement allows, but does not require, a Member State to adopt a measure which appears to be 
contrary to Union law, the Member State must refrain from adopting such a measure”663. Similarly, 
5171, at para 57. 
655 See H. Wehberg, “Pacta Sunt Servanda” (1959) 53 AJIL 775.
656 Article 351 (1) TFEU reads: “The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 
or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and 
one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties.”
657 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2006) at 301.
658 E. U. Petersmann and C. Spennemann, “Kommentar zu Artikel 307”, Rn 1-3. 
659 Case 10/61 Commission v. Italy [1962] ECR 1, emphasis added. 
660 Ibid.
661 Case 812/79 Attorney General v. Juan C. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para 8, emphasis added. 
662 Case C-324/93  The Queen v. ex parte Evans Medical Ltd and Macfarlan Smith Ltd. Secretary of State for Home  
Department [1995] ECR I-563.
663 Ibid., para 32.
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Article 351 (1) TFEU can only be invoked if the third country is actually in a position to rely on the 
contested obligation. A Member State is hence not able to justify any violations of Union law by 
invoking a pre-existing international obligation which does not grant rights to third countries664.
B. Article 351 (2) TFEU – The duty to eliminate incompatibilities
The respect for international law and the rights of non-member countries expressed in Article 351 (1) 
TFEU,  should  not,  however,  be  understood  to  mean  that  Member  States  are  entitled  to  give 
precedence to  incompatible international obligations to the detriment of EU law. As Article 351 
TFEU is “of general scope” and applies to all prior international agreements665, it has sometimes 
been misunderstood by Member States as “a carte blanche that allows them to continue to fulfil their 
international obligations arising out of their pre-accession treaties by disregarding conflicting [EU] 
law obligations”666. 
Indeed, Article 351 TFEU does not provide for an exception to the principle of primacy of EU law667, 
even if it has at times been interpreted as recognising that prior Member State obligations do prevail  
over conflicting Union rules668. This is because the second paragraph “adds a [Union] law layer” to 
the  provision669.  It  requires  that  Member  States  “take  all  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate  the 
incompatibilities  established”670.  Article  351 (2) TFEU thus reflects  the  ratio of  the principle  of 
sincere  cooperation  laid  down  in  Article  4  (3)  TEU.  Whilst  the  latter  provision  refers  to  all 
appropriate measures necessary for the fulfilment of Member States' Treaty obligations in general, 
Article 351 (2) TFEU specifies that in the context of pre-accession agreements, the fulfilment of 
Member States' obligations consists in the elimination of all incompatibilities with EU law. Article 
664 Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1998] ECR I-1023, see 
paras 60-64.
665 Case 812/79 Attorney General v. Juan C. Burgoa, para 6.
666 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 267.
667 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 301; compare, however, AG Tizzano in Case C-216/01 Budejovicku 
Budvar  v.  Rudolf  Ammersin  GmbH [2003] ECR I-13617 at  para  150:  “Article  [351 TFEU] […] recognises  the 
supremacy of the international obligations arising from agreements concluded by a Member State before its accession  
to the [Union]”.
668 See e.g. AG Tizzano in Case C-216/01  Budejovicku Budvar v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH at para 150: “Article [351 
TFEU]  […]  recognises  the  supremacy of  the  international  obligations  arising  from agreements  concluded by a 
Member State before its accession to the [Union]”.
669 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden” (2009) 46 C.M.L. 
Rev. 2059 at 2060. 
670 Article 351 paragraph 2 TFEU provides: “To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the  
Member State or  States  concerned shall  take  all  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate  the  incompatibilities  established. 
Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common  
attitude.”
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351 (2) TFEU can therefore be considered to “specifically implemen[t]” the principle of sincere 
cooperation671. 
The fact that paragraph 2 constitutes a lex specialis of the general duty of loyalty laid down in Article 
4 (3) TEU is also evident in the Court's interpretation of Article 351 TFEU672. The Member States' 
duty to facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks has been construed in such a way as to limit 
their  freedom  to  honour  pre-existing  international  obligations  in  a  two-fold  manner.  The  first 
concerns the scope of the notion of incompatibility. If the Court adopts a broad interpretation of the 
Union rules that can give rise to incompatibilities with prior Member State agreements, the duty to 
take all appropriate steps to eliminate such incompatibilities is triggered more easily (see Section 
III.). Once an incompatibility has been established, the central question is how the conflict with EU 
law is to be resolved (see Section IV.). Where the Court adopts a broad approach to both the scope 
and the nature of the restraint, the ensuing obligations become particularly onerous for the Member 
States. 
III. Incompatibilities within the meaning of Article 351 (2) TFEU 
The concept of incompatibilities within the meaning of Article 351 (2) TFEU “is logically composed 
of two conflicting elements: a Treaty obligation and an obligation arising from an agreement with a 
third country”673. The provision itself does not, however, specify what type of Union rules the notion 
of “Treaty obligation” refers to. It leaves open whether there has to be a direct conflict with a rule of  
secondary EU law, or whether Article 351 (2) TFEU is broader in scope, covering also conflicts with 
power-conferring provisions of the Treaties. 
A. The existence of incompatibilities linked with the precision of EU rules
The Court of Justice gave a first answer to what type of Union rules may trigger the application of 
Article 351 (2) TFEU in Levy674. This preliminary reference sought to ascertain whether the referring 
Court was under a duty to give effect to the ILO Convention on night work for women in industry 
671 Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-216/01 Budejovicku Budvar v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH at para 150.
672 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2066.
673 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Cases C-205/06 and 249/06, para 18.
674 Case C-158/91 Ministère public and Direction du travail et de l'emploi v. Levy [1993] ECR I-4287.
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concluded prior to the entry into force of the EU Treaties and subsequently transposed into national 
law, even if it was allegedly incompatible with a Council directive on equal treatment of men and 
women at the workplace. The Commission maintained that a prior obligation was not capable of 
granting a Member State the right not to observe the principle of equal treatment of men and women 
which formed an integral part of the general principles of EU law.675 The Court confirmed that the 
principle  did  indeed  constitute  a  fundamental  right  recognised  by the  Union legal  order,  but  it  
pointed out that “its implementation, even at Union level, has been gradual, requiring the Council to 
take action by means of directives”676. And those directives allowed, at least temporarily, for certain 
derogations from the principle of equal treatment. 
The Court concluded that in the absence of any precise Union rules in the area, it was “not sufficient 
to rely on the principle of equal treatment in order to evade performance of the obligations which are 
incumbent on a Member State in that field under an earlier international agreement [...]”677. A conflict 
between a pre-accession Member State agreement and a general principle of Union law, therefore, 
did not  per se trigger the obligation under Article 351 (2) TFEU to eliminate all incompatibilities. 
The Member States were required to take all appropriate steps only if the general principle had been 
implemented at Union level to such an extent that it no longer allowed for any derogations. 
The Court thus adopts a narrow view of the notion of incompatibilities, making the existence of 
conflicts  within the meaning of  Article  351 (2) TFEU dependent  on the precision of  the Union 
legislation promulgated with a view to implementing the general principle. It links the Union interest 
at stake with the protection of the fundamental acquis of the EU678. In the specific case, however, the 
protection of the acquis did not necessitate a finding of incompatibility. As long as EU law remained 
general in nature, the Member States were free to adopt and maintain more stringent measures. 
B. Incompatibilities with power-conferring provisions – The BITs cases 
The question of what type of rules may trigger the duty to eliminate incompatibilities arose again in 
the recent BITs cases679. In its first rulings concerning bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the Court 
was asked to assess the compatibility with Union law of certain provisions contained in BITs entered 
675 Ibid., para 15.
676 Ibid., para 16.
677 Case C-158/91 Levy, paras 16 and 17. 
678 L. Azoulai, “The Acquis of the European Union and International Organisations” (2005) 11 E.L. Rev. 196 at 213.
679 Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria [2009] ECR I-1301, Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECR I-1335 
and Case C-118/07 Commission v. Finland [2009] ECR I-10889. 
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into  by a  number  of  third  countries  with  Austria,  Sweden and Finland prior  to  their  respective  
accession to the EU. The Commission brought infringement proceedings against the three Member 
States for a failure to take the appropriate steps to remove the alleged incompatibilities between 
Union and the bilateral investment agreements. Specifically, the BITs contained standard transfer 
clauses granting investors of either party the right to transfer freely and without delay the capital  
connected with their investment680. The Commission contended that these transfer clauses failed to 
reserve the possibility for the Member States to restrict the free movement of capital to and from 
third countries under certain circumstances as envisaged by Article 57 (2) EC (now Article 64 (2)-(3) 
TFEU), Article 59 EC (now Article 66 TFEU) and Article 60 EC (now Articles 75/215 TFEU)681. 
Unlike the Court's previous judgments on prior Member State agreements, where the existence of 
incompatibilities with EU law was undisputed, the point of contention in the BITs cases  lay in the 
absence of a direct conflict between the pre-accession agreements and Union legislation. Indeed, no 
Union measures had yet been adopted on the basis of Articles 64, 66 and 75/215 TFEU, nor had they 
even been envisaged. Any alleged incompatibility with Union measures was therefore hypothetical 
as long as the Council had not adopted any rules. However, as Advocate General Maduro pointed out 
in the cases against  Sweden and Austria682,  the question of whether Article 351 TFEU could be 
invoked in favour of the two Member States would arise only if a conflict between the BITs and the 
Treaties was found to exist683.
The  Commission  contended  that  a  hypothetical  incompatibility  with  Union  law  was  enough  to 
trigger the application of Article 351 TFEU. Put differently,  it  argued that a conflict with Treaty 
articles was in itself sufficient to impose on the Member States concerned an obligation to amend the 
agreements. In the Commission's opinion, such a Treaty obligation could be based on secondary 
legislation envisaged in the Treaty articles, on the Treaty articles themselves, and on the duty of loyal 
cooperation684. 
680 As AG Maduro pointed out, these clauses are “standard, and indeed central” to most BITS, see Joined Opinion of AG  
Maduro in Cases C-205/06 and C-249/06, para 6. 
681 The Treaties allow for certain restrictions on capital movements. The Council may adopt measures on the movement 
of  capital  to  or  from third  countries  involving  direct  investment  under  Article  64  (2)-(3)  TFEU,  it  may adopt 
temporary safeguard measures pursuant to Article 66 TFEU where movements of capital to or from such countries  
cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic and monetary union, and finally, it is  
empowered by Articles 75/215 TFEU to take urgent measures on the movement of capital and payments with regard 
to third countries on the basis of a joint action relating to the common foreign and security policy.
682 The Opinion  on Case  C-118/07  Commission  v.  Finland instead  was  delivered  by AG Sharpston.  Despite  slight 
differences in their reasoning, both Advocate Generals concur in their final recommendations to the Court. 
683 Joined  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Maduro  in  Case  C-205/06  Commission  v.  Austria and  Case  C-249/06 
Commission v. Sweden, para 12.
684 Ibid., paras 17 and 21.
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i. Incompatibilities in the absence of legislation  
Advocate General Maduro dismissed the Commission's first claim, stating that no incompatibilities 
were possible in the absence of any legislation on the subject-matter. Turning to the argument that  
Treaty articles themselves imposed an obligation on the Member States, he noted that Articles 64, 66 
and  75/215  TFEU merely empowered  the  Union  to  act.  Only if  the  three  provisions  conferred 
exclusive competence on the EU would they have the two-fold effect of empowering the Union 
while simultaneously imposing on the Member States the obligation to refrain from legislating685. 
The competence in this case, however, was shared686. As any other interpretation would turn the three 
provisions at issue into areas of exclusive competence, they could not by themselves lead to any 
incompatibility within the meaning of Article 351 TFEU687. 
The Court of Justice concurred with the Advocate General as far as the outcome of the cases was  
concerned, finding that Austria and Sweden had failed to fulfil their obligations under Article 351 (2) 
TFEU to  take  the  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate  incompatibilities  with  Union law.  In a  concise 
judgment, the Court asserted the incompatibility of the transfer clauses contained in the BITs with 
Articles 64, 66 and 75/215 TFEU. As the agreements did not reserve the right for the Member States 
to fulfil their obligations as members of the Union, the three Treaty provisions were not capable of 
being applied immediately and were, therefore, rendered ineffective688. 
Unlike the Advocate General, however, the Court chose to base the failure to fulfil obligations on a 
breach of Article 351 TFEU. Interestingly, it made no mention of the fact that the incompatibility  
with Union law was only hypothetical. Neither did the Court explain where the conflict lay which 
triggered the application of Article 351 TFEU or, more generally, shed light on the question which 
type of Union rules were capable of imposing obligations on the Member States to rectify a conflict 
of rules. It made no distinction between Treaty articles which merely empower the Union to act and 
others which preclude all further Member State action, as AG Maduro had done. The mere fact that 
the effectiveness of Union legislation could be impaired if it ever came into existence was sufficient 
to impose on the Member States a duty to adjust the pre-accession agreements. What the Court 
effectively suggested was that Treaty provisions were per se sufficient to trigger the obligation take 
685 Ibid., paras 25-28. 
686 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this is no longer the case. Article 207 TFEU explicitly incorporates  
foreign direct investment into the Common Commercial Policy, granting the Union exclusive competence in the field. 
687 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06 
Commission v. Sweden, paras 31 and 32. 
688 See Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria, paras 36-39.
140
appropriate steps under Article 351 (2) TFEU689.
ii. The role of Article 4 (3) TEU in establishing an incompatibility 
Not satisfied with the Commission's claim that hypothetical incompatibilities could be considered 
incompatibilities within the meaning of Article 351 TFEU, the Advocate General went on to examine 
whether any further obligations on the Member States could flow from the duty of loyalty laid down 
in Article 4 (3) TEU. Drawing a parallel with the Member States' obligations during the period for  
implementing directives in the internal Union sphere, AG Maduro found that the Member  States 
were under an obligation not to frustrate any form of Union action, even if it involved a competence 
that would never be exercised. However, he was quick to underline that the possibility of a future 
conflict with Union legislation was not in itself enough to trigger the duty of loyalty. Only where the 
Union competence was of such a nature that international obligations of Member States were liable 
to “seriously compromise[...]” the effectiveness of future Union legislation could that duty come into 
play690. 
By contrast, the Court dismissed the line of argument based on Article 4 (3) TEU from the outset, 
arguing that reliance on the the loyalty obligation was not necessary in order to resolve the case 691. 
Besides considerations  of  a  procedural  nature692,  the Court  may have opted to  avoid any of the 
problems related to the application of Article 4 (3) TEU which were subsequently highlighted in the 
legal literature. 
The first  point of contention concerns the exclusion of Article 351 TFEU in favour of applying 
Article 4 (3) TEU. There is no apparent reason why the general obligation should be relied on when 
a specific obligation is available693. Moreover, the argument that “there is only one instance where 
empowerment  leads  to  an  obligation:  where  the  [Union]  has  exclusive  competence”694 is  not 
supported by the wording of Article 351 TFEU or the context of the Treaties695. Indeed, his reasoning 
689 See also J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their  
International Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 552.
690 Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria, paras 33-43.
691 Ibid., para 15. 
692 Several  Member  States  pointed  out  that  the  Commission's  line  of  argument  had  been  set  out  belatedly  in  the  
proceedings, which would have required the Court to reopen the oral procedure. However, the Court found that it had 
sufficient information to make a ruling without recourse to the contested point of law (see e.g. Commission v. Austria, 
paras 12-15). 
693 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2066.
694 Joined  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Maduro  in  Case  C-205/06  Commission  v.  Austria and  Case  C-249/06 
Commission v. Sweden, para 28. 
695 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2066.
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links the applicability of Article 351 TFEU to the nature of Union competence696. The focus on the 
nature of the competence at issue, however, is misleading: 
“What was in dispute was not whether it was the Member States or the [Union] which ought to exercise 
the power in question, but whether the former's conduct prior to their accession would undermine the 
effectiveness of the exceptional measures which the latter may be called upon to take”697.
The second problem raised by the Advocate General's application of Article 4 (3) TEU is related to a  
possible Member State duty to facilitate the exercise of Union competence. Drawing an analogy with 
Member States' obligations to implement directives, AG Maduro found that the Member States' duty 
not to compromise any form of Union action included also an obligation “to take all  appropriate 
steps to prevent their pre-existing international obligations from jeopardising the exercise of [Union] 
competence”698.  Such an obligation,  in  fact,  goes  beyond the  duty to  eliminate  incompatibilities 
situated in the context of conflict of rules: 
“[T]he duty to facilitate the exercise of Union competence may also consist in the obligation to abstain 
from any action that could  jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the objective at  
stake consisting in what the exercise of the Union competence aims at”699.
In fact, the AG's reasoning raises questions as to the boundaries of loyalty obligations in the context 
of Article 351 TFEU. It is reminiscent of the Court's statement in Opinion 1/2003 on the application 
of the AETR principle, where it held that 
“[i]t is necessary to take into account not only the current state of [Union] law in the area in question  
but also its future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis”700. 
A duty not to jeopardise the exercise of Union competence as advocated by AG Maduro, therefore,  
not only recalls restraints based on exclusive EU powers, but it also raises the question to what extent 
the Member States are required to take the possible future evolution of Union external policy into 
account. Furthermore, the Advocate General's analogy with directives and the ensuing obligation to 
facilitate the exercise of Union competence has been criticised as being “of questionable use” on the 
external scene701. As the respective Member State obligations vary significantly in nature within the 
two separate settings, the transposition of the duty to facilitate the exercise of Union competence to 
696 Ibid.
697 Ibid., at 2067. 
698 Joined  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Maduro  in  Case  C-205/06  Commission  v.  Austria and  Case  C-249/06 
Commission v. Sweden, para 42, emphasis added. 
699 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 348. 
700 Opinion 1/2003 Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano  Convention on jurisdiction and the  
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2006] ECR I-1145, para 126, emphasis 
added.
701 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2069.
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the context of pre-accession agreements is “unclear and unnecessarily broad”702. 
iii. Safeguarding the “effectiveness” of Treaty provisions 
What emerges from the Court's rulings in these cases is that neither the general obligation under 
Article  4  (3)  TEU  nor  the  question  of  competence  are  relevant  for  resolving  incompatibilities 
between EU law and pre-existing Member State obligations, even if  the conflict  at issue is of a  
hypothetical nature. What is decisive in the BITs cases is the effectiveness of the Union rules aimed at 
restricting the movement of capital or payments to or from third countries. Contrary to what AG 
Maduro argued,  Article  351 TFEU appears to be sufficient  to establish a conflict  between prior 
international Member State commitments and possible future EU measures. 
However,  the  Court  of  Justice  did  not  specify  how  broad  the  notion  of  protection  of  the 
“effectiveness” of Treaty provisions was to  be understood, limiting itself  to  the finding that the 
possibility of a future conflict with EU rules was sufficient to impose restraints on the Member  
States in these cases. It established  that Austria, Sweden and Finland were under an obligation to 
take steps “designed to eliminate the  risk of  conflict  with measures  liable to be adopted by the 
Council  [...]”703. Suddenly, the Member States' obligations under Article 351 (2) TFEU no longer 
included only the duty to take all appropriate steps to remove incompatibilities with EU law, but 
apparently also to remove all risks of incompatibilities. Advocate General Maduro, by contrast, had 
been careful to emphasise that the mere possibility of any future conflict with Union legislation and 
its objectives was not enough to jeopardise the effectiveness of those provisions. As he pointed out, 
“[i]f every such possibility had to be eliminated there would no longer be a shared competence, but 
an exclusive one”704. 
There  is  thus  a  fundamental  need  to  circumscribe  the  application  of  the  effectiveness  rationale 
underlying the Court's approach in these cases: 
To apply the logic of effet utile to any measure which the [Union] may choose to apply at any time in  
the future in order to impose a requirement on Member States to renegotiate or denounce their prior  
treaties  produces  effects  too  onerous  and  drastic on  the  basis  of  a  criterion  too  uncertain  and 
702 Ibid.
703 Case C-205/06  Commission v. Austria, para 42, emphasis added; similarly, Case C-118/07 Commission v. Finland, 
para 33. 
704 Joined  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Maduro  in  Case  C-205/06  Commission  v.  Austria and  Case  C-249/06 
Commission v. Sweden, para 40.
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indeterminate705.
Such a broad reading of the duty to eliminate incompatibilities is indicative of a conservative fidelity 
approach. It expresses a desire to harmonise the regulatory interests of the Member States, enforcing 
“harmony even where there is none”706. A liberal fidelity approach in these cases would have called 
for  the  preservation  of  engagement  between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  regarding  the 
elimination of incompatibilities once they had actually arisen. The conservative vision, by contrast, 
seeks to prevent conflict between pre-existing international obligations and EU law from the outset 
by achieving an optimal position for the Union to freely exercise its powers conferred by Articles 64, 
66 and 75/215 TFEU. Indiscriminately demanding that  any risk of future conflict  be eliminated 
would, as AG Maduro pointed out, be tantamount to granting the Union exclusive powers in the 
field. Such an understanding of the Member States' duties under Article 351 TFEU would indeed go 
“well beyond what can be reasonably justified by the goal of legal effectiveness”707. 
However, in the evaluation of the Court's reasoning in the BITs cases, it is important to take account 
of the specific character of the Union powers at issue. The rationale of the judgments “clearly relates 
to  the  requirement  of  effectiveness  of  measures  that  the  Council  may  take  in  the  specific 
circumstances provided for in Articles 64, 66 and 75/215 TFEU”708. Their effectiveness is determined 
by the speed with which they are applied. In fact, “[e]ven a minor delay would render them devoid of 
substantial  impact and would,  therefore,  defeat the purpose of their  adoption by the Council”709. 
Against this background, the scope of application of the Member State obligations imposed in the 
BITs judgments “should be a narrow one and confined to the specific nature of the provisions of 
Articles 64, 66 and 75/215 TFEU”710. Such a narrow reading based on the specific character of the 
provisions at issue can then be considered consistent with a  liberal fidelity vision of federalism. 
Although it undoubtedly limits the Member States' freedom to exercise their retained competence, 
the duty to eliminate the risk of incompatibilities in these cases does not seek to calm policy disputes 
by  suppressing  political  dissent  as  the  conservative  fidelity approach  would711.  Indeed,  there  is 
nothing in the BITs judgments which suggests that the mere possibility of a conflict with EU rules 
705 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, emphasis added. 
706 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778.
707 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 5.
708 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 553.
709 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2067. 
710 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements,  Eventual  Future Measures of the European Union”, 553; in a similar vein,  P.  Koutrakos,  “Case C-
205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2068.
711 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 773.
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would generally render pre-existing international obligations incompatible with Union law or that the 
effectiveness of future EU measures should be assessed in abstracto when assessing the existence of 
incompatibilities712.  The  effective  elimination  of  incompatibilities  in  these  cases  is  simply  not 
practicable when both the Member States and the Union may continue to act freely in the specific  
area, even if such action occurs in a spirit of “mutual obedience and coexistence”713 as advocated by 
the liberal fidelity approach. 
IV. Appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities
Contrary to what Levy and the BITs cases suggest, the point of contention in most cases before the 
Court of Justice involving pre-accession agreements is not the  existence of an incompatibility, but 
rather the appropriate response to the incompatibility.  As Article 351 (2) TFEU refers plainly to 
“appropriate steps”, it is left to the Court of Justice to determine which obligations that provision 
may entail. The Court has established a number of different measures which constitute appropriate 
steps to eliminate incompatibilities, ranging from consistent interpretation at the less intrusive end of 
the scale to a duty of denunciation as the most onerous remedy. 
A. Consistent interpretation
The duty of consistent interpretation was at the centre of the Court's reasoning in Budvar714. In this 
request  for  a  preliminary  ruling,  the  referring  Court  sought  guidance  on  the  applicability  of  a  
bilateral  agreement  concluded  between  the  Czech  Republic  and  Austria  on  the  protection  of 
designations of origin. The agreement was concluded prior to Austria's accession to the Union and 
was found to be incompatible with Union legislation implementing Article 34 TFEU (ex Article 28 
EC). The agreement provided that the name “Bud” should be reserved for beer produced in the 
Czech Republic, while the Austrian defendant freely marketed an American beer by the same name 
in accordance with Union law. 
With respect to Article 351 TFEU, the Court of Justice was asked whether the referring court was 
under a duty to apply the system of protection accorded under the pre-existing bilateral agreement, 
712 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2069.
713 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 822.
714 Case C-216/01 Budejovicku Budvar v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH [2003] ECR I-13617.
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notwithstanding its incompatibility with Article 34 TFEU. In assessing the question of whether the 
Czech Republic had acquired rights which Austria was required to respect, the Court undertook a 
detailed analysis of the legal situation created by the break-up of the Czechoslovak Republic, but it  
ultimately referred the determination of whether Austria and the Czech Republic actually intended to 
apply the international law principle of the continuity of treaties to the bilateral agreements at issue 
back to the national court715. 
If the outcome of this investigation was affirmative, the court would then be under the obligation to 
take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities of the bilateral agreement with the Treaty. 
More precisely, the referring court was to ascertain whether such incompatibilities could be avoided 
by interpreting the agreement “to the extent possible and in compliance with international law, in 
such a way that it is consistent with [Union] law”716. It was only if consistent interpretation proved to 
be impracticable that the national authorities were under an obligation to take further steps, such as 
adjusting the agreement or denouncing it, as a last resort. Pending the success of the outcome of one 
of  the  appropriate  steps,  the  national  court  continued  to  be  allowed  to  apply  the  bilateral 
agreement717.
Two aspects of the judgment in Budvar are noteworthy. Firstly, the Court makes clear that the least 
intrusive method included in the list of appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities should, if 
possible, be the preferred option: if the prior Member State agreement can be interpreted in such a 
way as to make it consistent with Union law, then no further steps are required718. This is all the more 
relevant in light of the fact that the bilateral agreement did provide for a denunciation clause. In 
previous cases, the Court appeared to take the inclusion of such a provision into the treaty as an 
invitation to make use of it, as this was in accordance with the intention of the parties719. 
The second aspect that stands out in the judgment is that the Court of Justice assigns a key role to the 
national court as far as the determination of what constitutes the appropriate steps is concerned. It is 
not the Court of Justice, but the Austrian court which has to investigate the intentions of both parties 
to the agreement, reconcile the bilateral agreement with Union law, and interpret it in such a way that 
715 Ibid., paras 147-162. 
716 Ibid., paras 168-169.
717 Ibid., para 169-172.
718 Case C-216/01 Budejovicku Budvar v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, para 170: “If it proves impracticable to interpret an 
agreement concluded prior to a Member State's accession to the European Union in such a way that it is consistent  
with [Union] law then, within the framework of Article [351 TFEU], it is open to that State to take the appropriate 
steps, while, however, remaining obliged to eliminate any incompatibilities existing between the earlier agreement  
and the Treaty.” (emphasis added). 
719 See below, e.g. the  Commission v. Portugal  cases, see also Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium (re: maritime  
transport agreement with Zaire) [1999] ECR I-5493.
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it  remains  consistent  with  international  law720.  By  encouraging  national  courts  to  resolve 
incompatibilities between EU law and pre-existing Member State obligations by seeking consistency 
between the two, the Court of Justice “places national courts right at the centre of the application of 
[Union] law in the area of external relations”721.
The Court's choice to “render [...] national courts involved in the process of achieving the objectives” 
of  Article  351 TFEU has  been described as  an  “ingenious  strategy”722.  Indeed,  the  approach of 
fostering engagement among the Union and the Member States by attributing a central role to the 
national  judicature  in  the  process  of  resolving incompatibilities  with  EU law appears  to  be the 
epitome of a liberal fidelity vision of federalism. Instead of enforcing a strict hierarchy of norms, the 
Court accepts the continuation in force of conflicting international obligations, provided they are 
applied in a way compatible with Union rules. The emphasis is on reconciling the different interests 
at stake in the least onerous way possible, rather than on the uniformity of rules throughout the EU 
legal  system. By contrast,  the reinforcement  of the role  of  Member State  courts  is  not  in  itself  
indicative of a  liberal fidelity approach. Indeed, a pre-accession agreement is not binding on  the 
Union and, therefore, the Court of Justice cannot prescribe how Member States are to apply  their 
obligations stemming from these agreements. On the contrary, the Member States courts are not only 
free to decide questions concerning the observance of obligations by themselves, but such questions 
rather “must be resolved by the national courts on the basis of an interpretation of the agreement and 
their  own  domestic  legal  order”723.  Therefore,  only  the  national  courts  are  entitled  to  interpret 
international obligations assumed by Member States prior to accession. What the Court of Justice 
effectively does is provide the national court with a possibility of bringing a prior obligation in line  
with the Member States' obligations under Union law. It does not, however, absolve the Member 
States of their duty to eliminate all incompatibilities with EU legislation. 
B. Adjustment of incompatible obligations
If consistent interpretation of a prior agreement proves to be impracticable, the Member States will 
720 It is interesting to note that after the case was remanded back to the national court, it went through another four 
instances  within  Austria  before  being  referred,  once  again,  to  the  Court  of  Justice  (Case  C-478/07  Budvar  v.  
Ammersin, judgment of 8 September 2009). In the meantime, the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU had  
rendered all questions concerning the applicability of Article 351 TFEU obsolete. 
721 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 310.
722 See ibid. at 312.
723 Case 812/79 Attorney General v. Burgoa, Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti, para 3, emphasis added.
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seek to renegotiate or amend the agreement so as to make it compatible with Union law. Adjustment 
of an international agreement is always the preferred option over denunciation. As the majority of 
provisions of an agreement  are most  likely not in conflict  with EU law,  “adjustment allows the 
Member State to retain rights that it may enjoy pursuant to those clauses which are either compatible 
with [EU] law or to the application of which [EU] law is relevant”724. As such, adjustment is much 
less  intrusive  on  the  Member  States'  foreign  policy  interests  than  denunciation  of  the  entire 
agreement.
Depending on the circumstances of a given case, adjustment of a pre-accession agreement may not 
always be easy to achieve, or even possible. If all attempts at re-negotiation or amendment have 
failed, the only conceivable solution for bringing the prior international obligation in line with EU 
rules is denouncing it.  A duty of denunciation is, however, not undisputed in the legal literature.  
Before  the  Court  of  Justice  pronounced itself  on  the  duty of  denunciation  for  the  first  time  in  
Commission v. Belgium725, there had even been disagreement as to whether such a duty could exist at 
all. It was argued that the “only one method available” in cases of incompatibility with Union rules 
was  “negotiations  with  the  party  or  parties  to  the  agreement  containing  the  incompatible 
provision”726. The reason why many legal scholars were reluctant to recognise a duty to denounce 
was that the termination of a prior agreement by a Member State is the most drastic of all measures 
available. Requiring that a Member State terminate “a whole agreement which only contains one or 
two clauses which are incompatible with [Union] law raises a problem of proportionality”, as it  
encompasses  also  those  parts  of  an  agreement  that  are  perfectly  compatible  with  EU  law727. 
Moreover, the application of such a measure is also constrained by international law728. 
C. Denunciation of agreements containing incompatible provisions
The Court resolved these uncertainties regarding the existence of a duty to terminate a pre-accession 
agreement in the  Commission v. Portugal  cases729. These infringement proceedings brought by the 
724  P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 305.
725 Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium. This case did not, however, concern the application of Article 351 TFEU, 
since the agreement in question had been ratified after accession to the Union. 
726 P. Reuter, “Article 234”, in Smit and Herzog (eds.), The Law of the European Economic Community: A Commentary  
on the E.E.C. Treaty, Vol. 6 (1993) at 296.30; see also Krück H, Völkerrechtliche Verträge im Recht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften (1977) at 132 and 133. 
727 C. Hillion, “Annotation: Case C-62/98, Commission v. Portugal, and Case C-94/98, Commission v. Portugal” (2001)  
38 CML Rev 1269 at 1281.
728 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 305.
729 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal.
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Commission under Article 258 TFEU (ex Article 226 EC) concerned two agreements on merchant 
shipping with Angola and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR) respectively which had been 
concluded prior to Portugal’s accession to the EU. 
i. The duty to take all appropriate steps – an obligation of result 
Portugal  accepted that  the disputed cargo-sharing clauses  contained in the two agreements were 
contrary to Regulation 4055/86, as argued by the Commission. What it did not accept, however, was 
the Commission's contention that it had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 3 and 4 (1) of the 
Regulation and under the Treaties by neither denouncing nor adjusting the agreements with a view to 
providing non-discriminatory access by Union nationals to Portuguese cargo shares. 
In its defence, Portugal argued that it had “spared no efforts” to remove the incompatibilities from 
the agreements, but the process of renegotiation had been slow due to the civil war in Angola and the 
break-up  of  the  FRY into  five  successor  states730.  Pending  the  amendment  of  the  agreements, 
Portugal had de facto waived its rights to rely on the cargo-sharing clauses contained in the bilateral 
agreements  concluded  with  non-member  countries  and  such  clauses  were  no  longer  being 
implemented731. In short, it had used its “best endeavours” to remedy the conflict with EU law and 
that was all it was obliged to do, as there was “no absolute, unconditional obligation” to remove the 
incompatibilities and Article 351 (2) TFEU could not be interpreted as imposing an obligation on 
Member States to achieve a specified result732.  An obligation to resort  to denunciation,  Portugal 
argued,  only  applied  “exceptionally  and  in  extreme  cases”,  particularly  in  cases  of  “total 
incompatibility” with Union law and where it was not possible to safeguard the Union's interests by 
any other means733.
Advocate  General  Mischo  found  that  Portugal  was  indeed  under  an  “indisputable  obligation  to 
achieve  a  result”734.  However,  in  reaching  that  conclusion,  the  Advocate  General  avoided  any 
reference to Article 351 TFEU. Instead, he relied exclusively on Article 3 and 4 (1) of the Regulation 
which provided for  the  adjustment  and phasing out  of  existing  cargo-sharing arrangements.  AG 
Mischo was more hesitant in his  formulation of the same duty under Article 351 TFEU, but he 
ultimately  concluded  that  the  “principle  of  uniform application”  and  the  “principle  of  uniform 
730 See Joined Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Cases C-62/98 and C-84/98 [2000] ECR I-5171, paras 44 and 45.
731 Ibid., paras 11 and 13.
732 Ibid., para 40.
733 Ibid., para 43.
734 Ibid., para 53. 
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implementation” did not permit any other interpretation than that of a duty to achieve a result735. 
Denunciation was therefore one of the appropriate steps referred to in Article 351 (2) TFEU, but it 
was qualified to the extent that it “should be regarded as a last resort to be used after a reasonable 
period  has  elapsed and a  less  severe  procedure  has  proved unsuccessful  in  achieving the  result 
required by [Union] law”736.  In light of the fact that both bilateral  agreements contained explicit 
denunciation clauses and that the EU Regulation provided for reasonable time-limits for adjustment, 
the Advocate General proposed that the Court of Justice declare Portugal  to be in breach of its 
obligations under the Regulation and under the Treaties. 
The Court  followed the  Advocate  General's  proposal  and  confirmed  that  Article  351 (2)  TFEU 
constituted an obligation of result. A duty to denounce, it held, was not a disproportionate measure, 
since “the balance between the foreign-policy interests of a Member State and the [Union] interest 
are already incorporated in Article [351] of the Treaty”737. The inclusion of express denunciation 
clauses by the two parties to the agreement meant that denunciation “would not encroach upon the 
rights  which  the  Republic  of  Angola  derive[d]  from  that  agreement”738.  Therefore,  the  Court 
concurred with the Advocate General that Portugal had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 
351  (2)  TFEU to  take  all  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate  the  incompatibilities  between  the  pre-
accession agreement and Union legislation. 
In sum, Portugal was found to be under an obligation to adjust prior agreements on the grounds of a 
violation of Articles 3 and 4 (1) of Regulation 4055/86 alone. However, the Court left no doubt that 
also in the absence of such provisions, Article 351 (2) TFEU would have imposed a more general 
obligation  to  eliminate  incompatibilities  with  EU  law.  It  was  forceful  in  its  rejection  of  the 
interpretation according to which Article 351 (2) TFEU was only a “best efforts” obligation. The 
Member States were free to choose the appropriate means at their disposal, but they were bound by 
the final result to be achieved. 
ii. The duty to denounce – An unduly strict obligation?
The Court  has  been criticised  for  adopting  an  “unduly narrow” interpretation in  Commission v.  
Portugal of the Member States' duty to take the appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities by 
735 Ibid., para 58 and 60.
736 Ibid., para 69.
737 See Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal, paras 48-50. 
738 Ibid., para 46.
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confirming that the Member States were under an obligation to terminate prior agreements739. In light 
of  the  “prevailing  academic  opinion”  at  the  time,  the  “vigour  with  which  this  interpretation  is 
pronounced” raised some scholarly eyebrows740. 
When assessing the Court's approach in these cases, however, it is helpful to distinguish between two 
different aspects of the Court's reasoning. The first aspect concerns the confirmation by the Court  
that Article 351 (2) TFEU does indeed impose an  obligation of result on the Member States. The 
second  aspect  relates  to  the  fact  that  Portugal  had  waived  its  rights  under  the  pre-accession 
agreements and was thus  de facto in compliance with Union law. The former aspect concerns the 
scope of the obligation to achieve a certain result, while the latter aspect concerns the definition of 
the result to be achieved. It is submitted that a mixing-up of these two aspects may lead to premature 
criticism of the Court's confirmation of a duty to denounce. 
a. The obligation to denounce 
The prevailing opinion in the legal literature prior to the Court's decision in Commission v. Portugal 
recognised no more than “an obligation on the part of the Member States to attempt in good faith to  
release themselves from incompatible  obligations”741.  Against  this  background,  the wording with 
which the Court made clear that the Member States had a choice as to the appropriate steps to be 
taken – but only so long as those steps led to the elimination of incompatibilities – was perceived as 
“fierce”742.  The  Court's  approach  was  considered  to  unduly restrain  the  Member  States  in  their 
freedom to fulfil pre-existing international obligations: 
“That does not leave the Member States a whole lot of room for manoeuvre: they can either renegotiate 
or  denounce.  The  former,  to  make  an  obvious  point,  requires  the  participation  of  the  third  party 
concerned; the latter may not always be easy, legally or politically.”743 
While it is undeniable that the Court leaves the Member States only a limited scope for action, it is  
nevertheless important to take account of the specific circumstances of the cases. When establishing 
the duty to denounce, the Court of Justice placed great emphasis on the fact that the parties to the  
bilateral  agreement had included a denunciation clause.  In fact,  the Court's  first,  and apparently 
739 J. Klabbers, “Moribund on the Fourth of July”, 194.
740 Ibid., at 195.
741 See J. Klabbers, “Moribund on the Fourth of July”, 195.
742 Ibid. at 196. 
743 Ibid.
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decisive point, centred around the inclusion of such a clause744. Only then did it declare in a more 
general fashion that the Member States were under an obligation of result. 
This does not, of course, imply that the Court would not impose the same duty, if necessary, also in 
the absence of a denunciation clause agreed upon by the parties. However, it shows that the intention 
of the third parties to prior Member States agreements are indeed important to the Court. If the third 
party did not express any objections to a possible unilateral termination of the agreement in the  
future, then it does not go against its interests to do so. Equally, difficult political situations in the 
non-member  country cannot  serve  as  a  justification  for  delays  in  renegotiating  or  amending  an 
agreement. It is normally the third country itself that is responsible for political complications, and 
when  it  is  deprived  of  rights  under  an  international  agreement  due  to  such  circumstances, 
denunciation does not present a disproportionately intrusive measure. 
In sum, the Court reminds the Member States that it is only the rights of third parties which Article 
351 TFEU seeks to protect, and not their own745. But once the third country's rights no longer deserve 
to be protected – either because it has waived them expressly or forfeited them by way of political  
instability – there is no valid reason to uphold the Member States' obligations towards that country to 
the detriment of the primacy of EU law.
b. Factual or de jure compliance?
What  makes  the  judgments  in  Commission  v.  Portugal perhaps  more  problematic  is  the  second 
aspect of the cases, namely the Court's interpretation of what is the actual result to be achieved by 
the obligation take all appropriate steps. The Court was free to apply two alternative standards of 
compliance  which  the  Member  States  were  required  to  achieve  –  either  de  facto or  de  jure 
compliance. As AG Mischo correctly observed, the issue thus came down to whether a Member State 
who complied with its Union obligations in actual fact was nevertheless obliged to denounce  an 
agreement with a third country if it failed to secure adjustment of it by negotiation746. 
The Court of Justice opted for the strict interpretation: the result to be achieved by the Member 
States was compliance on all levels. It acknowledged that Portugal had waived its right to rely on the 
744 In a similar vein, P. Manzini, “The Priority of Pre-Existing Treaties of EC Member States within the Framework of 
International Law” (2001) 12 EJIL 781 at 791.
745 See earlier judgments, such as Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, 
and Case C-124/95 Centro-Com, in which the Court affirmed that the words “rights” in Article 351 TFEU refers to 
the rights of non-member countries.
746 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Cases C-62/98 and C-84/98, para 67.
152
cargo-sharing clauses contained in the bilateral agreements. Although the clauses still appeared in the 
agreements and the latter remained in force, the incompatible provisions were  de facto no longer 
being  implemented,  meaning  that  their  application  no  longer  discriminated  against  the  shipping 
companies of other Member States. The factual compliance notwithstanding, the Court of Justice 
decided that Portugal had failed to achieve the result  that it  was required to achieve.  Any other 
interpretation would have been incompatible with the uniformity of Union law. It is interesting to 
note that in his Opinion, AG Mischo referred both to the “principle of uniform implementation” and 
to the “principle of uniform application”747. In this context, however, the two principles may have 
completely  different  meanings.  While  “uniform  implementation”  implies  that  a  rule  has  been 
transposed in the same way throughout the Union legal order, “uniform application” may suggest 
that it is sufficient if incompatible rules are simply not applied. The Court clearly chose the broader 
definition of uniformity and opted for an obligation that aims for the uniform implementation of 
Union rules. 
The result to be achieved by the Member States under Article 351 (2) TFEU was further qualified by 
restrictions of a temporal kind. Although the process of renegotiation between Portugal, on the one 
hand, and Angola and the FRY, on the other, was delayed, it was nevertheless on-going. According to 
the Advocate General, however, that process should have been concluded within the period of six 
years foreseen in the Regulation748. After such a “reasonable period of time” had elapsed in which 
less severe procedures had proved unsuccessful,  denunciation constituted an appropriate step for 
achieving the result required by Union law749. The Court of Justice did not make any mention of the 
AG's suggestion of a reasonable time-frame for renegotiations,  but simply spoke of “difficulties 
which make adjustment of an agreement impossible”750. Considering that the renegotiations in the 
Portuguese cases had not been abandoned unsuccessfully but simply been delayed beyond the time-
limit foreseen by the EU Regulation, the Court seems to adopt a strict reading of impossibility. 
The Court's narrow definition of the result to be achieved seems to indicate a  conservative fidelity 
approach to compliance. Requiring Portugal to repeal the inconsistent provisions even if it acts in 
accordance with Union law reflects a strict insistence by the Court on the division of competences 
and established hierarchies,  instead of  allowing a minimum degree of  complementarity between 
international and EU obligations of the Member States. It is questionable, however, that the principle 
747 Ibid. at paras 58 and 60 respectively, emphasis added.
748 Ibid., para 71. 
749 Ibid., para 69.
750 See Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal, para 49.
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of primacy, as developed by the Court of Justice, would necessarily require  de jure instead of  de 
facto compliance. As Dashwood has pointed out,  there is nothing in the  Simmenthal case751 that 
indicates that incompatible provisions must automatically be considered null and void and that it is 
not sufficient to refrain from applying conflicting obligations752.  In fact,  in the  Budvar case,  the 
Court had accepted the continuation in force of incompatible national measures, provided that they 
were interpreted in a way that was consistent with Union law753. Against this background, it has been 
argued  that  “the  lack  of  explicit  justification  why  unilateral  renunciation  is  insufficient  is 
remarkable”754. 
Nevertheless, the rationale behind the Court's mandate for active compliance does not necessarily 
suggest a conservative vision of fidelity. Although it significantly limits the Member State's freedom 
to act, the requirement of active compliance does not seek to suppress political dissent755. Instead, “it 
attempts  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  the  federal  legal  system by demanding  clear  legal  rules 
throughout the system”756. In fact, the Court's approach in  Commission v. Portugal reflects long-
standing jurisprudence from the internal market context. The maintenance in force of national rules 
incompatible with EU law “gives rise to an ambiguous state of affairs” and a “state of uncertainty” 
which cannot be tolerated757. Hence, the strict interpretation of the result to be achieved under Article 
351 (2) TFEU may be considered an expression of the “high level of uniformity in [Union] law” 
which the Court aims at maintaining758. 
D. A “pre-emptive” duty to denounce?
The scope of the duty to denounce an incompatible pre-accession agreement became an issue again 
751 In Case 106/77 Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629, the Court imposed a duty on national courts to set aside provisions of 
national law which are incompatible with Union law.
752 A. Dashwood, “The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/European Community”, 378:  
“I must say that I had always read the Simmenthal judgment as authority for the further point that the principle of the 
primacy  of  [Union]  law  does  not  render  a  national  provision,  which  is  in  conflict  with  a  [Union]  provision,  
automatically null and void: it merely requires a national judge to refrain from applying the national provision and to  
give the [Union] provision its full intended effect”.
753 Case C-216/01 Budejovicku Budvar v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, paras 168-169.
754 C. Hillion, “Annotation: Case C-62/98, Commission v. Portugal, and Case C-94/98, Commission v. Portugal”, 1279.
755 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 772.
756 Ibid.
757 Case 167/73  Commission v. France [1974] ECR 359, para 41. See also e.g. Case 74/86 Commission v. Germany 
[1988] ECR 2139, Case C-160/99  Commission v. France [2000] ECR I-6137, see further P. Koutrakos, “Case C-
205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2070. 
758 C. Hillion, “Annotation: Case C-62/98 and Case C-94/98”, 1283; similarly, J. Klabbers, “Moribund on the Fourth of  
July”, 197.
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in the  BITs cases discussed above. Once the Court of Justice had established that incompatibilities 
with power-conferring provisions of EU law also came within the scope of Article 351 (2) TFEU, the 
question  arose  whether  such  hypothetical  incompatibilities  were  capable  of  imposing  a  strict 
obligation to eliminate all incompatibilities. Were the Court to impose a duty of denunciation based 
on  hypothetical  incompatibilities,  such  a  duty  would  constitute  “a  sort  of  pre-emptive 
denouncement”759. 
When  assessing  the  various  options  at  its  disposal,  the  Court  of  Justice  first  looked  at  the 
mechanisms  available  under  international  law.  However,  it  immediately  found  that  both  the 
suspension and the denunciation of the agreements at  issue was “too uncertain in its  effects”760. 
Neither  of  the two mechanisms were capable of  guaranteeing that  the measures adopted by the 
Council could be applied effectively. In order to be effective, measures adopted under Articles 64, 66 
and 75/215 TFEU had to be capable of being applied immediately with regard to the third countries. 
The immediate effectiveness of these measures, however, could not be reconciled with the periods of 
time necessarily involved in international negotiations which would be required in order to reopen 
discussion of the agreements761. 
In  its  defence,  Austria  had  argued  that  it  intended  to  incorporate  a  clause  into  the  contested 
agreements which would allow it to fulfil its obligations as a Member State of the Union and make it 
possible  to  apply any measures  restricting  movements  of  capital  and payments  which  might  be 
adopted by the Council762. Both the Commission and the Court of Justice agreed that such a clause 
was indeed capable of removing the established incompatibility.  Nevertheless,  the Court did not 
accept Austria's proposal as an argument mitigating its failure to fulfil obligations under Article 351 
(2) TFEU, as the Member State had not taken any steps to eliminate the risk of conflict with EU law 
within the period prescribed by the Commission763.
In the absence of any valid mechanism of international law capable of guaranteeing the effective 
exercise of EU powers under  Articles 64, 66 and 75/215 TFEU, the Court came to the conclusion 
that  Austria,  Sweden  and  Finland  had  failed  to  take  the  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate 
incompatibilities within the meaning of Article 351 (2) TFEU. 
The  Court's  affirmation  that  a  duty  to  denounce  inconsistent  pre-existing  agreements  could  be 
imposed even in cases in which the conflict with EU law was merely hypothetical has been labelled 
759 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 281.
760 See e.g. Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria, para 40.
761 Ibid., paras 36, 39 and 40.
762 Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria, para 41.
763 Ibid., para 42.
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“absurd”764 and “misguided”765. From a Member State perspective, the judgments were deemed to “go 
too far”, particularly because the Court failed to provide convincing arguments why the Member 
States concerned would not be able to effectively suspend their incompatible agreements766. 
Furthermore, the judgments were criticised for unduly limiting the Member States' freedom to avoid 
denunciation by means of renegotiation. First, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Member States had lost their power to renegotiate inconsistent agreements involving foreign direct 
investment767.  Secondly,  the  requirement  that  all  Member  States  renegotiate  those  bilateral 
agreements  which  contained  no  express  saving  clause  allowing  the  swift  adoption  of  Council 
measures under Articles 64, 66 and 75/215 TFEU would result in a “massive exercise in collective 
renegotiation”768. And thirdly, if a Member State sought to amend its BITs in a way that reserved the 
right to suspend treaty obligations if so required by Union law, the other contracting parties would 
certainly  insist  on  reciprocity  or  other  corresponding  privileges769.  This  last  point  is  not  only 
detrimental to the interests of the Member States, but also “potentially damaging to the interests of 
the  Union”770, as those provisions of BITs guaranteeing  free transfer of capital and returns “would 
lose their practical effectiveness as a bulwark for the Union's foreign investors”771. 
It is noteworthy that this criticism does not question the legitimacy of the Union interest in effective  
applicability of EU law as established by the Court of Justice in the BITs cases. On the contrary, it 
recognises that the contested BITs would inhibit the Union's ability to impose swift measures which 
must be capable of instant application if they are to operate as an effective protection772. Such an 
approach, it has been accepted, “aims at protecting the autonomy of the [EU] legal order”773.
The  point  of  contention,  therefore,  is  neither  the  establishment  by  the  Court  of  a  hypothetical 
incompatibility on the grounds of effectiveness of EU law, nor the affirmation  per se that such an 
incompatibility may lead to the imposition of a duty to denounce a pre-existing agreement. Rather, 
the criticism appears to relate to the combination of the two factors and the perception that the 
Court's findings do not take due account of the position of the Member States when assessing the  
764 E.  Denza,  “Bilateral  Investment  Treaties  and  EU Rules  on Free  Transfer:  Comment  on Commission v  Austria,  
Commission v Sweden and Commission v Finland” (2010) 35 E.L. Rev. 263 at 269.
765 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 280.
766 Ibid.
767 E. Denza, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Rules on Free Transfer”, 270.
768 Ibid. at 271.
769 Ibid.
770 Ibid. at 270, emphasis added.
771 Ibid. at 271.
772 Ibid. at 270.
773 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 280.
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Union interest at stake. Indeed, the Court has been criticised for taking “a rigorous view of the duty 
of Member States”774 and for imposing a “disproportionate” burden on the Member States in its quest 
to protect the autonomy of the Union legal order775. This view is reinforced by the fact that the Union 
interest  served  to  safeguard  Council  powers,  the  value  of  which  was  “entirely  theoretical”, 
considering  that  they had never  been exercised by the  time the  Member States'  failure  to  fulfil  
obligations was established776.
V. Assessment – A proportionate relationship between Member State obligations and the Union 
interest 
This criticism of the Court's approach in the BITs cases raises a more general question concerning the 
proportionality between the protection of the Union interest and the imposition of restraints on the 
Member States' freedom to exercise their powers. The reactions to the BITs judgments suggest that 
the mere existence of a legitimate Union interest at stake should not be taken to mean that the Court 
can  automatically  impose  onerous  obligations  on  the  Member  States  in  order  to  safeguard  this 
interest. What, then, is the right balance between the Union interest and the Member States' interests 
as subjects of international law? 
With  regard  to  Article  351  TFEU,  the  Court  had  the  opportunity  to  address  this  question  in 
Commission v. Portugal777. Portugal had contested the proportionality of the obligation to denounce 
its inconsistent agreements: 
“Denunciation is a disproportionate means of achieving the objective sought by the second paragraph 
of Article [351] of the Treaty and involves  disproportionate disregard of Portuguese foreign-policy 
interests as compared with the [Union] interest [...]”778.
The Court, however, did not agree. It held that the balance between the foreign-policy interests of the 
Member States and the Union interest  was already incorporated in  Article  351 TFEU, in  that it 
allowed  Member  States  not  to  apply  a  Union  provision  in  order  to  respect  the  rights  of  third 
countries.  Furthermore,  Article  351  TFEU  allowed  them  to  choose  the  appropriate  means  of 
774 E. Denza, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Rules”, 270, emphasis added. 
775 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 280.
776 E. Denza, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Rules”, 271.
777 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal.
778 See Case C-62/98, para 30, emphasis added.
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rendering conflicting agreements compatible with Union law779. 
This reasoning was criticised as being “far from convincing”780, as the Court ultimately left no doubt 
that the benefit of respecting a third party's right came to an end where required by Union  law. 
Moreover, the choices left to the Member States in order to take appropriate steps were limited to 
two in this case. As a result, “the scales end up tilted rather heavily in favour of [Union] law”781. 
The Court of Justice had the opportunity to shed light on the question of the proportionate balance 
between  the  Union  interests  and  Member  State  obligations  in  Commission  v.  Austria782. These 
infringement  proceedings  brought  by the  Commission  against  Austria  concerned  the  legality  of 
national legislation on the employment of women in the underground mining industry. Austria had 
argued,  inter alia, that the national measure had been adopted for the purpose of implementing an 
ILO Convention ratified before accession to the Union. The Court established the incompatibility of 
the ILO Convention with the principle of equal treatment for men and women and its exceptions 
enshrined in  Articles 2 (1) and 3 (1) of Directive 76/207, before it  reaffirmed its  findings from 
Commission  v.  Portugal that  the  appropriate  steps  to  eliminate  incompatibilities  also  included 
denunciation. 
However, when it came to the obligation which the incompatibility imposed on the Member State, 
the  Court  found that  Austria  had  not  violated  its  duties  under  Article  351 (2)  TFEU.  The ILO 
Convention contained a clause providing that the agreement could be denounced within a year after 
the expiry of each period of ten years following its entry into force. But at the last point in time when 
Austria would have been able to denounce the convention, “the incompatibility of the prohibition 
laid down by that  convention with the provisions of  Directive 76/207 had not  been sufficiently 
clearly established for that Member State to be bound to denounce the convention”783.
Although the Court did not go into further details as to what constituted sufficient clarity and how 
such clarity could have been achieved in the specific case784, it nevertheless sent out a clear statement 
that the scope of the Member States' obligation to eliminate incompatibilities was not be assessed in  
abstracto, but had to be evaluated together with the Union interest at stake. In the specific case, the 
Union interest was not such as to require immediate denunciation, since the precise content of the 
779 Ibid, para 50. 
780 J. Klabbers, “Moribund on the Fourth of July”, 196.
781 Ibid. at 197.
782 Case C-203/03 Commission v. Austria [2005] ECR I-935.
783 Ibid., para 62.
784 Koutrakos points out that the Court had ruled already in 1986 (Case 222/84  Johnston) that the exception of Article 2 
(3) of the Directive should be interpreted strictly. See P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (2006), 315.
158
incompatible Union rules had not yet been sufficiently established. Indeed, the Court's approach in 
Commission v. Austria can be considered “an effort to strike a balance between the requirement of 
loyal cooperation which underpins the ratio of Article [351 (2) TFEU] and the drastic implications of 
denunciation of an international agreement”785.
Notwithstanding this readiness to take account of the different interests at stake, it is important to 
note  that  the  Court  remains  firm in  its  stance  regarding  the  scope  of  the  duty to  eliminate  all 
incompatibilities. It signals to the Member States that it is willing to make those concessions which 
the Union interest allows for, but it leaves no doubt that the Member States may ultimately be under  
a duty to denounce. 
What emerges from the Court's case law on Article 351 TFEU is, therefore, a strict pursuit of the  
primacy of Union law. The aim of Article 351 TFEU is not to find the right balance between the 
Union interest  and the  rights  of  third  countries  under  pre-existing  agreements  – and much less 
between the Union interests and the rights of  Member States under these agreements. Instead, the 
goal is to bring Member States' pre-existing obligations towards third countries in line with later 
obligations towards the EU. As such, the Court's interpretation of Article 351 TFEU clearly reflects 
the rationale of the more general duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU. 
The question of whether the Union interest permits any kind of concession to the Member States is 
assessed by balancing the incompatibility established against the obligation imposed. Or, expressed 
in  terms  of  the  two-tier  test  advocated  by Halberstam for  assessing  which  vision  of  federalism 
underlies a given approach786, it is assessed by balancing the type of restraint imposed against the 
rationale behind the restraint. This assessment also helps to explain the reactions to the BITs cases 
which described the Court's judgments as disproportionate and rigorous. After all, the establishment 
of a hypothetical incompatibility and the imposition of a “pre-emptive” duty to denounce, taken 
together, present a particularly onerous obligation on the Member States. This does not, however, 
mean that the Court was necessarily pursuing a conservative fidelity approach in the BITs cases. The 
Union rules at issue were of such a specific nature that their effective application required both a 
broad approach to the existence of an incompatibility under Article 351 (2) TFEU and the imposition 
of a strict compliance obligation787. In the specific case, the establishment of an incompatibility was 
so closely intertwined with the ensuing obligation that there was no scope for a balancing of the two. 
785 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (2006), 316, emphasis added. 
786 See the Introductory Chapter, Section IV. 
787 In a similar vein, J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of 
their International Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 553.
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VII. Overview – The role of Article 351 TFEU in the light of the general duty of loyalty 
When the Court of Justice was first  asked to rule on the validity of Member States'  agreements 
concluded prior to their accession to the Union, all it  had at its disposal was a Treaty provision 
stating that prior obligations were not be affected by EU law, notwithstanding the requirement that 
all incompatibilities were to be eliminated by the Member States. It was left to the Court to fill the 
provision with meaning by specifying its content and scope. While it has certainly done justice to the 
nature of Article 351 TFEU as a conflict rule aimed at achieving primacy of Union law, certain 
elements  of  the  Court's  case  law  nevertheless  mirror  its  approach  to  other  types  of  restraints 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
In the  BITs cases, AG Maduro had pleaded for a failure to fulfil obligations based on the general  
loyalty  obligation  of  Article  4  (3)  TEU.  The  Court  did  not  follow the  suggested  approach,  but 
nevertheless concurred with the Advocate General in his finding that the three Member States at 
issue had failed to fulfil their obligations to eliminate all incompatibilities. Although not related to 
the  elimination  of  incompatibilities  but  to  questions  of  competence,  the  argument  that  special 
circumstances  may  justify  strict  restraints  on  the  Member  States'  freedom  to  exercise  their 
competence even in the absence of any EU action in the field is reminiscent of the Court's approach 
in  Kramer788. In this case, the Court found that in the absence of Union action the Member States 
retained their power to act externally until the Union decided to exercise its competence by adopting 
internal legislation.  In the meantime, the Member States were restrained in the exercise of their 
rights and obligations under international law by the duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU. The 
Court emphasised that the Member States were under a duty to use all political and legal means at 
their disposal in order to ensure the participation of the Union in the international convention at 
issue789. The similarities between Kramer and the BITs cases notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that 
the former case concerned an area that had been “reserved” to the EU. The Union was set to obtain 
an exclusive competence by occupying the field, but the adoption of the final measures had been 
blocked in the Council790. The absence of Council measures in the BITs cases, by contrast, was not 
due to  a  Member State  blocking the  adoption of  such measures,  but  the  Union had simply not 
considered it necessary to act. More importantly though, the area of law concerned was one of shared 
competence in which no pre-emption had taken place yet. 
788 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others [1976] ECR 1279. 
789 Ibid., paras 34 and 35, see further Chapter Two.
790 See further Chapter Two
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The imposition of loyalty restraints in Kramer and the BITs cases thus shows that neither questions 
of competence nor the legal basis on which the restraint is based are necessarily a decisive factor in  
limiting the Member States' freedom to act. What matters instead is that the Union maintains the 
ability  to  fulfil  its  objectives.  This  is  also  evident  in  the  similarities  of  the  Court's  respective 
approaches to Article 351 TFEU and the AETR doctrine. Like the AETR doctrine, the obligation to 
eliminate all incompatibilities under Article 351 (2) TFEU may be applied only in those areas in 
which the Union has promulgated legislation, unless exceptional circumstances such as those present 
in  the BITs cases  require  otherwise.  Accordingly,  the  Union rules  in  place  must  be  sufficiently 
precise as far as the coverage of a given area is concerned791 and sufficiently clear as far as their 
openness to different interpretations is concerned792. As such, the Court's construction of the duty 
under Article 351 (2) TFEU resembles the requirement that a given area be covered by Union rules  
to a “large extent” and that those rules be precise enough to exclude the adoption of more stringent 
measures before it can be considered to pre-empt the Member States' competence in the field 793. The 
imposition of restraints, in other words, cannot occur randomly but is dependent on certain specific 
conditions. The difference between pre-emption and Article 351 (2) TFEU, however, is that the latter 
is broader it scope, as it does not require a finding of exclusive competence794. But at the same time, 
Article 351 (2) TFEU is less intrusive in its effect. A finding of exclusive competence means that the  
Member States are no longer allowed to be active in a given area, even if such activities would not 
be in contradiction with EU law795.  By contrast,  Article 351 (2) TFEU merely requires Member 
States to remove incompatibilities. However, a duty to remove also those parts of the agreements 
which are not incompatible with Union law, i.e. denunciation of the agreement, may apply once all  
other appropriate steps have been exhausted.
Another example which demonstrates that the Member States' obligations under Article 351 TFEU 
do not differ fundamentally from other compliance obligations, in the sense of granting the Member 
States special protection of prior international obligations, is the Court's judgments in a number of 
cases brought by the Commission against Belgium and Luxembourg796. These cases, decided shortly 
before the judgments in Commission v. Portugal, were identical on the merit with the situation in the 
791 See Case C-158/91 Levy. 
792 See Case C-203/03 Commission v. Austria.
793 See Opinion 2/91.
794 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 134.
795 Opinion 2/91, para 25.
796 Joined  Cases  C-176/97  and  C-177/97  Commission  v.  Belgium  and  Luxembourg;  similarly,  Case  C-170/98 
Commission  v.  Belgium,  and  Joined  Cases  C-171/98,  C-201/98  and  C-202/98  Commission  v.  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg.
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Portuguese  cases,  save  for  the  fact  that  the  cases  did  not involve  any pre-existing  obligations. 
Commission v. Belgium797, for example, concerned an agreement on maritime transport concluded by 
Belgium  with  Zaire.  Claiming  that  the  cargo-sharing  arrangements  contained  in  the  agreement 
infringed  the  subsequently concluded  EU Regulation  No.  4055/86,  the  Commission  brought  an 
action  against  the  Member  State.  Belgium  had  put  forward  arguments  based  on  the  practical 
difficulties in adjusting the agreement due to the political situation in Zaire which made negotiations 
impossible. The Court was oblivious to Belgium's claims that political difficulties in a third country 
may justify the failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations towards the Union. It  found that 
Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Regulation and declared that the Member State 
was under a duty to denounce the agreement with Zaire.
In spite  of  the fact  that  these cases did not  concern the application of Article  351 TFEU, their  
outcome was identical to Commission v. Portugal. None of the three Member States were allowed to 
rely on the justification that political difficulties had delayed the adjustment of the prior obligations.  
Instead, they were found to be under a duty to denounce the pre-accession agreements. The Belgium 
and Luxembourg cases and Commission v. Portugal show that the application of Article 351 TFEU 
may not always be necessary to resolve conflicts between prior agreements and EU law. Instead,  
reliance on the secondary legislation concerned or on Article 4 (3) TEU may lead to the same results. 
This will most certainly be the case for provisions of secondary law that prescribe the adjustment or 
phasing out of incompatible prior obligations, such as those contained in Regulation 4055/86. 
The  application  of  Article  351  TFEU,  in  these  cases,  does  not  add  any  additional  dimension 
compared with post-accession agreements. Instead, Member States are under a general obligation to 
ensure the primacy of EU law, irrespective of whether the incompatibilities are contained in pre-
existing agreements or not.  The only freedom that the Member States retain is as to the means for 
ensuring compliance, and not  whether to ensure compliance if that were detrimental to their own 
foreign policy interests. 
The Court's identical approach in two different legal situations raises questions regarding the purpose 
of Article 351 TFEU. If a case can be decided on the basis of a breach of a Union Regulation alone, 
then what is the additional benefit of including such a provision in the Treaties? Or, where recourse 
to Article 4 (3) TEU would offer the same solution to a conflict  of obligations,  for example as  
suggested by AG Maduro in the BITs cases, what additional purpose does Article 351 TFEU serve 
which exceeds the scope of the general duty of loyalty? 
797 Case C-170/98.
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By rejecting all claims relating to the applicability of Article 4 (3) TEU in the BITs cases, the Court 
delivered a powerful pronouncement on the scope of the Member States' obligations under Article 
351 (2) TFEU. By including also hypothetical conflicts in the sphere of application of Article 351 
TFEU,  the  Court  left  no  doubt  that  no  duty  of  loyal  cooperation  was  required  to  trigger  the  
application  of  Article  351 (2)  TFEU,  making it  clear  that  the  provision  itself  was  the  ultimate  
expression of Article 4 (3) TEU in this context. 
Notwithstanding its  close relationship with Article  4 (3)  TEU, it  is  important  not  to  understand 
Article 351 TFEU as a mere device of restraint. On the contrary, the Court's construction of Article 
351 TFEU establishes firm boundaries to what may expected from the Member States in the context 
of pre-accession agreements. When faced with the possibility of relying on Article 4 (3) TEU instead 
of Article 351 TFEU, the Court rejected the use of the general obligation. As discussed  above, a 
precedence based on Article 4 (3) TEU could have had far-reaching consequences and paved the way 
for “unnecessarily broad”798 restraints in future cases. Indeed, such an approach would have raised 
the question of whether the general duty not to compromise any form of Union action was capable of 
imposing an obligation on the Member States to eliminate the risk of any future conflict with Union 
legislation if so requested by the Commission. 
The potential for restraint inherent in Article 4 (3) TEU, in other words, may be considered bigger 
than that of Article 351 TFEU, the scope of which has been carefully circumscribed by the Court of  
Justice. Unlike the general obligation, Article 351 TFEU exclusively seeks to safeguard the primacy 
of Union law. In doing so, it furthermore aims to take account, where possible, of the Member States' 
interest to fulfil their obligations towards third countries, and to actively involve the Member States 
in the process of eliminating incompatibilities – first, by leaving the choice as to the appropriate 
means up to the Member States, and second, by attributing a central role to national courts within 
this process. And it is precisely these concessions to the Member States that the Court refers to when 
it stated in Commission v. Portugal that Article 351 TFEU already incorporates a balance of Union 
and Member State interests. 
A different type of balance which is not incorporated in Article 351 TFEU, instead, is that between 
primacy of EU law and primacy of inconsistent international obligations. Here, there is no scope for 
balance,  as  the  Court  has  repeatedly made clear.  Where a  conflict  has  been found to exist,  the 
Member States are required to eliminate it.  Only if the Union interest permits may the Member 
798 P. Koutrakos, “Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria and Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden”, 2069. 
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States be granted a moratorium for taking the appropriate steps799, but the final obligation remains. 
VI. Incompatibilities with CFSP acts 
Although Article 351 TFEU is a general provision applicable to all policy areas of EU law, it cannot 
be assumed that the Court's construction of the obligations it gives rise to apply in an equal manner 
to CFSP measures. While the application of the pacta sunt servanda principle laid down in Article 
351 (1) TFEU raises no problems with regard to the CFSP, the transposition of the duty to eliminate 
all  incompatibilities  found in  paragraph 2  is  less  straightforward.  Although  the  scope of  CFSP 
measures is usually limited, leaving ample space for national policies, conflicts may nevertheless 
arise  when  existing  international  Member  State  obligations  directly  violate  subsequent  CFSP 
decisions800. 
According to Declaration no. 17 attached to the Lisbon Treaty, “the Treaties and the law adopted by 
the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States”. However, 
primacy within the meaning of the Declaration applies under the conditions laid down by “the well-
settled case law of the European Court of Justice”.  The Court's  jurisdiction over CFSP matters, 
however, continues to be excluded also in the Treaty of Lisbon801. In the absence of any case law 
concerning the question of primacy of CFSP acts, the Declaration does not permit any conclusions 
on the effect of CFSP measures within the national legal orders. 
While the wording of Declaration no. 17 cannot be taken to mean “that primacy does not extend to 
CFSP”802, it is doubtful that CFSP measures may be deemed to take precedence over national rules. 
Two main arguments are advanced in the legal literature to support this view. The first argument 
relates to the absence of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice803. It is argued that a general application 
of the principle of primacy would place national courts “in a precarious position”804. Member State 
799 Case C-203/03 Commission v. Austria.
800 R. A. Wessel, “The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent Framework of Action 
and Interpretation” (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 117 at 130-131.
801 Article 24 (1) TEU. 
802 J. Wouters, D. Coppens, B. De Meester, “The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty”, 189. 
803 For an overview of the Court's position with regard to CFSP, see M. G. Garbagnati Ketvel, “The Jurisdiction of the  
European  Court  of  Justice  in  Respect  of  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy”  (2006)  International  and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 77.  
804 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance between 
Delimitation and Consistency”, 991; see also A. Dashwood, “The EU Constitution – What Will Really Change?” 
(2004-2005) 7 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 33 at 37. 
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courts would be required to refrain from applying incompatible provisions of national law without 
any guidance from the Court of Justice805, thus jeopardising the uniform application of Union law806. 
The mere fact that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is excluded in the field of the CFSP 
highlights “the political rather than the legal character of the CFSP”807. This view links in with the 
second argument brought forward in favour of rejecting the notion of primacy in the CFSP context, 
which centres around the purpose and context of the policy area808. The CFSP plays a “special and 
unique role” in the structure of the Treaties809. Even with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the CFSP continues to be dealt with in a separate part (Title V TEU) of the Treaties from other fields 
of external competence, and according to Article 24 (1) TEU, the CFSP remains “subject to specific 
rules and procedures”810. It has been argued that “[b]y thus preserving the particularity of the Union's 
competence  with  respect  to  the  CFSP,  […]  the  Treaty  prevents  the  principle  of  primacy from 
applying in this area, though it nowhere says so”811. 
In the absence of primacy, the Member States are, at the very least, bound by international law. A 
conflict  of  obligations  would  have  to  be  examined  in  light  of  Article  30  of  the  1969  Vienna 
Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties,  which  generally  favours  application  of  the lex  posterior 
principle812. In cases of incompatibilities with pre-accession agreements, therefore, the conflicting 
CFSP measure would prevail. However, the Member States would remain free to circumvent Union 
acts simply by concluding agreements derogating from their obligations under the CFSP813. 
Against this  background,  the binding nature of CFSP measures on the Member States becomes 
“critically important”814.  Article  24 (3)  TEU requires  the Member States  to  support  the Union's 
external and security policy “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” 
and to “refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its 
effectiveness”.  The Lisbon Treaty reinforces  this  obligation  by adding a  Member  State  duty to 
805 A. Dashwood, “The EU Constitution – What Will Really Change?”, 37. 
806 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 991; see also A. Dashwood, “The  
EU Constitution – What Will Really Change?”, 38 and M. Cremona, “A Constitutional Basis for Effective External 
Action? An Assessment of the Provisions on EU External Action in the Constitutional Treaty”, EUI Working Papers 
Law No. 2006/30, p. 18. 
807 C. Tietje, “The Concept of Coherence in the TEU and the CFSP” (1997) 2 E.F.A. Rev. 211 at 229. 
808 See A. Dashwood, “The EU Constitution – What Will Really Change?”, 38. 
809 W.  Wessels  and  F.  Bopp,  “The  Institutional  Architecture  of  CFSP  after  the  Lisbon  Treaty  –  Constitutional 
Breakthrough or Challenges Ahead?” (2008) Challenge Liberty & Security Research Paper No. 10 at 4. 
810 See further M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 63. 
811 See A. Dashwood, “The EU Constitution – What Will Really Change?”, 38. 
812 See further J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 168.
813 Ibid.
814 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 66.
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“comply with the Union's action in this area”815. Since the entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
task of monitoring compliance in this area has been assigned not only to the Council, but also to the 
High Representative816. In light of the absence of the Court's jurisdiction in CFSP matters, however, 
the  emphasis  is  on giving  effect  to  CFSP measures  and implementation  by the  Member  States 
themselves817. In practice, therefore, the primacy of CFSP acts can only be guaranteed by way of a 
“tacit recognition of the supremacy of obligations arising out of [the CFSP] over obligations arising 
under other agreements”818. 
The duty to ensure the primacy of CFSP measures is reinforced by the general duty of loyalty. In  
addition to Article 24 (3) TEU, the loyalty clause contained in Article 4 (3) TEU “may be used to 
resolve conflicts in favour of Union law”819 and “force Member States to  comply with their CFSP 
obligations”820. In its 2007 judgment in Segi821, the Court of Justice confirmed for the first time the 
binding nature of common positions, making an express connection between compliance and the 
duty of sincere cooperation: 
“A common position requires the  compliance  of the Member States  by virtue of the principle of the  
duty  to  cooperate  in  good  faith,  which  means  in  particular  that  Member  States  are  to  take  all 
appropriate  measures,  whether general  or  particular,  to  ensure fulfilment  of their  obligations  under  
European Union law822.”
The Segi case concerned a Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) which had its legal basis both in the 
former second and third pillars, and could therefore be considered a CFSP decision823. While the 
Court's findings in Segi do not change the fact that the Court of Justice has no legal remedies at its  
disposal in relation to acts with a single CFSP legal basis, the Court's reasoning is nevertheless useful 
in defining the scope of the Member States' obligations to ensure compliance with CFSP measures. 
As AG Kokott argued in Pupino824 with regard to the former third pillar, the duty of loyalty is not 
limited to the former first pillar. The principles of consistency and solidarity which form the basis for 
815 Article 24 (3) TEU, emphasis added.
816 See Article 24 (3) TEU.
817 M. Cremona, “Defining Competence in EU External Relations”, 66.
818 J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 168.
819 M. Cremona “Coherence  through Law:  What  Difference  Will  the  Treaty of  Lisbon Make?”  (2008)  3  Hamburg  
Review of Social Sciences 11 at 28. 
820 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 93, emphasis  
added. 
821 Case C-355/04 P. Segi and Others v. Council [2007] ECR I-1657.
822 Ibid. at para 52, emphasis added.
823 See C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 90.
824 Case C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.
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the “ever closer union” foreseen in Article 1 TEU require that the Member States and institutions of 
the Union cooperate sincerely and in  compliance with the law”825. Hence, the Court's approach in 
other  areas  of law,  together  with the development  of  the relevant  primary law,  may be used as 
guidance for circumscribing the Member States' obligations in CFSP matters. As Wessel has argued, 
“the development of the Union legal order has an impact on the latent primacy and direct effect of  
CFSP norms, in the sense that their connection to other Union norms may force national Courts and 
legislators to take them into account826.”
Although,  at  present,  CFSP  measures  are  not  directly  applicable  within  the  Simmenthal827 
understanding of primacy, it may nevertheless be argued that CFSP acts enjoy primacy in the sense 
of Costa v. Enel828. It appears from the latter case that the Court's main concern is consistency: “The 
only thing that matters is that [EU law] puts forward an identifiable result which cannot be thwarted 
by incompatible  national  measures”829.  From this,  Lenaerts  and Corthaut  derive that  the reasons 
which led the Court to recognise the primacy of EU law in other areas may easily be transposed to  
the entire EU legal order: even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union – in the 
shape of the former second and third pillars – were established for an indefinite period, possessed its  
own institutions and had legal personality; furthermore, the Member States had transferred practical 
competences  to  the  Union,  to  the  extent  of  which  they  can  be  said  to  have  limited  their 
sovereignty830.  Lenaerts and Corthaut come to the conclusion that “the Member States have thus 
created a legal order which is binding upon them, even if no enforcement mechanism similar to Arts 
[258 to 260 TFEU] is available”831. 
Against this background, the principle of loyalty in CFSP matters cannot be conceived as a mere 
expression of the general international law principle of  pacta sunt servanda832. Article 24 (3) TEU 
and the general clause of Article 4 (3) TEU, instead, impose a more specific obligation. In cases of 
825 Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-105/03 Pupino, para 26, emphasis added.
826 R. A. Wessel, “The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order”, 132.
827 In case 106/77 Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629, the Court imposed a duty on national courts to set aside provisions of 
national law which are incompatible with Union law.
828 In case 6/64  Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585 at  593, the Court held:  “[T]he  law stemming from the Treaty,  an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal  
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as [Union] law and without the legal basis of the  
[Union] itself being called into question”.
829 K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, “Of Birds and Hedges: the Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law” (2006) 31  
E.L. Rev. 287 at 290-291.
830 Ibid. at 289-290. 
831 Ibid. at 290.
832 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 91.
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conflict,  the Member States  are  bound by a  positive  obligation  to  ensure the primacy of  CFSP 
measures over incompatible prior obligations towards third countries.
168
Chapter Four
Restraints In Areas of Member State Competence – The Duty of Consistent Exercise
I. Introduction
The preceding chapters  have  illustrated  how also in  areas  outside  of  exclusive a  priori  Union 
competence, the Member States are subject to significant restraints on the exercise of their external 
powers. Even in fields in which no pre-emption has taken place, the Member States may be required 
to abstain from acting or to denounce inconsistent international agreements. What these restraints 
have  in  common is  that  they  result  from Union  action  in  the  field  –  either  the  exercise  of  a 
legislative competence or the start of a concerted action on the part of the EU. If, by contrast, Union 
action in a given area is non-existent or limited, it should be assumed that the Member States are 
generally free to exercise their treaty-making powers by entering into international agreements with 
third countries, unaffected by restraints deriving from EU law. Such agreements do not bind the 
Union, but only the contracting Member State and the non-member country involved. Not forming 
part of EU law, these agreements are then deemed to be outside the interpretative jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice833. 
The fact that EU action in a given area is either non-existent or limited may be due to different 
circumstances. Firstly, the area in question may be the exclusive purview of the Member States834. 
Secondly, the Union may only enjoy limited powers to act because  harmonisation of the area is 
prohibited835, or thirdly, the exercise of EU powers has taken place in a piecemeal fashion only836. In 
these  situations,  the  Member  States  continue  to  enjoy  “retained  powers”837.  A  particular 
characteristic of retained powers is that they represent areas which safeguard “a certain idea of what 
the  State  can  and  should  do  in  Europe”  and  what  may be  understood  as  the  “essential  State 
833 See e.g.  Case  130/73  Magdalena Vandeweghe and others  v.  Berufsgenossenschaft  für  die  chemische  Industrie  
[1973] ECR 1329 at  para 2: “The Court has no jurisdiction under Article [267 TFEU] to give a ruling on the  
interpretation of provisions of international law which bind Member States outside the framework of [Union] law.”
834 See e.g. Cases C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-3533 and C-246/89 Commission v. United  
Kingdom  [1991] ECR I-4585, discussed below, which involved the determination of territorial baselines and the 
granting of nationality to ships, respectively. See also Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain concerning double taxation.
835 See e.g. See Case C-55/00 Gottardo concerning a social security agreement. 
836 See the Open Skies cases, discussed below, where in the fields of access to intra-Union routes and the granting of 
operating licenses on such routes, treaty-making power continued to be a prerogative of the Member States.
837 See also L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice: EU Law as 
Total Law?” (2011) 4 EJLS 192 at 206. 
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functions” referred to in Article 4 (2) TEU838. Since retained powers are “the collective goods the 
State is supposed to protect so as to ensure the social cohesion of its own population in its territory”, 
Member States enjoy a unilateral right of action without interference from Union institutions839. 
In areas where the Member States retain powers to act, international obligations may nevertheless 
collide with the requirements imposed by Union law. In fact, the relationship between Union law 
and international agreements concluded within areas of Member State competence has given rise to 
conflicts on a number of occasions. Differently from the previous chapters, these situations do not 
concern a conflict between international agreements and Union secondary law, but incompatibilities 
with the Treaties themselves. The question which arises in this context is whether the Treaties may 
impose  compliance  obligations  on  the  Member  States  in  fields  coming  within  their  own 
competence, or whether the Member States can invoke international obligations against Union law. 
International lawyers might be tempted to argue that 
“since the [Union] is bound by international law, [Union] law cannot compel Member States to violate 
this law if they act within their own sphere of competences. Where the Member States alone bear 
international responsibility, obligations imposed by public international law should take precedence 
over [Union] law.”840
From the perspective of EU law, however, the situation is entirely different. In case of a conflict, EU 
law prevails: 
“This would follow from such considerations as the ERTA case-law (disavowing the possibility that 
[EU]  law  be  affected  by  an  agreement  concluded  with  a  third  party),  as  well  as  the  notion  of 
Gemeinschaftstreue of article [4 (3) TEU], and seems perfectly in line with the ambitions of the [EU] 
to have a uniform system of EU law, where the EU’s citizens are subject to the same rules no matter 
where they are or reside within the EU.”841 
In fact, it  emerges from the Court's case law that the Member States are under an obligation to 
exercise their international powers consistently with their primary Treaty obligations under Union 
law.  As  in  the  previous  chapters,  the  Court  of  Justice  distinguishes  between  the  existence  of 
Member State powers and the exercise thereof, with the result that the scope of application of Union 
law extends beyond the subject areas over which the EU enjoys jurisdiction. Member States are 
required to ensure that  EU law prevails  in  situations of  conflict  between international  law and 
Member State agreements also in areas of retained competence. 
This chapter will first look at the scope for restraint of EU Treaty articles, tracing the development 
838 Ibid., at 207. 
839 Ibid.
840 B. Brandtner and H.P. Folz, “The International Practice of the European Communities: Current Survey” (1993) 4 
EJIL 430 at 434.
841 J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2009) at 211, emphasis added. 
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of the duty of consistent exercise in different areas of law (section II.), before it goes on to assess 
the  nature of  the  compliance obligations,  which  differs  according to  the  degree to  which  third 
countries are involved in remedying the contested incompatibility (section III.). Section IV. provides 
an  assessment  of  the  impact  of  both  the  scope  for  restraint  of  the  Treaties  and  the  ensuing 
obligations on the Member States' freedom to act. Section VI. gives an overview of the duty of 
consistent  exercise in  the broader  context  of loyalty restraints  under  Article  4  (3) TEU, before 
Section V. transposes the findings of the present chapter to the CFSP context. 
II. The scope of Treaty obligations – The duty of consistent exercise
In its case law on the internal market, the Court of Justice has often stated that Member States must 
comply with their obligations towards the Union, even when exercising their own competence842. 
The  question  of  whether  such  compliance  obligations  also  apply  where  Member  States  have 
exercised a competence on the international stage was first addressed in Case C-146/89 Commission 
v.  United  Kingdom843 concerning  a  violation  of  EU  secondary  law.  This case  caused  some 
uncertainty as to what rules of Union law were capable of triggering compliance obligations in areas 
of Member State competence (Section A.). In subsequent cases, however, the Court of Justice has 
clarified what type of Union rules may give rise to compliance obligations in these areas (Section 
B.). 
A. Incompatibilities with secondary Union law?
In Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom844, the Commission brought an action against the 
United Kingdom seeking a declaration that the UK had violated its Treaty obligations by applying 
new baselines for the purpose of determining which parts of the waters around the coast of the UK 
were subject to certain fishery arrangements laid down in EU law. Contrary to the objective of equal 
access to territorial waters, the UK's newly adopted Territorial Sea Act had the effect of restricting 
the fishing rights of Member States which had traditionally fished in its waters. Although the UK 
842 For a thorough discussion of this case law and its impact on Member State powers, see K. Lenaerts, “Federalism and 
the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice” (2010) 33 Fordham Int'l  L.J.  1338, and L.  
Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”.  
843 Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom.
844 Ibid.
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had simply exercised its rights under the London Fisheries Convention of 1964, it had nevertheless 
restricted the rights of other Member State nationals under Union law. 
The dispute that arose between the Commission and the UK essentially concerned the interpretation 
of the rules relating to the determination of fishing limits laid down by EU Regulation No. 170/83. 
As the Commission argued, Member States were not entitled to “unilaterally alter  the scope of 
protection  which  [Union]  law confers  on  certain  fishing  activities”  by  shifting  their  territorial 
baselines845. The Court of Justice agreed with the Commission and confirmed that the UK had failed 
to fulfil its obligations under Union law. Interestingly, however, the failure to fulfil obligations did 
not consist in a violation of a Treaty provision or a breach of a provision of Regulation No. 170/83. 
Instead, the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under Union law by jeopardising the objective of 
the Regulation846. 
The Court did not, however, specify what rules of primary Union law this objective corresponded 
to. It is noteworthy in this context that Regulation No. 170/83 is not based on the principle of equal 
treatment laid down in Article 18 TFEU, but only lists (current) Article 43 TFEU as a legal basis847. 
On the contrary, the objective of Regulation No. 170/83 is to achieve a balance between the “system 
of exclusive access to coastal waters for national fishermen”, on the one hand, and “the protection 
of certain activities of fishermen from other Member States”848 on the other. Hence, the aim of the 
Regulation was, if not quite juxtaposed, at least not entirely compatible with the Union principle of 
equal treatment, as it sought to balance the freedom of equal access with the national interests in 
sovereignty over a Member States' territorial waters. The Court itself acknowledged the need to 
reconcile the opposing interests at stake and accepted that it was to that very end that Regulation 
No. 170/83 established a system “in derogation from the principle of equal access”849. Against this 
background, it is noteworthy that the Court relied on the “general structure”850 and the “objective” 
of Regulation No. 170/73 in order to establish a breach of the UK's failure to fulfil its obligations 
under Union law. 
What appears from the foregoing then is that in areas of their own competence, the Member States 
845 Ibid., para 21.
846 Ibid., paras 21-25.
847 While Regulation No. 170/83 does make reference to the Regulation on equal access to territorial waters (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70, subsequently replaced by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 101/76 of 19 January 1976  
laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 19) ), it does  not 
adopt the latter's objectives according to which “[...] Union fishermen must have equal access to and use of fishing 
grounds in maritime waters coming under the sovereignty or within the jurisdiction of Member States” (see the 
preamble of Council Regulation No. 101/76). 
848 Case C-146/89, para 22.
849 Ibid., emphasis added.
850 The expression used by the Commission in its submissions to the Court, see Case C-146/89, para 20.
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are under an obligation not to obstruct the objectives of secondary Union legislation.  Instead of 
simply asserting a plain breach of (current) Article 18 TFEU, the Court followed the Commission's 
proposal and found that the national legislation was incompatible with the “objective” of Regulation 
No. 170/83. However, the judgment should not be understood as laying down a general duty for the 
Member States to exercise their rights under international law in accordance with broadly-framed 
aims pursued by acts of the Union legislator. It was perhaps the fact that the Regulation provided for 
a derogation from the principle of equal treatment or the fact that the Commission's claim against 
the UK made no reference to primary EU law that led the Court to adopt this approach. 
B. Compliance with the principle of non-discrimination
Case  C-146/89 illustrates  the  Court's  initial  difficulty  in  finding  a  suitable  approach  to  the 
imposition  of  compliance  obligations  in  areas  of  Member  State  competence.  The  Court 
subsequently took Case C-246/89851 as an opportunity to establish a straightforward formula for 
compliance in areas of Member State competence. Ruling that the Member States were under a duty 
to exercise their international powers consistently with their obligations under Union law, the Court 
laid  the  groundwork  for  the  application  of  the  duty  of  consistent  exercise  which  would  be 
subsequently extended to other areas of law. 
i. Fisheries
Only a few months after its judgment in Case C-146/89, the Court of Justice was asked again to rule 
on the compatibility with Union law of an autonomous Member State action in a field of national 
competence. The area of law concerned as well as the parties involved in the proceedings in Case C-
246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom852 were the same as in the previous case. The Commission 
brought infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU against the United Kingdom, seeking a 
declaration from the Court that the Member State had violated the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality. The UK Merchant Shipping Act 1988 had established a new register of 
British fishing vessels in which could be registered only those fishing vessels which were British-
owned, managed and controlled from within the United Kingdom.  According to the Commission, 
851 Case C-246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom [1991] ECR I-4585. 
852 Ibid. 
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these requirements constituted discrimination on grounds of nationality as prohibited by the general 
rule contained in Article 18 TFEU, as well as by the more specific provisions of Articles 49 and 55 
TFEU. 
The Court of Justice first recalled its previous findings that competence to determine the conditions 
for the registration of vessels was vested in the Member States. That competence was not affected 
by the existence of Council Regulation No. 101/76, which made express reference to the registration 
and the flags flown by fishing vessels, as it left those terms to be defined in the legislation of the 
Member States853. Indeed, it acknowledged that 
“it is for the Member States to determine, in accordance with the general rules of international law, the 
conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a vessel to be registered in their registers and granted 
the right to fly their flag […]”854. 
The Member States' competence over the subject-matter notwithstanding, the Court was quick to 
emphasise that such Member State competence could not be exercised without restrictions. In what 
was to become the determining formula regulating Member States' external action in the sphere of 
their  own  competence,  the  Court  held  that  “powers  retained  by  the  Member  States  must  be 
exercised consistently with [Union] law”855. 
The Court  of  Justice had already stated in  earlier  case law concerning the internal  market  that 
retained powers could not be exercised in violation of EU Treaty provisions856. In this judgment, 
however,  the international  dimension was of particular relevance.  The UK did not question the 
Court's  approach  to  the  exercise  of  retained  powers  in  its  internal  market  case  law.  However, 
referring to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas857, the Member State argued that where a 
competence  is  granted  under  international law,  “the  position  is  different”858.  Similar  concerns 
regarding  the  impact  of  the  international  dimension  on  the  Member  States'  duty  of  consistent 
exercise had also been raised by the referring national  court  in  the 'sister  case'  of  Factortame, 
853 Ibid., paras 9-11.
854 Ibid., para 12, emphasis added. 
855 Ibid., para 12, emphasis added. 
856 See e.g.  the two cases quoted in this judgment,  in which the Court  had applied a similar reasoning concerned 
national measures taken in the monetary field amounting to state aids within the meaning of (current) Article 107 
TFEU (Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v. Commission of the European Communities [1988] ECR 2855), and national 
measures setting maximum prices on imports of certain meats and livestock contrary to (current) Articles 34 and 207 
TFEU (Case 127/87 Commission v. Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 3333).
857 Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on the High Seas, United Nations Treaty Series 450, No 6465. Article 5 (1)  
reads: “Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its  
territory and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly.  
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its  
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.” 
858 Case C-246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 13.
174
decided only two months earlier859. The High Court of Justice of England and Wales had asked the 
Court of Justice whether Union law could “affect” the conditions under which a Member State was 
able to regulate the granting of nationality to ships860. 
The two instances of national objection are no coincidence, considering that 
“[t]he flag flown on the high seas is one of the rare spheres in which international law lays down a  
principle of exclusivity for the state. The power to determine the conditions for attributing nationality 
to ships flying its flag is a power that belongs to a state and to one state alone.”861
The  Court  of  Justice,  however,  was  unimpressed  by  the  particular  nature  of  the  international 
competence at issue. For the first time, it made an explicit distinction between the existence and the 
exercise of competence under  international law. Recognising the existence of the Member States' 
competence in the field, it specified that “in exercising that power, the Member States must comply 
with the rules of [Union] law”862. It has been argued that this approach has the effect of “including 
this  competence  in  the  framework of  a  division  of  powers between the  Member  State  and the 
EU”863. As a result, the notion of exclusive Member State competence under international law is 
constructed to mean that “the Member State is legitimately in a position to act wherever the EU fails 
to do so”864.
ii. Double tax agreements 
In  Saint-Gobain865,  a  preliminary  reference  concerning  advantages  granted  under  two  bilateral 
agreements  concluded  between  Germany and  two  non-Member  countries,  the  Court  of  Justice 
extended the duty of consistent exercise to double tax agreements. The  Saint-Gobain case raised 
questions concerning the interpretation of (current) Articles 49 and 54 TFEU referred by a German 
court in relation to proceedings between the German branch of Saint-Gobain and the Tax Office 
Aachen.  Saint-Gobain  challenged  the  Tax  Office's  refusal  to  grant  it  certain  tax  concessions 
provided under two treaties for the avoidance of double taxation concluded between Germany, on 
859 Case C-221/89 Factortame [1991] ECR I-03905.
860 Ibid., para 11.
861 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 202, emphasis 
added.
862 Case C-246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 15, emphasis added.
863 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 202, emphasis 
added.
864 Ibid.
865 Case  C-307/97  Compagnie  de  Saint-Gobain,  Zweigniederlassung  Deutschland  v.  Finanzamt  Aachen-Innenstadt 
[1999] ECR I-6161.
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the one hand, and Switzerland and the United States, on the other. The agreements provided for an 
exemption  from German corporation  tax  for  the  dividends  received from the  two non-member 
countries, restricting these concessions, however, to German companies and companies subject in 
Germany  to  unlimited  tax  liability.  Saint-Gobain  submitted  that  the  exclusion  of  a  German 
subsidiary of  a  company established  in  France  from such tax  concessions  was  contrary to  the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of EU Member States and of companies and firms established 
in accordance with the laws of a Member State. 
The Court of Justice had no difficulty finding that the refusal to grant capital tax exemption for 
international groups to the permanent establishments of French companies put them in a situation 
“less favourable” than that of German subsidiaries of French companies, which constituted a “single 
composite infringement of Articles [49] and [54 TFEU]”866. 
The Court subsequently considered Germany's submission that “the conclusion of bilateral treaties 
with  a  non-member  country  does  not  come  within  the  sphere  of  [Union]  competence”867.  The 
Member State had argued that no secondary EU law existed in the field and that, therefore, the 
Union  did  not  possess  any  competence  over  taxation  matters.  The  Union  would  violate  the 
allocation of competences between the EU and the Member States if it were to become active in a 
field which was outside the scope of its powers by extending the rights under a bilateral Member 
State agreement to companies and individuals of other Member States. A requirement according to 
which all inequalities between Member States had to be removed would be tantamount to the Union 
exercising a competence of its own868.  The Court's response to Germany's argument was brief. It 
stated simply that in spite of national competence in the field, the “Member States nevertheless may 
not  disregard  [Union]  rules”  and  therefore  “must  nevertheless  exercise  their  taxation  powers 
consistently  with  [Union]  law”869.  In  the  specific  case,  national  competence  was  exercised 
consistently with EU law if the Member State adhered to the national treatment principle, granting 
to permanent establishments of non-resident companies the advantages provided for under the treaty 
on the same conditions as those which apply to resident companies870.
866 Ibid., paras 41-43.
867 Ibid., para 54.
868 Ibid., para 54.
869 Ibid., para 56.
870 Ibid., para 58.
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iii. Social security agreements
For a long time, the Court of Justice seemed hesitant to apply the principle of consistent exercise to 
international Member State commitments concerning social security. In previous cases, in which the 
Court had the opportunity to pronounce itself on the scope of the compliance obligations imposed 
by EU Treaty  provisions,  it  chose  to  circumvent  the  issue.  In  three  cases  concerning  old-age 
pensions, the Court avoided dealing with the extension of the principle of consistent exercise by 
declaring that the respective requests for a preliminary ruling submitted by national courts were 
drafted in such a way as not to require an answer to that question871. All three cases brought before 
the  Court  on  this  matter  prior  to  its  change  of  approach  in  Gottardo872 had  been  resolved  by 
resorting to secondary Union legislation providing for the principle of equal treatment in the sphere 
of social security of migrant workers. Over the course of decades, the Court of Justice displayed a 
remarkable reluctance to apply principles flowing directly from the provisions of the Treaty in order 
to restrict the Member States' international powers within the sphere of their own competence. 
After Saint-Gobain finally confirmed that Treaty provisions were capable of imposing compliance 
obligations on the Member States in the implementation of their international commitments, AG 
Colomer advocated a “radical change” in the Court's case law on social security agreements in order 
to accord the same favourable treatment to the prohibition against discrimination of workers as the 
prohibition  against  discrimination  concerning  establishment and  services873.  When  Gottardo,  a 
preliminary reference concerning benefits under a Swiss-Italian agreement on social security, was 
brought before the Court, the Advocate General urged the Court to “give Article [45 (2) TFEU] the 
scope required by the fundamental principle of non-discrimination it enshrines”874, even if the facts 
of the case were “strikingly similar”875 to those in  Grana-Novoa, where the Court had refused to 
apply that Treaty provision to an international agreement. 
Mrs Gottardo, an Italian national by birth,  had to  renounce her  nationality in favour of French 
nationality  following  her  marriage  to  a  French  national.  She  successively  worked  in  Italy, 
Switzerland, and France, receiving Swiss and French old-age pensions which were granted to her 
871 See  Case  C-23/92  Maria  Grana-Novoa  v.  Landesversicherungsanstalt  Hessen [1993]  ECR  I-4505,  where  the 
bilateral convention at issue concluded between a Member State and a third State, although incorporated as a statute 
into the domestic legal order, did not constitute legislation within the meaning of the relevant Regulation; see also 
Cases 75/76  Kaucic [1977] ECR 495 and Case 16/72  Ortskrankenkasse Hamburg v  Landesversicherungsanstalt  
Schleswig-Holstein [1972] ECR 1141. 
872 Case C-55/00 Elide Gottardo v. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INP) [2002] ECR I-413.
873 Case C-55/00 Gottardo, Opinion of Advocate General Colomer [2002] ECR I-413, para 29.
874 Case C-55/00, Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, para 29.
875 D. Martin, “Comments on Gottardo, Finalarte, Portugaia Construcoes” (2002) 4 Eur. J. Migration & L. 369 at 370.
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without  any  need  for  aggregation  of  periods  of  insurance.  When  applying  for  Italian  old-age 
pension, the authorities refused her request on the grounds that the  aggregation of the Italian and 
French periods would not enable her to achieve the minimum period of contributions required under 
Italian legislation for entitlement to an Italian pension. They argued that she would only be entitled 
to an Italian old-age pension if account were also taken of the periods of insurance completed in 
Switzerland pursuant to a social security convention concluded between Italy and Switzerland in 
1962. As a French national, however, she did not fall within the scope of application of the bilateral 
agreement. 
The Court of Justice was hence called upon to decide whether the Member States' Union obligations 
under (current) Article 18 or Article 45 TFEU required the national authorities to take into account 
periods of insurance completed in a non-member country by a national of a second Member State. It 
had no difficulty establishing that the dispute concerned a difference in treatment on the sole ground 
of nationality,  but the situation was more complicated, as it  involved benefits  stemming from a 
bilateral international convention which did not come within the scope of Union competence876. The 
Court then recalled its findings in Matteucci877, a case decided in the context of intra-Member State 
agreements. It held that even outside the scope of application of the Treaty, “every Member State is 
under a duty to facilitate application of that provision and, to that end, to assist every other Member 
State which is under an obligation under [Union] law” when “application of a provision of [Union] 
law is liable to be impeded by a measure adopted pursuant to the implementation of a bilateral  
agreement”878.
Repeating its findings in Saint-Gobain that the Member States “may not disregard [Union] rules but 
must exercise their powers in a manner consistent with [Union] law” also in matters falling within 
their  own competence,  the  Court  came to  the  conclusion  that  the  principle  of  equal  treatment 
required Italy to grant nationals of other Member States the same advantages as those which its own 
nationals enjoyed under the bilateral international convention on social security879.
iv. International aviation
The  Court  of  Justice  subsequently  applied  the  principle  of  non-discrimination  to  international 
876 Case C-55/00, Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, paras 24-25.
877 Case 235/87 Annunziata Matteucci v. Communauté française of Belgium and Commissariat général aux relations  
internationales of the Communauté française of Belgium [1988] ECR 5589.
878 Ibid.
879 Ibid., paras 32-34. 
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Member State agreements in the field of aviation in the Open Skies cases880, an enforcement action 
brought  by the  Commission  against  eight  Member  States  challenging their  bilateral  air  service 
agreements  with  the  United  States.  According  to  the  Commission's  main  contention,  these 
agreements violated the Union's exclusive external competence in the area of air transport881. The 
Court agreed partly with the Commission, finding that the Member States had infringed exclusive 
Union competence in the areas of establishment of fares and rates on intra-Union routes and the use 
of computerised reservation systems. As far as two other areas were concerned, however, the Court 
rejected the assertion of exclusive Union competence. In the fields of access to intra-Union routes 
and  the  granting  of  operating  licenses  on  such  routes,  treaty-making  power  continued  to  be  a 
prerogative of the Member States882. 
It is with regard to those two latter areas that the Open Skies cases become relevant for the present 
chapter. As a secondary argument brought forward in the proceedings, the Commission claimed that 
certain provisions contained in the bilateral agreements were incompatible with Union law. More 
specifically, the so-called “ownership and control” provisions violated the right of establishment 
guaranteed by (current) Article 49 TFEU because 
“an  airline  owned  or  controlled  by  a  non-contracting  Member  State  (or  by  nationals  of  a  non-
contracting Member State) and  established in one of the defendant Member States would not, as a 
result of the nationality clause, receive the same treatment as that accorded to national companies and 
would thereby suffer discrimination contrary to [Union] law”883. 
Indeed,  the  “ownership  and  control”  provisions  allowed  the  contracting  parties  to  decline  the 
recognition of  the other  party's  designation of a  carrier  where the carrier  was not  substantially 
owned and effectively controlled by the second contracting party or its nationals884. The Court of 
Justice  had  little  difficulty  asserting  the  discriminatory  nature  of  those  clauses  by finding  that 
airlines established in one Member State and of which a substantial  part  of the ownership and 
effective control was vested in another Member State could be affected by that clause885.
By  their  second  argument,  the  defendant  Member  States  argued  that  the  economic  activities 
regulated by the bilateral agreements were outside the scope of Article 49 TFEU ratione loci, since 
880 Case C-466/98 Commission v. UK [2002] ECR I-9427, Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519, 
Case C-468/98 Commission v. Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575, Case C-469-98 Commission v. Finland [2002] ECR I-
9627,  Case  C-471/98  Commission v.  Belgium [2002]  ECR I-9681,  Case  C-472/98 Commission v.  Luxembourg 
[2002] ECR I-9741, Case C-475/98  Commission v.  Austria [2002] ECR I-9797, Case C-476/98  Commission v.  
Germany [2002] ECR I-9855. 
881 See Chapters One and Two. 
882 See, for example, Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, paras 91-92.
883 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies Cases [2002] ECR I-9427, para 120.
884 See further L. Heffernan and C. McAuliffe, “External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: the Court of Justice and  
the Open Skies Agreements” (2003) 28 EL Rev. 601 at 604.
885 See, e.g., Case C-476/98 Commission v. Germany, para 151.
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they formed “part of the relationship between the [Union] and a non-member country”886. Basing 
themselves  on the  previous  argument,  they claimed that  the fact  that  the advantages  under  the 
bilateral agreements were granted by a third country was sufficient to exclude the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination to the agreements887. The Court of Justice left no doubt in its reply 
that the freedom of establishment was no less applicable in circumstances of an international nature 
than it was within the internal market, emphasising that “all  companies established in a Member 
State within the meaning of Article [49 TFEU] are covered by that provision, even if their business 
in that State consists of services directed to non-member countries”888. 
Thus, the Court made clear that the protection of the freedom of establishment very much had an 
international dimension and was not limited to cross-border activities within the Union. Regardless 
of whether an economic activity concerns a purely  international dimension or not, the Member 
States are under a duty to exercise all remaining Member State powers consistently with Union law. 
v. The freedom to export
In  Saint-Gobain, Gottardo, and the  Open Skies cases, the Court of Justice delivered a powerful 
confirmation of the primacy of the EU Treaties in areas outside of Union competence. It declared 
the principle of non-discrimination to be of universal applicability, irrespective of the field of law 
involved. As a consequence of the ruling in Gottardo, Member State nationals are equally protected 
against discriminatory treatment when exercising their right of free movement of  workers as they 
are when exercising the freedom of establishment or the free movement of services. 
These Treaty freedoms protected by the principle of non-discrimination are not the only Treaty rules 
capable  of  imposing  compliance  obligations  on  the  Member  States  in  areas  of  their  own 
competence. In Centro-Com889, the Court applied the duty of consistent exercise within the context 
of  Article 207 TFEU, in a preliminary reference from the English High Court dealing with the 
extent to which a Member State could legally deviate from Union law regulating sanctions against 
third countries. In implementation of a UN Security Council Resolution imposing sanctions against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Council Regulation 1432/92890 was amended so as to prohibit 
the export of all commodities and products originating in or coming from the Union, providing for 
886 Ibid. at para 142.
887 Ibid. at para 142.
888 Ibid at para 146, emphasis added.
889 Case C-124/95 Centro-Com [1997] ECR I-81.
890 Council Regulation 1432/92 prohibiting trade between the EEC and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro [1992] 
OJ L 151/4.
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an exception in relation to commodities and products intended for strictly medical purposes. 
Centro-Com  exported  pharmaceutical  products  from  Italy  to  two  wholesalers  in  Montenegro. 
Following a newly adopted policy aimed at enabling the UK authorities to exercise effective control 
over goods exported so as to ensure that the goods matched their  description,  Centro-Com was 
refused authorisation to transfer sums needed to pay for medical products exported from Italy to 
Montenegro.  The  referring  court  asked  whether  the  Common  Commercial  Policy  precluded 
Member States from adopting, in accordance with international law, measures restricting payments 
for exports by nationals of another Member State. 
The United Kingdom argued that the change of national policy was undertaken by virtue of its 
national competence in the field of foreign and security policy: 
“The validity of those measures cannot be affected by the exclusive competence of the [Union] in  
relation to the common commercial policy or by the Sanctions Regulation, which does no more than 
implement at [Union] level the exercise of Member States' national competence in the field of foreign 
and security policy.”891 
The Court of Justice acknowledged that the “Member States have indeed retained their competence 
in the field of foreign and security policy”, but it nevertheless emphasised that “the powers retained 
by the Member States must be exercised in a manner consistent with [Union] law”892. Consequently, 
Member States were not allowed to adopt national measures whose effect was to restrict the export 
of certain products on the basis that they fell outside the scope of the CCP893. This finding was 
reinforced by the fact that in the specific case, it was precisely “in the exercise of their national 
competence in matters of foreign and security policy that the Member States expressly decided to 
have recourse to a [Union] measure, which became the Sanctions Regulation, based on Article [207 
TFEU]”894.
III. The scope of compliance obligations in areas of Member State competence 
Once  an  incompatibility  with  the  Treaties  has  been  established,  the  question  arises  of  what 
obligations such a finding entails and how the respect for international law impacts on the scope of 
these obligations. To this end, the Court of Justice has adopted an approach based on the notion of 
“conflict”. In this context, the absence of a conflict of obligations does not mean the absence of an 
891 Case C-124/95 Centro-Com, para 23.
892 Ibid., paras 24-25.
893 Ibid., paras 26-27.
894 Ibid., para 28.
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incompatibility with Union law, but implies that all inconsistencies between the Member States' 
international  obligations  and  their  obligations  towards  the  EU  can  be  resolved  without 
compromising the rights of non-member countries. This is the case where international rules allow 
for certain national measures, but do not require them, or where inconsistencies can be removed by 
the Member State itself, without the consent of the third country involved. 
The Court of Justice developed its compliance mechanisms in areas of Member State competence in 
an incremental fashion. In the late 1980s, it dealt with two cases involving autonomous Member 
State  action  (A.).  It  subsequently  extended  the  duty  of  consistent  exercise  to  international 
agreements  involving  rights of  third  countries  which remained unaffected  due to  the unilateral 
extension of benefits provided for in those agreements (B.), before applying the same principles to 
agreements actually affecting third countries' rights (C.).
A. Autonomous action 
In Cases C-146/89 and C-246/89, the Commission brought two enforcement actions against the 
United Kingdom, challenging national legislation adopted on the basis of international law. The 
international  rules  in  question set  forth only minimum requirements,  leaving a large margin of 
discretion to the contracting states concerning the adoption of more stringent measures. The fact 
that  the  Member  State  involved  was  not required by international  law to  adopt  national  rules 
incompatible with the EU Treaties meant that compliance obligations imposed by EU law did not 
conflict with international rules, with the consequence that the contested national legislation had to 
be repealed.
In  Case  C-146/89  Commission  v.  United  Kingdom,  the  UK  government  sought  to  rely  on  its 
“sovereignty [...] in matters relating to fishing in the zone situated within the twelve-mile limit” 895. 
Since Union law contained no rules for determining the location of baselines or the extent of waters 
under  national  sovereignty,  it  was  for  each  Member  State  to  determine,  in  accordance  with 
international law, the location of its baselines. Such national sovereignty derived, in particular, from 
a 1976 Resolution896 by which the EU Member States, by means of concerted action, extended their 
fishing limits to 200 nautical miles along their coasts.  However, as the Union provisions did not 
contradict  those  of  the  Resolution  passed  by the  Member  States,  there  was  “no  possibility  of  
895 Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 39.
896 Resolution on Fishing Adopted by the EEC Council at the Hague on 30 October 1976 and Formally Approved on 3 
November 1976.
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conflict” between the EU Regulation and the rules of international law897. 
According to Advocate General Lenz, the absence of a conflict between Union law and international 
law was significant, since the fishing rights established in the six to twelve-mile zone were not 
affected,  even if public international law required the contracting states to alter the outer limits of 
their  fisheries  jurisdiction  to  reflect  a  change  in  baselines.  The  “crucial  point  here”  was  that 
“[Union] law can take precedence without difficulty in this sphere because there is no possibility of 
conflict with public international law”898. The finding that international law did not oblige the UK to 
adopt the contested legislation, but merely contained such an option, was of utmost importance to 
the Court and the Advocate General, because it confirmed that the UK was capable of complying 
with EU law without having to violate international rules.
The UK sought to rely on a similar argument in Case C-246/89  Commission v. United Kingdom. 
Emphasising “the competence of each State under public international law to define as it thinks fit  
the conditions upon which it grants to a vessel the right to fly its flag”899, as laid down in Article 5 
(1) of the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958 on the High Seas900, the UK argued that the principle 
of  consistent  exercise  developed  in  internal  market  case  law  could  not  be  transposed  to  the 
international context901. 
The Court of Justice emphasised that “in exercising [a] power, the Member States must comply with 
the rules of [Union] law”902. According to the Court, there were no Union provisions in place which 
could  conflict  with  international  law  in  this  field.  Although  it  did  not  explain  any further  its 
findings,  the absence of a conflict  between the international rules at  stake and the EU Treaties 
appears to have resulted, in the specific case, from the fact that the Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas left it up to the Member States to lay down the conditions for the registration of ships. Since 
the international  rules  in  question,  thus,  only laid down minimum requirements,  which did not 
violate  any  Treaty  provisions,  the  United  Kingdom  was  not  able  to  rely  on  its  international 
obligations  in  order  to  justify  non-compliance  with  Union law.  After  a  lengthy analysis  of  the 
national provisions, the Court concluded that they were incompatible with (current) Articles 18, 49, 
and 55 TFEU and the UK had, therefore, failed to fulfil its obligations under the EU Treaties903.
In the view of the UK government, such restrictions were tantamount to pre-emption of Member 
897 Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 44, emphasis added. 
898 Case C-146/89, Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, [1991] ECR I-3555, at para 48.
899 Case C-246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 13.
900 United Nations Treaty Series 450, No. 6465.
901 See also case C-221/89 Factortame [1991] ECR I-03905. In this preliminary reference concerning the same context 
as that of C-246/89, the referring national court specifically raised the relevance of international law, see para. 11. 
902 Case C-246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 15.
903 Ibid., paras 17-39.
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State powers within the sphere of national competence904. However, in both cases, the crux of the 
Court's reasoning appears to be the minimum requirements laid down by international law. Where 
international rules leave a certain margin of discretion to the Member States, the latter are free to lay 
down rules of their own. To that extent, the Member States do not act in  implementation of their 
international commitments when adopting legislation, but instead, such legislation is introduced by 
way of autonomous action. Unlike implementation obligations, however, minimum requirements do 
not impose on the Member States any duty to take autonomous action. In other words, compliance 
with international commitments in these cases does not  require the Member States to adopt any 
legislation. A conflict of compliance obligations on the part of the Member States was therefore 
excluded. 
The principle governing autonomous Member State action in accordance with their commitments 
under international law can therefore be summed up as follows: where international rules grant 
rights to the Member States without imposing a corresponding obligation, the Member States are 
under a duty to renounce to such rights if found to be incompatible with the fundamental freedoms 
provided  for  by  the  EU  Treaties.  Indeed,  in  subsequent  case  law,  the  Court  established  this 
reasoning as a general rule: 
“[W]hen an international agreement allows, but does not require, a Member State to adopt a measure 
which appears to be contrary to [Union] law, the Member State must refrain from adopting such a  
measure”905.
The Court thus adopts a strict view of the obligations imposed on the Member States in such cases. 
As emerges from the pre-litigation procedure, the Commission had urged the UK government not to 
apply the contested legislation to vessels from Member States fishing in areas where they were 
authorised to do so by Union law906. The Commission's request indicates that the breach of Union 
law could have been remedied if the rights stemming from the London Convention which the UK 
granted to its own nationals had been extended also to nationals of other Member States907. Contrary 
to  the  Commission's  plea,  however,  the  Court  makes  clear  that  the  extension  of  rights  is  not 
sufficient for a Member State to fulfil its obligations towards the Union. Instead, the Member States 
are required to “refrain from adopting such a measure” in the first place908.
904 See Case C-246/89, para 10: “The UK contends in the first place that the EEC Treaty cannot be interpreted so as to 
deprive the Member States of their competence to determine the nationality of their vessels, including conditions  
relating to the nationality of owners.”
905 See Cases  C-324/93  The Queen v.  Secretary of  State for  Home Department,  ex parte Evans  Medical  Ltd and  
Macfarlan Smith Ltd. [1995] ECR I-563 at para 32 and C-124/95 Centro-Com, op. cit., at para 60, emphasis added.
906 Ibid., para 15.
907 Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom.
908 See Cases C-324/93 Macfarlan Smith Ltd., para 32 and C-124/95 Centro-Com, op. cit., at para 60, emphasis added.
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 B. Unilateral extension of benefits
International agreements concluded by the Member States usually lay down specific obligations 
which, unlike mere minimum requirements, not only grant rights but also impose certain obligations 
towards non-member countries.  As we saw above,  the Court of Justice for a long time seemed 
hesitant in applying the principle of consistent exercise to international Member State commitments 
involving rights  of  third countries.  In  Saint-Gobain909,  the Court  finally confirmed that primary 
Treaty  law may  impose  compliance  obligations  on  the  Member  States  when  exercising  rights 
stemming from an international agreement. While the Court limited itself to a mere statement of the 
principle of consistent exercise, the Advocate General provided also the legal foundations for this 
reasoning.  Implementation  of  a  Member  State  commitment  under  international  law  was  to  be 
considered no different from implementation of a domestic legal act and did therefore not merit any 
protection against incompatible rules of Union law910. This did not, however, say anything about the 
Member States' obligations towards third countries. The case was easily resolved, since fulfilment 
of  these  obligations  involved benefits  granted  by the Member  State  itself  and not  by the  third 
country. Hence, Germany was able to remedy the inconsistency on its own by unilaterally extending 
the tax advantages under the bilateral  agreements to nationals and companies of other Member 
States.  In  the  words  of  the  Court,  the  Member  State  was  required  to  “grant  to  permanent 
establishments of non-resident companies the advantages provided for by that treaty on the same 
conditions as those which apply to resident companies”911.
When examining the scope of the compliance obligations to be imposed in  Gottardo, the Court 
considered as a final point the existence of an objective justification for Italy's refusal to extend to a 
French national the advantages which its own nationals derived from the bilateral convention with 
Switzerland. Although similar considerations had already been discussed in Saint-Gobain, the Court 
for the first time conceded expressly that disturbances in the balance and reciprocity of a bilateral 
Member State agreement 
“may, it is true, constitute an objective justification for  the refusal by a Member State party to that 
convention to extend to nationals of other Member States the advantages which its own nationals  
derive from that convention”912.
909 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain.
910 Case C-307/97  Saint-Gobain, Opinion of Advocate General Mischo [1999] ECR I-6161, para 77:  “[T]here is no 
need to distinguish between a Member State's provisions on direct taxation which are purely domestic in origin and 
those which derive from a double-taxation agreement with another Member State or a non-member country. Once 
these agreements have been ratified by the national parliament, they form part of the national law on direct taxation,  
in the same way as purely domestic provisions.”
911 Ibid., para 58.
912 Case C-55/00 Gottardo, Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, para 36.
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In the specific case, however, the Court of Justice reached the conclusion that Italy had failed to 
establish  the  existence  of  such  an  objective  justification.  In  the  view  of  the  Court,  a  valid 
justification  would  have  been  if  the  obligations  which  Union  law  imposes  on  Italy  were  to 
“compromise those resulting from the commitments which the Italian Republic has entered into vis-
à-vis the Swiss Confederation”913. However, this was not the case, as the unilateral extension of 
benefits to nationals of other Member States “would in no way compromise the  rights which the 
Swiss  Confederation  derives  from the  Italo-Swiss  Convention  and  would  not  impose  any new 
obligations on that  country”914.  A possible  increase in  the Member State's  financial  burden and 
administrative difficulties in cooperating with the competent Swiss authorities, in contrast, could not 
justify Italy's failure to comply with its Treaty obligations915. Neither was Italy able to defend itself 
by relying on Switzerland's refusal to provide the Italian authorities with the information it required 
to award the contested benefits916.
In these two cases, the Court of Justice left no doubt that the principle of consistent exercise may 
impose concrete compliance obligations where international Member State commitments towards 
third countries conflict with their commitments towards the Union. As a rule, the Member States are 
under a duty to ensure full compliance with primary Union law. If compliance implies renouncing to 
rights provided for under an international agreement, then the Member States are required to do so. 
Thus, the Court transposed the same reasoning developed in the area of autonomous Member State 
action to cases involving third countries. While the two situations differ substantially, they both 
have in common that the relevant international rules which conflict with the EU Treaties do not 
grant rights to third countries. 
In the case of autonomous action, the absence of a conflict is easily explained, for the international 
rules in question did not prescribe discriminatory action on the part of the Member State, but merely 
permitted  it.  The bilateral  agreements  at  issue  in  Saint-Gobain and  Gottardo,  by  contrast,  did 
impose specific implementation obligations on the Member States. Nevertheless, as the Advocate 
General explained in  Saint-Gobain, “there is no potential conflict between the obligations” which 
Union law places on the Member States and those which follow from their commitments to non-
Member  States917.  What  was decisive for  the  absence of  a  conflict  in  these cases  was that  the 
international agreements at issue did not prevent the Member States from extending the advantages 
to nationals of or companies established in other Member States. Extending the advantages in such a 
913 Case C-55/00 Gottardo, para 37, emphasis added. 
914 Ibid., emphasis added.
915 Ibid., para 38.
916 Case C-55/00, Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, para 41.
917 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain, Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, para 81.
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way “does not compromise the rights of the non-member States which are parties to the agreements 
and does not place them under any fresh obligation”918. This, in the view of both the Court and the 
Advocate General, constituted a balanced state of reciprocity of obligations, even if the Member 
States were still bound by their commitments without being able to profit from the rights thereunder.
Thus, as long as the implementation of an international Member State commitment leaves the rights 
of a third country unaffected, Member States are under a duty of full compliance with their Treaty 
obligations.  The  duty  is  not,  however,  unconditional.  The  Court  leaves  room  for  objective 
justifications, but only gives hints as to what could potentially constitute such a justification. It is 
more explicit when it comes to categorically excluding certain defences from the outset – arguments 
related to budgetary concerns or practical difficulties are not a valid defence.
C. Advantages granted by non-member countries
Where compliance constraints  under EU law do not  compromise the rights of the non-member 
States involved or place them under any new obligations, there is thus no potential conflict between 
the Member States' obligations towards the third states and their obligations towards the Union. 
However, it may not always be possible to achieve this “balance and reciprocity”919 by removing the 
incompatibilities  on the part  of  the  Member  States.  Where an international  agreement  involves 
incompatible  rights  granted  by the  other  contracting  party,  the  incompatibility  with  Union law 
cannot be remedied in the same way. 
The  Court  of  Justice  first  dealt  with  such a  constellation  in Matteucci920,  a  preliminary  ruling 
concerning an  intra-Member State  agreement. Germany and Belgium had concluded a Cultural 
Agreement which provided for scholarships for professional training to be granted by each Member 
State to nationals of the other Member State. Miss Matteucci, an Italian national born in Belgium, 
brought proceedings against the Belgian grant-awarding authority after it refused her application for 
financial support during her stay in Germany on the grounds that scholarships awarded pursuant to 
the Cultural Agreement were reserved exclusively for candidates of Belgian nationality. While the 
scholarships  to  Belgian  nationals  were  granted  by  the  German  authority,  the  candidates  were 
selected on the basis of a list drawn up by their Belgian counterpart. The latter, hence, sought to 
defend itself by relying on the fact that the disputed benefits were granted by the other Member 
918 Ibid., para 82.
919 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain, para 59.
920 Case 235/87 Matteucci.
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State.  As  the  German  authorities  were  in  any  event  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  bilateral 
agreement,  under  which  only nationals  of  the  two countries  were  eligible  for  scholarships,  “to 
impose obligations on [Belgium] would therefore be otiose”921. 
In the view of the Court of Justice, however, this argument was not compatible with the Member 
States' duties under (current) Article 4 (3) TEU, as Member States were not allowed to prevent other 
Member States from fulfilling the obligations imposed on them by Union law: 
“If, therefore, the application of a provision of [Union] law is liable to be impeded by a measure  
adopted pursuant  to  the  implementation of  a  bilateral  agreement,  even where the agreement  falls 
outside the field of application of the Treaty, every Member State is under a  duty to facilitate the 
application of the provision and, to that end, to assist every other Member State which is under an  
obligation under [Union] law”.922
Relying on EU legislation relating to the free movement of workers, the Court concluded that the 
conduct of the Belgian authorities violated the principle of equal treatment of Union workers923. In 
Matteucci,  both contracting states were subject to compliance constraints imposed by Union law 
and the case was easily resolved. Belgium was therefore not able to rely on the justification that the 
inconsistent benefits were granted by the other contracting party. 
Where  such  benefits  are  granted  by  a  non-member  state,  however,  the  situation  is  decisively 
different, since the Court of Justice cannot impose on them the obligation to comply with Union 
law. The Court was confronted with precisely such a constellation in the Open Skies cases924. In their 
submissions, the defendant Member States sought to rely on essentially two arguments. By the first 
one, they claimed that the discriminatory benefits were granted by the third country and were thus 
not  subject  to  control  by  the  Member  States.  The  defendant  Member  States  argued  that  the 
discrimination  alleged  by  the  Commission  was  not  a  consequence  of  the  bilateral  agreements 
themselves, but resulted directly from the conduct of the United States which consisted in limiting 
the permissions in respect of those Member States that had not concluded an open skies agreement. 
Advocate General Tizzano rejected this argument, pointing out that only the contracting Member 
States themselves had the right to obtain from the US authorities the required permissions to operate 
921 Ibid., para 17.
922 Ibid., para 19.
923 Ibid., para 23.
924 Case C-466/98 Commission v. UK [2002] ECR I-9427, Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519, 
Case C-468/98 Commission v. Sweden [2002] ECR I-9575, Case C-469-98 Commission v. Finland [2002] ECR I-
9627,  Case  C-471/98  Commission v.  Belgium [2002]  ECR I-9681,  Case  C-472/98 Commission v.  Luxembourg 
[2002] ECR I-9741, Case C-475/98  Commission v.  Austria [2002] ECR I-9797, Case C-476/98  Commission v.  
Germany [2002] ECR I-9855. 
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the services provided for under the Open Skies agreements925. Hence, the Member States party to 
the bilateral agreements would be actively involved in the discrimination on the part of the US 
authorities and were not able to rely on their defence based on benefits granted by a non-member 
country. 
The Court of Justice expressed this concept in more precise terms: the formulation of the clauses not 
only  permitted  the  US  authorities  to  discriminate,  but  even  put  them  “in  principle  under  an 
obligation to grant the appropriate operating authorisations and required technical permissions to 
airlines of which a substantial part of the ownership and effective control is vested in [one of the 
contracting states]”926. As a result of the fact that the benefits were granted by a third country, Union 
airlines established in non-contracting Member States “may always be excluded from the benefit of 
the air  transport  agreement” and consequently “suffer discrimination which prevents them from 
benefiting from the treatment which the host Member State [...] accords to its own nationals”927.
Thus, the Court of Justice clarified two important points. Firstly,  Member States cannot validly 
defend themselves by arguing that a given benefit is granted by a third country, since it is their 
decision to conclude the agreement which imposes on the third country a duty to grant the benefit. 
Secondly, the crux of benefits granted by third countries is that the discriminatory conduct is beyond 
the control of the Union legal order and can consequently not be remedied by means of compliance 
obligations under EU law. 
Several of the defendant Member States had, as a secondary claim, presented the Court with an 
objective justification for the differential  treatment created by the Open Skies treaties based on 
(current) Article 52 TFEU, according to which the rules on the right of establishment are not to 
prejudice national provisions justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
Arguing on the basis of reciprocity, the Member States objected that they would be required to grant 
the US the same rights they enjoyed, meaning that they would no longer be able to withhold or 
revoke airlines designated by the US but owned or controlled by non-US nationals928. After recalling 
its internal market case law concerning justification on grounds of public policy, the Court quickly 
concluded that the bilateral agreements did not limit the application of the discriminatory clauses to 
circumstances involving a threat to public policy. Consequently, no objective justification existed 
that could have remedied the Member States'  failure to fulfil  their  obligations under Article 49 
TFEU929.
925 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies cases, para 123.
926 See, e.g., Case C-476/98 Commission v. Germany, para 152, emphasis added.
927 Ibid., para 153, emphasis added.
928 Ibid., para 127. 
929 Ibid., paras 157-161.
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IV. The duty of consistent exercise and Member State competence – An assessment
When exercising  an  external  competence,  the  Member  States  are  not  only under  a  duty under 
international  law to  comply with  their  commitments  towards  third  countries,  but  they are  also 
required by Union law not to jeopardise certain objectives of EU law. Even in the absence of Union 
powers  and,  therefore,  Union  rules  in  a  given  field,  the  Member  States  are  thus  subject  to 
compliance obligations. 
By distinguishing between the existence and the exercise of Member State powers also in areas of 
retained competence,  the Court of Justice expands the scope of Union law beyond the areas in 
which the EU has been given the right to act. To that end, the Court has developed a recurring 
formula,  according  to  which  “powers  retained  by  the  Member  States  must  be  exercised 
consistently” with Union law930. As emerges from Section II., the Court has continuously applied 
this  formula in different subject areas,  irrespective of whether or not the matter at  issue comes 
within those areas which are traditionally considered the exclusive purview of the Member States. 
Not only does this approach illustrate that the applicability of particular provisions of EU primary 
law “is  largely indifferent  to  the  delineation  of  competences  between  the  EU and its  Member 
States”931, but it also suggests that the concept of 'exclusive' Member State competence is reduced to 
“meaning that the Member State is legitimately in a position to act wherever the EU fails to do 
so”932. This interpretation of the Court's construction of the duty of consistent exercise would then 
be diametrically opposed to the notion of Member State exclusivity. Indeed, it strongly resembles 
the definition of concurrent competence933, described in Article 2 (2) TFEU as meaning that “[t]he 
Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence”. 
Against this background, “one might think that national powers have been abolished”934. It appears 
that “there are no enclaves of national sovereignty precluding EU law from displaying its pervasive 
effects”935. The Treaty freedoms which give rise to the duty of consistent exercise are capable of 
applying in any field, as long as the functioning of the internal market may be affected. It thus  
seems that “there is an EU framework that percolates through all areas of national law, limiting the 
930 See e.g. Case C-246/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, para 12.
931 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 203. 
932 Ibid., p. 202.
933 See e.g. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, para 76: “A characteristic of 
concurrent competence (also referred to as shared competence) is that the Member States exercise their competence 
in so far as the [Union] has not exercised its competence”, emphasis in the original.
934 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 204. 
935 K. Lenaerts, “Federalism and the Rule of Law”, 1386.
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discretion of national legislators and administrative authorities”936. As a result, the Court's approach 
amounts  to  a  denial  of  the  Member  States'  position  as  'Masters  of  the  Treaties':  “[f]ar  from 
containing  the  scope  of  EU  law,  it  serves  as  a  vehicle  for  the  totalization of  the  process  of 
integration”937. 
In order to address these concerns that Member State competence is being restricted beyond what 
they have agreed to in their role as Masters of the Treaties, it is useful to examine different aspects  
of the duty of consistent exercise. In the following, we will first seek to assess the Court's approach 
to the scope of EU primary law (A.), before turning to the obligations which follow from a finding 
that a given situation falls within the scope of EU Treaty provisions (B.). In assessing the scope of  
the  compliance  obligations,  it  is  helpful  to  consider  the  possibility  of  objective  justification, 
allowing  for  an  exception  to  the  duty  of  consistent  exercise  (i.),  as  well  as  the  limits  to  the 
compliance obligations (ii.). 
A. The scope of primary EU law 
In the light of the extensive reach of the duty of consistent exercise into areas of Member State 
competence, it may be tempting to compare the Court's approach to notions such as competence 
creep, pre-emption, or an entitlements view of federalism. In this respect, however, it is important to 
take account of the limits to the substantive scope of the duty. First, it must be acknowledged that 
the applicability of the duty of consistent exercise requires a link with the substantive law of the 
Union.  It  is,  therefore,  “the  existence  (or  absence)  of  this  link  that  is  decisive  in  the  vertical 
allocation of powers”938. 
By contrast, the field of law in which the conflict between international Member State obligations 
and Union law arises is not relevant in this context. As we saw earlier, compliance obligations are 
capable of applying in any area, irrespective of questions of competence. While the area of law is 
not  decisive,  the  nature of  the  Treaty provisions  which  conflict  with  national  rules  determines 
whether the Member States are under an obligation to remove incompatibilities or not. Compliance 
with  fundamental  EU  law  is  necessary  to  guarantee  the  effectiveness of  the  Treaties  and  the 
functioning of the entire Union legal order. If Member States were free to use their retained powers 
as they wished by impeding free movement and non-discrimination, the very project of a single 
European market would be at risk939. 
936 Ibid., emphasis added.
937 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 196. 
938 K. Lenaerts, “Federalism and the Rule of Law”, 1386.
939 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 211. 
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Furthermore, compliance restraints based on fundamental Treaty norms can be distinguished from 
other types of compliance obligations in that they “have typically been applied by the ECJ with the 
individual interest in mind, rather than on the basis of any dogma about treaty conflict”940.  The 
Court's objective is not to expand the scope of Union law into areas of retained powers, but it seeks 
to protect isolated interests in the Union. These include the interests of those circulating within the 
Union, coming from or being established in other Member States – interests “that are  naturally 
underrepresented  in  the  legislation  of  Member  States  constitute  the  ‘European’ situations  par 
excellence”941. National rules have the potential of jeopardising the common interest of the Member 
States and their citizens. Union law, however, “forces the State authorities to rethink the way they 
act”, so as to compel national authorities to take account of transnational and European interests942. 
Instead of seeking an extension of Union powers, the Court recognises that what is required is a 
reorganisation of the internal forum: 
“The Court relies on Treaty provisions precisely because it does not want to replace the powers of the  
Member States by those of the Union. [The duty of consistent exercise] is not a matter of preempting 
the sphere occupied by national regulations but of adapting the way in which they are applied”943.
Concerns  over  a  possible  creeping  expansion  of  EU  competence  are,  therefore,  unnecessary. 
Member State power is not denied, but “it exists only with respect to a ‘global system’ in which it is 
bound up”944.  
B. The nature of compliance obligations in areas of retained competence 
Compliance obligations are liable to arise in all areas of Member State competence, provided that 
there is a substantive link with the Treaties and certain sensitive interests are at stake. But does this 
also mean that the safeguarding of the European project can require unlimited restraints  on the 
Member States' international competence where this would further the Union's interests?
In order to determine the scope of the obligations which flow from a finding that a certain Member 
State act comes within the reach of EU law, it is useful to examine to what extent the Court allows 
for derogations from the duty of consistent exercise and how far the compliance obligation extends 
in cases where no objective justification is applicable. 
940 J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, 213.
941 L. Azoulai, “The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice”, 213. 
942 Ibid.
943 Ibid., p. 215 and p. 218, emphasis added.
944 Ibid., p. 212.
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i. Objective justifications and reciprocity 
The only instances in which the failure to remove an incompatibility with the Treaties does not 
amount to a failure to fulfil obligations under EU law is where the Member States can rely on an 
objective justification. The Court's standards for what constitutes an objective justification are strict, 
however. Practical945 or administrative946 difficulties cannot serve as an objective justification any 
more than arguments of a budgetary nature947. Neither is a breach of Article 4 (3) TEU on the part of 
the other Member State involved a valid excuse948.  Similarly,  a breach of the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of public policy, public security or public health have been found to be 
justified – in line with the Court's internal market case law in the field – only in cases of a “genuine 
and  sufficiently  serious  threat  affecting  one  of  the  fundamental  interests  of  society”949.  The 
argument brought forward in the  Open Skies cases that the reciprocity inherent in international 
negotiations  would  require  the  Member  States  to  grant  the  United  States  the  same rights  they 
enjoyed, meaning that they would no longer be able to withhold or revoke airlines designated by the 
US but owned or controlled by non-US nationals, was not a sufficient justification950. 
More generally, the political reality of international negotiations cannot serve as a valid defence for 
a Member State's failure to fulfil its obligations. Several Member States indicated in the Open Skies 
cases that they had tried to secure conformity with the EU Treaties by inserting a clause to that 
effect in the agreement, but received a “flat refusal” from the US authorities951. The Member States 
were not able to show that they did “everything necessary” in order to secure amendment of the 
discriminatory clause and that the same result pursued by the contested clause could not have been 
achieved by any less  restrictive means952.  The  Open Skies cases thus  illustrate  the difficulty of 
applying traditional standards of objective justification and proportionality in areas of Member State 
competence. In particular, “it may be problematic to ascertain whether Member States could have 
attained the same objective with less restrictive means when the restrictive measure is the result of 
negotiations with third parties”953.
In Gottardo and Saint-Gobain, on the other hand, the Court acknowledged that disturbances in the 
balance and reciprocity of a bilateral Member State agreement could indeed constitute an objective 
945 See Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom.
946 See Case C-55/00 Gottardo.
947 See Cases C-307/97 Saint-Gobain and C-55/00 Gottardo.
948 See Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain.
949 Open Skies cases, see e.g. Case C-467/89 Commission v. Denmark, para 121.
950 Ibid., paras 157-161.
951 Joined Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies cases, para 130.
952 Ibid., paras 129-131.
953 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 134-135.
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justification for  the refusal by a Member State party to that convention to extend to nationals of 
other Member States the advantages which its own nationals derived from that convention. In Saint-
Gobain,  for example, the intervening Swedish government objected that the balance inherent in 
double taxation treaties would be disturbed if the benefits thereunder were extended to companies in 
other Member States954. The Court held that “the balance and the reciprocity” of the tax treaties with 
Switzerland and the USA “would not be called into question by a unilateral extension, on the part of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, of the category of recipients in Germany of the tax advantage 
provided for by those treaties”955. However, the Court of Justice displays a different understanding 
of the notion of reciprocity than that relied upon by the Swedish government.  While Sweden’s 
submission sought to safeguard  national interests by preventing the extension of benefits by one 
Member State to companies of other Member States to the detriment of the former, the Court’s 
interpretation  of  reciprocity  in  this  case  only  takes  into  account  the  interests  of  third states.  
According to the Court, the reciprocity and balance under the bilateral agreements would not be 
jeopardised, “since such an extension would not in any way affect the rights of the non-member  
countries which are parties to the treaties and would not impose any new obligation on them”956. 
In  the Open  Skies cases,  however,  where  Member  State  action  did  affect  the  rights  of  third 
countries, the argument related to “balance and reciprocity” proved to be no objective justification 
after all. In fact, the Court applied the same reasoning developed in its previous case law which did 
not concern any conflict with third countries' rights to a situation where the advantage under an 
international agreement was granted by a non-member country. By confirming that the Member 
States  must  use  their  foreign  relations  powers  consistently  with  Union law,  “the  Court simply 
presumed  the  primacy  of  EU  law”  and  “[a]t  no  point  did  [it]  consider  the  possibility  that 
international law might have something else to say”957.
ii. The limits of compliance
The  Open Skies cases thus demonstrate that the difficulties inherent in unilaterally remedying a 
discriminatory effect are not in themselves a sufficient excuse. Does this then imply that Member 
States may be required to denounce entire agreements concluded in areas of national competence, if 
there is no other means to remove the contested incompatibility available? And the obligation to 
remove incompatibilities aside, does the duty of consistent exercise give rise to further constraints 
954 Case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain, para 55.
955 Ibid., para 59.
956 Ibid., emphasis added.
957 J. Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union, 212.
194
on the exercise of Member State powers which go beyond the requirement to achieve primacy of 
EU law?
a. The duty to denounce 
What emerges from the Court's case law in areas of Member State competence is a strict pursuit of 
the  primacy  of  Union  law.  Where  a  conflict  arises  between  Member  States'  international 
commitments and their obligations towards the Union, the Member States are required to resolve it.  
The Court's aim is not to find the right balance between the Union interest and the rights of Member 
States under conflicting international agreements. This is illustrated, as we saw above, also by the 
Court's understanding of “balance and reciprocity”. Instead, the goal is to bring Member States' 
obligations towards third countries in line with EU law. 
However, where an inconsistent conduct takes place on the part of third countries, Member States 
are not in a position to unilaterally remedy a contested incompatibility. In those cases, Member 
States may not be left with a lot of scope for action, as evidenced by the Open Skies judgments. In 
the specific cases, the Court of Justice did not sanction a duty of denunciation, and uncertainty arose 
concerning how to enforce the judgments. In fact, the Commission claimed in its communication on 
the effect of the cases that the  Member States were not only to refrain from entering into other 
bilateral air service agreements, but also to denounce all existing agreements with the United States, 
but the Member States strongly opposed958. 
Although the Court stopped short of imposing a duty to denounce on the Member States involved, 
its bold assertion that the Member States are required to remove incompatibilities with EU law at all 
costs seems to confirm the existence of a duty to denounce international agreements, regardless of 
whether  they  fall  within  Member  State,  shared  or  exclusive  Union  competence.  Citing  the 
Commission v. Portugal959 cases discussed in Chapter Three, the Court held that 
“the Member States are prevented not only from contracting new international commitments but also 
from maintaining such commitments in force if they infringe [Union] law”960. 
The Court's construction, in  Gottardo, of a compliance obligation stemming directly from Article 
351 TFEU, seems to confirm this reading: 
“[W]hen giving effect to commitments assumed under international agreements, […] Member States 
are required, subject to the provisions of Article [351 TFEU], to comply with the obligations that  
958 See C. N. K. Franklin, “Flexibility vs. Legal Certainty”, 95.  The Commission subsequently retracted its pleas for 
denunciation, only to be later granted by the Council a negotiating mandate for the entire air transport sector.
959 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal.
960 See e.g. Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, para 39, emphasis added. 
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[Union] law imposes on them.”961
In two different cases involving questions of Member State competence962, the Court thus relied on 
Article 351 TFEU and the related case law, in which, as we saw in Chapter Three, the Court left no 
doubt that the Member States are ultimately under a duty to denounce inconsistent agreements. It 
can, therefore, be assumed that also in areas of retained competence, the Member States are under 
an obligation of result, i.e. they must achieve compliance with their Union obligations, even if that 
implies  a  duty  to  denounce  the  international  agreement  concerned.  Denunciation  of  an  entire 
agreement invalidates all provisions included therein, regardless of whether they actually conflict 
with  or  impede  the  objectives  of  Union  legislation.  In  other  words,  the  existence  of  one 
inconsistency is sufficient to exclude Member State involvement in a wider area, irrespective of 
material normative tensions with EU law. Of course, Member States would be free to conclude the 
same international agreement again without the inconsistent clause. However, where a third country 
has demonstrated its unwillingness to re-negotiate parts of an agreement, it is unlikely to accept 
negotiations for an entirely new agreement. In fact, the  Open Skies cases illustrate the difficulties 
encountered  by the  Member  States  in  this  respect.  Several  Member  States  had  tried  to  secure 
conformity with the EU rules by inserting a clause to that extent in the agreement, but received a 
flat refusal from the US authorities963. In the aftermath of the judgments, the question therefore 
arose of “[w]hat chance do the Member States have to effectively renegotiate the ownership clauses 
with the US?”964. As a result of the Court's judgments, in fact, the Council was forced to grant the 
Commission a negotiating mandate for the whole air transport sector, including those areas falling 
within Member State competence965.  In such cases,  then,  the compliance obligation in fields of 
Member State powers does not differ in its outcome from the exclusion of all Member action in 
fields of exclusive Union competence. 
The Court's ruling in the Open Skies cases not only significantly limits the Member States' freedom 
to exercise a retained competence, but the outcome of the judgments is also strongly reminiscent of 
a conservative fidelity view of political morality. The comprehensive negotiating mandate granted to 
the Commission as a consequence of the Open Skies judgments counteracts the diversity of policies 
and interests present in the air transport sector, effectively harmonising the interests of the various 
actors throughout the system966. Nevertheless, the duty imposed on the Member States in these cases 
cannot  be  deemed  to  seek  to  calm  policy  disputes  by  suppressing  political  dissent,  as  the 
961 Case C-55/00 Gottardo, para 33. 
962 It must be pointed out, however, that the Open Skies cases also involved areas of exclusive Union competence.
963 Joint Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies cases, para 135.
964 P. Slot and J. Dutheil de la Rochère, “Case Law.  Open skies judgments of the Full Court of 5 November 2002” 
(2003) 40 CML Rev. 697 at 712. 
965 See Franklin, “Flexibility vs. Legal Certainty”, 103 et seq. 
966 Ibid.
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conservative  fidelity approach  would967.  The  Court's  main  objective  was  to  abolish  the 
discriminatory effect of the contested provisions, either by extending the incompatible benefits to 
airlines  established  in  other  Member  States  or  by  requiring  the  Member  States  involved  to 
renegotiate the relevant clauses. In practice, neither of the two solutions proved feasible and the 
Member States opted for a different route. The Union, however, cannot be held accountable for 
practical difficulties which make the renegotiation of international agreements impossible.
b. The limits to compliance – The duty of consistent exercise and its relationship with Article 4 (3)  
TEU
This interpretation of the Court's ruling in the  Open Skies cases is in line with its more general 
approach to compliance obligations in areas of Member State competence. It appears that the Court 
is careful to resolve the incompatibilities in these cases on the basis of primacy alone, signalling 
that the level of intrusiveness of EU rules in areas of Member State competence is to be kept to a 
minimum. 
Firstly, the Court adopts a lenient approach to the concept of primacy. While Member States are not  
allowed to maintain in force any conflicting national legislation adopted by way of autonomous 
action, the situation is very different where third countries' rights are affected. Here, Member States 
are able to act in conformity with EU law simply by applying the advantages granted to them under 
international law also to nationals of other Member States. Consequently, there is no obligation on 
the Member States to achieve de jure compliance by removing all incompatibilities with Union law. 
Incompatible clauses may remain in force, as long as the discriminatory benefits are extended to 
other Member States. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Court does not always adopt this  
interpretation of primacy. In the Commission v. Portugal  cases, the Member State at issue had de 
facto waived  its  rights  stemming  from an  inconsistent  bilateral  agreement  and  the  conflicting 
clauses were no longer being implemented968. However, the Court did not deem it sufficient that the 
Member State had renounced to its  international rights,  but insisted that the inconsistency with 
Union law be remedied also on paper969. In areas of Member State competence, however, it suffices 
if Member States fulfil their obligations towards the EU by way of de facto compliance, provided 
that the rights of third states are not affected by an inconsistent provision. 
Secondly, the Court emphasises the role of primacy in resolving conflicts in areas of Member State 
competence by making clear that no further, potentially unlimited, compliance constraints may arise 
967 See D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 773.
968 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal, para 11 and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal, para 13.
969 See Chapter Three. 
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on the basis of the general duty under Article 4 (3) TEU. As we saw earlier, the Court had some 
initial difficulties in formulating the substantive scope of the duty of consistent exercise. In Case C-
146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom970, the Court seemed to suggest that the “objectives” of EU 
secondary law were sufficient to impose compliance constraints. In this case, the restrictive effect of 
Union rules is not based on a conflict between Member State law and a specific provision of Union 
law, but merely requires a finding that the national measure interferes with the proper functioning of 
the Union legal order or impedes the objectives of Union legislation971. In light of its potential for 
restraint based solely on a vaguely defined conflict, this phenomenon has been termed “obstacle 
pre-emption”972. The wording of Article 4 (3) TEU with its objective to “facilitate the achievement 
of the Union's tasks” would, in fact, leave ample space for obstacle pre-emption. As mentioned in 
Chapter  Three,  compliance  obligations  based  on  the  general  loyalty  obligation  may  have  far-
reaching consequences and pave the way for unnecessarily broad restraints, such as an obligation to 
abstain from any action that could jeopardise the attainment of Treaty objectives973. Member States 
could  have,  for  example,  been  found to  be  under  an  obligation  not  to  enter  into  international 
agreements if there was the risk of conflicting commitments or a strict procedural obligation of 
consultation with the Commission before concluding any agreements which had the potential of 
jeopardising the application EU primary law. However, the Court has rejected the use of the general 
obligation, basing the Member States' duties in areas of national competence strictly on the specific 
obligation to ensure primacy. 
V. Overview – The duty of consistent exercise in the context of the general duty of loyalty 
In its construction of the duty of consistent exercise, the Court of Justice has thus developed a 
precisely circumscribed formula for achieving Member States' compliance with their obligations 
towards the Union in areas of national competence. The approach it has developed does not rely on 
the general duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU, neither is it based on the obligation to eliminate  
incompatibilities  laid  down in  Article  351 TFEU. Nevertheless,  when assessing the obligations 
970 Case C-146/89 Commission v. United Kingdom, paras 21-25.
971 E.  D.  Cross  “Pre-emption  of  Member  State  Law  in  the  European  Economic  Community”,  463,  R.  Schütze  
“Supremacy without Pre-Emption”, 1041.
972 See e.g. A. G. Soares “Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity”, 133, R. Schütze “Supremacy without  
Pre-Emption”, E. D. Cross, “Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community”.
973 See Joined Opinion of Advocate General  Maduro in Case C-205/06  Commission v.  Austria and Case C-249/06 
Commission v. Sweden, para 42, where the AG argued that Member States were required  “to take all appropriate 
steps to prevent their pre-existing international obligations from jeopardising the exercise of [Union] competence”, 
emphasis added.  
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incumbent on the Member State in Gottardo, the Court introduced a new line of argument based on 
Article 351 TFEU. Although none of the parties to the dispute nor the intervening Member States or 
the Commission sought to rely on the provision, and neither had AG Colomer brought it forward in 
support of his line of argument974, the Court deemed it necessary to point out that “Member States 
are required,  subject to the provisions of Article [351 TFEU], to comply with the obligations that 
[Union]  law  imposes  on  them”975.  However,  if  Article  351  TFEU  applies  equally  in  areas  of 
national competence and in relation to post-accession agreements, then questions arise concerning 
the relationship between Article 351 TFEU and Article 4 (3) TEU. In fact, these questions were 
already addressed in Chapter Three, where it emerged that in the  Commission v. Portugal  cases, 
which  concerned  pre-existing  commitments,  the  Court  imposed  the  same  obligations  as  in 
Commission  v.  Belgium976 involving  a  post-accession  agreement.  The  fact  that  the  inconsistent 
agreements concluded by Portugal came within the scope of Article 351 TFEU did not impact in 
any way on the Member States' obligation to ensure the primacy of Union law. 
The Open Skies cases confirmed that Article 351 TFEU does not constitute an exception to primacy, 
emphasising that the obligation to ensure primacy applies regardless of whether the inconsistent 
commitments are assumed before or after accession to the EU, and regardless of whether they fall 
within an area of Member State or of Union competence.  AG Tizzano argued that the bilateral 
agreements concluded with the United States did not fall within the scope of Article 351 TFEU, but  
even if they did, the Member States were nonetheless in breach of Article 351 (2) TFEU for their  
failure to eliminate the contested clauses977. The Court of Justice, by contrast, found that there was 
no need to rule on the applicability of Article 351 TFEU in the first place978. Notwithstanding its 
rejection of the claim based on Article 351 TFEU, however, the Court drew a parallel between post-
accession agreements  in  areas  of  Member State  competence  and obligations  arising  under  pre-
accession commitments. Citing the Commission v. Portugal979 cases, the Court held that the same 
obligations applied also in the context of post-accession agreements. In both cases, the Member 
States were prevented from maintaining in force international commitments which infringed Union 
974 The absence of arguments based on Article 351 TFEU is easily explained by the fact that the bilateral convention on 
social security concluded between Italy and Switzerland was signed in 1962 and later amended in 1980, long after 
Italy's  accession to the Union in 1957, which excludes the application of an article regulating pre-membership 
agreements from the outset. While the AG did make mention of Article 351 TFEU, he referred to it in an entirely 
different context when discussing “the effect of the wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling” and 
the differences between the Gottardo and Grana-Novoa cases in this respect, see Case C-55/00 Gottardo, Opinion of 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para 34.
975 Case C-55/00 Gottardo, para 33, emphasis added. 
976 Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium [1999] ECR I-5493. 
977 Joint Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in the Open Skies cases, paras 141-145.
978 See e.g. Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, paras 38-43.
979 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal.
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law980. 
It thus appears that regardless of whether an international agreement is concluded before accession 
or  afterwards,  and regardless  of  whether  it  falls  within the scope of Union law or outside,  the 
Member States are always under the same obligation to achieve full compliance with EU law. The 
difference is, however, that where agreements falling entirely outside Union competence contain 
incompatible  clauses,  the  Member  States  may,  if  possible,  remove  such  inconsistencies  by 
unilaterally remedying the discriminatory effect of these provisions. The international agreements, 
along with the rights of third countries, thus remain unaffected. In the Portugal cases, by contrast, 
the Court did not accept the Member State's unilateral renunciation of its rights under the contested 
agreements.  Although  Portugal  was “prepared  to  guarantee  the  shipowners  of  third countries 
engaged in maritime transport all the rights deriving from the application of Regulation 4055/86”981, 
it was nevertheless found to have failed to fulfil its obligations towards the EU. In Saint-Gobain and 
Gottardo, by contrast, the Court considered it a sufficient remedy of incompatibilities with Union 
law that  the  Member  States  continued to  grant  rights  to  third  countries  without  restricting  the 
principle  of  non-discrimination.  If  the  Court  had  applied  its  reasoning  from  Saint-Gobain and 
Gottardo in the Portugal cases, the question of whether Portugal was under a duty to denounce its 
pre-accession  agreements  would  have  never  arisen.  Against  this  background,  the  Court's 
interpretation of the duty to remove incompatibilities in the Portugal cases appears overly strict and 
certainly “formalistic”982 in comparison with its approach in Saint-Gobain and Gottardo. 
VI.  Incompatibilities with CFSP acts 
The doctrine of primacy, which forms the basis for the duty of consistent exercise, is sometimes 
argued to be capable of being applied to CSFP measures as well983. As we saw in Chapter Three, 
however, it is doubtful that CFSP measures may be deemed to take precedence over national rules. 
In addition to the Court's limited jurisdiction in the area, the special nature of CFSP competence is 
980 See e.g. Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, para 39: “In such a case, the Member States are prevented not only 
from contracting new international  commitments but also from maintaining such commitments in force if  they 
infringe [Union] law (see, to that effect, Case C-62/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-5171 and Case C-
84/98 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-5215).”
981 See C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal, para 13, emphasis added. 
982 C. Hillion, “Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal, and Case C-84/98  Commission v. Portugal, judgments of the 
Full Court of 4 July 2000”, 1283.
983 See e.g. G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 202, R. A. Wessel, “The Dynamics of the 
European Union Legal Order”, 131, R. Gosalbo Bono, “Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order” (2006) 43 
C.M.L. Rev. 337 at 378. 
200
often assumed to prevent a transposition of the primacy principle to CFSP matters984. 
In a strictly CFSP context, therefore, a conflict of obligations between Member States' international 
commitments and their  obligations within the area of the CFSP would not be capable of being 
resolved on the basis of primacy alone. As in the previous chapter, the binding nature of CFSP then 
becomes all the more important. By virtue of  Article 24 (3) TEU, the Member States are under an 
obligation not only to actively and unreservedly support the Union's external and security policy, 
but also to comply with the Union's action in this area. This duty of compliance is reinforced by the 
general duty of loyalty under Article 4 (3) TEU. In its 2007 judgment in Segi985, the Court of Justice, 
in fact, confirmed that the Member States may be required by the “principle of the duty to cooperate 
in good faith” to comply with measures falling outside the former first pillar986. 
Against this background, it may be argued that CFSP measures may indeed give rise to restraints on 
Member States' foreign policy competence. In particular, Article 28 (2) TEU specifies that CFSP 
decisions  “commit  the  Member  States  in  the  positions  they adopt  and in  the  conduct  of  their  
activity”. The language used in Article 28 (2) TEU suggests that CFSP decisions do indeed limit the 
freedom of the Member States to pursue their individual policies as they wish, requiring them to act  
in conformity with these decisions987. 
Notwithstanding the loyalty obligation and the wording of Article 28 (2) TEU, however, it cannot 
be assumed that the duty of consistent exercise as developed by the Court of Justice applies equally 
to the CFSP. While secondary CFSP measures may impose on the Member States an obligation of 
compliance, the same cannot be said of the CFSP Treaty provisions. 
Unlike the Treaty freedoms discussed in the present chapter, CFSP Treaty provisions are “largely 
procedural in nature”988. In addition, CFSP objectives “are wide and abstract and cover practically 
all aspects of external relations”, and neither are they operational per se, as the objectives pursued 
by other EU policies are989. While it has been inferred from the binding nature of secondary CFSP 
measures that the sovereignty of the Member States has been limited in the field of CFSP990, the 
CFSP objectives, on their own, “do not carry with them a permanent limitation of the sovereign 
rights of the Member States”991. 
984 See Chapter Three, Section VI. 
985 C-355/04 P. Segi and Others v. Council [2007] ECR I-1657.
986 Case C-355/04 Segi, para 52: “A common position requires the compliance of the Member States by virtue of the  
principle of  the duty to cooperate in good faith,  which means in particular  that  Member States are to take all  
appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under European Union 
law.”, emphasis added.
987 R. A. Wessel, “The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order”, 131.
988 Ibid. at 130.
989 R. Gosalbo Bono, “Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order”, 359.
990 See P.  Van Elsuwege, “EU External  Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”,  991, K. Lenaerts and T.  
Corthaut, “Of Birds and Hedges”, 290, R. A. Wessel, “The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order”, 130. 
991 R. Gosalbo Bono, “Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order”, 359.
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In a  strictly  CFSP context,  it  is  therefore difficult  to  see how a similar duty of consistency as 
developed by the Court in other policy areas may apply. The obligation imposed on the Member 
States  to  comply  with  the  fundamental  Treaty  freedoms  operates  on  the  basis  that  EU Treaty 
provisions take precedence over national provisions in cases of conflict. Due to the general and 
abstract nature of CFSP Treaty provisions, however, it is not conceivable how a conflict between 
such broadly formulated objectives and specific  provisions contained in bilateral  Member State 
agreements may arise in the first place. 
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Chapter Five
Loyalty Restraints under Mixed Agreements 
I. Introduction
Chapters One to Three considered how Union action may restrain the Member States in the exercise 
of their competence – by pre-empting Member State powers, imposing procedural obligations to 
cooperate or substantive obligations to remove incompatibilities with EU law, while Chapter Four 
examined how the duty of loyalty operates in areas in which only the Member States have acted. 
Restraints do not, however, arise only when either the Member States or the Union act, but also –  
and perhaps in particular – when both exercise their competence together. This is the case where the 
Union and the Member States conclude a mixed agreement. 
Article  216 (2)  TFEU provides  that  international  agreements  concluded by the  Union shall  be 
binding on the EU institutions as well as the Member States. As a consequence, the Member States 
are  under  a  duty  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  obligations  arising  from  international  Union 
agreements. Compliance obligations thus do not only derive from international law, but are also the 
expression of an obligation towards the Union to perform the commitments under the agreement: 
“In ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the [Union] institutions 
the Member States fulfil an obligation not only in relation to the non-member country concerned but 
also and above all in relation to the [Union] which has assumed responsibility for the due performance 
of the agreement”992. 
However, the role of Article 216 (2) TFEU is less straightforward where mixed agreements are 
concerned. If parts of a given agreement fall within the competence of the Union, while other parts 
cover areas that remain within Member States powers,  it could be assumed that only those parts 
coming within EU competence give rise to compliance obligations. Article 216 (2) TFEU must be 
read  in  combination  with  Article  216  (1)  TFEU,  which  provides  that  the  conclusion  of  an 
international agreement by the Union depends on the extent of its competence993. Therefore, Article 
216 (2) TFEU “should not in itself concern parts of a mixed agreement falling outside the Union 
competence”994.  Accordingly,  those  parts  of  a  mixed  agreement  falling  within  Member  State 
competence should not give rise to compliance obligations under Union law. Some authors even argue 
992 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C. A. Kupferberg & Cie KG [1982] ECR 3641, para 13.
993 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 336.
994 Ibid.
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that in areas of concurrent competence, Member State powers cannot be restrained, as the Union is 
engaged in a mixed agreement only to the extent of its exclusive competence:
“[T]he [Union's] participation is legally only relevant insofar as the [Union's] exclusive competence is  
concerned;  the  rest  of  the  commitments  are  assumed  by  the  Member  States  in  their  individual 
capacity”995. 
In the light of the limited scope of Article 216 (2) TFEU, Article 4 (3) TEU assumes a central role in 
the interpretation and implementation of mixed agreements. If the Member States are required by 
the duty of sincere cooperation to take all  necessary measures in order to fulfil  the obligations 
deriving from a mixed agreement, it becomes irrelevant whether a given provision falls within an 
area of Union competence or not. The question of whether a mixed agreement as a whole may 
constitute  a  source  for  Union  law  obligations  is  thus  directly  linked  to  the  division  of 
competences996.  Indeed, the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to interpret provisions coming 
within Member State competence raises a 
“complex question in which the general problem of the interrelationship of international, [Union] and 
national legal orders meets the regulation of institutional relations between the Court and the other  
[Union] institutions and national authorities”997.
Constructing the whole of a mixed agreement as a source of EU law obligations implies restraints 
on  Member  State  competence  relating  to  the  infringement  procedure  and  the  interpretative 
competence of the Court of Justice. In areas in which no Union competence has been exercised 
whatsoever and the Member States continue to be able to introduce their  own rules,  a binding 
interpretation provided by the Court of Justice determining the way in which a given provision is  
applied would constitute a “manifest breach” of the division of powers between Union and national 
authorities998.
Problems relating to the division of competences not only exist in relation to the interpretation and 
implementation  of  mixed  agreements,  but  may also  arise  when  Member  States  act  within  the 
framework of such an agreement. Article 4 (3) TEU imposes a number of procedural obligations on 
the Member States when they act under a mixed agreement. In this respect, the question arises of 
where the boundaries of the loyalty obligation are to be located in this context. If Article 4 (3) TEU 
imposes an obligation to refrain from acting until a common position has been reached, then this 
may amount to a denial of Member State competence. 
995 J.  Heliskoski,  Mixed  agreements as  a  technique  for  organizing  the  international  relations  of  the  European  
Community and its member states, 46-47, emphasis added.
996 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 335.
997 Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Joined Cases C-300/98 and 392/98  Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk  
Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV 
[2000] ECR I-11307 at para 31.
998 Ibid., para 42.
204
This chapter investigates the Court's construction of the obligations flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU 
in the context of mixity. It seeks to assess whether the Court has been able to find an appropriate 
balance between  the Union's interest in unity of action and the need to preserve the institutional 
balance of powers. To that end, the chapter first looks at the scope for restraint by examining how the 
Court of Justice construes a Union obligation to implement a mixed agreement in its entirety (Section 
II.), before focussing on the  nature of the restraints by looking at the types of obligations which 
arise in this context (Section III.). In assessing what approach to federalism the Court of Justice has 
been pursuing with regard to mixity, the Chapter then considers both the scope and the nature of the 
restraints under mixed agreements together (Section IV.). It concludes by examining to what extent 
these restraints may apply with respect to the CFSP (Section V.).
II. Mixed agreements as a source for Union obligations 
Under Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings where a 
question has been referred to it by a court or tribunal of a Member State concerning the validity and 
interpretation  of  acts  of  the  Union  institutions.  It  is  settled  case  law  that  the  term  “acts  of 
institutions”  covers  international  agreements  concluded by the  Council  on behalf  of  the  Union 
under Article 216 TFEU. From the coming into force of an international agreement, its provisions 
form part of the Union legal order and, as a consequence, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings on its interpretation and validity999. Similarly, the Court is competent, under 
Article 258 TFEU, to adjudicate on a Member State's failure to comply with obligations arising out 
of an international agreement concluded by the Union. 
This  does  not,  however,  mean  that  the  Court's  jurisdiction  to  interpret  and  implement  Union 
agreements extends also to those provisions of a mixed agreement concluded under Member State 
powers. The present section first looks at the Court's approach to bringing provisions covered by 
national competence within the scope of its interpretative jurisdiction (A.), before examining under 
which conditions it accepts its competence to resolve disputes concerning the implementation of 
such provisions (B.). 
A. The Court's interpretative jurisdiction under mixed agreements 
The first time that the question of jurisdiction was raised before the Court of Justice with respect to 
999 Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 449, paras 4-6.
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mixed agreements was in  Demirel1000, a preliminary reference concerning the interpretation of a 
number of articles of the Association Agreement concluded between the EU and the Member States, 
on the one side, and Turkey on the other. Germany and the UK questioned the Court's jurisdiction to 
interpret the provisions on the free movement of workers, which had been concluded under Member 
State powers. According to the two Member States, in the case of mixed agreements, the Court's  
interpretative jurisdiction did not extend to provisions whereby Member States had entered into 
international commitments in the exercise of their own competence1001.  
The Court disagreed, noting that commitments concerning the freedom of movement came within 
the powers conferred upon the Union by (current) Article 217 TFEU. The empowerment of the 
Union in this case was closely linked to the fact that the agreement in question was an association 
agreement.  Since the  agreement  created  “special,  privileged links” with a  non-member  country 
which take part  in  the EU system, the Union,  in  the view of  the Court,  necessarily had to  be 
empowered to guarantee commitments in all fields covered by the Treaty. One such field was the 
free movement of workers, covered by the Treaty by virtue of (current) Article 45 TFEU. In the 
context of association agreements, therefore, Article 217 TFEU conferred special powers on the EU 
in the area of free movement of workers1002. As a consequence of its finding that powers had been 
conferred on the Union by virtue of Article 217 TFEU, the Court had jurisdiction to interpret the 
contested provisions on freedom of movement for workers. 
The Court's answer to the question of the extent of its jurisdiction to interpret provisions of mixed 
agreements  has  been  described  as  “notoriously  vague”1003.  Indeed,  it  prompted  a  multitude  of 
differing interpretations, ranging from the assumption that the Court of Justice had jurisdiction over 
any agreement  in its  entirety if  it  was an act  adopted by the Union institutions1004 to the more 
cautious interpretation that the Court's construction of a Union competence based on Article 217 
TFEU  was  merely  intended  to  dismiss  Germany's  and  the  UK's  claim  that  the  EU  had  no 
competence whatsoever in the field in question1005. A number of commentators, however, appeared 
to infer from the Court's reasoning that the Union had actually exercised its  competence in the 
entire  sphere  covered  by  the  agreement,  thus  creating  an  implied  exclusive  competence1006. 
1000 Case 12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719.
1001 Ibid., para 8. 
1002 Ibid., para 9. 
1003 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 207.
1004 A. F. Gagliardi, “The right of individuals to invoke the provisions of mixed agreements before the national courts: a 
new message from Luxembourg?” (1999) 24 E.L. Rev. 276 at 286. In a similar vein, the Opinion of AG Tesauro in 
Case C-53/96 Hermès International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603 at para 18.
1005 R. Holdgaard,  External  Relations Law of  the European Community,  207.  See  also A.  Dashwood,  “Preliminary 
Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements”, in D. O'Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds.),  Liber amicorum in  
honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley: Judicial Review in European Union Law (Kluwer 2000) 167 at 170.
1006 See P. Koutrakos, “The Interpretation of Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary Reference Procedure” (2002) 7 
EFARev. 25 at 32 et seq.; J. H. H. Weiler, “Thou Shalt not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the 
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According to yet another reading of the Demirel judgment, the Court, irrespective of questions of 
actual competence, adopted an approach whereby the “internal objectives of the Treaty are used to 
justify [Union] competence over external affairs normally subject to Member State competence”, 
resulting in a “significantly greater scope for a 'mixed' agreement to be characterised as being part 
of [Union] law”1007.
Due to the multitude of possible interpretations of the Court's approach, it remained unclear whether 
the Court had an all-encompassing competence to interpret any provision of any mixed agreement, 
or whether such jurisdiction, instead, extended to areas of exclusive Union competence only, or 
included  also  areas  of  non-exclusive  competence.  It  has  been  argued  that  none  of  these 
interpretations hold true, since the Court did not sufficiently address any of these issues1008. In fact, 
it  has been widely accepted in the literature that  the judgment leaves  open the question of the 
Court's  jurisdiction  to  interpret  those  provisions  of  a  mixed  agreement  falling  within  national 
powers1009.
i. Hermès – Provisions falling within the scope of both national and Union law
The first case in which the Court was asked to rule on its jurisdiction over a mixed agreement which 
was not an association agreement was Hermès1010, the first judgment in a line of preliminary rulings 
concerning the TRIPs Agreement concluded under the auspices of the WTO. The referring court 
sought guidance on the interpretation of Article 50 (6) TRIPs, a provision which requires that a 
decision imposing provisional measures for the protection of intellectual property rights be revoked 
if proceedings on the merits are not initiated within a reasonable time. Specifically, the Court of 
Justice was asked whether an interim measure such as the Dutch provision in question constituted a 
provisional measure within the meaning of Article 50 TRIPs. 
The Court's interpretative jurisdiction in the case was challenged by France, the Netherlands and the 
UK which argued that the Union's competence to conclude the TRIPs Agreement was non-exclusive 
in accordance with Opinion 1/941011. In the view of the three Member States, Article 50 TRIPs fell 
Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals – A Critique” (1992) 3 EJIL 65 at 75 et seq.; J. Heliskoski, “The Jurisdiction of  
the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements” (2000) 69  
Nordic Journal of International Law 395 at 399. 
1007 P. Gasparon, “The Transposition of the Principle of Member State Liability into the Context of External Relations”  
(1999) 10 EJIL 605 at 612, emphasis added. 
1008 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 207.
1009 See A. Rosas, “Mixed Union – Mixed Agreements”, in M. Koskenniemi (ed.),  International Law Aspects of the  
European Union (Kluwer 1998) 125 at 140-141. See also J. Heliskoski, “The Jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements”, 400, and the literature cited there. 
1010 Case C-53/96 Hermès v. FHT [1998] ECR I-3603. 
1011 Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, para 104. For a discussion of the Opinion see Chapter One.
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outside the scope of EU law on the ground that the Union had not exercised its internal competence 
in the area1012. 
The Court of Justice rejected this argument and declared that it did have jurisdiction to interpret 
Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement. In its response to the arguments submitted by the three Member 
States, the Court recalled that the WTO Agreement was concluded by the Union and ratified by the 
Member  States  without  any allocation  of  competences  between  them,  before  pointing  out  that 
Council Regulation No. 40/94 on the Union trade mark had already been in force when the WTO 
Agreement was signed1013. The TRIPs Agreement was found to be relevant for the application of 
national rules aimed at the protection of rights arising under a Union trade mark. As the Court 
explained, the EU was a party to the TRIPs Agreement and that agreement applied to the EU trade 
mark. Therefore, national provisional measures within the meaning of Regulation No. 40/94 had to 
be applied in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPs1014. 
In the specific case, however, the application of these general principles of reception of the TRIPs 
into Union law was less straightforward. The case did not concern an EU trade mark, but national 
trade  marks  registered  in  the  Benelux under  national trade  mark  law.  According to  the  Court, 
however, this was “immaterial”, because 
“where  a  provision  can  apply both  to  situations  falling  within  the  scope  of  national  law and  to 
situations falling within the scope of [Union] law, it is clearly in the [Union] interest that, in order to  
forestall future differences of interpretation, that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever  
the circumstances in which it is to apply”1015.
Noting that Article 50 TRIPs applied to EU trade marks as well  as to national ones, the Court 
concluded that it did have jurisdiction to rule on the questions submitted by the national court.
The implications of the Hermès judgment for the Court's competence to interpret mixed agreements 
were disputed in the literature. It remained unclear whether the Court's reasoning was applicable 
only to provisions falling within the scope of both national and Union law, or whether it covered all  
provisions within EU competence, both exclusive and non-exclusive. According to one reading of 
the Hermès judgment, the Court's approach was “extremely far-reaching” in that it could equally be 
applied to any provision of a mixed agreement concluded under shared competence, since it was 
likely that a minimum of internal legislation had been enacted in every such field, and it could be 
applied  even  to  fields  in  which  Union  competence  remained  purely  hypothetical1016.  Such  an 
1012 Case C-53/96 Hermès v. FHT, para 23.
1013 Ibid., paras 24-25.
1014 Ibid., paras 26-29.
1015 Ibid., para 32.
1016 A. Dashwood, “Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements”, 173.
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interpretation of the Court's reasoning was subsequently criticised as being “too broad”1017. It was 
submitted that the rationale of the Hermès judgment was not the adoption of legislation in a given 
field, but the fact that Article 50 TRIPs “affected, in the meaning of the AETR judgment, Article 99 
of Regulation No. 40/94” and there was, therefore, a Union interest in uniform interpretation of both 
provisions1018. Jurisdiction to interpret provisions of a mixed agreement thus required a “substantive 
link” between EU and national competence1019, which in the specific case consisted in the fact that 
the provision at issue was applicable both to situations falling within the scope of national law and 
to situations falling within the scope of Union law. Nevertheless, it  was considered that certain 
ambiguities  in  the  Court's  reasoning  allowed  for  the  interpretation  that  the  Court  based  its 
jurisdiction on a Union competence over Article 50 TRIPs and, therefore, the  Hermès judgment 
provided little guidance on the question of the Court's jurisdiction over mixed agreements more 
generally1020. 
ii. Dior/Assco – Procedural provisions applicable to both national and Union law
The Court of Justice shed more light on this question in Dior/Assco1021, two references from Dutch 
courts concerning the interpretation of Article 50 TRIPs. While the first case1022 concerned national 
trade marks for perfumery products, the second case1023 related to industrial  design rights for a 
scaffolding system. In both cases, the national courts referred questions regarding the interpretation 
and the legal effect in domestic law of Article 50 (6) TRIPs. In the  Assco  case, in addition, the 
Dutch Supreme Court wanted to know whether the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice extended 
specifically to those provisions of Article 50 TRIPs which did not involve trade mark rights, such as 
industrial design rights1024. The fact that Assco concerned national design rights was highly relevant 
because,  unlike  trade  mark  rights,  there  was  no  Union  design  right  in  place  and  no  further 
legislation aimed at the protection of such rights had been adopted. 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Cosmas held that the reasoning adopted in  Hermès, where the 
Court had relied on Regulation No. 40/94 on the Union trade mark, could not readily be applied to 
the  case  at  hand,  since  the  latter  concerned an  area  in  which  no Union competence  had been 
1017 J. Heliskoski, “The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation 
of Mixed Agreements”, 404.
1018 Ibid., p. 405.
1019 Ibid., p. 406.
1020 P. Gasparon, “The Transposition of the Principle of Member State Liability into the Context of External Relations”,  
613.
1021 Joined Cases C-300/98 and 392/98 Dior and Assco.
1022 Case C-300/98 Dior.
1023 Case C-392/98 Assco.
1024 Joined Cases C-300/98 and 392/98 Dior and Assco, para 27.
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exercised1025.  Accepting  the  jurisdiction  to  interpret  Article  50  TRIPs  in  areas  in  which  Union 
competence had not yet been exercised would “constitute pursuit of a policy of judge-made law in 
conflict with the constitutional logic of the Treaty and would be difficult to justify on grounds of 
expediency”1026.
The Court  of Justice did not share the Advocate General's  concerns  and ruled that  it  did have 
interpretative jurisdiction where it was called upon to assess provisional measures for the protection 
of all intellectual property rights falling within the scope of TRIPs and was, therefore, not restricted 
solely to situations covered by trade-mark law1027. The Court began its analysis with a statement that 
was “as forceful in its tone as it [was] broad in its scope”1028, by declaring that as a result of TRIPs 
having been concluded under joint competence, the Court had jurisdiction to define the obligations 
which the Union had thereby assumed and therefore to interpret the agreement1029. It appeared to 
suggest that it had an exclusive competence to handle all types of judicial procedures by which 
mixed agreements may be brought before it, including the question of interpretation. The Court 
went on to reiterate some of the arguments developed in Hermès1030, even if these had been based on 
the adoption of EU legislation in the field and could therefore not be transposed to the case at hand. 
Two new elements were introduced, however,  to  demonstrate  that the Court did not  only have 
jurisdiction to interpret those parts of Article 50 TRIPs relating to trade marks, but that it also had 
jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling concerning industrial  designs.  Citing Opinion 1/94, the 
Court argued that the Member States and the EU institutions were under an “obligation of close  
cooperation in fulfilling the commitments undertaken by them under joint competence”1031. It went 
on to find that Article 50 TRIPs constituted a “procedural provision which should be applied in the 
same way in every situation falling within its scope and is capable of applying both to situations  
covered by national law and to situations covered by [Union] law”1032. 
The Court of Justice thus rejected AG Cosmas'  restrictive reading of  Hermès.  According to the 
Advocate General, in Hermès the Court had established two conditions which needed to be fulfilled 
in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to interpret a provision of a mixed agreement: firstly, the 
Union had to have exercised its competence in the relevant field, and secondly, the provision in 
question had to apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations  
1025 Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-292/98 Dior and Assco, para 40.
1026 Ibid., para 51.
1027 Joined Cases C-300/98 and 392/98 Dior and Assco, paras 39 and 40.
1028 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 200.
1029 Joined Cases C-300/98 and 392/98 Dior and Assco, para 33.
1030 Ibid., paras 34 and 35.
1031 Ibid., para 36, emphasis added.
1032 Ibid., para 37.
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falling within the scope of EU law1033. In the Assco case, such a substantive EU law link between 
the national provisions and the TRIPs Agreement  was absent,  since no EU measures had been 
adopted in the field of industrial design rights. Nevertheless, the Court found that Article 50 TRIPs 
could very well affect the scope of EU law, simply because it was a procedural provision applicable 
to both national and Union law. A substantive link between the respective spheres of national and 
Union competence was not necessary in order to establish the Court's interpretative jurisdiction. At 
the same time, the Court made it clear that the Union interest in uniform interpretation was not per 
se sufficient  to justify the Court's  exclusive jurisdiction.  Rather,  an additional  link between the 
national and EU spheres of competence was required,  even if  only of a procedural nature. The 
general principle, therefore, appears to be that the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret a 
mixed agreement under Article 267 TFEU if the agreement contains provisions that apply both to 
situations falling within Union and within national competence, irrespective of whether the dispute 
concerns Member State or Union competence1034.
This approach was confirmed in Schieving-Nijstad1035, another preliminary reference from the Dutch 
Supreme Court requesting guidance on the interpretation of Article 50 (6) of the TRIPs Agreement. 
The dispute concerned the protection of a trade mark registered in the Netherlands. As there was no 
objection to the Court's jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling in this case, the Court limited itself  
to  a  brief  affirmation of  its  previous  case law in  the  field of  trade marks.  Citing  Hermès and 
Dior/Assco, the Court held that “[i]n the field of trade marks, to which TRIPs is applicable and in 
respect of which the [EU] has already legislated, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of 
TRIPs”1036. It is noteworthy here that the Court apparently felt the need to refer to the existence of 
EU legislation  when  asserting  its  jurisdiction.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  this  reading  of  its 
previous case law suggests that it would not have had jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 TRIPs in 
the absence of EU rules1037.
B. The Court's jurisdiction to implement mixed agreements 
The Court of Justice not only recognises its jurisdiction to interpret provisions of mixed agreements 
falling within Member State competence,  but it  also accepts its  competence to resolve disputes 
concerning the implementation of such provisions. 
1033 Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-292/98 Dior and Assco, para 40.
1034 See  also  J.  Heliskoski,  Mixed  Agreements  as  a  Technique  for  Organizing  the  International  Relations  of  the  
European Community and its Member States, 59-61.
1035 Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v. Robert Groeneveld [2001] ECR I-5851.
1036 Ibid., para 30.
1037 P. Koutrakos, “The Interpretation of Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary Reference Procedure”, 47.
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i. The Berne Convention case – Indivisible compliance obligations 
This  first  became  apparent  in  the  Berne  Convention case1038.  The  Commission  had  brought 
infringement proceedings against Ireland, alleging a failure of the Member State's obligations to 
fulfil its obligations under (current) Article 216 (2) TFEU in conjunction with Article 5 of Protocol 
28 to the EEA Agreement. Under the latter provision, the Contracting Parties undertook to adhere to 
several multilateral conventions including the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. Ireland had failed to become a signatory to the Berne Convention within the time 
frame foreseen in the EEA Agreement. The Commission argued that Ireland had not complied with 
its obligation to adhere to the Convention. 
As the Convention itself was not a mixed agreement, the Ireland's alleged non-compliance consisted 
in its failure to exercise its own competence. While Ireland accepted the Commission's contention, 
the alleged failure to fulfil obligations was challenged by the UK government intervening in support 
of Ireland. According to the United Kingdom, the action was not admissible to begin with, as the 
Court lacked competence to determine the matter. The obligation to adhere to the Berne Convention 
did  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  Union  law.  The  Berne  Convention  was  not  covered  by  EU 
competence in its entirety and, as a consequence, neither did the obligation to adhere to it1039. 
The Commission sought to argue on the basis of competence, putting forward an analysis aimed at  
demonstrating that the Union had occupied the field within the meaning of the AETR principle1040. 
Advocate General Mischo, however, pointed out that the issue before the Court did not focus on the 
division of competence. Instead, the Advocate General argued that the decisive point in this context 
was indivisibility of the agreement: 
“A State cannot therefore adhere to [the Berne Convention] in part. Its adherence assumes, on the 
contrary,  the acceptance of all  of  the obligations laid down by that  Convention.  It  follows that  if  
[Union] law requires that the Member States adhere, that can only be adherence to the Convention as a  
whole1041.”
The Member States were thus under an indivisible  obligation to  accede to a mixed agreement, 
irrespective of the extent to which the Union had exercised its competence in the areas covered by 
the agreement. As a consequence, the Berne Convention as a whole either did create obligations for 
the Member States, or it did not. The extent to which the EU had exercised its competence in the 
field in question was irrelevant, as it was the mere  existence of Union rules which established a 
1038 Case C-13/00 Commission v. Ireland (Berne Convention) [2002] ECR I-2943.
1039 See ibid., Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, paras 7-8.
1040 See case C-13/00, Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, paras 36-39.
1041 Ibid., para 48, emphasis added.
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Union interest in compliance with the entire mixed agreement. The Court of Justice, by contrast, 
adopted an approach based precisely on the scope of the exercise of EU powers. The Court held that 
“there can be no doubt that the provisions of the Berne Convention cover an area which comes in 
large measure within the scope of [Union] competence”1042. It proceeded to compare the content of 
the Berne Convention with the relevant EU legislation in place, coming to the conclusion that not 
only  had  Union  rules  been  adopted  in  areas  covered  by  the  Convention,  but  these  areas, 
furthermore, were “to a very great extent governed by [EU] legislation”1043. 
The Union interest in compliance was, therefore, based on the exercise of an EU competence in the 
field  covered  by the  Berne  Convention.  This  reasoning  resembles  the  Court's  assertion  of  its 
interpretative  jurisdiction  in  Dior/Assco, where  the  Court  had  held  that  provisions  of  a  mixed 
agreement only came within the scope of EU law if the Union had already legislated in the field at 
issue.  In  the  Berne Convention case,  however,  the Court  appears  to  add a  qualification to  this 
condition, according to which a certain amount of legislation needs to have been adopted, i.e. the 
field must be covered to a “great extent” or “in large measure”. This criterion is more restricted in  
its application and makes it more difficult to establish a Union interest in compliance with a given 
provision of a mixed agreement. In the specific case, the Court had no difficulty finding that the 
subject matter of the Berne Convention was indeed covered in large measure by EU law. As a result, 
the Commission was competent to assess compliance with Article 5 of Protocol 28 to the EEA 
Agreement1044. 
The Court's approach in this case brings to mind the  AETR principle1045 as developed in Opinion 
2/911046.  However,  the  Court's  approach should  not  be misunderstood as  asserting  an  exclusive 
Union  competence  over  the  provisions  at  issue.  In  fact,  as  the  Advocate  General  pointed  out,  
questions about competence are misplaced in this context. Rather than examining whether the EU 
had  exclusive  powers  in  relation  to  the  Berne  Convention,  the  Court  determined  whether  the 
agreement  came  within  the  scope of  EU law.  What  seemed  to  be  the  cause  for  disagreement 
between  the  Advocate  General  and  the  Court,  however,  was  the  question  of  the  criterion  for 
determining whether  the  agreement  came within  the  scope of  Union law.  Whilst  the  Advocate 
General examined whether the EU had legislated in the field, the Court asked specifically to what  
extent  it  had  done  so.  The  Advocate  General  essentially  applied  the  Court's  principles  on  the 
1042 Case C-13/00, para 16, emphasis added.
1043 Ibid., para 17.
1044 Ibid., para 20.
1045 Similarly, R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 221; P. J. Kuijper, “Case C-239/03, 
Commission v. French Republic, judgment of the Court of 7 October 2004” (2005) 42 CMLRev. 1491 at 1495.
1046 Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the ILO [1993] ECR I-1061, paras 22-26.
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justification of its jurisdiction as formulated in  Schieving-Nijstad, but the Court chose to base the 
imposition of a compliance obligation in this case on a stricter criterion. 
This  divergence  from  the  Court's  case  law  on  its  interpretative  jurisdiction  may  perhaps  be 
explained on the grounds of the indivisibility of obligations under the Berne Convention. When the 
Court is called upon to give a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, it assesses the Union 
interest in the uniform interpretation of single provisions of a mixed agreement. When assessing the 
Union interest in compliance with Article 5 of Protocol 28 of the EEA Agreement, by contrast, the 
Court's assertion that it fell within the scope of EU law affected a multitude of provisions contained 
in the Berne Convention which did not otherwise fall within the scope of EU law. A Union interest 
existed only in relation to parts of the Berne Convention, but, for practical and legal reasons, it was 
not possible to impose an obligation on the Member States which corresponded to the degree of the 
Union interest involved. Accession was possible either to the whole of the agreement, or not at all. 
The difference between the  Berne Convention case and the case law on the Court's interpretative 
jurisdiction is, therefore, that in the latter cases, the Court accepts its jurisdiction to the extent to 
which the provision at issue falls within the scope of EU law, while in the Berne Convention case, 
the compliance restraints go way beyond the scope of EU law within the interest of the Union. 
Consequently,  the  criterion  for  establishing  whether  there  is  a  sufficient  Union  interest  in 
compliance has to be stricter than the basis for jurisdiction. 
ii. Étang de Berre – Compliance obligations in the absence of Union legislation
The question of whether compliance with a mixed agreement could be enforced as a Union law 
obligation arose again in the  Étang de Berre1047 case. However, while the  Berne Convention case 
concerned an area of law partly covered by Union legislation, the alleged breach of obligations at 
issue in Étang de Berre related to parts of a mixed agreement which were not covered by EU rules.
The Commission brought an action under Article 258 TFEU, alleging that France had failed to fulfil 
its obligations under the Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
pollution, a mixed agreement concluded by the Union and the Member States. The Étang de Berre, 
a salt-water marsh in the South of France directly linked with the Mediterranean Sea, had suffered 
considerable environmental damage as a result of fresh water being artificially discharged into it by 
a French electricity supplier.  The Commission took the view that  France had failed to take all 
1047 Case C-239/03 Commission v. France (Étang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9325. 
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appropriate measures to prevent and reduce the pollution. France, on the other hand, disputed from 
the outset that the obligations which it had allegedly infringed fell within the scope of Union law, 
arguing that no EU directive regulated the discharges of fresh water and alluvia into a salt-water  
marsh and that, as a consequence, the Barcelona Convention did not fall within EU competence. 
The Court acknowledged that discharges of fresh water and alluvia into the marine environment had 
not yet  been regulated by the EU1048.  However,  this  did not mean that the Convention and the 
Protocol did not fall within the scope of Union law. Citing a number of directives adopted in the 
field of environmental protection, the Court found that in the Convention and the Protocol “without 
doubt cover a field which falls in large measure within [Union] competence”1049. 
As in the  Berne Convention case, this reasoning is not to be confused with the occupation of the 
field within the meaning of  the AETR principle.  In fact,  rather  than holding that  there was an 
exclusive competence because the mixed agreement in question covered a field that came within 
large measure within EU competence, the Court created an express link between the amount of EU 
legislation in place with the existence of a Union interest: 
“Since the Convention and the Protocol thus create rights and obligations in a field covered in large 
measure by [Union] legislation, there is a [Union] interest in compliance by both the [Union] and its  
Member States with the commitments entered into under those instruments”1050. 
The Court thus confirms that the legal nature of the obligation is irrelevant in determining the extent 
of the Member States' compliance obligations under a mixed agreement. By way of conclusion, it 
held that it was competent to assess France's compliance with the Convention in the present case. 
The Court hence adopted the same approach as it did in the Berne Convention case: provisions of a 
mixed agreement creating obligations in a field largely covered by EU law come within the scope of 
Union law and, therefore, give rise to compliance obligations imposed on the Member States. 
However, the factual situations in the Berne Convention case and in the present case differ in one 
important point. While the former case concerned an obligation to adhere to a mixed agreement in 
its  entirety,  Étang  de  Berre  is  about  the  obligations  created  by certain  provisions of  a  mixed 
agreement1051.  The  Berne  Convention case  concerned  a  situation  in  which  the  Union  interest 
necessarily had to go beyond the scope of EU law, while there is no such necessity in the Étang de 
Berre case. Nevertheless, the Court found that the entire mixed agreement fell within the scope of 
EU competence, thus imposing compliance obligations on the Member States in areas outside of 
actual EU competence. 
1048 Ibid., para 30.
1049 Ibid., para 27 and 28. Citation is from para 28, emphasis added.
1050 Ibid., para 29.
1051 The same distinction is adopted by Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion in Case C-459/03  Commission v.  
Ireland (MOX Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635, para 31.
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A number of commentators have argued that the Court of Justice in  Étang de Berre did, in fact, 
establish a Union competence over the field in question1052. Advocate General Maduro held in his 
Opinion  in  the  subsequent  MOX  Plant  case  that  the  Union  had  exercised  its  non-exclusive 
competence  in  the  field  by  concluding  the  Barcelona  Convention.  He  based  his  claim on  the 
argument  that  the act  of  conclusion  of  that  agreement  itself  was “a form of  exercising  a  non-
exclusive competence of the [Union], independently of the previous adoption of [Union] internal 
legislation”1053. As a result of an exercise of EU competence, the field of discharges of fresh water 
and sediments into the marine environment came within the Court's jurisdiction.
Rather  than  reading the  Court's  reasoning in  the  Étang de  Berre  case  as  establishing  a  Union 
competence,  the  alternative  interpretation  would  be  that  the  Court  ruled  on  infringement 
proceedings  in  respect  of  obligations  arising  outside the  scope  of  Union  law.  AG  Maduro 
commented on such a reading of the Étang de Berre judgment that “[o]f course, this cannot be the 
case”1054.  However,  the  wording  of  the  Court's  judgment  suggests  that  it  did  indeed  create 
obligations in an area outside of Union rules. As mentioned above, the Court makes a causal link 
between the adoption of  EU rules  in  a given field and the Union  interest at  stake,  rather  than 
competence: the mixed agreement at issue is covered in large measure by EU legislation and, as a 
consequence, there is a Union interest in compliance also with those provisions concluded under 
Member State powers1055. 
 
iii. The MOX Plant Case – Disputes between two Member States arising out of a mixed agreement 
Although both the Berne Convention and the Étang de Berre cases concerned provisions covered by 
non-exclusive Union competence, the Court of Justice did not consider it necessary to establish who 
had actually exercised a competence over those matters. It was only in the MOX Plant case1056 that 
the Court examined the question of whether it had been the Union or the Member States to exercise 
the  non-exclusive  external  competence  in  question.  In  this  case,  the  Commission  brought  an 
1052 See P. J. Kuijper, “Case C-239/03, Commission v. French Republic, judgment of the Court of 7 October 2004”; P. 
Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 205.
1053 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 33.
1054 Ibid. at para 33, emphasis added. His reasoning, however, is not so much based on a substantive objection to the 
expansion of the Union interest beyond the scope of EU law, but on an objection of a procedural nature (see his 
footnote 37): If the Commission had intended to bring proceedings for the failure to fulfil obligations outside the 
scope of EU competence, it was mistaken in bringing them directly on account of a failure to fulfil the obligations 
arising from the mixed agreement. Instead, proceedings would have had to be brought on account of a failure to  
fulfil the EU obligation arising from (current) Article 4 (3) TEU. 
1055 See Case C-239/03 Commission v. France, para 29: “Since the Convention and the Protocol thus create rights and 
obligations in a field covered in large measure by [Union] legislation, there is a [Union] interest in compliance by  
both the [Union] and its Member States with the commitments entered into under those instruments”.
1056 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland.
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infringement  action  against  Ireland  alleging  a  breach  of  the  Member  States'  obligations  under 
Articles 4 (3) TEU and 344 TFEU (formerly Articles 10 EC and 292 EC) and the corresponding 
provisions of the Euratom Treaty after it had initiated dispute-settlement proceedings against the 
United Kingdom outside the framework of EU law. By the time that the case reached the Court of 
Justice, it  had already gone through multiple rounds of dispute settlement in other international 
tribunals1057. 
In 2001, the British Government had authorised the construction and operation of a mixed oxide 
fuels  (MOX) plant  near  Sellafield  in  north-west  England,  which  Ireland  had consistently  been 
opposing for half a decade, expressing concerns that by perpetuating the nuclear fuel processing 
industry in the United Kingdom it would cause additional radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea. 
Ireland subsequently brought proceedings against the UK under the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Seas1058 (UNCLOS), arguing that the operation of the MOX plant was or would be in violation 
of various provisions of UNCLOS relating to the prevention of marine pollution, cooperation in the 
protection of the marine environment and environmental impact assessment. Earlier in the year, the 
Irish Government had already instituted proceedings under the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic1059 (the OSPAR Convention), alleging a breach on 
the part of the UK of the Convention by having refused to disclose certain information during their 
joint consultations on authorisation. 
After repeatedly calling on Ireland to suspend the proceedings before the OSPAR Tribunal and the 
ITLOS on the  grounds  that  the  dispute  came within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of 
Justice,  the  Commission  initiated  infringement  proceedings.  More  specifically,  the  Commission 
claimed that Ireland had failed to respect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court under Article 344 
TFEU to rule on any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of Union law and that it  
had failed to comply with its duties under Article 4 (3) TEU by exercising a competence which 
belonged to the Union and by failing to inform or consult with the competent Union institutions1060.
In relation to the first claim, the Commission submitted that the dispute fell within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on the ground that the UNCLOS was a mixed agreement and its 
provisions  consequently came within  the  scope  of  the  Union's  external  competence  in  matters 
relating to environmental protection1061. Nevertheless, it emphasised that it was “not necessary to 
1057 For a more detailed account of the proceedings see e.g. R. Churchill and J. Scott, “The MOX Plant Litigation: The  
First  Half-Life”  (2004)  53  ICLQ 643,  and  Y.  Shany,  “The  First  MOX Plant Award:  The  Need to  Harmonize 
Competing Environmental Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures” (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 815.
1058 1833 UNTS 396.
1059 (1993) 32 ILM 1069.
1060 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 59.
1061 Ibid., para 61.
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establish exclusive competence of the Union within the areas concerned by the dispute”1062. After 
all, it followed from cases such as Hermès, Dior, and the Berne Convention case that the Court had 
jurisdiction to  interpret  the provisions  of  mixed agreements  not  only where  the  provisions  fell  
within the exclusive competence of the Union but also where they fell within shared powers1063. The 
Commission's emphasis on shared competence notwithstanding, it went on to point out that all of 
the  issues  raised  before  the  Tribunal  were  “largely  covered by  an  almost  complete  legislative 
framework  of  internal  [Union]  measures”1064,  indicating  the  existence  of  an  exclusive  Union 
competence in the field. Ireland, by contrast, contested the Commission's claim that a transfer to the 
Union of competence in relation to the subject-matter covered by the dispute had taken place. In 
order to establish such a competence,  the Member State argued, it was necessary to prove that  
measures of Union law were affected by the provisions of the Convention in issue. In the present 
case, Ireland claimed, the EU rules on protection of the environment laid down only minimum 
rules, which allowed the Member States to seek greater protection at international level. An exercise 
of non-exclusive EU competence had, therefore, not taken place in the field at issue, with the result 
that the relevant parts of UNCLOS did not fall within the scope of EU law and were not subject to  
the Court's exclusive jurisdiction. 
As far as the question to what extent a transfer of competence to the EU had taken place was 
concerned,  Ireland  submitted  that  under  the  UNCLOS  no  transfer  of  shared  competence  was 
possible and only those areas capable of being affected could have been transferred to the Union. As 
there was no transfer of exclusive competence, the competence over the dispute at issue remained 
with the Member States. The Commission, by contrast, argued that the areas of shared competence 
in question were transferred to the Union even in the absence of Union rules. 
As a premise to its analysis whether the Union had in fact exercised its non-exclusive competence 
in the field of protection of the marine environment, the Court delivered an important clarification 
regarding the conditions for determining the scope of Union competence in a given case: 
“[T]he question as to whether a provision of a mixed agreement comes within the competence of the  
[Union] is one which relates to the attribution and, thus, the very existence of that competence, and not 
to its exclusive or shared nature1065.”
This is a highly significant confirmation of the rationale underlying all previous case law on both 
interpretation  and application  of  mixed agreements  that  should  put  to  rest  all  speculation  over 
1062 Ibid., para 62, emphasis added.
1063 Ibid., para 63, emphasis added.
1064 Ibid., para 64, emphasis added.
1065 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 93, emphasis added. 
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whether the Court applied the AETR principle in the context of mixed agreements1066. The existence 
of Union competence for the purpose of enforcing compliance with the Member States' obligations 
under a mixed agreement is 
“not,  in  principle,  contingent  on the adoption of  measures  of  secondary law covering the area  in  
question and liable to be affected if Member States were to take part in the procedure for concluding 
the agreement in question, within the terms of the principle formulated by the Court in paragraph 17 of 
the AETR judgment”1067. 
In the specific field, the Court found that Union competence was shared and could be exercised 
“even if the specific matters covered by those agreements are not yet, or are only very partially, the 
subject of rules at [Union] level, which, by reason of that fact, are not likely to be affected” 1068. The 
Court  proceeded  to  examine  whether  the  Union  had  actually  exercised  its  non-exclusive 
competence by concluding the UNCLOS. To that end, it relied on the legal base for the concluding 
Council  decision  and  on  the  declaration  of  competence  made  by the  EU  under  Annex  IX  of 
UNCLOS, according to which Union competence was exercised only to the extent that the field was 
covered by Union rules1069. 
It has been argued that the Court's focus on the exercise of Union competence was misplaced1070. In 
fact, notwithstanding its focus on competence, the Court ultimately followed its reasoning adopted 
in the  Berne Convention and  Étang de Berre cases where the Union interest in compliance was 
based on the existence of Union law, rather than on the scope of Union competence1071. Thus, when 
summarising the conditions under which the dispute between the two Member States came within 
its jurisdiction, the Court of Justice stressed that “a significant part of the dispute […] relates to the  
interpretation  or  application  of  [Union]  law”1072.  The  provisions  relied  on  by  Ireland  in  the 
proceedings initiated against the UK formed part of the Union legal order1073. Submitting a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than 
those  provided  for  therein  was  capable  of  jeopardising  the  “autonomy  of  the  [Union]  legal 
system”1074. The Court's jurisdiction, therefore, necessarily had to be exclusive. 
1066 See e.g. P. J. Kuijper, “Case C-239/03, Commission v. French Republic, judgment of the Court of 7 October 2004”.
1067 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 94, emphasis added.
1068 Ibid., para 95.
1069 Ibid., paras 106-108. 
1070 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 150.
1071 Ibid.
1072 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 135, emphasis added.
1073 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 121.
1074 Ibid., para 123.
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C. Assessment – The Union interest in uniformity
The autonomy of the Union legal order also lies at the heart of the Court's more general approach to 
the interpretation and enforcement of those provisions contained in mixed agreements which fall 
outside the scope of Union competence.  In all  the cases examined, the Court asks whether the 
disputed provisions have become part of the Union legal order. To that end, it focuses on the scope 
of Union law instead of the scope of Union competence. If a given provision contained in a mixed 
agreement is found to fall  within the scope of Union law, there is  a Union interest  in uniform 
interpretation and enforcement of the mixed agreement, irrespective of whether there is a Union 
competence in the field. 
Thus, a provision of a mixed agreement must be interpreted uniformly if it forms part of a field in 
which the EU has legislated. Conversely, where the Union has not legislated, the provision does not 
generally come within the scope of EU law and, consequently, does not require uniform application. 
However, this is not the case where a provision of a mixed agreement can apply both to a situation 
governed by EU legislation and by national law. In such a case, there is a Union interest in uniform 
interpretation even if is applied in a field where the Union has not exercised its competence. This 
was illustrated in the  Dior/Assco case. While there was no EU legislation in place in the field of 
industrial  design  rights,  the  provision  at  issue  was  of  a  procedural  nature  and could  therefore 
hypothetically apply also to EU rules.  Nevertheless,  where such an additional link between the 
national and EU spheres of competence is absent, no Union interest in uniform interpretation can be 
found to exist. 
Contrary  to  initial  assumptions  that  the  Court  of  Justice  had  intended  a  broad  interpretative 
jurisdiction covering not only the TRIPs Agreement in its entirety1075, but also all provisions of any 
type  of  mixed  agreement  falling  within  exclusive  and  non-exclusive  EU  competence  more 
generally1076, subsequent case law has revealed a more nuanced approach. It was suggested by some 
commentators that the fact that in every field of non-exclusive competence at least  a minimum 
amount  of  legislation  had  been  adopted  would  bring  the  corresponding  provisions  of  mixed 
agreements within the scope of the Court's interpretative jurisdiction1077. However,  the Court of 
Justice  has  never  held  that  its  interpretative  jurisdiction  extended  to  those  parts  of  a  mixed 
agreement that fall within Member State competence or which concern a field in which the EU has 
1075 See A. Rosas, “The European Union and Mixed Agreements”, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The General  
Law of E.C. External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 200 at 214; in a similar vein, A.F. Gagliardi, “The right of 
individuals to invoke the provisions of mixed agreements before the national courts”, 286.
1076 A. Dashwood, “Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements”, 173.
1077 See A. Rosas, “The European Union and Mixed Agreements”, 214 and A. Dashwood, “Preliminary Rulings on the  
Interpretation of Mixed Agreements”, 173.
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not exercised its competence yet. What emerges from the Court's case law on the TRIPs Agreement, 
instead, is that the Court of Justice does not consider itself competent to interpret the provisions of a 
mixed agreement merely because it falls within the non-exclusive powers of the EU. The guiding 
principle is that the Court has jurisdiction where there is a Union interest in uniform interpretation,  
regardless of whether a given provision falls within the sphere of Member State competence or 
within that of the EU. 
The Court has adopted a similar approach predicated on the scope of Union rules also in relation to 
the  implementation  of  mixed agreements.  Thus,  as  we saw in  the  Berne Convention case,  the 
enforcement of a mixed agreement may entail an obligation on the Member States to exercise their 
own competence by concluding an international agreement. The finding that the Member State in 
question was under a Union obligation to comply with the mixed agreement required a link with 
Union legislation. In the specific case, parts of the Berne Convention were covered by Union rules.
The Étang de Berre case, however, concerned a mixed agreement which was not actually covered 
by EU legislation. Instead, the Court found it sufficient for the recognition of its jurisdiction that the 
agreement formed part of a field in general which was covered to a large extent by Union rules.  
The Court of Justice, in sum, makes clear that the Union has a strong interest in the fulfilment of the 
Member States' obligations under mixed agreements, even if those obligations do not fall within EU 
competence. The obligations incumbent on the Member States in the context of mixity thus flow from 
Article 4 (3) TEU, rather than from 216 (2) TEU alone. Article 216 (2) TFEU is not per se a sufficient 
basis for the integration of a mixed agreement in its entirety into the Union legal order. By virtue of 
the duty of sincere cooperation, however, the Member States become bound under EU law by parts of 
a mixed agreement falling under their own national competence. 
II. Restraints on the Member States' freedom to act under mixed agreements
The Court of Justice readily accepts its jurisdiction for the interpretation and application of, as well 
as  compliance  with,  provisions  of  mixed agreements  falling  within  Member  State  competence, 
provided such provisions fall within the scope of Union law. But also as far as the Member States' 
freedom to exercise their own powers under a given mixed agreement are concerned, the Court 
imposes restraints deriving from the duty of sincere cooperation. It has made clear that Article 4 (3) 
TEU entails legal and enforceable obligations that may be particularly stringent where Member 
State and Union competence is interlinked (A.).  The duty of cooperation,  furthermore,  imposes 
specific obligations of a procedural nature at the level of participation under a mixed agreement 
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(B.), but it may also go so far as to entail a substantive obligation of result (C.). 
A. The duty of cooperation – A legal and enforceable obligation 
Initially, the obligations deriving from Article 4 (3) TEU were phrased in general terms. The Court's  
first indications as to the applicability of the duty of loyalty in the context of mixity were given in 
Ruling 1/781078 concerning the conclusion of a  mixed agreement  in the context  of the Euratom 
Treaty. The envisaged agreement fell partly within exclusive EU competence and partly outside EU 
competence. Finding that there was a “close interrelationship between the powers of the [Union] 
and those of the Member States” with regard to certain parts of the agreement, the Court held the 
participation of both the Member States and the Union was required1079. The Court placed special 
emphasis  on  Article  192  EAEC,  the  Euratom  Treaty's  equivalent  of  Article  4  (3)  TEU,  and 
concluded that 
“the Draft Convention put forward by the international agency can be implemented as regards the 
[Union] only by means of a close association between the institutions of the [Union] and the Member 
States both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the obligation entered 
into1080.”
This obligation of “close co-operation”1081 was thus aimed at ensuring the implementation of the 
mixed agreement. To that end, the Member States were required to work closely together with the 
Union institutions in the various stages of a mixed agreement, from its negotiation to substantive 
compliance with the adopted provisions. 
In Opinion 2/911082, the Court held that this “duty of cooperation” also applied in the context of the 
EC Treaty, since “it results from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
[Union]”1083. The Court declared that the duty of cooperation could vary in its intensity, depending 
on  the  circumstances  of  the  specific  case.  In  the  case  at  hand,  the  Union  was  unable,  under 
international law, to conclude an agreement and had to rely on the Member States to act on its 
behalf. The duty of cooperation was, therefore, “all the more necessary” in this case1084. As a result, 
1078 Ruling 1/78 re Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear  
Materials, Facilities and Transports [1978] ECR 2151.
1079 Ibid., paras 31 and 32.
1080 Ibid., para 34, emphasis added.
1081 Ibid., para 36.
1082 Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the ILO [1993] ECR I-1061.
1083 Ibid., para 36.
1084 Ibid., para 37.
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both  the  Union  institutions  and  the  Member  States  were  required  to  “take  all the  measures 
necessary so  as  best  to  ensure  such  cooperation”1085.  However,  the  question  of  what  specific 
obligations these necessary measures entailed was left unanswered. 
In the  FAO case1086 concerning the exercise of voting rights by the EU and the Member States 
within the UN Fisheries and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Court confirmed that the duty of 
cooperation had legal  effects.  In order to  facilitate  the joint  participation of the Union and the 
Member States within the FAO, the Council and the Commission adopted an arrangement setting up 
a  coordination  procedure  between  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States.  The  Commission 
brought proceedings asking to annul a Council decision which granted voting rights to the Member 
States on a subject-matter on which the Union should have voted, in line with the terms of the  
Arrangement.  The  Council  questioned  the  very  admissibility  of  the  case  brought  by  the 
Commission, arguing that 
“any decision  that  may have  been  taken  was  a  matter  purely of  procedure  or  protocol  and  was 
incapable of affecting the rights of the Commission or the allocation of competence as between the 
[Union] and the Member States.”1087 
Advocate  General  Jacobs agreed with the Council.  As the action  did  not  concern  any genuine 
dispute on the  substance of the mixed agreement in question, it was not evident that any of the 
Member States had acted to the detriment of the Union's interest1088. The Court of Justice, however, 
firmly rejected this reasoning, declaring that there was indeed a Union interest at stake. The Council 
vote was not a simple procedural mishap, as it was capable of having legal effects on the Union's  
position  on  the  international  scene1089.  In  the  specific  case,  the  duty  flowed  directly  from the 
arrangement concluded between the Council and the Commission: 
“In  the  present  case,  section  2.3  of  the  Arrangement  between  the  Council  and  the  Commission  
represents fulfilment of that duty of cooperation between the [Union] and its Member States within the 
FAO1090.” 
In other words, as Heliskoski notes, “it was through the concept of the duty of co-operation that the 
Arrangement  […] was  vested  with  normative  content”1091.  As a  result,  the  Council  decision  to 
conclude the draft agreement was annulled.
1085 Ibid., para 38, emphasis added.
1086 Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council (FAO) [1996] ECR I-1469.
1087 Ibid., para 30.
1088 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council (FAO), paras 50-59.
1089 Ibid., para 37.
1090 Ibid., para 49.
1091 J.  Heliskoski,  Mixed  Agreements  as  a  Technique  for  Organizing  the  International  Relations  of  the  European  
Community and its Member States, 65.
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Opinion  1/941092 did  not  add  to  the  clarification  of  the  specific  obligations  under  the  duty  of 
cooperation, but it provided some useful indications as to the limits of the requirement of unity as in 
the context of mixed agreements. The Commission argued that the participation of the Member 
States in the administration of the WTO Agreements would undermine the EU's unity of action vis-
à-vis the rest of the world. The Court held instead that the Member States and the EU institutions 
were under a duty of close cooperation. This duty was of particular relevance in the present case, 
since the WTO Agreements were “inextricably interlinked”, which made cooperation in matters of 
retaliation all the more imperative1093. 
B. Procedural obligations in the context of mixed agreements – The MOX Plant case 
Having established that the restraints under mixed agreements stemming from Article 4 (3) TEU 
entailed enforceable obligations, the Court specified in the MOX Plant case what precise obligations 
the duty of cooperation gave rise to. Once it was established that Ireland had violated the exclusive 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  under  Article  344 TFEU by initiating  international  dispute 
settlement  proceedings  on  matters  that  fell  within  the  scope  of  Union  competence,  the  Court 
considered the Commission's claim that Ireland had failed in its duty of cooperation under Article 4 
(3) TEU by bringing those proceedings unilaterally without having first informed and consulted the 
competent Union institutions. In fact, Ireland had not informed the Commission of its intention to 
bring a dispute before a tribunal of international arbitration, since all consultation occurred only 
after Ireland had brought dispute-settlement proceedings within the framework of the international 
agreement at issue. 
The Court of Justice first recalled that the Member States and the Union institutions were under a 
particular obligation of close cooperation in fulfilling the commitments undertaken by them under 
joint competence where a mixed agreement related to an area in which Member State and Union 
competence was closely interrelated1094. In the specific case, it went on, 
“[t]he act  of  submitting a dispute of this  nature to a judicial  forum such as the Arbitral  Tribunal  
involves  the risk that  a judicial  forum other  than the Court  will  rule  on the scope of obligations 
imposed on the Member States pursuant to [Union] law.”1095 
Against this background, Ireland was under a “duty to inform and consult the competent [Union] 
1092 Opinion 1/94 re WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267.
1093 Ibid., para 109.
1094 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), paras 175 and 176.
1095 Ibid., para 177. 
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institutions prior to instituting dispute-settlement proceedings […]”1096. As it had failed to fulfil this 
obligation, Ireland was found to have acted in violation of Article 4 (3) TEU. 
The Court thus confirms that the duty of loyalty imposes binding and enforceable obligations in the 
context of mixity. Indeed, under mixed agreements, these obligations may be particularly stringent 
if the joint exercise of competence concerns an area in which Union and Member State powers are 
intertwined. More importantly in this case, the Court makes clear that Article 4 (3) TEU may entail  
specific procedural duties, such as the obligation of information and consultation. 
The wording of the judgment suggests that these procedural duties are obligations of best efforts. 
However, in its submissions, Ireland had raised doubts whether such best efforts would have been 
sufficient to satisfy the Commission's request of a specific conduct: 
“Ireland adds  that,  in  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  prior  consultation  would  not  have  made  it  
possible to reconcile the respective views as the Commission was clearly of the opinion that Ireland  
could not have recourse to the dispute-settlement procedure under the Convention.”1097
In other words, Ireland objected that the Commission would have rejected the route of international 
arbitration in any event, regardless of whether or not consultation between the two had taken place 
on the matter. The legal literature seems undecided on whether the obligation incumbent on Ireland 
in the MOX Plant case was one of best endeavours or one of result. It was argued that in the context 
of  mixity,  “the  obligation  incumbent  on  Member  States  is  a  best  efforts  obligation”1098.  Thus, 
consultation is necessary to reduce the risk of divergence, but ultimately, the requirement may be 
fulfilled “even if consultation ends with the decision that Member States may express their own 
position”1099. In the specific case, the duty of consultation would therefore “not necessarily imply 
refraining from having recourse to an Arbitral Tribunal”1100. 
Indeed,  two Member States were able to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in a 
similar dispute without any infringement proceedings being brought by the Commission1101. In the 
Ijzeren Rijn dispute, an arbitral tribunal had to decide on a dispute between the Netherlands and 
Belgium concerning the costs for the reopening of an old railway line. The parties requested the 
tribunal to take EU law into consideration, as they recognised from the outset that Article 4 (3) TEU 
and  Article  344  TFEU  concerning  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  could  be 
relevant. The arbitral tribunal, however, came to the conclusion that it was able to render its award 
1096 Ibid., para 179.
1097 Ibid., para 165.
1098 E. Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty”, 355.
1099 Ibid. at 356.
1100 Ibid.
1101 Ibid. at 356, footnote 106.
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without having to apply or interpret Union rules. In the aftermath of the  MOX Plant judgment, it 
was argued that there was no difference between the MOX Plant and Ijzeren Rijn cases concerning 
the potential violation of Articles 4 (3) TEU and 344 TFEU1102. In the latter case, the two Member 
States  involved  were  able  to  persuade  the  tribunal  that  Article  344 TFEU was  not  applicable, 
although both were aware of the fact that this was most likely in breach of the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice1103. If the Commission had decided to bring proceedings against Belgium and 
the  Netherlands  for  violating  EU law,  the  Court  of  Justice  would  have  been  able  to  render  a 
conflicting judgment1104. Under those circumstances, it is questionable whether it can be derived 
from the  Ijzeren  Rijn dispute  that  Member  States  are  generally  free  to  circumvent  the  Court's 
exclusive jurisdiction, provided that they have consulted and informed the Commission. 
The  MOX  Plant  case  does  not  answer  the  question  of  whether  the  obligations  incumbent  on 
Member States under mixed agreements go beyond strictly procedural duties of best efforts. The 
judgment suggests that “a 'best endeavours' obligation based on the duty of co-operation could also 
entail the obligation to reach a certain result”1105. However, the Court remains silent on whether the 
duty of cooperation may entail an obligation to refrain from acting altogether. It has been pointed 
out that there was “no particular need for the Court to be more specific on this point”, given that it 
had  already  found  that  instituting  dispute  settlement  proceedings  violated  its  exclusive 
jurisdiction1106. 
C. A duty of abstention? The Swedish PFOs case 
The question of whether the duty of cooperation may amount to a duty to abstain was answered in 
the  Swedish  PFOS  case1107 concerning the  Member  States'  and the  Union's  participation  in  the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, a mixed agreement regulating substances 
which are harmful to the environment. The Court was asked to rule on the extent of the Member  
States' obligations under Article 4 (3) TEU in an area of shared competence and, specifically, the 
question  of  whether  this  duty  was  capable  of  imposing  an  obligation  to  abstain  from  acting 
altogether.
1102 N. Lavranos, “The MOX Plant and Ijzeren Rijn Disputes: Which Court is the Supreme Arbiter?” (2006) 19 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 223 at 241.
1103 Ibid.
1104 Ibid.
1105 G. De Baere, “'O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty?' Some Thoughts on the Duty of Loyal Co-operation and the 
Union's External Environmental Competences in the Light of the PFOS Case”, 417, emphasis added. 
1106 C. Hillion, “Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations”, 99.
1107 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden [2010] ECR I-3317.
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In  August  2004,  the  Commission  had  presented  a  proposal  for  a  Council  decision  requesting 
authorisation to submit to the Stockholm Convention and the Aarhus Protocol a certain number of 
chemicals (POPs) to be included in their annexes. This proposal did not, initially, cover a specific 
type of  POP named perfluoroctane  sulfonate (PFO),  which  Sweden proposed to  include in  the 
common proposal. Although the Union and the Member States subsequently agreed on two POPs 
that would be put forward for inclusion in the Aarhus Protocol, no decision was taken regarding the 
inclusion of PFOs. This was because work was ongoing on the identification of control measures at  
EU level and a proposal for inclusion in the Aarhus Protocol was not to be submitted until the 
Commission had reached a decision on those measures. A decisive factor in the decision to propose 
PFOs for inclusion in the annexes were also the economic consequences of such a proposal, which 
could have resulted in calls for financial aid by developing countries. Before such a decision was 
taken,  however,  Sweden unilaterally submitted a proposal to include PFOs in the annex of the 
Stockholm Convention. A few months later, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Directive 
regulating  the  marketing  and  use  of  PFOs  which  entered  into  force  a  year  later.  After  an 
unsuccessful attempt at encouraging Sweden to comply with the formal notice alleging a breach of 
(current) Article 4 (3) TEU, the Commission decided to start infringement proceedings before the 
Court of Justice.
Sweden argued in its submissions that the duty of cooperation was “limited in scope” in areas of 
shared competence1108. The Court accepted that competence over the matter was indeed shared and 
proceeded  to  reiterate  the  standard  formula  concerning  the  duty  of  cooperation  in  mixed 
agreements. Where it was apparent that the subject-matter of an agreement fell partly within Union 
competence and partly within that of its Member States, it was essential to ensure close cooperation 
between the  Member  States  and the  Union institutions,  both  in  the  process  of  negotiation  and 
conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into. This obligation flowed from the 
requirement of unity in the international representation of the Union1109. With regard to Sweden's 
submission that the duty of cooperation was limited in scope in areas of shared competence, the 
Court recalled its  findings in previous cases,  Commission v. Luxembourg1110 and  Commission v.  
Germany1111, where it had held that the duty of cooperation was of general application and did not 
depend on the nature of the Union competence concerned. In these cases1112, the Court had held that 
the Member States were subject to special duties in a situation in which the Council had adopted a 
1108 Ibid., para 70.
1109 Ibid., paras 72 and 73.
1110 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, para 58.
1111 Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany, para 64.
1112 See Chapter Two for the factual background of these cases.
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decision authorising the Commission to negotiate a multilateral agreement on behalf of the EU. The 
adoption of such a decision marked the start of a concerted Union action at international level and 
triggered “if not a duty of abstention on the part of the Member States, at the very least a duty of 
close cooperation”1113. In an earlier case cited by the Court, Commission v. United Kingdom1114, the 
Member States had even been found to be under a duty of  abstention in a situation in which the 
Commission  had  submitted  to  the  Council  proposals  which,  although  not  yet  adopted  by  the 
Council, represented the point of departure for concerted Union action1115. 
In the present case, however, there was no formal decision regarding a proposal to include PFOs in 
the annex of the Stockholm Convention. Nevertheless, this did not mean that no concerted Union 
action had been initiated. In the view of the Court, the mere existence of a Union strategy not to 
propose the listing of the substance in the context of the Convention was sufficient to impose such 
duties of action and abstention1116. Indeed, it was not “indispensable that a common position take a 
specific form for it to exist and to be taken into consideration in an action for failure to fulfil the 
obligation of cooperation in good faith”1117. Examining whether such a strategy had already been 
adopted at the time when Sweden submitted its unilateral proposal, the Court found that there was 
“no ‘decision-making vacuum’ or even a waiting period equivalent to the absence of a decision”, 
because it  had been intended  not to  reach a  decision  not  to  add PFOs to  the  list  of  proposed 
substances1118.  There  was,  therefore,  a  “concerted  common strategy”  within  the  Council  not  to 
propose the addition of PFOs to the Stockholm Convention, which Sweden “dissociated” itself from 
by unilaterally submitting such a proposal1119. 
In the second strand of its reasoning, the Court of Justice argued that Sweden's unilateral proposal 
had legal consequences for the Union1120. Since the Union was also a party to the mixed agreement, 
it could be bound by the resulting amendment to the annex. In that regard, Sweden sought to rely on 
(current)  Article 193 TFEU which allowed Member States to  introduce more stringent national 
measures in environmental matters. The Swedish Government submitted that its unilateral proposal 
was equivalent to a national measure which was more stringent than minimum Union measures. 
However, the Court had no difficulty in refuting this argument, by pointing out that the Union could 
be bound by an amendment to an annex to the Stockholm Convention, whilst it would not be bound 
1113 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 75; see also Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, para 60 and 
Case C-433/03 Commission v Germany, para 66.
1114 Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom, see Chapter Two.
1115 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 74.
1116 Ibid., para 76.
1117 Ibid., para 77.
1118 Ibid., para 87.
1119 Ibid., para 91.
1120 Ibid., paras 92-101.
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by national measures1121. Bringing the two strands of its reasoning together, the Court concluded 
that the Commission's complaint alleging a breach of Article 4 (3) TEU was well founded. 
In its previous case law on the duty of sincere cooperation in the context of mixed agreements, the  
Court of Justice had not pronounced itself on the potential scope of Article 4 (3) TFEU and the 
question of whether that provision was capable of imposing a duty of abstention on the Member 
States. Abstention is a concept commonly associated with exclusive Union competence, while in 
areas of shared competence,  Member States are generally free to act within the realms of their 
powers. Nevertheless, the Court in this case came to the conclusion that the Member States were 
required to abstain from acting altogether. 
It is noteworthy how the Court constructs its line of argument on the basis of similar earlier cases, 
applying their rationales to this case which differs from the cited case law in important aspects. 
Relying on Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom, the Court pointed out that it had already 
held in the past that the Member States were subject to a duty of abstention where the Commission 
had submitted proposals which represented the point of departure for concerted Union action. What 
the Court did not mention in that regard, however, is that Commission v. United Kingdom concerned 
a case of supervening exclusive Union competence. The situation in Commission v. United Kingdom 
thus differs from the Swedish PFOS case in an important point. While the latter concerned an area 
of shared competence, the situation in Commission v. United Kingdom was characterised by the fact 
that the field of law at issue was “reserved to the powers of the [Union]” and the Member States 
were, as a result, only allowed to act “as trustees of the common interest”1122.
Similarly, the Court applied its reasoning from the Commission v. Luxembourg and Commission v.  
Germany judgments1123 to the present case. Here again, the factual and legal situation differs from 
the Swedish PFOS case. In the Commission v. Luxembourg and Commission v. Germany cases, the 
Court stopped short of imposing a duty of abstention, holding that once a concerted Union action 
has been initiated, the Member States are “if  not a duty of abstention on the part of the Member 
States,  at  the  very  least  a  duty  of  close  cooperation”1124.  Moreover,  in  the  Commission  v.  
Luxembourg and  Commission v. Germany cases, the Council had adopted a decision granting the 
Commission the corresponding negotiating mandate. Such a formal decision, however, was absent 
in  this  case.  The  Court,  therefore,  considered  whether  this  kind  of  formality  was  absolutely 
necessary in order to trigger a duty of abstention. Interestingly, the Court relied on the FAO case1125 
in order to reinforce its argument that it  was not “indispensable that a common position take a 
1121 Ibid., para 102.
1122 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR I-1045, para 30.
1123 Cases C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, and C-433/03 Commission v. Germany.
1124 Cases C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, para. 60 and C-433/03 Commission v. Germany, para 66.
1125 Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council (FAO).
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specific form for it to exist and to be taken into consideration in an action for failure to fulfil the 
obligation of cooperation”1126. In the relevant paragraph of the FAO case, the Court explains how the 
arrangement  between  the  Council  and  the  Commission  represents  fulfilment  of  the  duty  of 
cooperation. In the words of the Court, it is “clear […] that the two institutions  intended to enter 
into a binding commitment towards each other”1127. In the present case, by contrast, there is neither 
a codification of the respective commitments nor is  there any formal act from which Sweden's 
intention to be bound by a certain strategy may be deduced. It is, therefore, questionable whether 
the analogy with  the  FAO judgment  is  applicable  to  the  Swedish PFOS case.  Thus,  it  remains 
doubtful whether there was a basis, in earlier case law, for the finding that a formal decision taken 
in the Council may be replaced by informal and vague concepts such as the adoption of a “common 
strategy”. 
What emerges from the Swedish PFOS case then is an expansion of the scope of the duty of sincere 
cooperation in the context of participation in mixed agreements in a two-fold manner. Firstly, the 
normative scope of the duty has been extended so as to include an obligation of abstention in areas  
of non-exclusive competence.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its findings from 
earlier case law that concerned areas of exclusive Union competence. In fact, the restraints imposed 
by the Court's ruling in the Swedish PFOS case do not differ in any way from those that were found 
to exist in the Greek IMO1128 case concerning an area of exclusive EU powers. Like Sweden in the 
present case, the Greek Government had submitted legislative proposals within the framework of its 
participation in an international organisation. The Court found that the subject-matter was covered 
by exclusive competence, giving rise to a duty on the Member States to abstain from unilateral 
action.  Although  the  Court  of  Justice  itself  acknowledged  that  the  present  case  had  to  be 
“distinguished  from the  situation  at  issue  in  Case  C-45/07  Commission v  Greece [...],  which 
concerned  exclusive  competence”1129,  its  reasoning  nevertheless  gives  rise  to  the  same  type  of 
restraints. In other words, Sweden was de facto pre-empted from acting within the meaning of the 
AETR principle.
In addition to an expansion of the normative scope of the duty of sincere cooperation, the Court  
extended its temporal scope. It is no longer necessary that a formal decision be taken within the 
ambit of the decision-making process governing the relations between the Union institutions, but 
the existence of a “common strategy” is sufficient to prevent the Member States from acting on 
their own. It remains unclear where the temporal limits of this approach are to be located, i.e. at 
1126 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 77.
1127 Ibid., emphasis added.
1128 Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECR I-701, see Chapter Two. 
1129 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 72.
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what point in time a sufficiently precise concerted strategy can be found to have been adopted and 
who must have consented to the adoption of such a strategy. Against this background, it has been 
argued that the requirements for a concerted strategy to exist are “not very high”: 
“[C]onclusions of the Council (which are political to their nature), minutes of a Council working party 
(ie a preparatory body with no decision-making powers) and events subsequent to the action of a 
Member  State  the  legality of  which  is  to  be  reviewed,  taken  together,  may be  conducive  to  the 
existence of a 'common strategy'.”1130
In the absence of any formal decision, the application of the reasoning underlying Commission v.  
Luxembourg and  Commission v.  Germany according to which the Member States were under a 
“duty of,  if  not  of  abstention,  at  least  of close cooperation” would have then been a  generous 
approach to the principle of unity. Nevertheless, the Court took this reasoning even one step further,  
finding that the existence of a common strategy was sufficient to require abstention from acting. In 
this sense, the adoption of a “concerted strategy” is attributed the same legal effects as the pre-
emption of an entire field of law within the meaning of the  AETR principle. Since the  Swedish 
PFOS case only differed from these previous cases in as far as its context of mixity was concerned, 
it  appears that,  in  the view of the Court of Justice,  the “principle  of unity in  the international  
representation of the Union and its  Member States”1131 is  so stringent when the Union and the 
Member States act together under a mixed agreement that it warrants a two-fold expansion of the 
scope of the duty of sincere cooperation. 
IV.  Assessment:  The requirement  of  unity  and mixed  agreements  –  A  conservative  fidelity 
approach?
The Court's judgment in the Swedish PFOS case illustrates that “the line between cooperation and 
competence may be thin”1132. In fact, the obligation imposed on the Member States to abstain from 
acting and comply with a concerted Union strategy “comes close to an obligation of result”1133. The 
imposition of such strict substantive duties in areas of shared powers risks “blurring the essential 
1130 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 561.
1131 See the Court's conclusions in Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 104.
1132 P. Van Elsuwege, “Commission v. Sweden. Case C-246/07” (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 307 
at 311.
1133 Ibid, emphasis added.
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distinction between exclusive and shared Union competence”1134. 
If the Court of Justice seeks to restrain the exercise of Member State competence to the point of 
rendering  national  powers  obsolete,  does  this  mean  that  it  is  pursuing  a  conservative  fidelity 
approach in this case? As we saw earlier, the conservative vision of federalism aims at obtaining a 
unitary alignment of interests between the Union and the Member States. Among the instances of 
conservative fidelity identified by Halberstam, the Court's judgment in the Swedish PFOs case most 
closely resembles that of the duty of “political support”1135. According to proponents of such a duty, 
the Member States should be required to advance Union integration when meeting in the Council. The 
Member States may then be under an obligation to facilitate the formation of Union policies1136. 
Halberstam argues that such an obligation of political support would be “a naked attempt to force an 
alignment of interests upon the diverse actors within the system”1137. As a result, “[n]ot only would 
acceptance of this duty spell the end of federalism, it would spell the end of democracy as well”1138.
Although the restraints imposed in the Swedish PFOs case have the effect of preventing Member State 
participation under a mixed agreement, it is not evident that they were imposed with a view to furthering 
political harmony as the conservative fidelity approach would. The rationale behind the restraints imposed 
in the Swedish PFOS case was not to prevent the adoption of international rules liable to affect Union law. 
In fact, if the Council had decided not to take any action regarding the inclusion of PFOS into the annex of 
the mixed agreement at hand, Sweden would have been free to act. However, such a decision was still  
pending. 
The Court's analysis is “fundamentally geared towards the specific facts of the case and the international 
context in which the Union and the Member States operate together”1139. In previous cases concerning the 
Member States' freedom to act under an international agreement, duties of abstention and cooperation 
were  triggered  by the  adoption  of  a  Council  decision  authorising  the  Commission  to  negotiate  a 
multilateral agreement on behalf of the EU1140. The adoption of such a decision marked the start of a 
concerted Union action at international level. In the Swedish PFOS case, however, there was no formal 
decision  regarding  a  proposal  to  include  PFOs  in  the  annex  of  the  Stockholm  Convention. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that no concerted Union action had been initiated. In the view of the 
Court, the mere existence of a Union “strategy” not to propose the listing of the substance in the 
1134 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 561.
1135 See D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 11. 
1136 Ibid.
1137 Ibid.
1138 Ibid.
1139 G. De Baere, “'O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty?'”, 410.
1140 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg, at para 58 and Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany, at para 64. See 
also the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, case withdrawn. 
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context of the Convention, was sufficient to impose such duties of action and abstention1141.  The 
common strategy in this case consisted in the decision reached in the Council's “international environment 
group”  that  a  common  proposal  would  be  made  regarding  the  inclusion  of  PFOs  into  the  mixed 
agreement. 
The decisive criterion in the Court's construction of the duty of abstention is “whether independent 
Member State action is likely to impede the Union's action”1142. If Sweden had been free to unilaterally 
propose the listing of PFOs, the adoption of a possible common proposal by the Union and the Member 
States would have been impossible. The adoption of international measures would have then been binding 
on the EU. Thus, it has been argued that the “consequences for the Union” constitute the main standard for 
assessing the obligations incumbent on Member States in the context of mixed agreements1143. By contrast, 
AG Maduro had held that the foundation of the restraints in this context should be located in the duty to  
facilitate the  effective exercise of Union competence1144. He concluded that Sweden's proposal did not 
necessarily affect Union powers, as the EU retained the possibility to influence the technical review of 
PFOs and submit proposals concerning their treatment. The criterion based on the consequences for the 
Union is “more flexible” than the Advocate General's approach: 
“Whereas  Maduro’s  approach  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Sweden’s  proposal  to  add  PFOS  to  the 
Convention does not necessarily jeopardize the EU’s competence, […] the ECJ points at the implications 
for the unity of the EU’s representation and the ensuing legal uncertainty for the member states and third 
parties.”1145
The Court's reasoning in the Swedish PFOs judgment thus appears to be linked with the nature of the 
agreement at issue having been concluded as mixed1146. The duty of cooperation is particularly stringent 
where international Member State action is likely to affect the autonomy of the Union legal order. That is 
the case if national measures lead to the adoption of international rules binding on the EU, impeding the 
Union's decision-making process. 
A similar rationale emerges from the MOX Plant case, where the Court held that the act of submitting to an 
international tribunal a dispute relating to an area of closely interrelated competences involved the risk that 
a tribunal other than the Court itself would rule on the scope of obligations imposed by EU law 1147. The 
rationale underlying the Court's approach thus appears to be refraining Member States from unilateral 
action where such action is liable to lead to the promulgation of norms at international level which entail 
1141 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 76.
1142 G. De Baere, “'O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty?'”, 410.
1143 P. Van Elsuwege, “Commission v. Sweden. Case C-246/07”, 312.
1144 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), para 38.
1145 P. Van Elsuwege, “Commission v. Sweden. Case C-246/07”, 312.
1146 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 561.
1147 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant), paras 176-177.
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consequences for the Union, be they treaty rules or rulings of an international tribunal. 
As we saw in Section I., the Court of Justice adopts a similarly generous approach to its jurisdiction to 
interpret and enforce provisions contained in mixed agreements. It accepts its own competence to give a 
preliminary ruling where there is a Union interest in uniform interpretation, regardless of whether a 
given provision falls within the sphere of Member State competence or within that of the EU. Where 
there is EU legislation in a given field, provisions of a mixed agreement falling within this field come 
within the scope of Union law. In matters of shared competence, therefore, there is a Union interest in the 
performance by the Member States of a mixed agreement in its entirety. This broad criterion suggest that 
only in areas clearly falling within Member State competence, provisions of mixed agreements would not 
be covered by the Court's jurisdiction. The fact that it is often difficult to establish whether a given 
provision falls within EU or national competence, in combination with the possible consequences for the 
EU as regards international responsibility for the infringement of a mixed agreement, requires that the 
Court is competent to interpret also those provisions that fall within the competence of the Member 
States1148. Therefore, the requirement of  uniformity, it was argued by Advocate General Tesauro in the 
Hermès case, has to be regarded as “fundamental” in the context of the interpretation and application of 
mixed agreements1149. 
The need for uniform application of international agreements within the EU, however, is “not an absolute 
requirement”, as Advocate General Cosmas pointed out in Dior/Assco1150. In fact, as Heliskoski has put it, 
“the requirement of uniformity in the interpretation and application of all the provisions of a mixed 
agreement […] fails to explain why the interpretation of a mixed agreement should always be uniform, 
given that part of the subject-matter of the agreement as a rule falls within national competence and may 
touch  upon  interests  of  the  Member  States  which  no  concept  of  [Union]  unity  is  capable  of 
accommodating”.1151
Against  this  background,  it  has  been argued that  the  concern  to  ensure  the  unity of  action  in  the 
international representation of the Union cannot justify departing from the division of powers between the 
Union and the Member States1152. As the Court's approach of considering a mixed agreement in its 
entirety a source of EU law obligations on the Member States constrains national competences to 
implement  and  interpret  the  national  provisions  of  mixed  agreements  through  the  infringement 
procedure and the recognition of full interpretative competence for the Court of Justice, an overly 
broad approach to  recognising  its  jurisdiction  may,  in  fact,  create  the  effect  of  exclusive  Union 
1148 Ibid.
1149 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Hermès, para 20.
1150 Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-292/98, para 61, emphasis added. 
1151 J. Heliskoski, “The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of 
Mixed Agreements”, 409.
1152 Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-292/98, para 69.
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competence in areas in which competence is shared. 
The closest that the Court of Justice has come to blurring the division of competences was in the 
Étang de Berre judgment. While the preceding  Berne Convention case concerned an area of law 
partly covered by Union legislation, the alleged breach of obligations at issue in  Étang de Berre  
related to parts of a mixed agreement which were not covered by EU rules. The Court nevertheless 
found that there was a Union interest in compliance, since the mixed agreement created rights and 
obligations in a field covered in large measure by EU legislation. The Court thus reasoned along the 
same lines of its  AETR judgment, where the occupation of a given field of law had the effect of 
turning a shared competence into an exclusive Union competence. Notwithstanding the absence of 
any Union rules in the field, the Court restrained the Member States' competence to implement the 
mixed  agreement  as  it  would  in  an  area  of  exclusive  EU  powers.  The  judgment  effectively 
harmonised the interests of the Member States and the Union in the subject-matter at issue. As the 
Court acknowledged, the Union had not adopted any rules concerning discharges of water into a 
saltwater marsh, but nevertheless, the judgment “mimics the existence of a unitary system” in line 
with a conservative fidelity view to federalism1153. In fact, the Court adopted such a broad approach to 
the scope of compliance obligations under EU law that a number of commentators assumed that the 
Union had actually exercised a non-exclusive competence by concluding the mixed agreement in 
question1154. 
The Court's reasoning in this case should not, however, be understood as a strategy of enforcing 
political harmony between the Union and the Member States where the division of competences says 
otherwise. In fact, the Court is careful to link the recognition of its jurisdiction with the nature of the 
agreement at issue being mixed. Discharges of fresh water and alluvia into a saltwater marsh fell 
within the Union framework because “those articles are in mixed agreements […] and concern a field 
in large measures covered by [Union] law”1155. The wording chosen by the Court thus suggests that 
the mere fact that the provisions in question created obligations in a field largely covered by EU rules 
was not sufficient to impose compliance restraints on the Member States. It was only in combination 
with the mixed nature of the agreement in which they were contained that the provisions were capable 
of being enforced by the Court of Justice. 
Here again, we see that the duty of sincere cooperation is all the more imperative where it operates in 
the context of mixity. Nevertheless, if the restraints flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU are to remain in 
1153 For the characteristics of this type of fidelity, see D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 736-737.
1154 See P. J. Kuijper, “Case C-239/03, Commission v. French Republic, judgment of the Court of 7 October 2004”; P. 
Koutrakos,  EU International Relations Law, 205; A. Rosas, “International Dispute Settlement: EU Practices and 
Procedures” (2003) 46 German Yearbook of International  Law 284; see also the Opinion of Advocate General 
Maduro in Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, para 33.
1155 Case C-239/03 Commission v. France, para 31, emphasis added.
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the realms of a liberal fidelity approach, they cannot have the effect of depriving the Member States 
of their powers. Indeed, the Court of Justice itself has held that considerations concerning the unity of 
action are not capable of modifying the allocation of competences between the EU and the Member 
States1156. In the Court's attempts to balance the effectiveness of external Union action with the respect 
for  the  Member  States'  competence,  we  may  find,  it  was  argued  above,  a  few  instances  of 
conservative fidelity. The broad construction of the loyalty obligations in these cases notwithstanding, 
the restraints flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU have nevertheless been predicated on the scope of Union 
law.  Thus,  the  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  enforce  provisions  of  a  mixed agreement  falling  within 
Member State competence even in the absence of Union rules relating to the subject-matter, provided 
that the field of law is covered to a large extent by EU legislation. Furthermore, it also has jurisdiction 
to interpret provisions of a mixed agreement even if they fall outside Union competence, if these are 
of a procedural nature and could therefore hypothetically apply also to EU rules. Finally, the duty of 
cooperation may require the Member States to abstain from acting altogether even in the absence of a 
common position on the subject-matter. In that case, however, an identifiable Union position must be 
found to exist  “which can be established to the requisite legal standard”1157.  It  thus emerges that 
however broad the Court's understanding of the “scope of Union law” may be, a specific link with 
Union  rules  is  nevertheless  required  before  the  Member  States'  freedom to  act  under  a  mixed 
agreement may be restrained. Where the Union and the Member States jointly exercise a competence 
by concluding a mixed agreement, therefore, the Member States are neither free to act as sovereign 
states,  nor  reduced to  a  position  of  trustees  of  the  Union interest.  Rather,  the  Court's  generous 
construction of its jurisdiction to interpret and apply mixed agreements and the restraints flowing 
from the duty of cooperation in this respect are “the price the Member States are expected to pay for 
the prevailing position of mixity”1158.
V. Loyalty restraints in the context of mixed agreements concluded under the CFSP 
In stark contrast with the dynamic role played by Article 4 (3) TEU in governing the interpretation, 
implementation  and  management  of  mixed  EU-Member  State  agreements,  the  CFSP-specific 
loyalty obligation contained in Article 24 (3) TEU has received little attention in relation to mixed 
1156 Ibid., para 107.
1157 See Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden, para 77.
1158 P.  Koutrakos,  “The Elusive Quest  for  Uniformity in  EC External  Relations”  (2002) 4 Cambridge  Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 243 at 256.
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agreements. This is due to the fact that no mixed Union-Member States agreements covering the 
CFSP have  been  concluded  to  date.  The  absence  of  mixed  agreements  in  the  field  does  not, 
however, mean that no such agreements are possible. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced an express 
legal basis for the conclusion of international agreements by the Union as a whole. Although the EU 
has  made  active  use  of  its  treaty-making  competence  by  becoming  a  party  to  a  multitude  of 
international agreements,  these agreements have all  “perhaps ironically” been concluded by the 
Union on an exclusive basis1159. 
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,  the treaty-making capacity of the Union was  
disputed.  It  was  unclear  whether  the  Council  acted  on  behalf  of  the  EU when  concluding  an 
international agreement or whether it acted in the collective interest of the Member States becoming 
the contracting parties1160. Most Member States had doubts regarding the legal status of the Union 
and did not consider agreements concluded by the EU appropriate to be subjected to their regular 
parliamentary procedure1161. 
The Treaty of Lisbon put an end to this debate by confirming the international legal personality of 
the  Union  in  Article  47  TEU.  Furthermore,  the  Union's  capacity  to  conclude  international 
agreements covering the CFSP is explicitly provided in Article 37 TEU. Thus, both the EU and the 
Member States are competent to conclude (mixed) agreements in the area of the CFSP. In other 
policy  areas,  the  Union  generally  concludes  mixed  agreements  where  the  scope  of  Union 
competences is limited or the nature of its competences is non-exclusive. The nature of the Union's 
competence under the CFSP, too, is non-exclusive and could, therefore, give rise to mixity. As we 
saw  in  Chapter  One,  Union  competence  in  CFSP-matters  could  best  be  described  as  non-
preemptive,  meaning  that  the  Member  States  remain  entitled  to  enter  into  international 
commitments themselves. 
The Lisbon Treaty, thus, opens the door for mixed agreements within the CFSP. In fact, the creation 
of a single legal personality for the Union in Article 47 TEU may increase the Member States'  
interest in becoming a party to EU agreements in the field, as ratifications of such agreements at the 
domestic  level  are  no  longer  necessary  from  an  institutional  point  of  view1162.  Whenever  an 
agreement covered by the CFSP touches on areas of Member State competence, the latter “may 
wish to give their national parliaments a chance to approve an agreement by becoming a party 
1159 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 103.
1160 For more on this debate see R. Gosalbo Bono, “Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order”, 354-55.
1161 R. A. Wessel, “Cross-Pillar Mixity: Combining Competences in the Conclusion of EU International Agreements”, in 
C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 30 at 40. 
1162 R. A. Wessel, “Cross-Pillar Mixity”, 52. 
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themselves”1163. 
While  former  Article  24  (6)  TEU  provided  that  Union  agreements  were  binding  on  the  EU 
institutions, without any reference to the Member States, it is now explicitly stated in Article 216 
(2) TFEU that “[a]greements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union 
and on its Member States”1164. Thus, no distinction is made any longer between agreements based 
on the CFSP and other agreements as far as their binding nature are concerned. However, this does 
not mean that also those parts of a mixed agreement falling within national competence can be 
enforced as a Union law obligation, as in other policy areas. Most importantly in this respect, the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in CFSP matters continues to be excluded also after the entry 
into  force  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty1165.  As  a  result,  the  Court  is  incapable  of  interpreting  national 
provisions in conformity with a mixed CFSP agreement and of enforcing their compliance. But even if the 
Court were competent to rule on these questions, it is doubtful whether it could be argued that there is a 
Union  interest  in  the  uniform interpretation  and  application  of  those  provisions  of  a  mixed  CFSP 
agreement falling within national competence. 
Firstly, as far as the interpretation of mixed agreements is concerned, we saw above that the requirement 
of uniform interpretation is applied with a view to forestalling future differences in the interpretation of a 
provision of a mixed agreement1166. This reasoning cannot be applied to the CFSP. The non-pre-emptive 
nature of Union competence in the area means that both the Union and the Member States remain 
competent  to  conclude  international  agreements  under  the  CFSP.  Accordingly,  the  Member  States 
continue to be competent to interpret provisions of a mixed CFSP agreement, even if this may lead to 
inconsistencies with EU law in the future. 
Secondly,  the Court has recognised its  jurisdiction to enforce compliance also with those provision 
contained in mixed agreement which fall within national competence where the EU incurs international 
responsibility for the infringement of a mixed agreement. As the Court held in Étang de Berre and the 
MOX Plant case, “the Member States fulfil, within the [Union] system, an obligation in relation to the 
[Union], which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of that agreement”1167. With regard to 
the CFSP, however,  it  is not evident that the Union would incur international responsibility for the 
performance of a mixed agreement in its entirety. While there is nothing in the Treaties which provides for 
the conclusion that the Member States alone bear international responsibility within the CFSP, it is not 
1163 Ibid. at 53. 
1164 Emphasis added.
1165 See further M. G. Garbagnati Ketvel, “The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Respect of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy”.  
1166 See e.g. Case C-53/96 Hermès v. FHT, para 32.
1167 Case C-239/03 Commission v. France at para 15; C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland at para 85.
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evident either that the EU itself would be primarily responsible for any international wrongful acts in the 
area1168. 
However,  this  does  not  mean  that  provisions  of  mixed  agreements  falling  within  Member  State 
competence do not have to be interpreted and applied in conformity with CFSP rules. The requirement of 
uniform interpretation may, in fact, be relevant for the interpretation of provisions contained in mixed 
CFSP agreements by  national courts. In the  Pupino judgment, the Court of Justice held that “[w]hen 
applying national law, the national court that is called upon to interpret it must do so as far as possible in 
the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision” at issue1169. The case concerned a 
framework decision taken under the former third pillar, but it has been argued that the duty of consistent 
interpretation established in this case applies also to the CFSP1170. More generally, this would imply “that 
all national legislation should be interpreted as far as possible so as to comply with relevant CFSP 
acts”1171. 
Furthermore, while it appears problematic to transpose the Court's reasoning from its case law on the 
implementation of mixed agreements to the CFSP, the Member States are under an obligation to secure 
compliance with provisions of a mixed agreement which flows from Article 4 (3) TEU, rather than from 
the agreement itself. The Council is under an obligation under Article 4 (3) TEU “to ensure that the  
Member States comply with their CFSP obligations so as not to make the achievement of the [Union's] 
tasks more difficult”1172. Therefore, the Member States are under an obligation to comply not only with the 
CFSP-specific duty of loyalty aid down in Article 24 (3) TEU, but also with the more general loyalty 
obligation incorporated in Article 4 (3) TEU when acting under the CFSP. The same reasoning applies to 
Member States' participation within an international agreement. As we saw in Chapter Two, the Member 
States are subject to specific restraints of a procedural nature also when acting under the CFSP. Article 32 
TEU, which provides that the Member States shall consult each other within the European Council and 
the  Council  on  any CFSP matter  in  order  to  determine  a  common approach,  imposes  procedural 
obligations prior to the adoption of a common strategy in CFSP matters. In its role as a “necessary pre-
legislative procedure”1173, Article 32 TEU may restrain Member State action in other policy areas even 
before an exercise of Union competence has occurred. The obligation of information and consultation in 
Article 32 TFEU, however, is limited by the qualification that it applies to all matters “of general interest”. 
1168 See  further  L.  den  Hertog  and  R.  A.  Wessel,  “EU  Foreign,  Security  and  Defence  Policy:  A Competence-
Responsibility Gap?”, in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.),  International Responsibility: EU and International  
Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2013) 339.
1169 C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, para 43.
1170 G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 209.
1171 Ibid.
1172 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 111.
1173 R. Wessel, “The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations”, 179.
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The Member States, therefore, remain free to decide whether or not a matter is of general interest. The 
information and consultation obligation is, however, reinforced by the CFSP loyalty obligation laid down 
in Article 24 (3) TEU. This obligation becomes more substantive once the Union has acted1174,  for 
example, by concluding a (mixed) agreement. Procedural restraints could, furthermore, derive directly 
from the general loyalty obligation contained in Article 4 (3) TEU. On the basis of that provision, the 
Member States could be required to comply in good faith with their CFSP obligations. Firstly, given the 
proximity between Article 4 (3) TEU and Article 24 (3) TEU, there are reasons to interpret the former in 
the light of the latter1175. Secondly, Member States' compliance with their CFSP obligations is a means to 
fulfil the overall objective of the EU of asserting its international identity and to ensure the consistency 
and coherence of the Union's external activities1176. 
Against this background, it appears that when acting under a mixed CFSP agreement, the Member States 
would be under procedural obligations similar to those discussed above. Thus, like in the Swedish PFOS 
case, they would be required to inform and consult the other Member States and the relevant Union 
institutions before taking unilateral action once a Union position has emerged on a CFSP topic. As in other 
policy areas, it can be assumed that the duty of cooperation is particularly stringent when the Union and 
the Member States jointly exercise their competence by concluding a mixed agreement. An obligation of 
result, such as the duty to refrain from acting imposed by the Court of Justice in the Swedish PFOS case, 
would not, however, be compatible with the nature of CFSP competence. Neither Article 4 (3) TEU nor 
the CFSP-specific loyalty obligation under Article 24 (3) TEU can have the effect of precluding any 
further national action once a Union initiative has been started. Substantive obligations are, therefore, 
excluded in the context of mixed CFSP agreements.
1174 R. A. Wessel, “The EU as a Party to International Agreements”, 183.
1175 Ibid.
1176 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 111.
240
Concluding Chapter 
The EU Loyalty Obligation – From Exclusion to Complementarity
I. Introduction
Looking  at  some  of  the  developments  examined  in  the  foregoing  chapters  in  isolation,  the 
impression may arise that the exercise of the Member States' retained competence has increasingly 
and systematically been restrained by the Court of Justice to such an extent that the duty of sincere  
cooperation leaves them no more freedom of action than that of “doomed […] lemmings heading 
towards the edge of a cliff”1177. Court decisions impinging on national competence or the exercise 
thereof often result in national criticism that Member States' “sovereignty has been taken away by 
the European Court of Justice […] to the dismay of all”1178. Against this background, the present 
chapter will attempt to assess the Member States' position in respect of both the duty of sincere 
cooperation and the CFSP loyalty obligation. Are the restraints imposed on the exercise of Member 
State  competence really to  be understood as  restraints  on national  sovereignty,  or  is  the Court 
actually furthering the Member States' own interests? 
In order to assess this question, the chapter first summarises the Court's case law on Article 4 (3)  
TEU (Section II.),  on the basis of which a number of trends in the development of the loyalty 
obligation can be formulated (Section III.). The main part of the chapter is dedicated to assessing 
the impact of Article 4 (3) TEU on the Member States' status of sovereign states under international 
law (Section IV.). It concludes by examining to what extent the findings of the present thesis differ 
with regard to the CFSP (Section V.). 
II. Chapter summary – The scope of the loyalty obligation
A. From the exclusion to the retention of Member State competence 
The Court of Justice, as became apparent in Chapter One, has moved away over the years from the 
1177 Opinion of AG Maduro in case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), para 58, describing Sweden's position of 
being compelled to await the outcome of the Union decision-making process after unsuccessfully trying to achieve a 
common proposal on the matter.
1178 Lord Denning, Introduction to The European Court of Justice: Judges or Policy Makers? (The Bruges Group 1990).
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classic pre-emption doctrine in  AETR to the confirmation in Opinion 1/2003 that implied powers 
can be shared. Its emphasis has shifted from the exclusionary effect of EU legislation to a focus on 
increased participation of the Union alongside the Member States. The scope of implied EU powers 
has been extended, while the legal impact of such powers has been reduced. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court rendered a number of potentially far-reaching judgments which 
saw the creation of EU powers even in the absence of any express authorisation in the Treaty.  In 
AETR, the Court established the principle that the Union had corresponding external powers in all 
areas covered by the Treaty. Once Union powers had been exercised, a given field was considered 
occupied, with the result that the Member States were no longer able to act alongside the EU. At the 
same time,  it  linked the existence of  such implied powers  with their  exclusive nature.  Internal 
legislation was automatically assumed to be affected or its scope altered by international Member 
State measures. This type of exclusivity was subsequently found to arise also if the conclusion by 
the EU of an international agreement was necessary to reach a Union objective1179. The scope of 
implied powers was then expanded so as to include the whole scheme of the Treaty1180, before it was 
established that exclusive implied competence could also exist in areas which were only covered to 
a large extent by Union rules1181. The dynamic nature of implied powers was confirmed in Opinion 
1/2003, where the Court found that the assessment of whether a given area was largely covered had 
to take into account also the future development of Union law. 
On the other hand, the two strands of scope and nature of EU powers were increasingly separated, 
significantly restricting the AETR doctrine in its effect. In the 1990s, the Court began to accept that 
implied powers need not necessarily be exclusive in nature.  Where the rules at  issue lay down 
minimum requirements only, the Member States remain competent to act1182. In Opinion 1/2003, 
finally, the questions of existence and nature of implied competence were explicitly separated. A 
finding of exclusivity is now dependent on a detailed analysis of the relevant Union rules and the 
envisaged agreement, as well as on the nature and content of those provisions. At the same time, the 
Court leaves no doubt in Opinion 1/2003 that where the uniformity and “full effectiveness”1183 of 
Union law are at risk, Member State action remains precluded. 
After the wide-ranging implications of the Court's approach to implied powers in its early case law, 
the Member States sought to regain control over their foreign relations powers in the SEA and the  
Maastricht Treaty.  The expansion of the scope of the Treaties in the meantime, which provided 
express  attribution  of  external  relations  powers  to  the  Union,  indicates  that  the  transfer  of 
1179 Opinion 1/76.
1180 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer.
1181 Opinion 2/91.
1182 Ibid.
1183 Opinion 1/2003. 
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competence to the Union was not per se against the interest of the Member States. Rather, it was the 
growing scope of implied Union powers paired with its exclusive effect which led the Member 
States to limit the potential for further expansion of EU competence. When amending the Treaty, 
they decided to explicitly categorise the newly enacted express powers as non-exclusive. The Court 
of Justice subsequently adjusted its approach accordingly by recognising both exclusive and non-
exclusive  implied  powers.  As  a  result,  we  find  an  increasing  number  of  fields  in  which 
complementary Member State and Union action is accepted. 
As a general trend, it is thus possible to trace a development on two levels. On the one hand, the  
scope for implied powers to exist is expanded, while on the other hand, the restraining effect of such 
powers has been diminished and Member State participation alongside the Union is increasingly 
accepted.  Powers  are  no  longer  either  exclusive  or  concurrent.  The aim is  instead  to  ensure a 
uniform and consistent  application  of  EU rules  and the  proper  functioning of  the  system they 
establish,  with  an  overarching  objective  of  effet  utile,  as  most  recently  confirmed  in  Opinion 
1/2003. As long as Member States' international obligations do not encroach on these objectives, 
their presence alongside the Union remains allowed, while a full parallelism between internal and 
external powers of the Union is no longer the prime objective. 
B. Restraints on the exercise of Member State competence 
While Chapter One revealed an increased emphasis by the Court on the retention of the Member 
States' external relations powers, the remainder of the study has revealed that the exercise of those 
powers is increasingly restrained by the duty of sincere cooperation. 
In contrast to the principle of pre-emption discussed in Chapter One, it emerged in Chapter Two that 
Article  4  (3)  TEU  can  give  rise  to  loyalty  restraints  even  before the  Union  has  exercised  its 
competence.  The  scope  of  loyalty  restraints  in  this  context  is  determined  by  a  risk  of  future 
legislative developments and their impact on the Union legal order. Where there is the prospect of 
the Union exercising its competence, the Member States' freedom of action is circumscribed by 
Article 4 (3) TEU. In this respect, the Court has established strict loyalty restraints on the ground 
that  concerted  action  has  been initiated  at  EU level.  These  restraints  may not  only impose  an 
obligation on the Member States to refrain from acting,  but this pre-emptive effect can equally 
apply also in areas of shared competence1184. The temporal reach of  AETR-type pre-emption has 
been  extended  to  situations  in  which  no  exercise  of  Union  competence  has  taken  place.  The 
1184 Case C-13/07  Commission v. Council  (Vietnam WTO Accession), Opinion of Advocate General Kokott; Case C-
433/03 Commission v. Germany and Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg.
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temporal scope of Article 4 (3) TEU has been further expanded to provide for  AETR pre-emption 
also in situations which do not concern the conclusion of an agreement, but which relate to action 
within the framework of an agreement after it has been concluded1185. 
We thus see an expansion of the AETR doctrine, not only in terms of its normative scope, but also in 
the  temporal  sense.  The  AETR doctrine  also  operates  to  constrain  national  action  of  a  non-
contractual kind, provided that such action may lead to the adoption of new international standards. 
It emerges that where there is the prospect of an exercise of Union competence, the Member States 
may be subject to a duty to refrain from acting, regardless of whether the area in question is covered 
by shared or by exclusive competence. 
In  addition  to  loyalty  restraints  aimed  at  avoiding  the  risk of  conflict  between  EU  law  and 
international Member State obligations, like those discussed in Chapters One and Two, Article 4 (3) 
TEU also gives rise to obligations intended to  resolve such conflicts. Chapter Three showed how 
these compliance obligations apply also to those situations which come within the scope of the 
protection afforded by Article 351 TFEU for international agreements concluded by the Member 
States before joining the EU. The Member States are required to take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate any incompatibilities between their pre-accession obligations and EU law. Initially, the 
Court emphasised the link between the Member States' obligation to eliminate incompatibilities and 
the  scope  of  EU law,  as  the  obligation  on  Member  States  existed  only  where  the  Union  had 
promulgated legislation1186, and Union rules had to be sufficiently precise and clear1187. Recent case 
law, however, has seen a substantial  loosening of this principle. Where an objective of EU law is 
jeopardised, the mere possibility of legislative EU action in the future prevents the Member States 
from  maintaining  in  force  an  international  pre-accession  agreement1188.  As  such,  the  Court's 
reasoning mirrors the rationale of the  AETR doctrine: pre-emption logically precedes primacy by 
precluding Member State action, not because rules of Union law apply which prevail in cases of 
conflict, but simply because national action in a given area would affect the attainment of a Union 
objective,  even  if  no  Union  norm  exists  with  which  national  rules  can  come  into  conflict. 
Furthermore, compliance is construed in a formalistic manner, in the sense that unilateral, i.e.  de 
facto,  compliance by the Member States is not sufficient1189.  Ultimately,  the Member States are 
under a duty to denounce any incompatible pre-accession agreement in its entirety. This obligation 
is remarkably wide in scope, as it applies irrespective of whether the agreement concerned falls 
1185 Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece.
1186 Case C-158/91 Levy.
1187 Case C-203/03 Commission v. Austria.
1188 Case C-205/06  Commission v. Austria, Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden  and Case C-118/07  Commission v.  
Finland.
1189 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal.
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within exclusive or shared competence. 
Compliance obligations, as we saw in Chapter Four, apply even in the absence of Union powers in a 
given field. By distinguishing between the existence and the exercise of Member State powers also 
in areas of retained competence, the Court of Justice expands the scope of Union law beyond those 
areas in which the EU has been given the right to act.  To that end, the Court has developed a 
recurring formula, according to which powers retained by the Member States must be exercised 
consistently with Union law. In the same way that Article 351 TFEU does not release the Member 
States from their obligation to achieve compliance between pre-existing obligations and EU rules, 
the fact that a given commitment falls within national competence does not absolve the Member 
States of their duty to achieve the primacy of Union law over conflicting international obligations.  
Where it is not possible for a Member State to unilaterally remedy the discriminatory application of 
rules because the advantages in question are granted by a third country,  the Member States are 
under a duty to renegotiate the relevant provisions. Ultimately, this duty also entails an obligation to 
denounce an entire agreement containing a single inconsistent clause. In practice, Member States 
may sometimes  not  be left  any other  choice  but  to  re-enter  into a  commitment  over  the  same 
subject-matter  by  way  of  concerted  action  at  Union  level.  De facto,  then,  the  competence  is 
transferred to the Union and the Member States are pre-empted from acting.    
Chapter Five looked at how the duty of loyalty crystallises into concrete legal obligations where the 
Union and the Member States conclude international agreements together. In order to establish its 
exclusive jurisdiction for the interpretation of mixed agreements, the Court found that a sufficient 
justification was given where a provision contained in a mixed agreement  was applicable both to 
situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of Union 
law1190.  The Court's  approach to establishing its  exclusive jurisdiction to interpret  provisions of 
mixed agreements was initially predicated on the scope of EU law. However, it was incrementally 
expanded so as to establish interpretative jurisdiction where no EU rules exist, but only substantive 
links  of  a  merely  procedural  nature.  Based  on  a  “largely  covered”  test,  the  Court  has  found 
compliance obligations to exist even if they fall within the competence of the Member States 1191. 
The criteria applied for determining the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, however, are no  AETR 
criteria, as their rationales differ in important respects. Nevertheless, the compliance obligations 
imposed by the Court do not differ in any way from obligations contained in provisions falling 
within exclusive Union competence. As far as the procedural obligations which apply in a context 
of mixity are concerned, the Member States are under strict obligations to inform and consult the 
1190 Case C-53/96 Hermès. 
1191 Case C-13/00 Commission v. Ireland.
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Commission  where  unilateral  action  may  lead  to  the  adoption  of  international  rules1192.  Most 
recently, this duty has been expanded so as to include a duty to abstain from acting altogether1193. 
Thus, the Member States' freedom to act under a mixed agreement has been restricted to such an 
extent that national action is only possible where a Union position has been formulated.
III. The application of the duty of sincere cooperation – Trends in the Court's case law
On the basis of the foregoing, a number of trends in the Court's case law may be formulated. 
A. Increasing emphasis on the retention of Member State powers
Looking at the question of competence, we can see a development of the concept of implied powers 
in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the Court has become reluctant to deprive Member 
States  of  their powers. Implied  powers  have  evolved  from strictly  exclusive  to  non-exclusive 
powers, causing the restraining effect of implied competence to diminish significantly. On the other 
hand, the scope for implied powers to exist has gradually been expanded so as to provide for EU 
competence in circumstances which previously did not give rise to corresponding external powers. 
Thus, while the exclusion of Member State action has been limited, the participation of the EU has 
simultaneously been promoted. As a result  of these two opposite developments, we see a trend 
towards increased participation of the Member States alongside the Union. 
B. Article 4 (3) TEU turning into an obligation of result 
The growing acceptance of non-exclusive powers, however, does not imply that the exclusion of 
Member State action no longer takes place. On the contrary, a second trend in the Court's case law 
suggests that the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU has developed over  
time into an instrument for limiting the exercise of Member State powers to such an extent that its  
restraining effect can be tantamount to pre-emption where required by the Union interest. As such, 
the duty of sincere cooperation in external relations emphasises substantive compliance as opposed 
to restrictions of a procedural nature. 
As an example of the Member States' freedom to exercise their retained powers from the early case 
1192 Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland, Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden.
1193 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden.
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law, the Court of Justice found in Kramer that the Member States remained free to exercise their 
competence even in areas that had already been “reserved” by the Union1194. A legislative process at 
Union level had, in other words, almost been completed and yet, the Member States were merely 
bound by procedural Union obligations when negotiating within the framework of the agreement 
concerned. 
In recent cases, by contrast,  we see a transformation of the duty of sincere cooperation into an 
obligation of result. Where concerted action has been initiated at Union level, the Member States 
are under an obligation not to hinder the outcome of the process. Recent cases suggest that this  
obligation goes beyond a procedural duty to cooperate closely with the Union institutions involved, 
ultimately including – even in areas of shared competence – a duty to refrain from acting altogether, 
if  not  with  the  consent  of  the  Union1195.  Similarly,  the  concept  of  concerted  action  has  been 
expanded over time. While concerted action initially required a discourse between institutions, such 
as the granting of a negotiating mandate by the Council to the Commission1196, it may now include 
situations  in  which  mere  internal  deliberations  have  been  started  at  the  level  of  one  of  the 
institutions1197.
Substantive compliance obligations apply also where the Member States have already exercised 
their competence by entering into an international agreement with a third country, either prior to 
accession to the EU or within the ambit of their own retained powers. In order to protect the third  
countries' interests, the preferred solution to a conflict with EU rules is generally amendment or re-
negotiation of the contested parts of an international agreement. However, the political reality often 
does not allow for such modifications, leaving the Member States no choice but to allow the EU to 
craft a common external policy and to replace the bilateral agreements with Union agreements.
C. Moving away from the scope of EU competence towards the scope of EU law 
These substantive compliance obligations have in common that they can be applied in such a way as 
to reproduce the effect of exclusive Union powers, albeit in areas of shared or national competence. 
This observation then leads to a third trend that can be discerned in the Court's case law, according 
to which the precise content of the loyalty obligation under Article 4 (3) TEU is less and less  
predicated on questions of competence. Put differently, the question of who is competent in a given 
1194 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer.
1195 Case C-246/07  Commission v. Sweden  (PFOS); Case C-13/07  Commission v. Council  (Vietnam WTO Accession); 
Case C-459/03  Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant); Case C-433/03  Commission v. Germany  and Case C-266/03 
Commission v. Luxembourg.
1196 See Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom.
1197 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS).
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area no longer determines the extent to which national action may be restrained. 
As  argued  above,  we  see  a  de  facto pre-emptive  effect  in  a  number  of  legal  circumstances, 
irrespective of who is actually competent over the matter at issue. Where Member States are subject 
to substantive compliance obligations, the duty of sincere cooperation may yield the same results as 
the AETR doctrine, with the difference that the obligation applies even where no occupation of the 
field has taken place, thus circumventing the strict requirements for implied exclusive competence. 
A look at the Court's approach to the concept of “start of concerted action” illustrates this point.  
Where concerted action has been initiated at EU level, Member States' freedom to act is restricted to 
such an extent that national action is only possible where a Union position has been formulated. 
Concerted action thus can be likened to a loss of Member State powers1198, regardless of who is 
actually competent over the matter. In the Swedish PFOS case1199, for example, the Member States 
were just as much prevented from acting in an area of shared competence as they were in the FAO 
case1200 concerning provisions falling within exclusive Union competence1201. In fact, the restraints 
imposed  on  the  Member  States  in  the  Swedish  PFOS case  were  identical  to  those  applied  in 
Commission v. UK1202 concerning exclusive Union powers, and the Greek IMO judgment1203, where 
Member States had become trustees of the Union interest.
This trend away from questions of competence is also reflected in the Court's construction of its  
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  those  parts  of  mixed  agreements  coming  within  Member  State 
competence.  The  Court is  concerned  with  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  Union interest  in 
accepting jurisdiction for the implementation of a given provision, rather than establishing the risk 
that the exercise of national competence might affect existing Union legislation.  Also the Court's 
exclusive interpretative jurisdiction has been established in the absence of a close link between a 
given provision contained in a mixed agreement and the scope of EU law. Loosely framed links of a 
procedural nature can serve as a sufficient substantive link1204. As we saw in Chapter Five, questions 
about competence are misplaced in this context. Instead of examining the extent to which the EU has 
exclusive powers in relation to a given mixed agreement, the Court's jurisdiction concerns the extent 
to which the agreement comes within the scope of EU law.
The interim conclusion reached in Chapter Three, in fact, already noted a convergence of compliance 
obligations differing significantly in nature. Article 351 TFEU, although conceived as conflict rule, 
1198 See in a similar vein, AG Kokott in Case C-13/07 (Vietnam WTO Accession Case), para 79.
1199 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS).
1200 Case C-25/94 Commission v. Council (FAO).
1201 See Chapter Five.
1202 Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom.
1203 Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece.
1204 Joined Cases C-300/98 and 392/98 Dior and Assco.
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can now have the effect of precluding incompatibilities between EU rules and international Member 
State obligations, similar in its effect to AETR-type pre-emption. The duties imposed by Article 351 
TFEU, moreover, resemble the compliance obligations discussed in Chapters Two and Four which do 
not  come  within  the  scope  of  protection  foreseen  for  pre-accession  agreements1205.  It  appears, 
therefore, that regardless of the nature of EU competence involved, compliance obligations imposed 
on the Member States are increasingly construed so as to lead to the same outcome. 
A further indication that compliance restraints based on the duty of sincere cooperation are moving 
away from being predicated on the scope of EU competence is the Court's recent confirmation in the 
Swedish PFOS case that the duty under Article 4 (3) TEU is not merely complementary in nature, but 
may function as an independent obligation1206. Article 4 (3) TEU has traditionally been viewed by 
academics1207 and practitioners1208 as an auxiliary tool aimed at supporting the enforcement of Member 
States' Treaty obligations. According to this long-standing conviction, the provision 
“by itself never creates duties, but only together with some other rule of [Union] law, or some principle 
or  objective  of  [Union]  policy  which  is  to  be  facilitated  or,  at  least,  not  jeopardized.  Legal 
consequences  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  general  words  of  Article  [4  (3)]  alone,  but  only  in  
combination with other specific rules. The content  of  the obligation results  from the other rule or 
objective“1209.
The need for the residual obligation under Article 4 (3) TEU was deemed to arise where “a particular 
situation lacks sufficient effect to compel a Member State [...]  to behave in conformity with 
it”1210. The application of the duty of sincere cooperation, in other words, was closely linked to  
Union competence and the extent to which it had been exercised. Article 4 (3) TEU, in fact,  
was “not a device for filling in or developing the content of a policy which has not been agreed  
in detail, and which needs to be dealt with by general [Union] measures”1211. 
While significantly expanding the scope of Article 4 (3) TEU, the Court's reasoning in the Swedish 
PFOS case should not, however, be understood as an extensive reinterpretation of the duty of sincere 
1205 See Case C-170/98 Commission v. Belgium.
1206 Case C-246/07  Commission v. Sweden (PFOS). The action brought by the Commission against Sweden alleged a 
breach of (current) Articles 4 (3) TEU and 218 (1) TFEU. The complaint alleging a breach of Article 218 (1) TFEU 
was deemed unfounded by the Court (para 110), leaving Article 4 (3) TEU as the sole basis for the finding that  
Sweden had failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations. The latter complaint was not brought in conjunction with any other 
Treaty provision or other rules of EU law.
1207 See, for example, P. J. Kuijper, “Re-reading External Relations Cases in the Field of Transport”, 291; J. Temple 
Lang, “The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities under Article 10 
EC” (2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1483 at 1517.
1208 See the conclusions of the FIDE Congress, General Report: The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and  
Courts and the Community Institutions under Article 10 EC Treaty, in Vol. 1, IXI F.I.D.E. Congress (2000, Helsinki). 
1209 J. Temple Lang, “The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities under 
Article 10 EC”, 1517, emphasis added.
1210 P. J. Kuijper, “Re-reading External Relations Cases in the Field of Transport”, 293.
1211 J. Temple Lang, “The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities under 
Article 10 EC”, 1517.
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cooperation. The Court has not created “any wholly new duties, not related to those which are already 
binding on Member States or to which they have agreed as [Union] objectives or policies”1212. Rather, 
the judgment merely confirms the recent trend of moving away from the scope of EU competence 
towards the scope of EU law. Instead of creating a general duty of abstention from unilateral  
action under  mixed agreements in  areas  of  shared competence on the basis  of Article  4  (3) 
TEU, the Court links the application of the duty in this case to a common strategy by which it  
has been agreed not to interfere with the legislative process initiated in respect of the subject  
matter at issue1213. 
In light of the foregoing, the assumption that Article 4 (3) TEU is a supplementary provision  
which only applies in combination with other  specific  rules  no longer holds true.  However,  
despite no longer being predicated on the scope of EU competence, Article 4 (3) TEU is still  
very much connected to  the scope of  Union  law.  This recent  development,  then,  appears to 
confirm the assumption that in its construction of the duty of sincere cooperation, the Court is  
moving away from questions of competence towards an assessment based more broadly on the 
scope of EU law.
D. Expanding the temporal dimension of the scope of EU competence
The fact that the application of the duty of sincere cooperation is increasingly separated from 
Union competence and the extent to which it has been exercised is also reflected in another  
recent  trend.  The  Court's  case  law  shows  that  Article  4  (3)  TEU  not  only  expands  the  
substantive reach of EU law – by creating a pre-emptive effect where Member States retain 
competence – but it may also have the result of enlarging the temporal scope of Union law. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Article 4 (3) TEU was already used early on to preclude Member 
State action in the absence of any exercise of Union competence which would have justified  
such a pre-emptive effect. In Commission v. UK1214, the Member States were found to be under 
an obligation to abstain from acting once concerted action had been initiated at Union level.  
The Union's failure to exercise its competence notwithstanding, an exclusive competence was 
found to exist in the specific case. 
Over the last decade, by contrast, the Court has consistently expanded the temporal scope of  
Article  4  (3)  TEU so as  to  create  similar  restraints  even in  the absence of  a  corresponding 
Union competence. The “start of concerted Union action” was found to entail an obligation of  
1212 Ibid.
1213 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), paras 85-89.
1214 See Case 804/79 Commission v. United Kingdom.
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close cooperation, “if not a duty of abstention”1215. It was subsequently even suggested that the 
start of concerted action represented the very point in time in which a concurrent competence  
became  exclusive1216.  In  the  Swedish  PFOS case1217,  the  Court  confirmed  that  the  duty  of 
loyalty  may  indeed  entail  an  obligation  of  abstention  from acting  even  in  areas  of  shared  
competence. 
Another example of the expansion of the temporal scope of Article 4 (3) TEU can be found in 
the  incremental  relaxation  of  the  AETR criteria  for  determining  whether  a  given field  has  been 
occupied by the Union. Whereas the AETR doctrine initially applied only in cases in which a field had 
been fully occupied, it was later extended so as to include fields that were “largely covered”1218. After 
the most recent Opinion 1/2003, even the “future development” of EU legislation has to be taken into 
account1219. 
In the  Greek IMO case1220, the  AETR-effect based on future rules was applied to a non-contractual 
situation. The Court found that Greece had violated its Union obligations by initiating a procedure 
which could lead to the adoption by the IMO of new rules which would “affect” EU law1221. The 
Member State  had merely submitted  a  legislative proposal  and it  was  far  from certain that  this 
proposal would have been adopted. Nevertheless, this “totally hypothetical, possible, future effect on 
[Union] law” was sufficient to entail a failure on the part of Greece to fulfil its obligations under EU 
law1222. 
The notion of the future development of EU rules forming part of the scope of Union law can also be 
found outside the context of pre-emption. As we saw in the BITs cases, pre-accession agreements 
concluded  by  the  Member  States  can  be  subject  to  compliance  obligations  on  the  ground  that 
conflicting EU rules may be adopted in the future1223. 
It thus becomes apparent that future legislative developments increasingly play a decisive role in 
defining the notion of “scope of EU law”. However,  in this  context it  is important to recall  the 
observations made in the foregoing chapters in respect of the specific circumstances under which the 
Court has expanded the temporal reach of Article 4 (3) TEU. We saw in each case that the imposition 
of loyalty restraints requires a concrete link between the scope of EU law and the scope of EU 
competence. The exercise of Member State competence, in fact, is not circumscribed by the future 
1215 See Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany, para 66.
1216 AG Kokott in Case C-13/07 (Vietnam WTO Accession Case).
1217 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS).
1218 Opinion 2/91.
1219 Opinion 1/2003, para 126, emphasis added.
1220 Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece.
1221 See Chapter Two.
1222 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 277.
1223 Case C-205/06  Commission v. Austria, Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden and Case C-118/07  Commission v.  
Finland. 
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state  of  Union  law  generally,  but  “specifically  by  a  prospect of  the  Union  exercising  its 
competence”1224. Restraints based on a mere “hypothetical impact”1225 of Member State action on 
Union law are, therefore, excluded. 
E. Result: The convergence of the Member States and the EU into a unit
Having traced these trends in the Court's  case law, we are left  with the question of how these 
seemingly unrelated  developments  relate  to  each  other.  One  the  one  hand,  we  can  witness  an 
increasing  emphasis  on  the  retention  of  competence  on the  part  of  the  Member  States  and an 
extension of the scope of implied powers. On the other hand, emphasis is shifting away from the 
notion of powers towards the scope of EU law, in that questions of competence no longer determine 
the extent to which national action may be restrained. The scope of EU law, in turn,  has been 
expanded so as to offer a greater potential for restraint. By linking loyalty restraints to the scope of 
EU law as opposed to EU competence, the duty of sincere cooperation is expanded in a two-fold 
manner, both substantively and temporally. At the same time, the function of the duty has shifted 
from focussing on procedural restraints to an increasing emphasis on substantive compliance. 
Bringing these different themes together, we see a picture emerge of Article 4 (3) TEU operating as 
a tool for the convergence of the EU and its Member States into a unified entity on the international 
scene. This process takes place on two levels. On the one hand, a shift towards the acceptance of 
complementary Member State and Union action has occurred as far as competences are concerned. 
As we saw above, implied powers are increasingly construed as non-exclusive, while at the same 
time expanding the scope for implied EU competence to arise in the first place. The emphasis is  
therefore on common action. 
On the other hand, the exercise of the powers retained by the Member States is subject to significant 
compliance restraints. These restraints are characterised by two key features. Firstly, the scope of 
the restraints is no longer circumscribed by the limits of Union competence. Rather, the notably 
broader notion of “scope of EU law” increasingly forms the basis for determining whether and to 
what extent Member States' freedom of action should be constrained in a given case. Put differently, 
the scope for restraints to apply has been significantly expanded. Secondly, the Member States are 
increasingly subject to obligations of result. Such restraints range from the obligation to eliminate 
existing incompatibilities with EU law to the avoidance of future conflicts by precluding Member 
State action altogether through the imposition of a duty to abstain from acting unilaterally. Even the 
1224 J. Heliskoski, “The Obligation of Member States to Foresee, in the Conclusion and Application of their International  
Agreements, Eventual Future Measures of the European Union”, 545, emphasis added.
1225 N. Lavranos, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, 277, emphasis added.
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less intrusive obligation to eliminate incompatibilities may have the effect of forcing the Member 
States into allowing the Union to replace the contested agreements with EU agreements. Here we 
see once again that Member State participation in external matters is encouraged, but only within 
the tightly formulated boundaries laid down by the Court of Justice. 
IV. The duty of sincere cooperation and Member State sovereignty 
Seen  from  the  perspective  of  the  Member  States,  it  should  be  assumed  that  the  creeping 
transformation of the duty of sincere cooperation into an instrument for the convergence of Member 
State  and Union action  into  a  single  unit  in  international  relations  is  a  cause  for  concern.  As 
discussed in the Introductory Chapter, the creation of a European “super-state” has long been feared 
by national politicians warning of “creeping federalism”, according to which “[t]he powers have all 
been going towards Brussels and away from nation states”1226. 
Indeed, the previous chapters have demonstrated that the duty of sincere cooperation can be applied 
in such a way as to restrain Member State autonomy in ways tantamount to an actual transfer of 
competence. In other words, it appears that the Member States may fall victim to competence creep, 
notwithstanding the formal retention of powers. What, then, does this transformation of the duty of 
loyalty mean for the Member States? Did they seek to counteract the Court's expansion of the 
doctrine of implied in the early case law by amending the Treaty accordingly, as we saw in Chapter 
One, just to be de facto deprived of their scope for manoeuvre through the back door? This section 
will attempt to evaluate the position of the Member States vis-à-vis their obligations towards the 
Union under Article 4 (3) TEU. Have they become the victim of a monster they themselves created 
by  inserting  a  broadly  framed  duty  of  loyalty  into  the  Treaty  with  a  view  to  ensuring  its 
effectiveness, or could the broad application of Article 4 (3) TEU instead be in their own national 
interest? 
This section will first look at the problem of creeping competence via Article 4 (3) TEU (A.), before 
coming to some brief conclusions on the vision of political morality which dominates the exercise 
of Member State powers in EU external relations (B.). It will then give some more consideration to 
the argument introduced in Chapter One, according to which the development of implied powers 
can be considered a result of a process of action and reaction between the Member States and the 
Court of Justice (C.). Next, this section will seek to shed light on the possible reasons why it could 
1226 See, for example, A. Grice, “Hain warns of 'creeping federalism' in EU”, The Independent, 22 July 2002, citing  
Peter Hain, the British minister for Europe at the time. 
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be in  the  Member  States'  own interest  to  act  together  with the Union (D.)  and considers  why 
Member States are traditionally reluctant to empower the EU institutions to act (E.). The section 
will proceed to discuss why the duty of sincere cooperation is particularly suited to balance these 
two competing interests (F.) and (G.), before concluding with an assessment of the impact of Article 
4 (3) TEU on Member State sovereignty (H.). 
A. Competence creep via Article 4 (3) TEU?
The notion of competence creep is traditionally associated with a generous application by the Court 
of  Justice  of  legal  basis  provisions.  The  discussion  of  the  notion  of  competence  creep  in  the 
Introductory Chapter, however, revealed that according to a more recent broader understanding of 
competence creep1227 also the limits imposed on the Member States' freedom to act within the scope 
of EU law can constitute significant inroads into national procedural autonomy which are “often 
perceived as a loss of sovereign powers and for that matter creeping competences”1228. 
If competence creep is  conceived in this  broader sense, then the Court's case law offers ample 
instances to suggest that the loyalty obligation laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU has indeed developed 
into  an  instrument  for  the  loss  of  competence  at  national  level,  leaving  the  Member  States'  
remaining freedom to act strictly circumscribed by Union law. As we saw in the foregoing, the 
Member States' scope for unilateral action is often significantly restricted, even in areas of national 
competence. 
The concerns raised by creeping competence through the means of the duty of sincere cooperation 
are obvious. For one, the Court's approach to Article 4 (3) TEU leaves a lot to be desired in terms of 
legal certainty. Restraints imposed on the basis of the remarkably broad notion of “scope of Union 
law” in combination with a vaguely defined Union interest do not allow for the formulation of a  
clear and predictable doctrine which determines under what circumstances and to what extent the 
loyalty obligation limits the Member States' freedom of action. In fact, the scope of such restraints  
has continuously been expanding, further reducing any possibility of predicting the outcome of a 
given case. In particular, the recent upgrade of Article 4 (3) TEU to an independent obligation in the 
Swedish  PFOS case1229 increases  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  basis  for  the  duty  of  sincere 
cooperation to apply, while simultaneously creating the potential for virtually limitless obligations. 
In addition to the ambiguous application of Article 4 (3) TEU, competence creep via the duty of 
sincere cooperation is constitutionally questionable, since it circumvents the strict requirements for 
1227 As advocated by S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”.
1228 S. Prechal, “Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”, 19. 
1229 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden.
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AETR-type competence discussed in Chapter One. Where Article 4 (3) TEU reproduces the effects 
of pre-emption, which presupposes that the EU has occupied a given field to a significant extent by 
adopting legislation, the question arises whether the imposition of such restraints should not be a 
matter to be addressed by the legislature1230. 
The  Court's  interpretation  of  the  duty  of  sincere  cooperation,  it  could  therefore  be  assumed, 
circumvents a cornerstone of the constitutional structure of the Union – the principle of attributed 
powers. As conceived by the Founding Treaties, providing for the functional and substantial limits  
of  the  EU,  all  limitations  of  Member  State  sovereignty  were  made  subject  to  the  relevant 
constitutional authorisations by the Member States themselves. The scope of the powers conferred 
was to be determined by the extent to which the Member States had consented to renouncing to 
their sovereign powers in favour of Union competence. The duty of sincere cooperation, however, 
no longer seems to operate within the limits of attributed powers. Without their prior consent, the 
Court of Justice  de facto allocates competences to the Union which previously belonged to the 
Member States. 
B. Article 4 (3) TEU and the three visions of political morality – Towards a liberal fidelity approach 
If  we draw a  conclusion  at  this  point,  it  appears  that  the  Member  States  are  left  in  a  highly 
unsatisfactory position. While officially retaining competence in certain fields, they are factually 
deprived  of,  or  at  least  significantly  restrained  in,  their  freedom  to  act,  on  the  basis  of  a 
constitutionally questionable mechanism. But, against the background of the previous findings, can 
we really conclude that the specific obligations deriving from the Court's interpretation of Article 4 
(3) TEU upset the balance of power between the Union and the Member States and between the 
Court and the Union legislator?  Or can the limitations imposed on the exercise of Member State 
competence, instead, be deemed to form part of a broader strategy, aimed at furthering both Union 
and Member State interests?
In order to be able to assess these questions, the thesis sought to evaluate the restraints imposed on 
the exercise of the Member States' external competence on the basis of Halberstam's model of the 
political morality of federalism. As we saw in the beginning, if Article 4 (3) TEU is applied in such 
a way as to ensure exclusive Union action in as many instances as possible, the underlying rationale 
of federalism differs significantly from a simple increase in restrictions on the exercise of Member 
State  powers  where  the  strengthening  of  existing  EU  powers  vis-à-vis  parallel  powers  of  the 
1230 In a similar vein, but with regard to restraints stemming from principles of EU law more generally, see S. Prechal,  
“Competence Creep and General Principles of Law”, 15.
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Member States is required to ensure unified action for the common interest.
In  dealing  with  implied  Union  competence,  the  Court  of  Justice  has  broadly  shifted  from an 
entitlements to a liberal fidelity approach. While the creation of implied powers, as was argued in 
Chapter  One,  was in  line with the principle  of conferred powers  and presented an example of 
conservative  fidelity,  the  initial  finding  by  the  Court  that  these  newly  created  powers  were 
automatically  exclusive in nature was not.  The combination of the broad power potential and the 
prohibitory nature of the implied powers effectively created an “absolute entitlement” for the Union 
to regulate the external aspect of internal Union legislation1231. A decisive step in moving away from 
an entitlements approach came with the limiting of the conditions under which implied powers pre-
empted Member State competence in the Court's 1990s case law. The final step in moving towards 
a  liberal fidelity approach in this area came in Opinion 1/2003, where the Court explicitly stated 
that implied powers can be shared. Liberal fidelity, in fact, 
“counsels  against  automatic  exclusivity of  central  government  powers  as  well  as  inviolability  of 
specific substantive areas of constituent state authority, in favor of preserving constructive democratic 
policy engagement between the different levels of government”1232.
While the Court has slowly shifted away from an entitlements towards a liberal fidelity approach as 
far as the existence of Member State competence is concerned, the opposite is true in relation to the 
exercise thereof. In recent years, the Court has in a number of judgments come close to displaying a 
conservative  view of federalism.  It  was argued that  such an approach was evident  in  the  BITs 
cases1233,  the Swedish PFOS case1234,  Commission v. Luxembourg and Commission v. Germany1235, 
the  Vietnam  WTO  Accession case1236,  the  Greek  IMO case1237,  the  Open  Skies cases1238 and 
Commission v. Portugal1239. The  conservative approach, as discussed in the Introductory Chapter, 
seeks to achieve  an optimal  position for the Union to freely exercise its  powers by  preventing 
conflict between pre-existing international obligations and EU law from the outset1240. 
However,  with  the  exception  of  Advocate  General  Kokott's  Opinion1241 in  the  Vietnam  WTO 
1231 This reasoning is adopted by analogy from Halberstam's assessment of the Court's approach to the internal market in 
Dassonville, see D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 12.
1232 D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 26, emphasis added.
1233 Case C-205/06  Commission v. Austria, Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden  and Case C-118/07  Commission v.  
Finland, see Chapter Three. 
1234 Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), see Chapter Five.
1235 Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg and Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany, see Chapter Two.
1236 Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council (Vietnam WTO Accession), Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, see Chapter 
Two.
1237 Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece, see Chapter Two.
1238 Case C-466/98 Commission v. UK, Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark, Case C-468/98 Commission v. Sweden, 
Case C-469-98 Commission v.  Finland,  Case C-471/98  Commission v.  Belgium,  Case C-472/98 Commission v.  
Luxembourg, Case C-475/98 Commission v. Austria, Case C-476/98 Commission v. Germany, see Chapter Two.
1239 Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal, see Chapter Three.
1240 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 778, see further the Introductory Chapter.
1241 See Case C-13/07 Commission v. Council, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para 72. AG Kokott argued that 
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Accession case, which was withdrawn before the Court itself was able to issue further guidance on 
the  matter,  a  closer  look at  all  of  the  aforementioned  cases  revealed  that  despite  the  severely 
restrictive effect of these judgments, the Court was not actively seeking to counteract the diversity 
of  policies  and interests  inherent  in the  EU system,  as  a  conservative  fidelity approach would 
suggest. Rather, the aim was in all cases to safeguard the effectiveness of Union law, which could 
not be guaranteed if the Member States continued to be allowed to act freely. Thus, Member State 
participation  was  excluded  where  there  was  a  concrete  risk  of  adoption  of  international  rules 
binding  on  the  Union1242,  the  effective  application  of  specific  Treaty  norms  could  not  be 
guaranteed1243, the outcome of international negotiations that had already been initiated would have 
been jeopardised1244, or the clarity of rules throughout the system was at stake1245.
Despite  these  instances  of  restraint  which  seemingly  suggest  a  conservative  fidelity  approach, 
therefore, it is not apparent that the Court of Justice is moving away from what otherwise can only 
be characterised as a liberal fidelity approach.
C. Loyalty restraints as the product of a constitutional dialogue between the Court and the Member  
States
If the Court of Justice is broadly pursuing a liberal fidelity approach in external relations, both in 
relation to the  existence of Member State competence and to the  exercise thereof, then we must 
assume that the duty of sincere cooperation as it  stands today does not violate the principle of 
conferred powers and that it, hence, does not encroach on national sovereignty more generally. In 
fact, we can see this theoretical assumption reflected in the political reality of EU external relations. 
The duty of  sincere  cooperation  may indeed be  understood as  the  outcome of  a  constitutional 
process actively shaped by the Member States themselves. 
There are two complementary processes governing the expansion of Union powers1246. On the one 
hand, the Court of Justice can stretch its own jurisdictional limits and take away powers from the 
Member States without any formal Treaty amendment by relying on different legal instruments and 
Member State participation had to be excluded for the entire field from the outset, on the ground that  “[t]he more 
players there are on the European side at international level, the more difficult it will be to represent effectively the  
interests of the [Union] and its Member States outwardly, in particular vis-à-vis significant trading partners.”
1242 See Case C-246/07 Commission v. Sweden (PFOS) and Case C-45/07 Commission v. Greece.
1243 See the BITs cases, Case C-205/06 Commission v. Austria, Case C-249/06 Commission v. Sweden and Case C-118/07 
Commission v. Finland.
1244 See Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg and Case C-433/03 Commission v. Germany.
1245 See Case C-62/98 Commission v. Portugal and Case C-84/98 Commission v. Portugal.
1246 These two processes have been termed “exogenous expansion” and “endogenous development” respectively, see M. 
M. Martin Martinez, National Sovereignty and International Organizations (Kluwer Law International 1996) at 105. 
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principles1247.  This type of process takes place within the framework of the EU Treaty without 
affecting the constitutional set-up of the Union. 
It should be assumed that the expansion of Union powers by means of judicial activism is a priori  
contrary to the Member States' interests. This is where the second type of expansion comes into 
play. Where the  de facto changes in the allocation of powers between the EU and the Member 
States have obtained such a momentum that the Member States deem it necessary to adapt the 
current constitutional structures to the new areas absorbed by the Union in order to strengthen the 
process of European integration,  the Member States are free to legalise the EU's acquisition of 
powers by amending the EU Treaty. It can be argued that the fact that the Member States have not 
reversed the legal doctrines created by the Court of Justice indicates that the Court has not deviated 
significantly from their interests. As Garrett put it, 
“[i]f member governments have neither changed nor evaded the European legal system, then from a  
'rational government' perspective, it must be the case that the existing legal order furthers the interests 
of national governments”1248. 
Although an absence of opposition by the Member States against decisions of the Court of Justice is 
not  necessarily  a  simple  reflection  of  political  support1249,  the  Member  States'  consent  to 
incorporating the changes introduced by the Court into the Treaty is a clear indication that such a  
transfer of powers is be in the national interest. After all, any amendment to the Treaty requires 
unanimous agreement and ratification of the changes by all Member State parliaments. 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Member States reacted to the Court's bold assertion of implied 
powers in the early case law by seeking to regain control over their foreign relations powers in the 
SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. When amending the Treaty, the Member States decided to explicitly 
categorise the newly enacted express powers as non-exclusive. The Court of Justice subsequently 
adjusted its approach accordingly by recognising that implied powers could be non-exclusive in 
nature.  The  acceptance  of  this  judicial  development  by  the  Member  States  was  subsequently 
confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. By stipulating, in Article 4 TFEU, that in certain areas the exercise 
of Union competence is not to pre-empt them from acting, the Member States have incorporated 
into the Treaties a safeguard of their national interests. 
1247 Such as the principle of  effet utile, recourse to Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 EC), see M. Martin Martinez, 
National Sovereignty and International Organizations (Kluwer Law International 1996). 
1248 G.  Garrett, “The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union” (1995) 49 International Organization 171, 
emphasis added.
1249 See K. Alter, “Who Are the 'Masters of the Treaty':  European Governments and the European Court of Justice”  
(1998) 52 International Organization 121, arguing that the possible responses of national governments to decisions 
of the Court of Justice within the domestic political realm are limited where there is a lack of political consensus to  
attack the  Court,  due  to  important  differences between the  legal  and  the political  dynamics in  European legal 
integration.
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If Member States retain powers, they are more willing to transfer competences to the EU 1250. This is 
reflected in the Member States' readiness to confirm in the Treaty of Lisbon the cornerstones of the 
doctrine of implied exclusive competence as developed by the Court of Justice. By incorporating 
Article 3 (2) TFEU into the Treaties, the Member States expressly consented to the very basis for  
depriving the Member States of their concurrent powers developed over the years by the Court of 
Justice. For the first time ever, the provision lays down the conditions for implied exclusive Union 
powers  in  primary Union law.  To that  end,  it  reiterates  the  AETR doctrine,  the requirement  of 
necessity created  in  Opinion 1/76 and the  principle  established in  Opinion 1/94  that  exclusive 
implied powers arise when the conclusion of a given agreement is provided for in a legislative act 
of the Union1251. In sum, it appears that since the beginning of the Treaty reforms initiated by the 
SEA, there has been a “kind of dialogue between the [Court of Justice] and the Member States 
acting as 'constituante' on the powers of the [Union] in the field of foreign relations”1252. 
Treaty amendments are, however, not the only means the Member States have at their disposal to 
rectify unwelcome developments in the case law of the Court of Justice. Starting from the 1970s, 
the Member States have increasingly insisted on the conclusion of mixed agreements. The mixed 
nature of an international agreement,  in fact,  is  not necessarily a reflection of the allocation of 
powers at the time of conclusion1253. For example, as Kuijper has pointed out, mixed association 
agreements “became the norm in spite of the fact that it was clear that this was unnecessary as the 
Association  Agreements  with  Cyprus  and  Malta  were  concluded  as  exclusive  [Union] 
agreements”1254. In addition to a growing number of expressly shared competences, this process was 
made possible  by the  “daily reality of  external  relations,  where  time is  short  and questions  of 
competence have to be decided quickly”1255. In such a setting, the Member States in the Council did 
not have much difficulty obliging the Union to conclude a given agreement as mixed, as it required 
a constant willingness from the Commission to bring a claim before the Court of Justice alleging 
exclusive Union competence. 
What emerges from the foregoing is  that the profound constitutional changes brought about by 
judicial  activism on the  part  of  the  Court  of  Justice  have  not  only been  met  with  hardly any 
1250 L. and R. Holdgaard, “The External Powers of the European Community”, 174.
1251 Article  3  (2)  TFEU  provides:  “The  Union  shall  also  have  exclusive  competence  for  the  conclusion  of  an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable 
the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope.”
1252 P. J. Kuijper, “Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations: Continuity and the Dialogue between Judges and Member  
States as Constitutional Legislators” (2007-2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1571 at 1572.
1253 See P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union – Legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP 2004) at 
198-199.
1254 P. J. Kuijper, “Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations”, 1579. 
1255 Ibid. at 1581.
259
opposition from the Member States, but on the contrary, they have even been incorporated in part 
into the Treaties by the Member States themselves. As was already touched upon in Chapter One, 
this willingness to accept the constitutional evolution of the Union legal order is conditioned by the 
establishment  of  a  “legal-political  equilibrium”  between  the  radical  process  of  constitutional 
integration on the one hand and a transfer of political and decision-making power to the Member 
States  on  the  other1256.  A  number  of  changes  in  EU  decision-making  in  favour  of 
intergovernmentalism,  such as  the  creation  of  intergovernmental  bodies,  increased  the  Member 
States' veto power. This, in turn, increased the Member States' willingness to accept the proactive 
development  of  Union  law  through  the  Court  of  Justice:  “[t]hey  could  accept  the 
constitutionalization because they took real control of the decisionmaking process, thus minimizing 
its threatening features”1257. Combined with their political leverage which allowed them to insist on 
the  conclusion  of  mixed  agreements  in  practice,  the  Member  States  thus  had  two  powerful 
mechanisms of correction and recuperation at their disposal which contributed significantly to their 
readiness to pursue European integration in the area of external relations. 
D. The Member States' interest in common action
From this process of action and reaction between the Member States and the EU institutions we can 
conclude  that  the  vision  of  federalism governing  the  exercise  of  competences  in  EU  external 
relations is not based on hierarchical subjugation, but the “result of repeated, voluntary acceptance 
of the necessary discipline that holds the [Union] system together”1258. The Member States, in other 
words,  very much remain the “Masters of the Treaty”.  But,  if  they retain a certain measure of 
control  over  the  process  of  European  integration,  then  why  have  they  not  only  accepted  the 
progressive development of the obligation of loyalty by the Court of Justice but, in part, actually 
pursued this  strategy? The establishment of the legal-political  equilibrium described above may 
help  explain  the  Member  States'  acceptance  of  the  Court's  judicial  activism,  but  it  does  not, 
however, explain their  interest in doing so.  As an obligation which is increasingly aimed at the 
convergence of Member State and Union action into a single unit in international relations even in 
areas of Member State competence, it is not immediately evident why the Member States should 
prefer the application of the duty of sincere cooperation as developed by the Court of Justice to full-
1256 See J. H. H. Weiler, “The transformation of Europe”, 2426-29. 
1257 Ibid. at 2429.
1258 See D.  Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 822, summarising the principle of “constitutional tolerance” 
developed by J. H. H. Weiler, “Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg”, in K. Nicolaidis and R. 
Howse (eds.),  The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European  
Union (OUP 2001) 54 at 62–70, emphasis added.
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fledged freedom to act as sovereign states. What this boils down to is the question of what interest  
the Member States may have in common external action of the Member States together with the 
EU, even in areas where no corresponding powers exist for the Union.
The relationship between the EU and its Member States has often been conceptualised as a “zero-
sum game”, meaning that the strengthening of the Union happens to the detriment of the Member 
States,  and the strengthening of the Member States'  position is  at  the expense of the Union1259. 
However, as the present thesis has attempted to show, the impact of Union law goes beyond the 
scope of attributed Union powers. As a consequence, “the distribution in the [Union] system of 
external competence between the [Union] and the Member States cannot be understood as a zero-
sum matrix – where competence belongs to either one or the other (or both at the same time)”1260. 
In the same way that the distribution of competence between the EU and the Member States cannot 
be conceived of as a zero-sum game, it should not be assumed that the strengthening of the Union's 
position in international relations happens at the expense of the Member States. On the contrary,  
comparative studies of international regimes have shown that states establish this type of framework 
for  joint  action  where  unilateral  national  action  is  likely to  be  insufficient  or  unproductive1261. 
Particularly in “areas of high 'issue density', marked by interdependence and linkages among the 
issues”, common actions “produce better results, for each member, than 'uncoordinated individual 
calculations of self-interest'”1262. 
With specific regard to EU external action, it is commonly known that EU membership leads to 
greater power and influence on the world stage1263. Showing a united front on a given foreign policy 
issue increases the political clout of each Member State beyond what any individual state would be 
able to accomplish on its own, making those issues considered important by Europe harder to ignore 
by other countries. The same reasoning holds true in terms of economic influence. Over the past 
decades, the EU has grown into the world’s biggest trading bloc, giving it the power to define the 
terms of trade relations with third countries. In addition to an increase of political influence on the 
international scene, delegating negotiating powers to the EU is appealing to the Member States with 
regard to the effectiveness of regulation in certain fields. The Member States have therefore joined 
in a more general “worldwide trend to want to regulate matters with a global impact (trade, world 
1259 See further J. Klabbers, “Restraints on the Treaty-Making Powers of Member States Deriving from EU Law”, 156.
1260 R. Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community, 125.
1261 See S. Hoffman, “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today” (1982) 21 Journal of Common Market  
Studies 21 at 33.
1262 Ibid.
1263 For an overview of the different International Relations seeking to explain the nature of the Member States' interest  
in  strengthening  the  European  integration  process,  including  references  to  further  literature  see  M.  Pollack,  
“International Relations Theory and European Integration”(2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 221.
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finance, environmental problems, health problems, etc.) at a supra-regional level”1264. In sum, the 
constraints imposed on the Member States' freedom to act internationally are “easily outweighed by 
the increased opportunities for external influence that [EU] membership offers them”1265.
E. The fundamental tension underlying the Member States' position in EU external relations 
In line with this  reasoning,  it  could be assumed that  the Member States would have attributed 
exclusive powers to the Union in all policy areas in order to maximise the benefits resulting from 
joint  EU-Member  State  action.  As  a  consequence,  they  would  have  lost  the  competence 
autonomously to conclude international  agreements in the fields concerned, with the result  that 
Member State action could take place only after prior authorisation by the Union. However, as we 
saw,  the  Member  States  have  been  setting  boundaries  to  exclusive  Union  powers  from  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  onwards  by  introducing  and  subsequently  expanding  areas  of  non-exclusive 
competence. 
The Member States' resistance against an all-encompassing Union competence is illustrative of the 
fundamental tension underlying EU external relations. On the one hand, the Member States seek to 
increase the efficiency of their international relations through unified action, but on the other hand, 
they remain intent on preserving a maximum level of national sovereignty. Domestic politics are 
traditionally biased against the interference of legal principles with foreign policy1266. According to 
this  inside-looking  rationale,  “the  executive  must  have  its  hands  free  to  react  to  international 
developments quickly and effectively, without interference from the legislature or the judiciary”1267. 
In addition,  Member States  are  concerned about  maintaining an international  profile:  “Member 
States wish to continue to appear as contracting parties in order to remain visible and identifiable 
actors on the international scene”1268.
As we saw earlier, the Member States have different mechanisms available in order to resolve the 
fundamental  tension  and  establish  an  equilibrium  between  the  two  opposing  interests.  Treaty 
amendments or recourse to practical solutions, such as mixity, illustrate the extent to which the 
Member States are willing to accept inroads into national sovereignty by way of Union law. 
As the core component of EU external relations,  the field of international trade can serve as a 
1264 P. J. Kuijper, “Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations”, 1593.
1265 B. De Witte, “The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law: The EU and its Member States as 
Strange Subjects”, in J. Wouters, P. A. Nollkaemper and E. de Wet (eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law 
(TMC Asser Press 2008) 39 at 49.
1266 See further G. de Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations, 1.
1267 Ibid.
1268 C. D. Ehlermann, “Mixed Agreements – A List of Problems”, in D. O’Keeffe and H. G. Schermers (eds.),  Mixed 
Agreements (Kluwer 1983) 3 at 6.
262
“barometer  of  acceptable  […]  transfers  of  sovereignty”1269 in  this  respect.  Despite  frequent 
disagreement among the Member States concerning the transfer of negotiating powers to the Union, 
the  basic  principle  of  speaking  with  a  single  voice  in  international  trade  negotiations  was  not 
seriously questioned until the emergence on the agenda of new trade sectors in the context of the 
Uruguay Round. Since a number of Member States were reluctant to give up their powers over new 
trade  sectors,  the  Commission  asked  the  Court  of  Justice  for  an  advisory  opinion,  which  was 
subsequently delivered in the form of Opinion 1/941270.  Eight Member States, together with the 
Council,  opposed the Commission's arguments before the Court. Taking account of the Member 
States' concerns, the Court made it clear that the Union did not have exclusive competence over all 
matters covered by the WTO Agreements. Finding instead that competence in the areas concerned 
was shared, the Court emphasised the duty imposed on the Commission and the Member States to 
cooperate closely when acting within the ambit of the newly created organisation1271.
The Member States' opposition against further transfers of competence was part of a more general 
trend  of  objection  among  Member  State  governments  against  the  expansion  of  EU  powers 
following the Maastricht ratification debate which saw an increased wariness on the part of national 
public opinion1272. In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Opinion 1/94, however, the number of 
Member States actively opposing further limits to national sovereignty decreased from a majority to 
a minority1273. 
F. The duty of cooperation – A balancing principle 
The  example  of  Opinion  1/94  illustrates  the  role  and  the  importance  of  the  duty  of  sincere 
cooperation  in  establishing  an  equilibrium  between  the  competing  interests  underlying  the 
fundamental  tension  which  shapes  the  Member  States'  position  in  EU external  relations  –  the 
interest  in  a  strengthened  EU  and  the  interest  in  preserving  a  maximum  level  of  national  
sovereignty. 
In the past two decades, the Member States have displayed reluctance against further transfers of 
external relations powers to the Union. Indeed, new boundaries were put into place limiting the 
scope of those powers which the EU had already acquired, such as the introduction of non-exclusive 
competences and the toning-down of the doctrine of implied powers. On the international scene, the 
1269 S. Meunier,  Trading Voices: the European Union in International Commercial Negotiations (Princeton University 
Press 2007) at 21.
1270 Opinion 1/94.
1271 Ibid., para 108.
1272 See S. Meunier, Trading Voices, 27.
1273 Ibid. at 28.
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Member States wanted to remain present and visible alongside the Union. But if the Member States 
wanted to avoid bringing the process of European integration – the pursuit of which is very much in 
their own interest – to a standstill, they had to encourage and accept alternative mechanisms for 
ensuring  the  Union's  continued freedom to  act  where  necessary.  Thus,  in  return  for  remaining 
entitled to act together with the EU, the Member States had to make concessions in the form of 
constraints on the exercise of their competence. 
These constraints flow from the duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU. As we saw in  
the previous chapters, the duty of sincere cooperation manifests itself in different obligations. All of 
these obligations have in common that in recent years they have been construed by the Court of 
Justice in such a way as to impose a substantive duty of compliance. 
In areas in which the Member States have not transferred competence to the Union, because they 
have not considered it in their interest to do so, the only rules which have to be complied with are  
the fundamental Treaty freedoms. Having consented to the introduction of these basic freedoms for 
the benefit of a well-functioning internal market early on, it is in every Member State's interest that 
all other Member States comply with these rules also in their external relations. 
The more a  given Union policy has been shaped and defined,  however,  the more specific  and 
comprehensive the compliance obligations become. In this respect, questions of competence are 
increasingly irrelevant. Instead, the Member States are subject to the same compliance obligations, 
irrespective  of  whether  the  field  of  action  is  one  of  shared  or  exclusive  competence.  These 
obligations can even go so far as to impose a duty to refrain from acting altogether. What matters in 
this regard is the scope of EU law, as opposed to the scope of EU competence. As a result, the scope 
of compliance obligations expands commensurately with the process of European integration. 
At the same time, the increasing use of compliance obligations allows the Member States to remain 
present and active in most areas falling within the scope of EU law. Despite the ever-expanding 
scope of EU law, the Member States increasingly act together with the Union on the international  
scene. In fact, the closer the Member States work together with the EU, the more easily they are 
able to shape the rules to their advantage and prevent the imposition of unfavourable international 
obligations. 
The most effective instrument in this respect is of course the conclusion of mixed agreements, since 
“mixity  de  facto  brings  about,  if  not  formal  unanimity,  at  least  a  kind  of  veto  in  relation  to 
international  agreements”1274.  In  addition  to  ensuring  Member  State  participation  alongside  the 
Union in international matters, mixity represents a potent mechanism of control over EU external 
action. In the “post-Maastricht climate where the principles of enumerated powers, subsidiarity and 
1274 P. J. Kuijper, “Fifty Years of EC/EU External Relations”, 1594.
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protection of national identity are the order of the day”, mixed agreements may offer “the only way 
out”  of  the  dilemma  between  safeguarding  the  Member  States'  sovereignty  and  ensuring  the 
effective participation of the EU in international relations1275. Indeed, the conclusion of international 
agreements by the Union together with the Member States has been heralded a “real alternative to 
the working out of the federal principle”1276. Instead of weakening the strength inherent in united 
action, mixity “is a way which is particularly sensitive to the one interest which is difficult to square 
with the alternative federal state approach: the preservation, so far as possible, of the international 
personality and capacity of  the Member  States”1277.  This  formula,  moreover,  is  not  only in  the 
interest  of Member State autonomy,  but also increasingly appears to be accepted by the Union 
institutions  themselves.  It  was  noted  already early  on  that  recourse  to  mixity  was  not  always 
necessary and could often be avoided by limiting the subject matter of an agreement or by adopting 
a broader interpretation of Union powers1278. 
Together with the possibility to conclude mixed agreements, the Member States have retained a 
direct influence on EU policy-making through their participation in the Council of Ministers and its 
working  groups1279.  Thus,  in  the  quest  for  establishing  an  equilibrium  between  unity  in  the 
international representation of the EU and the respect for national interests, the formula that has 
slowly emerged is  that  of common action of  the Member States  together  with the Union.  The 
Member States have not entirely relinquished their sovereignty by allowing the Union to take over 
their  role  as  subjects  of  international  law,  but  instead  they  have  “'pooled'  these  fragments  of 
sovereignty within the institutional structure of the European Union, so as to enhance their  joint 
capacity for effective international action”1280. In this context, a central role is played by the duty of 
sincere cooperation. It allows the Member States to remain present on the international scene as 
sovereign states, while at the same time imposing strict obligations on them to comply with the 
substantive law of the EU. As such, the duty of sincere cooperation can rightfully be described as 
“the  panacea  for  situations  where  the  [Union]  risk[s]  being  debilitated  by the  presence  of  the 
individual Member States, or the Member States by the existence of the [Union]”1281. 
1275 N. Emiliou, “The death of exclusive competence?” (1996) 21 E.L. Rev. 294 at 310-311.
1276 J. H. H. Weiler, “The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors”, 82.
1277 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
1278 See C. D. Ehlermann, “Mixed Agreements – A List of Problems”, 3, also P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the  
European Union, 198.
1279 B. De Witte, “The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law”, 49. 
1280 Ibid., emphasis added.
1281 N. A. Neuwahl, “Shared Powers or Combined Incompetence? More on Mixity” (1996) 33 CML Rev. 667 at 668.
265
G. Article 4 (3) TEU – A flexible yet effective mechanism
It thus emerges that with the help of various control mechanisms, the Member States have generally 
been able to shape the progress of European integration in their  favour,  slowly establishing an 
equilibrium  between  safeguarding  national  sovereignty  and  ensuring  effective  external  action 
through a  unified  approach at  EU level.  Only two decades  earlier,  the  debate  about  European 
integration was much more one-sided. Instead of focussing on mechanisms designed to achieve a 
balance between the Member States' competing interests, the Member States insisted on the respect 
for conferred powers and the protection of national autonomy more than ever before. Salvation 
came in the form of  the principle  of  subsidiarity,  “the great  limiting principle  that  will  defend 
national  sovereignty  against  incursion  by  the  ever-expanding  Brussels  bureaucracy”1282, 
subsequently incorporated into the final version of the Maastricht Treaty as a general principle of 
EU law1283.  As a constitutional principle of “potentially enormous significance”1284, the principle 
was proclaimed a guideline for further European integration1285. It was predicted that subsidiarity 
“will  prove  to  be  one  of  the  most  important  modifications  to  the  [Union's]  constitution  since 
1957”1286. 
In  stark  contrast  with  these  predictions,  however,  the  management  of  EU external  relations  is 
increasingly  governed  by  a  different  rationale,  a  rationale  based  on  centralised  action  of  the 
Member States and the EU as a  unit. Where required by the Union interest,  this rationale even 
allows for the pre-emption of Member State action in specific circumstances. The introduction of 
the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty is considered to have been a critical reaction 
also to  the  Court  of  Justice's  “expansive interpretation  of  [Union]  powers  against  the apparent 
interest of the Member States”1287. Against this background, it is noteworthy that the most intrusive 
restraints on the exercise of Member State competence were developed only recently, long after the 
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. Instead of focussing on the limits of the exercise of Union 
1282 See P. D. Marquardt, “Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union” (1994-1995) 18 Fordham Int'l L. J. 616 
at  617, citing G. A. Bermann, “Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:  Federalism in the European Community and the 
United States (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 at 334. 
1283 The Single European Act (1986) had already introduced the principle of subsidiarity into the Treaty, but it  was 
limited to the field of environment. Article 130r (4) of the EEC Treaty provided: “The Community shall take action 
relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at  
Community level than at the level of the individual Member States”. 
1284 E. T. Swaine, “Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice”, 5.
1285 See R. K. Vischer, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution” (2001-2002) 35 Ind. L. Rev. 103 
at 121.
1286 Speech given by Sir Leon Brittan, at the time Vice-President of the EC, on 11 June 1992 at the EUI in Florence. An 
extract is available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doreference=IP/92/477&format=HTML&aged=1&
     la  nguage=EN&  guiLan  guage=en  .
1287 G. A. Bermann, “Subsidiarity and the European Community” (1993) 17 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 97 at 101-
103.
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competence, the emphasis has shifted towards a focus on the limits of the exercise of Member State 
competence. The Member States appear to have accepted certain inroads into national sovereignty 
in favour of concerted action at Union level. 
In light of the Member States'  insistence on the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the 
Treaty with a view to establishing an effective safeguard against excessive centralisation by the EU, 
how can we explain the attractiveness of the duty of sincere cooperation in its present form as the 
preferred tool for the management of the exercise of external relations power, favoured not just by 
the EU institutions, but apparently by the Member States themselves?
In essence, the answer to this question lies in in the simple reality that just because subsidiarity 
provides a check on the expansionary ambitions of the EU does not mean that it is necessarily the 
best  instrument  for  the  protection  of  national  interests1288.  For  one,  the  principle  may  be 
“fundamentally corrosive to rather than supportive of the sovereignty of the nation-state”1289. The 
basic problem boils down to the fact that 
“there are few functions for which a mid-sized actor is most efficient. The logic of the market, broadly 
construed, is that bigger is better. A larger market, more fully integrated, is better for economic growth 
than a smaller, segmented economy. Many other public functions benefit from economies of scale as  
well. A united Europe has a greater voice in foreign affairs and a better ability to defend itself than a  
collection of squabbling countries”1290. 
In the field of external  relations,  in particular,  this  means that  a majority of objectives will  be 
deemed to be achieved more efficiently at the supranational level, which is also reflected in the 
growing trend to regulate matters of a global nature within the framework of international fora. 
Integration of external relations matters in the EU can take place and yield fruitful results both for 
the Member States and the Union without the need for a complete centralisation of powers at Union 
level. Rather, it is in the interests of the EU and the Member States to use their combined weight to 
the best effect. Their external affairs power is not necessarily stronger if all activity is concentrated 
into a single voice. In many cases, the Member States acting individually or collectively along with 
the Union can be more effective1291. Therefore, the Member States and the EU institutions need to 
consider in the specific case what arrangements will most effectively enable them to achieve their 
objectives  and  how to  defend  their  individual  and  common  interests.  Capable  of  operating  in 
different ways in various international settings, the duty of sincere cooperation, as developed by the 
Court of Justice to date, is “a flexible concept which allows the [Union] and the Member States to 
1288 In a similar vein, P. D. Marquardt, “Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union”, 639.
1289 Ibid. at 617.
1290 P. D. Marquardt, “Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union”, 637.
1291 See S. Hyett, “The Duty of Co-operation: A Flexible Concept”, 252.
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reach a practical solution tailored to the particular case”1292. 
Thanks to its flexibility, the duty of sincere cooperation only imposes restraints where necessary. If 
a particular case requires the preclusion of Member State action for the sake of the achievement of  
common goals,  then  the  pre-emptive  effect  covers  only the  specific  situation,  while  the  actual 
competence remains intact. Therefore, the duty of sincere cooperation is significantly less intrusive 
in nature than a management of EU external relations based on a transfer of competences. 
Another reason why the management of EU-Member State external relations on the basis of the 
duty of sincere cooperation could be considered in the very interest of the Member States is that it  
may offer national politicians facing Euro-sceptical criticism in their home countries a means to 
reassure those suspicious of the growth of EU power. As no power is actually transferred from the 
Union to the EU, public opinion is less likely to be affected. At a time in which the process of 
European  integration  is  increasingly  politicised  in  national  elections  and  referendums1293,  any 
mechanism which allows the Member States to  pursue their  interests  abroad without  having to 
worry  about  negative  reactions  at  home  may  be  welcomed.  In  the  run-up  to  the  national 
referendums on the Treaty establishing a  Constitution  for  Europe,  for  example,  the image was 
created  in  some  Member  States  that  the  EU  was  morphing  into  a  European  superstate,  an 
“uncontrolled colossus, encroaching upon the identities of proud nation states”1294, which played an 
important role in the final outcome of the referendums. A different approach, emphasising the limits 
to EU powers in the Treaty, while at the same timing limiting the exercise of Member State powers 
by the means of a less visible mechanism, such as the duty of sincere cooperation, would have 
certainly been received much less negatively by the general public. 
Perhaps this tentative theory may also help explain why the expansion of the scope of Article 4 (3) 
TEU into the powerful mechanism that it is today has occurred only rather recently. After the highly 
publicised debate surrounding the Constitutional Treaty and the unsuccessful outcomes of some 
referendums over the ratification thereof, the phenomenon of achieving substantive compliance by 
means of restraining the exercise of competences instead of power-conferring provisions appears to 
have taken off. Some of the most radical judgments – such as the Swedish PFOS case and the BITs 
cases,  which  saw  an  upgrade  of  Article  4  (3)  TEU  to  an  independent  provision  capable  of 
precluding Member State action even in areas of Member State competence, have been decided in 
the aftermath of this controversy. Taking into account that the preferences of the general public and 
1292 S. Hyett, “The Duty of Co-operation: A Flexible Concept”, 252-253.
1293 See L. Hooghe and G. Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to 
Constraining Dissensus” (2008) 39 B. J. Pol. S. 1.
1294 L. J. Brinkhorst, “National Sovereignty in the EU: An Outdated Concept”, M. Bulterman, L. Hancher, A. McDonnell 
and H. Sevenster (eds.), Views of European Law from the Mountain – Liber Amicorum Piet Jan Slot (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 327 at 332.
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of national political parties have become decisive for jurisdictional outcomes1295, it appears possible 
that the Court of Justice has engaged in a doctrinal shift that favours less visible instruments for 
achieving Union objectives and forcing Member State compliance with EU law.
The effect  of  blurring  the  political  reality  of  EU-Member  State  external  relations  may also  be 
beneficial  for  the  Member  States  for  warding off  pressure  from national  politics  and domestic 
interest  groups.  Where the duty of sincere cooperation imposes  a certain way of action on the 
Member States which is ultimately in their own interest, they may value the ability to hide their  
support  for  the  relevant  measure  within  the  dynamic  of  loyalty  restraints1296.  The  politics  of 
international negotiations have been described as a “two-level game1297”: while at the national level, 
domestic groups pressure the government to adopt favourable policies, at the international level, 
governments “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing 
the adverse consequences of foreign developments”1298. Particularly in matters of CFSP, where both 
the European Parliament and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice are largely excluded, Member 
States could find the loss of transparency, democratic control and judicial review which comes with 
Union action advantageous to their national interests1299.
With a view to this tension, the Member States may prefer the apparent loss of control as a means of 
relieving themselves from domestic pressures in order to be able to focus on the effectiveness of 
external action. To that end, they may accept significant limitations of the exercise of their powers 
without, however, having to face any modifications in the actual allocation of competences between 
themselves and the Union. 
H. Assessment – The duty of sincere cooperation and Member State sovereignty
Joint Member State and Union action is, it thus appears, often more attractive for both the Member 
States and the EU itself. The duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU has proved to be 
an effective tool for managing the international relations of this emerging unit. Unlike mechanisms 
aimed  at  limiting  the  centralisation  of  Union  action,  such  as  subsidiarity,  the  duty  of  sincere 
cooperation works in two different directions. Instead of seeking to reinforce individual Member 
State action as a general rule, the duty of sincere cooperation limits both Union prerogatives  and 
1295 See L. Hooghe and G. Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration”. 
1296 For a similar phenomenon in the context of joint decision-making concerning internal legislation see B. Kohler-
Koch, “Organized Interests in European Integration: The Evolution of a New Type of Governance”, in H. Wallace 
and A. R. Young (eds.), Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union (OUP 1997) 42 at 61. 
1297 See R. D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” (1988) 42 Int'l Org. 427.
1298 Ibid. at 434.
1299 See B. De Witte, “The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law”, 50.
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Member State rights where necessary for the attainment of a common objective. Differently from 
subsidiarity,  the  duty  of  sincere  cooperation  is  not  intended  as  a  safeguard  of  Member  State 
interests. Its prime objective is the effective application of all norms falling within the scope of EU 
competence  by  filling  gaps  of  power  in  the  European  legal  system.  But  it  goes  beyond  the 
effectiveness of EU rules in that it  also operates in the interest of the Member States. Such an 
emphasis on the management of external relations “might appear less inspiring than the endless 
discussions about which grand construct should shape European integration”, but “it is what the 
current development of the [Union] legal order requires”1300. Against this background, what can we 
conclude concerning the impact of the duty of sincere cooperation as developed to date on the 
Member States' national sovereignty? 
In the same way that the allocation of competence between the EU and the Member States cannot  
be conceived of as a “zero-sum game”, neither the concept of sovereignty should be understood in 
“a ‘winner-takes-all’ manner to mean that either the Member States or the European Union retain 
original sovereignty”1301. This classical conception of the indivisibility of sovereignty no longer fits 
the political and legal reality of the relationship between the Union and its Member States1302. 
Among the newer conceptions of sovereignty which have emerged from the shift in paradigms of 
sovereignty, the management of EU-Member State external relations could be said to be governed 
by a  “cooperative  model  of  sovereignty”1303.  According to  this  understanding,  sovereignty is  a 
reflective and dynamic concept1304. It is reflective in that it creates a constant questioning of the 
allocation of power, requiring a centralisation or even a decentralisation of competence depending 
on the circumstances. Instead of diminishing it, this dimension makes sovereignty stronger due to 
its concerted exercise1305. This model of sovereignty is also dynamic, as it implies a search for the 
most effective allocation of power in each case. 
Applied  to  the  exercise  of  powers,  these  two  characteristics  are  present  also  in  the  Court's 
application of the duty of sincere cooperation. As we saw earlier, Article 4 (3) TEU serves as a tool 
for  empowering the Union to  act  and restraining the Member States'  freedom of  action  where 
necessary, irrespective of prior decisions over who should have the power to act or not. But far from 
operating only in favour of the Union, the duty of sincere cooperation also works in the interest of 
1300 P. Koutrakos, “The Elusive Quest for Uniformity in EC External Relations”, 270.
1301 S. Besson, “From European Integration to European Integrity: Should European Law Speak with Just One Voice?” 
(2004) 10 European Law Journal 257 at 270.
1302 See also L. J. Brinkhorst, “National Sovereignty in the EU”, 331.
1303 See further, for example, N. Walker, “Constitutionalism and Late Sovereignty in the European Union”, in N. Walker 
(ed.),  Sovereignty  in  Transition  (Hart  Publishing  2003)  3;  M.  P.  Maduro,  “Contrapunctual  Law:  Europe’s 
Constitutional Pluralism in Action”, in N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2003) 501.
1304 S. Besson, “From European Integration to European Integrity”, 271.
1305 Ibid.
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the Member States. On the one hand, it allows the Member State to retain competence in fields that  
were previously considered to require exclusive Union action. On the other hand, it ensures a more 
effective management of EU external relations. And since the Member States remain Masters of the 
Treaty and actively shape Union rules according to their preferences, the effective functioning of 
Union rules in this field is in their own interest. 
If  we go back and revisit  the German Federal Constitutional Court's  conception of sovereignty 
discussed in the beginning, according to which the Member States retain their status as a sovereign 
countries as long as no transfer of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz  to the Union has taken place, we may 
conclude at this point that  the duty of sincere cooperation in EU external relations is compatible 
with this understanding of sovereignty. The fact that the Member States are subject to an increasing 
number  of  restraints  on  the  exercise  of  their  external  competence  is  not  the  result  of  having 
empowered the Union to grant itself new powers against the wishes of the Member States, but it  
follows from the need to ensure effective external action for their own benefit. 
At the same time, the duty of sincere cooperation as developed to date contradicts the BVerfG's 
“legally outdated and politically deplorable”1306 understanding of the EU as a mere “compound” of 
sovereign states1307. Article 4 (3) TEU makes clear that the Member States are also subjects of the 
European legal order and, as a consequence, are subject to the rules to which they have bound 
themselves and have to fulfil the obligations to which they have committed1308. What they have 
accepted is that some of their sovereign powers will not be exercised or that they will be exercised 
in a certain way. They have agreed that in specific fields, EU external action has replaced bilateral 
Member State activities, and that in other areas, they have to work together with the EU institutions 
as a unit. The Member States have realised that in those fields, they cannot achieve the desired 
results  through unilateral  action.  Rather,  certain national objectives can only be attained by the 
Member States acting together within the framework of the EU. The notion that the Member States 
delegate powers to the Union for their own benefit is incorporated in Article 1 TEU, which speaks 
of a Union “on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in 
common”. 
The Member States have thus given up their formal right to exercise their external competence as 
they wish, but they have compensated for this loss by increasing their presence on the international 
scene alongside the EU. By expanding the scope for the exercise of their international powers with 
the help of the duty of sincere cooperation, on the one hand, and controlling the decision-making 
1306 R. Bieber, “An Association of Sovereign States”, 399.
1307 See the Introductory Chapter. See further D. Doukas, “The Verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on 
the Lisbon Treaty”, 871.
1308 L. J. Brinkhorst, “National Sovereignty in the EU”, 330.
271
process in a way that the allocation of those powers does not prejudice their interests, on the other 
hand,  the  Member  States  have  been  able  to  reduce  the  threatening  features  of 
constitutionalisation1309, making such a process more acceptable both to national governments and 
to  the  general  public.  In  this  respect,  the  duty  of  sincere  cooperation  can  be  considered  a 
“constructive  approach  to  dealing  with  the  growing  pressure  for  European  solutions  under 
conditions of increasing politically salient diversity”1310.
The common exercise of sovereignty by the Member States and the Union is then reflected in the 
structure of the relationship between the national and the EU legal orders: no legal order is entirely 
subordinate or superior to the others1311. A rigid division of competences between the Union and its 
Member States is not sufficient for governing a fruitful relationship between the two. The system of 
EU  external  relations  cannot  function  effectively  if  their  relationship  is  understood  in  “a 
confrontational either/or manner”1312. The Union and the Member States are not alternatives, but 
complement each other. They “need each other as the famous yin and yang symbols of Chinese 
antiquity”1313. 
The  liberal fidelity approach underlying the application of Article 4 (3) TEU recognises this by 
“protect[ing]  both  the  central  government  and  the  constituent  states”1314.  The  duty  of  sincere 
cooperation promotes the creation of a unified entity consisting of equal players which both cooperate 
with the ultimate aim of furthering their own interests. As such, the duty of loyalty as it stands today 
also features an element of the  entitlements approach, which emphasises the actors' self-interested 
political  calculus.  In this latter  understanding of political  morality,  “federalism is  all  about arms' 
length relations among competing political institutions”1315, with the important difference that in EU 
external relations, neither the Union nor the Member States can afford to compete against each other. 
On the contrary, political self-interest dictates that both work together as a system.
Confining the relationship between the Union and the Member States to an agenda which can be 
reliably identified in advance in an attempt to counteract the problem of competence creep, as the 
Laeken Declaration set  out to do,  will  “diminish the EU's capacity to act effectively in order to 
address [the] objectives assigned to it by its  Treaties”1316.  Rather than a focus on the division of 
competence, “modes of interaction and institutional design […] between levels are the key to the 
1309 Similarly, J. H. H. Weiler, “The transformation of Europe”, 2429.
1310 See S. Besson, “From European Integration to European Integrity”, 281, who expresses this concept with regard to 
the principle of integrity, according to which the Member States should be bound to act, in all areas, in a way that is 
representative of the legal views of the entire Union. 
1311 Similarly, ibid. at 271.
1312 S. Weatherill, “Competence creep and competence control”, 18.
1313 L. J. Brinkhorst, “National Sovereignty in the EU”, 333.
1314 D. Halberstam, “Of Power and Responsibility”, 765.
1315  D. Halberstam, “Beyond Competences”, 3.
1316 S. Weatherill, “The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising”, 851.
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legitimisation of the power exercised”1317. The salient issue pertaining to sovereignty is, therefore, no 
longer whether a transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the EU has taken place or not,  
“but  how to organise the division and sharing of sovereignty rights between the various levels of 
government”1318. In the field of external relations, therefore, “the focus should be on the elaboration 
of legal mechanisms which would be both flexible enough to accommodate diversity and rigorous 
enough to ensure the effectiveness of those policies for which the [Union] is competent to act”1319. In 
this  respect,  the  duty  of  sincere cooperation  as  developed  by  the  Court  of  Justice  to  date  is 
“brimming with potential for the future”1320. With its emphasis on flexible and efficient action in all 
areas that come within the scope of EU law, Article 4 (3) TEU may constitute the ideal instrument 
for a pluralist future of constitutionalism in the European Union. 
V.   Member State sovereignty and the CFSP loyalty obligation 
In contrast to the increasing convergence of EU and Member State action in other policy areas, the 
Union's  external action in foreign-policy matters  continues to  be characterised by the “intrinsic 
dualism” which derives from the special status of the CFSP. The unique role of the CFSP manifests 
itself in the placement of this policy field between the other categories of EU competences, which 
can be interpreted as a “continuing 'pillarisation' within the treaties”1321. The CFSP, as we saw, does 
not recognise the principle of conferred powers which is characteristic of the former first pillar.  
Neither  does  it  have  the  same  working  methods  and  procedures,  as  reinforced  by the  explicit 
statement  in  Article  24  (1)  TEU  that  the  CFSP  is  subject  to  specific  rules  and  procedures. 
Parliamentary control is weak, as the CFSP is dominated by the institutions which are assimilated 
with the executive power.  The CFSP does not  have a  single system of judicial  control  and its 
instruments,  although binding legally,  are  not  legislative  acts  comparable to  other  EU policies. 
Taken together, these factors deprive the CFSP legal order of the supranational character which has 
been responsible for the dynamic development of the duty of sincere cooperation in other policy 
areas. 
1317 K. Nicolaidis, “The Federal Vision beyond the Federal State”, in K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse (eds.),  The Federal  
Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (OUP 2001) 451.
1318 T. A.  Börzel  and T.  Risse,  “Who is  Afraid of  a European Federation?  How to Constitutionalise a  Multi-Level 
Governance  System”,  in  C.  Joerges,  Y.  Mény,  J.  H.  H.  Weiler  (eds.),  What  Kind  of  Constitution  for
What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (EUI Florence/Harvard Law School 2000) 45, emphasis added. 
1319 P. Koutrakos, “The Elusive Quest for Uniformity in EC External Relations”, 270, emphasis added.
1320 S. Weatherill, “Beyond Pre-emption”, 31.
1321 W. Wessels and F. Bopp, “The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty”, 10.
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As a result of these fundamental differences between the CFSP and the other areas of EU policy, the 
loyalty obligations which apply are fundamentally different too. The Treaty does not provide much 
guidance on the binding nature of decisions taken within the CFSP context, and neither is the Court 
of Justice in a position to take it upon itself to develop any guiding principles, due to its limited 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Treaty language suggests that the adoption of CFSP decisions does 
indeed limit the Member States' freedom to pursue their foreign policy-making as they wish1322. As 
discussed earlier, the Member States are not allowed to adopt national positions or act in violation 
of CFSP decisions in any other way. 
There is no doubt that CFSP provisions do not exist in a legal vacuum, but have to be considered in 
the light of the Court's interpretations rendered in similar contexts and against the background of the 
constitutional  principles  underpinning  the  Union  legal  order  as  a  whole.  Nevertheless,  when 
assessing the potential  impact of the duty of sincere cooperation on the CFSP legal order, it  is 
essential to define the obligations flowing from Article 4 (3) TEU in the light of the constitutional 
specificities  of  the CFSP.  The Court's  jurisprudence cannot  be applied  mutatis  mutandis to  the 
relationship  between  the  EU  and  the  Member  States  in  the  area  of  the  CFSP. A  complete 
transposition of the interpretation of Article 4 (3) TEU to the CFSP would not take due account of 
the constitutional specificities of the CFSP legal order. What, then, are the boundaries within which 
the interpretation given to Article 4 (3) TEU may be used to define the CFSP loyalty obligation? 
It was argued above that the restraints flowing from the duty of sincere cooperation do not encroach 
on national sovereignty, as they are ultimately conducive to the Member States' own interests. If we 
apply the same criterion to the CFSP, however, we get a different result, as the national interests at  
stake are of an entirely different nature (A.). Nevertheless, it is important to understand national 
action under the CFSP as constituting more than a mere expression of the collective interest of the 
Member States  (B.).  Therefore,  it  is  argued that  the CFSP loyalty obligation imposes  concrete 
norms of conduct which go well beyond obligations of international law (C.). 
A. National interests in CFSP matters
Foreign policy is traditionally seen as a core area of national sovereignty and many European states  
have long histories of conflicting interests in foreign affairs. Thus, when establishing the CFSP, the 
Member States could not agree on any form of cooperation in foreign policy as easily as they did in 
1322 See further, A. Dashwood, “The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions”, 53; C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “External 
Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 83. 
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other  areas  of  external  relations,  such  as  economic  integration,  development  cooperation  or 
emergency aid. In fact, in the constitutional traditions of many Member States and other countries 
more  generally,  foreign  affairs  take  up  a  special  status  among  the  states'  dealings  in  external 
relations.  Matters  of  “high politics”,  which  include  diplomatic  activity  as  well  as  security  and 
defence issues, are often separated from issues concerning “low politics”, which comprise external 
economic  relations  sensu  lato,  such  as  trade,  development  cooperation  and  emergency  aid1323. 
Questions relating to high politics, indeed, are traditionally characterised by a dominance of the 
executive power.  According to a long-standing conviction, foreign affairs require a wide margin of 
flexibility for the political branches to respond to all challenges that might pose a threat to national 
security: 
“The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional 
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”1324
The distinct features and resources of the executive branch imply an institutional advantage over the 
courts and parliaments in policing and interpreting foreign affairs powers1325. Thus, in international 
disputes or conflicts, it is often more advantageous for the states involved to employ power-based 
diplomacy and negotiation than rule-based adjudication1326. In this respect, the situation regarding 
the CFSP is not fundamentally different from the national context of many Member States, where 
the same arguments are used to justify limited involvement of parliaments and courts in foreign 
affairs1327. Therefore, it is possible to read the CFSP provisions as an expression of the executive 
dominance over matters of foreign policy, rather than considering it as an example of the traditional 
approach  which  contrasts  intergovernmentalism  and  supranationalism  and  explains  the  special 
nature  of  the  CFSP  on  the  grounds  of  concerns  over  national  sovereignty1328.  Against  this 
background, the absence of full jurisdiction for the Court of Justice and the limited role of the 
European  Parliament  in  CFSP  decision-making  are  “not  an  aberration  but,  rather,  a  logical 
consequence of the specific features of foreign affairs”1329.
For Article 24 (3) TEU, the special status of the CFSP means that Member States can breach the 
inherent loyalty obligations without facing any sanctions. If it is in the national interest, states tend 
to bypass non-enforceable duties. It is, therefore, unlikely that Article 24 (3) TEU will serve as the 
basis for a “regime of cooperation within which the Member States – orchestrated by the High 
1323 G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations , 219.
1324 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist NO. 23 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) at 122.
1325 See further J. Nzelibe, “The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs Powers” (2004) 89 Iowa Law Review 941.
1326 See further M. Morris, “High Crimes and Misconceptions” (2001) 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 13 at 18. 
1327 See P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 999.
1328 P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 143. 
1329 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 999.
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Representative – will transform the Treaty principles into common norms of behaviour in the living 
architecture”1330. Rather, it must be assumed that in crises involving matters considered to be “high 
politics”,  Member  States  will  act  exclusively  in  their  own  national  interest,  regardless  of  the 
obligation laid down in Article 32 TEU to “show mutual solidarity”1331.
In the light of the fundamental role played by the Member States' willingness to further integration 
in the field of the CFSP, it appears that the potential scope of the CFSP loyalty obligation has to be  
defined against the background of the Member States' interest in cooperating within the framework 
of the CFSP. Due to the constitutional limitations dominating the CFSP normative order, the loyalty 
obligation can only restrain the Member States to such an extent as they deem beneficial to the 
attainment of a common objective. 
Although the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the granting of legal personality 
to  the  Union  or  the  reinforcement  of  the  role  of  the  High  Representative,  sent  out  a  strong 
affirmative  message  regarding  the  Union's  external  capability  to  act,  the  Member  States  have 
remained  vocal  about  their  apprehension  of  losing  influence  in  CFSP matters.  Consensus  and 
unanimity continue to dominate decision-making in this policy area. In addition, the declarations 
concerning  the  CFSP annexed  to  the  Lisbon  Treaty  are  illustrative  of  a  continuously  strong 
“sovereignty reflex”. Declaration 13 states that the provisions on the CFSP will  not “affect the 
responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of 
their foreign policy”. Neither are they allowed to “prejudice the specific character of the security 
and defence policy of the Member States”. Similarly, Declaration 14 provides that the CFSP is not 
to “affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to  
the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy [...]”. In addition, Declaration 18 stresses that 
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties will remain with the Member States”, 
while Declaration 24 is intended to guarantee that the Union’s legal personality does not authorise it 
to act beyond its competences.
This cautious approach to the CFSP stands in stark contrast to the Member States' willingness to 
accept  limitations  on  the  exercise  of  their  powers  with  regard  to  other  EU  policies.  As  was 
discussed above, Article 4 (3) TEU appears to have been wilfully created by the Member States as 
an instrument to further integration. The Member States began to understand the Union as a useful 
instrument for achieving common purposes, instead of an “enemy” usurping their sovereign powers. 
A substantial  role  in  this  development  was played by the  Court  of  Justice  which  continuously 
1330 W. Wessels and F. Bopp, “The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty”, 12.
1331 Ibid.
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pushed the limits of the duty of sincere cooperation further and further, in the knowledge that the 
Member States were able to contrast its dynamic development by way of Treaty amendment once it  
was perceived as too deep of an inroad into national sovereignty. 
In the case of the CFSP, by contrast, both the dynamic of a constitutional dialogue between the 
Member States and the Court of Justice and the motivation behind the Member States willingness to 
be restrained in their freedom to act have largely been absent. Due to the fundamentally different 
interests at stake in areas of “high” politics, the Member States are much less likely to renounce to  
their freedom of action in favour of more efficient action at Union level. Moreover, the CFSP does 
not offer the additional benefit of increased participation that the Member States are awarded when 
they accept restraints based on Article 4 (3) TEU. As the CFSP is conceived as a non-pre-emptive 
shared competence from the outset, the Member States are present and participate alongside the EU 
in this policy field in any event. 
B. The CFSP – an autonomous system 
The fundamental differences between the CFSP and other policy areas should not, however,  be 
taken to mean that the Member States are  merely “using” CFSP provisions to pursue their own 
national goals. It would be misleading to portray Member State action under the CFSP as a mere 
expression of the collective interest of the Member States. In the same way that the Union interest  
that shapes the duty of sincere cooperation in other areas of external action goes beyond national 
interests and “represents an aspect of the autonomy of the [Union] system”1332, also in the CFSP, 
Union action is more than only shorthand for the collective foreign policy of the Member States.
With regard to Article 4 (3) TEU, the autonomy of the Union system from the will of the Member 
States is reflected in the fact that the duty of sincere cooperation operates across the entire scope of 
EU law, irrespective of whether the Union has competence in a given field. In fact, it was argued 
above that  the question of who is competent in a given area no longer determines the extent to 
which national action may be restrained.  Applied to the CFSP, this would mean that even in the 
absence of a transfer of competence to the Union, the Member States are limited in their scope of 
action where required for the effectiveness of CFSP measures.    
Indeed, the CFSP cannot be considered simply an “agent” of the Member States1333,  seeking to 
pursue national interests and strengthen their position in the international system via the Union’s 
1332 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest”, 127.
1333 See M.  Pollack, “Rational Choice and EU Politics”, in K. E. Jørgensen, M. A. Pollack and B. Rosamond (eds.),  
Handbook of European Union Politics (Sage Publishers 2006) 31.
277
institutional set-up.  It is no longer accurate to describe the CFSP as a purely intergovernmental 
system of cooperation radically opposed to the supranational nature of other areas of EU law 1334. By 
granting legal personality to the EU as a whole, the Lisbon Treaty has  included the CFSP in the 
unitary legal order of the Union. In addition, it has introduced a number of institutional innovations 
which  “transcend  the  traditional  dichotomy between  “high”  and  “low” politics  in  EU external 
relations”, such as the broadening of the function of the High Representative, whose tasks now 
include various aspects of the EU's external action which go beyond matters exclusively related to 
the CFSP1335.  The Treaty of Lisbon can, therefore, be considered a further step in the evolution of 
the CFSP 
“from a purely intergovernmental system based on consensus and international law into a fully-fledged 
system based on treaty law which includes institutions that operate under the rule of law and which 
have been given law-making powers”1336. 
The  traditional  distinction  between “high”  and “low” politics  no  longer  accurately reflects  the 
reality of EU external relations, since 
“trade and foreign policy can neither be pursued nor implemented in isolation. They are intrinsically 
linked and their effectiveness relies, in practical terms, to a great extent upon their consistency and 
coherence1337”.
Furthermore, in light of the overarching aim to ensure the coherence and consistency of the Union's 
external action and international representation, the Court's case law regarding vertical cooperation 
between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  must  be  considered  a  source  of  inspiration  for 
interpreting the  scope  of  the  CFSP loyalty  obligation1338.  The  requirement  of  consistency  and 
coherence of the Union's external activities is closely linked to Article 4 (3) TEU. It may therefore 
be argued that a Member State's failure to comply with this requirement could in certain cases be 
considered  a  breach  of  Article  4  (3)  TEU,  giving  rise  to  the  justiciability  of  consistency  and 
coherence1339. Aside from Article 4 (3) TEU, also the potential scope of the CFSP-specific loyalty 
obligation  under  Article  24  (3)  TEU should  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  Member  States' 
commitment to enhancing coherence.  The underlying rationale of coherence,  indeed, is  that the 
Union must present  itself  to the outside world as a unified system in order to ensure effective 
cooperation with third countries1340. 
1334 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 994.
1335 Ibid. at 992.
1336 R. Gosalbo Bono, “Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order”, 393.
1337 P. Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 44.
1338 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 1015.
1339 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 111. 
1340 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 1015.
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C. Conclusion: The CFSP loyalty obligation – more than an international law obligation  
It is against this background that we have to define the limits of the loyalty obligation within the 
CFSP normative  order.  In  line  with  the  Member  States'  collective  interest  in  coherence  and 
consistency, it must be assumed that the duty of loyalty under Article 24 (3) TEU entails  specific 
procedural obligations to inform and consult with the EU institutions prior to taking action in a 
given case. Such an obligation “cannot be ignored by Member States without a complete denial of 
the  rationale  behind  CFSP”1341.  In  view  of  its  proximity  to  Article  4  (3)  TEU,  the  obligation 
contained in Article 24 (3) TEU may also be interpreted in the light of the former, although such an 
interpretation should be limited by the rationale underlying the duty of sincere cooperation, which 
aims at achieving complementarity of action in the mutual interest of both the EU and the Member 
States. Despite the obvious differences in the operation of legal restraints in relation to the CFSP, 
both Article 4 (3) TEU and Article 24 (3) TEU pursue the same goal of coherent external action 
through the means of complementarity. 
The  CFSP obligation  cannot  be  considered  a  mechanism  for  achieving  the  primacy  of  CFSP 
instruments  over  national  rules,  nor  can  it  be  understood  as  an  instrument  for  enhancing  the 
effectiveness of CFSP measures. Member State competences in the field of foreign policy are not 
affected by CFSP action, which means that neither pre-emption of Member State competence can 
take place, nor may the CFSP loyalty obligation be construed so as to preclude the Member States 
from exercising their competence altogether. Therefore, Article 24 (3) TEU cannot turn a procedural 
obligation  into  an  obligation  of  result.  However,  by  reinforcing  the  binding  effect  of  CFSP 
measures,  the duty of loyalty imposes  an obligation on the Member States to comply with the 
strategy they have committed themselves to. 
Although related, the CFSP loyalty obligation clearly goes beyond the international law principle of 
pacta sunt servanda1342 governing the exercise of sovereign powers at intergovernmental level and 
the general international law obligation of cooperation which flows from it. Both the Court's case 
law and the evolution of the Treaties indicate that the CFSP includes a set of rules that are “clearly 
distinct from traditional international law and restrain the external competences of the Member 
States”1343. The CFSP-specific loyalty obligation, as was argued throughout this thesis, gives rise to 
specific  procedural  obligations.  The  international  law  principle  of  cooperation,  by  contrast,  is 
considered to be merely a general principle of law. Unlike the more precise rules of law, principles 
1341 R. Wessel, “The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations”, 183.
1342 See H. Wehberg, “Pacta Sunt Servanda”. 
1343 P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure”, 994.
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of law are characterised by a general nature which makes them inapt for solving specific legal 
problems in individual cases1344. The Member States, in conclusion, have not retained an absolute 
freedom to enter into international agreements concerning CFSP matters already covered by EU 
agreements:
“While the creation of CFSP norms depends on the political will of the Member States, once these norms 
have been established, their very purpose is to restrict the freedom Member States traditionally enjoy in their 
external relations.”1345 
All  divergences between the Member States and the Union notwithstanding, it  is  “questionable 
whether one can still maintain the view that under CFSP […] no sovereign rights were transferred 
to the Union”1346. Whether or not the CFSP loyalty obligation has the potential for achieving the 
convergence of the EU and the Member States into a unit similarly to Article 4 (3) TEU remains to 
be  seen.  The  dynamic  development  of  Article  24  (3)  TEU  depends  on  the  Member  States' 
willingness to accept limitations on the exercise of their retained powers under the CFSP. Only 
when they begin to view unilateral action as more than simply being contrary to the efficiency of 
Union action, but as being detrimental to the assertion of their own role as a relevant player in the 
world, will the CFSP loyalty obligation be able to unfold its potential as a tool for maximising both  
Member State and Union interests.
1344 C. Tietje,  "Die völkerrechtliche Kooperationspflicht  im Spannungsverhältnis Welthandel/Umweltschutz  und ihre 
Bedeutung für die europäische Umweltblume” (2000) 35 Europarecht 285. 
1345 C. Hillion and R. Wessel, “External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP”, 105. 
1346 R. Wessel, “The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations”, 183.
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